The BF_WRITE_ENA buffer flag became very complex to deal with, because
it was used to :
- enable automatic connection
- enable close forwarding
- enable data forwarding
The last point was not very true anymore since we introduced ->send_max,
but still the test remained everywhere. This was causing issues such as
impossibility to connect without forwarding data, impossibility to prevent
closing when data was forwarded, etc...
This patch clarifies the situation by getting rid of this multi-purpose
flag and replacing it with :
- data forwarding based only on ->send_max || ->pipe ;
- a new BF_AUTO_CONNECT flag to allow automatic connection and only
that ;
- ability to perform an automatic connection when ->send_max or ->pipe
indicate that data is waiting to leave the buffer ;
- a new BF_AUTO_CLOSE flag to let the producer automatically set the
BF_SHUTW_NOW flag when it gets a BF_SHUTR.
During this cleanup, it was discovered that some tests were performed
twice, or that the BF_HIJACK flag was still tested, which is not needed
anymore since ->send_max replcaed it. These places have been fixed too.
These cleanups have also revealed a few areas where the other flags
such as BF_EMPTY are not cleanly used. This will be an opportunity for
a second patch.
Please consider the following patches. They are required to
compile haproxy-1.4-dev2 on FreeBSD.
Summary:
1) include <sys/types.h> before <netinet/tcp.h>
2) Use IPPROTO_TCP instead of SOL_TCP
(they are both defined as 6, TCP protocol number)
The connection establishment was completely handled by backend.c which
normally just handles LB algos. Since it's purely TCP, it must move to
proto_tcp.c. Also, instead of calling it directly, we now call it via
the stream interface, which will later help us unify session handling.
Andrew Azarov reported that haproxy-1.4-dev1 does not build
under FreeBSD 7.2 because SOL_TCP is not defined. So add a
check for its definition before using it. This only impacts
network optimisations anyway.
As reported by Maik Broemme, if something different from "if" or
"unless" was specified after "tcp-request content accept", the
condition would silently remain void. The parser must obviously
complain since this typically corresponds to a forgotten "if".
The new statement "persist rdp-cookie" enables RDP cookie
persistence. The RDP cookie is then extracted from the RDP
protocol, and compared against available servers. If a server
matches the RDP cookie, then it gets the connection.
The RDP protocol is quite simple and documented, which permits
an easy detection and extraction of cookies. It can be useful
to match the MSTS cookie which can contain the username specified
by the client.
Since we can call the HTTP parser from TCP inspection rules, it makes
sense to be able to use the HTTP ACLs with it. That way, we can decide
from a TCP frontend to take a switching decision based on full layer7
decoding. This might be useful to perform layer7 content switching from
a layer4 frontend in fact. For instance, we might want to be able to
detect http/https on a frontend, but still switch to backend X or Y
depending on the Host header. Note that it is mandatory to wait for
an HTTP request otherwise the ACLs will randomly match.
This patch propagates the ACL conditions' "requires" bitfield
to the proxies. This makes it possible to know exactly what a
proxy might have to support for any request, which helps knowing
whether we have to allocate some space for certain types of
structures or not (eg: the hdr_idx struct).
The concept might be extended to a lot more types of information,
such as detecting whether we need to allocate some space for some
request ACLs which need a result in the response, etc...
Some stream analysers might become generic enough to be called
for several bits. So we cannot have the analyser bit hard coded
into the analyser itself. Let's make the caller inform the callee.
When the nolinger option is used, we must not close too fast because
some data might be left unsent. Instead we must proceed with a normal
shutdown first, then a close. Also, we want to avoid merging FIN with
the last segment if nolinger is set, because if that one gets lost,
there is no chance for it to be retransmitted.
Sometimes it can be useful to limit the advertised TCP MSS on
incoming connections, for instance when requests come through
a VPN or when the system is running with jumbo frames enabled.
Passing the "mss <value>" arguments to a "bind" line will set
the value. This works under Linux >= 2.6.28, and maybe a few
earlier ones, though due to an old kernel bug most of earlier
versions will probably ignore it. It is also possible that some
other OSes will support this.
Setting TCP_CORK on a socket before sending the last segment enables
automatic merging of this segment with the FIN from the shutdown()
call. Playing with TCP_CORK is not easy though as we have to track
the status of the TCP_NODELAY flag since both are mutually exclusive.
Doing so saves one more packet per session and offers about 5% more
performance.
There is no reason not to do it, so there is no associated option.
This option disables TCP quick ack upon accept. It is also
automatically enabled in HTTP mode, unless the option is
explicitly disabled with "no option tcp-smart-accept".
This saves one packet per connection which can bring reasonable
amounts of bandwidth for servers processing small requests.
Since 1.3.17, a config containing one of the following lines would
crash the parser :
tcp content reject
tcp content accept
This is because a check is performed on the condition which is not
specified. The obvious fix consists in checkinf for a condition
first.
tcp_request is not meant to decide how an error or a timeout has to
be handled. It must just apply it rules. Now that the error checks
have been added to the session, we don't need to check them anymore
in tcp_request_inspect(), which will only consider the shutdown which
may be the result of such an error.
That makes a lot more sense since tcp_request is not really waiting
for a request.
There are some configurations in which redirect rules are declared
after use_backend rules. We can also find "block" rules after any
of these ones. The processing sequence is :
- block
- redirect
- use_backend
So as of now we try to detect wrong ordering to warn the user about
a possibly undesired behaviour.
Sometimes it may make sense to be able to immediately apply a verdict
without waiting at all. It was not possible because no inspect-delay
meant no inspection at all. This is now fixed.
By appending "interface <name>" to a "bind" line, it is now possible
to specifically bind to a physical interface name. Note that this
currently only works on Linux and requires root privileges.
In the buffers, the read limit used to leave some place for header
rewriting was set by a pointer to the end of the buffer. Not only
this required subtracts at every place in the code, but this will
also soon not be usable anymore when we want to support keepalive.
Let's replace this with a length limit, comparable to the buffer's
length. This has also sightly reduced the code size.
The listener referenced in the fd was only used to check the
listener state upon session termination. There was no guarantee
that the FD had not been reassigned by the moment it was processed,
so this was a bit racy. Having it in the session is more robust.
The TCP analyser has moved to proto_tcp.c. Breaking the function
has required finer use of the return value and adding some tests
to process_session().
The owner of an fd was initially a task but this was sometimes
casted to a (struct listener *). We'll soon need more types,
so void* is more appropriate.
When an ACL is referenced at a wrong place (eg: response during request, layer7
during layer4), try to indicate precisely the name and requirements of this ACL.
Only the first faulty ACL is returned. A small change consisting in iterating
that way may improve reports :
cap = ACL_USE_any_unexpected
while ((acl=cond_find_require(cond, cap))) {
warning()
cap &= ~acl->requires;
}
This will report the first ACL of each unsupported type. But doing so will
mangle the error reporting a lot, so we need to rework error reports first.
All currently known ACL verbs have been assigned a type which makes
it possible to detect inconsistencies, such as response values used
in request rules.
It should be stated as a rule that a C file should never
include types/xxx.h when proto/xxx.h exists, as it gives
less exposure to declaration conflicts (one of which was
caught and fixed here) and it complicates the file headers
for nothing.
Only types/global.h, types/capture.h and types/polling.h
have been found to be valid includes from C files.
This new keyword matches an dotted version mapped into an integer.
It permits to match an SSL message protocol version just as if it
was an integer, so that it is easy to map ranges, like this :
acl obsolete_ssl req_ssl_ver lt 3
acl correct_ssl req_ssl_ver 3.0-3.1
acl invalid_ssl req_ssl_ver gt 3.1
Both SSLv2 hello messages and SSLv3 messages are supported. The
test tries to be strict enough to avoid being easily fooled. In
particular, it waits for as many bytes as announced in the message
header if this header looks valid (bound to the buffer size).
The same decoder will be usable with minor changes to check the
response messages.
Some people need to inspect contents of TCP requests before
deciding to forward a connection or not. A future extension
of this demand might consist in selecting a server farm
depending on the protocol detected in the request.
For this reason, a new state CL_STINSPECT has been added on
the client side. It is immediately entered upon accept() if
the statement "tcp-request inspect-delay <xxx>" is found in
the frontend configuration. Haproxy will then wait up to
this amount of time trying to find a matching ACL, and will
either accept or reject the connection depending on the
"tcp-request content <action> {if|unless}" rules, where
<action> is either "accept" or "reject".
Note that it only waits that long if no definitive verdict
can be found earlier. That generally implies calling a fetch()
function which does not have enough information to decode
some contents, or a match() function which only finds the
beginning of what it's looking for.
It is only at the ACL level that partial data may be processed
as such, because we need to distinguish between MISS and FAIL
*before* applying the term negation.
Thus it is enough to add "| ACL_PARTIAL" to the last argument
when calling acl_exec_cond() to indicate that we expect
ACL_PAT_MISS to be returned if some data is missing (for
fetch() or match()). This is the only case we may return
this value. For this reason, the ACL check in process_cli()
has become a lot simpler.
A new ACL "req_len" of type "int" has been added. Right now
it is already possible to drop requests which talk too early
(eg: for SMTP) or which don't talk at all (eg: HTTP/SSL).
Also, the acl fetch() functions have been extended in order
to permit reporting of missing data in case of fetch failure,
using the ACL_TEST_F_MAY_CHANGE flag.
The default behaviour is unchanged, and if no rule matches,
the request is accepted.
As a side effect, all layer 7 fetching functions have been
cleaned up so that they now check for the validity of the
layer 7 pointer before dereferencing it.
Due to the way Linux delivers EPOLLIN and EPOLLHUP, a closed connection
received after some server data sometimes results in truncated responses
if the client disconnects before server starts to respond. The reason
is that the EPOLLHUP flag is processed as an indication of end of
transfer while some data may remain in the system's socket buffers.
This problem could only be triggered with sepoll, although nothing should
prevent it from happening with normal epoll. In fact, the work factoring
performed by sepoll increases the risk that this bug appears.
The fix consists in making FD_POLL_HUP and FD_POLL_ERR sticky and that
they are only checked if FD_POLL_IN is not set, meaning that we have
read all pending data.
That way, the problem is definitely fixed and sepoll still remains about
17% faster than epoll since it can take into account all information
returned by the kernel.
The source address selection for health checks did not consider
the new transparent proxy method. Rely on the same unified function
as the other connect() calls.
This patch also fixes a bug by which the proxy's source address was
ignored if cttproxy was used.
Balabit's TPROXY version 4 which replaces CTTPROXY provides a similar
API to the previous proxy, but relies on IP_FREEBIND instead of
IP_TRANSPARENT. Let's add it.
Using some Linux kernel patches, it is possible to redirect non-local
traffic to local sockets when IP forwarding is enabled. In order to
enable this option, we introduce the "transparent" option keyword on
the "bind" command line. It will make the socket reachable by remote
sources even if the destination address does not belong to the machine.
Add the "backlog" parameter to frontends, to give hints to
the system about the approximate listen backlog desired size.
In order to protect against SYN flood attacks, one solution is
to increase the system's SYN backlog size. Depending on the
system, sometimes it is just tunable via a system parameter,
sometimes it is not adjustable at all, and sometimes the system
relies on hints given by the application at the time of the
listen() syscall. By default, HAProxy passes the frontend's
maxconn value to the listen() syscall. On systems which can
make use of this value, it can sometimes be useful to be able
to specify a different value, hence this backlog parameter.
Proxy listeners were very special and not very easy to manipulate.
A proto_tcp file has been created with all that is required to
manage TCPv4/TCPv6 as raw protocols, and provide generic listeners.
The code of start_proxies() and maintain_proxies() now looks less
like spaghetti. Also, event_accept will need a serious lifting in
order to use more of the information provided by the listener.