The function which parses a DNS response buffer did not move properly a
pointer when reading a packet where records does not use DNS "message
compression" techniques.
Thanks to 0yvind Johnsen for the help provided during the troubleshooting
session.
PiBANL reported that HAProxy's DNS resolver can't "connect" its socker
on FreeBSD.
Remi Gacogne reported that we should use the function 'get_addr_len' to
get the addr structure size instead of sizeof.
There are two types of retries when performing a DNS resolution:
1. retry because of a timeout
2. retry of the full sequence of requests (query types failover)
Before this patch, the 'resolution->try' counter was incremented
after each send of a DNS request, which does not cover the 2 cases
above.
This patch fix this behavior.
Some DNS response may be valid from a protocol point of view but may not
contain any IP addresses.
This patch gives a new flag to the function dns_get_ip_from_response to
report such case.
It's up to the upper layer to decide what to do with this information.
Some DNS responses may be valid from a protocol point of view, but may
not contain any information considered as interested by the requester..
Purpose of the flag DNS_RESP_NO_EXPECTED_RECORD introduced by this patch is
to allow reporting such situation.
When this happens, a new DNS query is sent with a new query type.
For now, the function only expect A and AAAA query types which is enough
to cover current cases.
In a next future, it will be up to the caller to tell the function which
query types are expected.
First dns client implementation simply ignored most of DNS response
flags.
This patch changes the way the flags are parsed, using bit masks and
also take care of truncated responses.
Such response are reported to the above layer which can handle it
properly.
This patch introduces a new internal response state about the analysis
of a DNS response received by a server.
It is dedicated to report to above layer that the response is
'truncated'.
In some cases, parsing of the DNS response is broken and the response is
considered as invalid, despite being valid.
The current patch fixes this issue. It's a temporary solution until I
rework the response parsing to store the response buffer into a real DNS
packet structure.
Jan A. Bruder reported that some very specific hostnames on server
lines were causing haproxy to crash on startup. Given that hist
backtrace showed some heap corruption, it was obvious there was an
overflow somewhere. The bug in fact is a typo in dns_str_to_dn_label()
which mistakenly copies one extra byte from the host name into the
output value, thus effectively corrupting the structure.
The bug triggers while parsing the next server of similar length
after the corruption, which generally triggers at config time but
could theorically crash at any moment during runtime depending on
what malloc sizes are needed next. This is why it's tagged major.
No backport is needed, this bug was introduced in 1.6-dev2.
Implementation of a DNS client in HAProxy to perform name resolution to
IP addresses.
It relies on the freshly created UDP client to perform the DNS
resolution. For now, all UDP socket calls are performed in the
DNS layer, but this might change later when the protocols are
extended to be more suited to datagram mode.
A new section called 'resolvers' is introduced thanks to this patch. It
is used to describe DNS servers IP address and also many parameters.
