In the HTTP applet, we have to parse the response headers provided by
the application and to produce a response. strcasecmp() is expensive,
and chunk_append() even more as it uses a format string.
Here we check the string length before calling strcasecmp(), which
results in strcasecmp() being called only on the relevant header in
practise due to very few collisions on the name lengths, effectively
dividing the number of calls by 3, and we replace chunk_appendf()
with memcpy() as we already know the string lengths.
Doing just this makes the "hello-world" applet 5% faster, reaching
41400 requests/s on a core i5-3320M.
Commit 4850e51 ("BUG/MAJOR: lua: Do not force the HTTP analysers in
use-services") fixed a bug in how services are used in Lua, but this
fix broke the ability for Lua services to support keep-alive.
The cause is that we branch to a service while we have not yet set the
body analysers on the request nor the response, and when we start to
deal with the response we don't have any request analyser anymore. This
leads the response forward engine to detect an error and abort. It's
very likely that this also causes some random truncation of responses
though this has not been observed during the tests.
The root cause is not the Lua part in fact, the commit above was correct,
the problem is the implementation of the "use-service" action. When done
in an HTTP request, it bypasses the load balancing decisions and the
connect() phase. These ones are normally the ones preparing the request
analysers to parse the body when keep-alive is set. This should be dealt
with in the main process_use_service() function in fact.
That's what this patch does. If process_use_service() is called from the
http-request rule set, it enables the XFER_BODY analyser on the request
(since the same is always set on the response). Note that it's exactly
what is being done on the stats page which properly supports keep-alive
and compression.
This fix must be backported to 1.7 and 1.6 as the breakage appeared in 1.6.3.
The header's value was parsed with atoi() then compared against -1,
meaning that all the unparsable stuff returning zero was not considered
and that all multiples of 2^32 + 0xFFFFFFFF would continue to emit a
chunk.
Now instead we parse the value using a long long, only accept positive
values and consider all unparsable values as incorrect and switch to
either close or chunked encoding. This is more in line with what a
client (including haproxy's parser) would expect.
This may be backported as a cleanup to stable versions, though it's
really unlikely that Lua applications are facing side effects of this.
The following Lua code causes emission of a final chunk after the body,
which is wrong :
core.register_service("send204", "http", function(applet)
applet:set_status(204)
applet:start_response()
end)
Indeed, responses with status codes 1xx, 204 and 304 do not contain any
body and the message ends immediately after the empty header (cf RFC7230)
so by emitting a 0<CR><LF> we're disturbing keep-alive responses. There's
a workaround against this for now which consists in always emitting
"Content-length: 0" but it may not be cool with 304 when clients use
the headers to update their cache.
This fix must be backported to stable versions back to 1.6.
Commit d1aa41f ("BUG/MAJOR: lua: properly dequeue hlua_applet_wakeup()
for new scheduler") tried to address the side effects of the scheduler
changes on Lua, but it was not enough. Having some Lua code send data
in chunks separated by one second each clearly shows busy polling being
done.
The issue was tracked down to hlua_applet_wakeup() being woken up on
timer expiration, and returning itself without clearing the timeout,
causing the task to be re-inserted with an expiration date in the past,
thus firing again. In the past it was not a problem, as returning NULL
was enough to clear the timer. Now we can't rely on this anymore so
it's important to clear this timeout.
No backport is needed, this issue is specific to 1.8-dev and results
from an incomplete fix in the commit above.
Since commit 9d8dbbc ("MINOR: dns: Maximum DNS udp payload set to 8192") it's
possible to specify a packet size, but passing too large a size or a negative
size is not detected and results in memset() being performed over a 2GB+ area
upon receipt of the first DNS response, causing runtime crashes.
We now check that the size is not smaller than the smallest packet which is
the DNS header size (12 bytes).
No backport is needed.
Since the DNS layer split and the use of obj_type structure, we did not
updated propoerly the code used to compute the interval between 2
resolutions.
A nasty loop was then created when:
- resolver's hold.valid is shorter than servers' check.inter
- a valid response is available in the DNS cache
A task was woken up for a server's resolution. The servers pick up the IP
in the cache and returns without updating the 'last update' timestamp of
the resolution (which is normal...). Then the task is woken up again for
the same server.
The fix simply computes now properly the interval between 2 resolutions
and the cache is used properly while a new resolution is triggered if
the data is not fresh enough.
a reader pointer comparison to the end of the buffer was performed twice
while once is obviously enough.
backport status: this patch can be backported into HAProxy 1.6 (with some
modification. Please contact me)
For troubleshooting purpose, it may be important to know when a server
got its fqdn updated by a SRV record.
This patch makes HAProxy to report such events through stderr and logs.
RFC 6891 states that if a DNS client announces "big" payload size and
doesn't receive a response (because some equipments on the path may
block/drop UDP fragmented packets), then it should try asking for
smaller responses.
Following up DNS extension introduction, this patch aims at making the
computation of the maximum number of records in DNS response dynamic.
This computation is based on the announced payload size accepted by
HAProxy.
This patch fixes a bug where some servers managed by SRV record query
types never ever recover from a "no resolution" status.
The problem is due to a wrong function called when breaking the
server/resolution (A/AAAA) relationship: this is performed when a server's SRV
record disappear from the SRV response.
Contrary to 64-bits libCs where size_t type size is 8, on systems with 32-bits
size of size_t is 4 (the size of a long) which does not equal to size of uint64_t type.
This was revealed by such GCC warnings on 32bits systems:
src/flt_spoe.c:2259:40: warning: passing argument 4 of spoe_decode_buffer from
incompatible pointer type
if (spoe_decode_buffer(&p, end, &str, &sz) == -1)
^
As the already existing code using spoe_decode_buffer() already use such pointers to
uint64_t, in place of pointer to size_t ;), most of this code is in contrib directory,
this simple patch modifies the prototype of spoe_decode_buffer() so that to use a
pointer to uint64_t in place of a pointer to size_t, uint64_t type being the type
finally required for decode_varint().
The two macros EXPECT_LF_HERE and EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN were exported
for use outside the HTTP parser. They now take extra arguments to avoid
implicit pointers and jump labels. These will be used to reimplement a
minimalist HTTP/1 parser in the H1->H2 gateway.
We now refrain from clearing a session's variables, counters, and from
releasing it as long as at least one stream references it. For now it
never happens but with H2 this will be mandatory to avoid double frees.
Now each stream is added to the session's list of streams, so that it
will be possible to know all the streams belonging to a session, and
to know if any stream is still attached to a sessoin.
The "hold obsolete" timer is used to prevent HAProxy from moving a server to
an other IP or from considering the server as DOWN if the IP currently
affected to this server has not been seen for this period of time in DNS
responses.
That said, historically, HAProxy used to update servers as soon as the IP
has disappeared from the response. Current default timeout break this
historical behavior and may change HAProxy's behavior when people will
upgrade to 1.8.
This patch changes the default value to 0 to keep backward compatibility.
Edns extensions may be used to negotiate some settings between a DNS
client and a server.
For now we only use it to announce the maximum response payload size accpeted
by HAProxy.
This size can be set through a configuration parameter in the resolvers
section. If not set, it defaults to 512 bytes.
The function srv_set_fqdn() is used to update a server's fqdn and set
accordingly its DNS resolution.
Current implementation prevents a server whose update is triggered by a
SRV record from being linked to an existing resolution in the cache (if
applicable).
This patch aims at fixing this.
Current code implementation prevents multiple backends from relying on
the same SRV resolution. Actually, only the first backend which triggers
the resolution gets updated.
This patch makes HAProxy to process the whole list of the 'curr'
requesters to apply the changes everywhere (hence, the cache also applies
to SRV records...)
This function is particularly useful when debugging DNS resolution at
run time in HAProxy.
SRV records must be read differently, hence we have to update this
function.
DNS SRV records uses "dns name compression" to store the target name.
"dns compression" principle is simple. Let's take the name below:
3336633266663038.red.default.svc.cluster.local.
It can be stored "as is" in the response or it can be compressed like
this:
3336633266663038<POINTER>
and <POINTER> would point to the string
'.red.default.svc.cluster.local.' availble in the question section for
example.
This mechanism allows storing much more data in a single DNS response.
This means the flag "record->data_len" which stores the size of the
record (hence the whole string, uncompressed) can't be used to move the
pointer forward when reading responses. We must use the "offset" integer
which means the real number of bytes occupied by the target name.
If we don't do that, we can properly read the first SRV record, then we
loose alignment and we start reading unrelated data (still in the
response) leading to a false negative error treated as an "invalid"
response...
DNS response for SRV queries look like this:
- query dname looks like '_http._tcp.red.default.svc.cluster.local'
- answer record dname looks like
'3336633266663038.red.default.svc.cluster.local.'
Of course, it never matches... and it triggers many false positive in
the current code (which is suitable for A/AAAA/CNAME).
This patch simply ignores this dname matching in the case of SRV query
type.
First implementation of the DNS parser used to consider TRUNCATED
responses as errors and triggered a failover to an other query type
(usually A to AAAA or vice-versa).
When we query for SRV records, a TRUNCATED response still contains valid
records we can exploit, so we shouldn't trigger a failover in such case.
Note that we had to move the maching against the flag later in the
response parsing (actually, until we can read the query type....)
Use a cpuset_t instead of assuming the cpu mask is an unsigned long.
This should fix setting the CPU affinity on FreeBSD >= 11.
This patch should be backported to stable releases.
I just noticed the raw socket constructor was called __ssl_sock_deinit,
which is a bit confusing, and wrong twice, so the attached patch renames it
to __raw_sock_init, which seems more correct.
stream_free() used to close the front connection by using s->sess->origin,
instead of using s->si[0].end. This is very visible in HTTP/2 where the
front connection is abusively closed and causes all sort of issues including
crashes caused by double closes due to the same origin being referenced many
times.
It's also suspected that it may have caused some of the early issues met
during the Lua development.
It's uncertain whether stable branches are affected. It might be worth
backporting it once it has been confirmed not to create new impacts.
As mentionned in commit cf4e496c9 ("BUG/MEDIUM: build without openssl broken"),
commit 872f9c213 ("MEDIUM: ssl: add basic support for OpenSSL crypto engine")
broke the build without openssl support. But the former did only fix it when
openssl is not enabled, but not when it's not installed on the system :
In file included from src/haproxy.c:112:
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:24:25: openssl/ssl.h: No such file or directory
In file included from src/haproxy.c:112:
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:45: error: syntax error before "SSL_CTX"
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:75: error: syntax error before '*' token
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:75: warning: type defaults to `int' in declaration of `ssl_sock_create_cert'
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:75: warning: data definition has no type or storage class
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:76: error: syntax error before '*' token
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:76: warning: type defaults to `int' in declaration of `ssl_sock_get_generated_cert'
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:76: warning: data definition has no type or storage class
include/proto/ssl_sock.h:77: error: syntax error before '*' token
Now we also surround the include with #ifdef USE_OPENSSL to fix this. No
backport is needed since openssl async engines were not backported.
Commit 48a8332a introduce SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey in openssl-compat.h but
SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey access internal structure and can't be a candidate
to openssl-compat.h. The workaround with openssl < 1.0.2 is to use SSL_new
then SSL_get_privatekey.
Recent commit 7a4a0ac ("MINOR: cli: add a new "show fd" command") introduced
a warning when building at -O2 and above. The compiler doesn't know if a
variable's value might have changed between two if blocks so warns that some
values might be used uninitialized, which is not the case. Let's simply
initialize them to shut the warning.
Make it so for each server, instead of specifying a hostname, one can use
a SRV label.
When doing so, haproxy will first resolve the SRV label, then use the
resulting hostnames, as well as port and weight (priority is ignored right
now), to each server using the SRV label.
It is resolved periodically, and any server disappearing from the SRV records
will be removed, and any server appearing will be added, assuming there're
free servers in haproxy.
As DNS servers may not return all IPs in one answer, we want to cache the
previous entries. Those entries are removed when considered obsolete, which
happens when the IP hasn't been returned by the DNS server for a time
defined in the "hold obsolete" parameter of the resolver section. The default
is 30s.
With strict-sni, ssl connection will fail if no certificate match. Have no
certificate in bind line, fail on all ssl connections. It's ok with the
behavior of strict-sni. When 'generate-certificates' is set 'strict-sni' is
never used. When 'strict-sni' is set, default_ctx is never used. Allow to start
without certificate only in this case.
Use case is to start haproxy with ssl before customer start to use certificates.
Typically with 'crt' on a empty directory and 'strict-sni' parameters.
Since the commit f6b37c67 ["BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: in bind line, ssl-options after
'crt' are ignored."], the certificates generation is broken.
To generate a certificate, we retrieved the private key of the default
certificate using the SSL object. But since the commit f6b37c67, the SSL object
is created with a dummy certificate (initial_ctx).
So to fix the bug, we use directly the default certificate in the bind_conf
structure. We use SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey function to do so. Because this
function does not exist for OpenSSL < 1.0.2 and for LibreSSL, it has been added
in openssl-compat.h with the right #ifdef.
This one dumps the fdtab for all active FDs with some quickly interpretable
characters to read the flags (like upper case=set, lower case=unset). It
can probably be improved to report fdupdt[] and/or fdinfo[] but at least it
provides a good start and allows to see how FDs are seen. When the fd owner
is a connection, its flags are also reported as it can help compare with the
polling status, and the target (fe/px/sv) as well. When it's a listener, the
listener's state is reported as well as the frontend it belongs to.
The logical operations were inverted so enable/disable operations did
the opposite.
The bug is present since 1.7 so the fix should be backported there.
Commits 2ab8867 ("MINOR: ssl: compare server certificate names to the
SNI on outgoing connections") and 96c7b8d ("BUG/MINOR: ssl: Fix check
against SNI during server certificate verification") made it possible
to check that the server's certificate matches the name presented in
the SNI field. While it solves a class of problems, it opens another
one which is that by failing such a connection, we'll retry it and put
more load on the server. It can be a real problem if a user can trigger
this issue, which is what will very often happen when the SNI is forwarded
from the client to the server.
This patch solves this by detecting that this very specific hostname
verification failed and that the hostname was provided using SNI, and
then it simply disables retries and the failure is immediate.
At the time of writing this patch, the previous patches were not backported
(yet), so no backport is needed for this one unless the aforementionned
patches are backported as well. This patch requires previous patches
"BUG/MINOR: ssl: make use of the name in SNI before verifyhost" and
"MINOR: ssl: add a new error code for wrong server certificates".
If a server presents an unexpected certificate to haproxy, that is, a
certificate that doesn't match the expected name as configured in
verifyhost or as requested using SNI, we want to store that precious
information. Fortunately we have access to the connection in the
verification callback so it's possible to store an error code there.
For this purpose we use CO_ER_SSL_MISMATCH_SNI (for when the cert name
didn't match the one requested using SNI) and CO_ER_SSL_MISMATCH for
when it doesn't match verifyhost.
Commit 2ab8867 ("MINOR: ssl: compare server certificate names to the SNI
on outgoing connections") introduced the ability to check server cert
names against the name provided with in the SNI, but verifyhost was kept
as a way to force the name to check against. This was a mistake, because :
- if an SNI is used, any static hostname in verifyhost will be wrong ;
worse, if it matches and doesn't match the SNI, the server presented
the wrong certificate ;
- there's no way to have a default name to check against for health
checks anymore because the point above mandates the removal of the
verifyhost directive
This patch reverses the ordering of the check : whenever SNI is used, the
name provided always has precedence (ie the server must always present a
certificate that matches the requested name). And if no SNI is provided,
then verifyhost is used, and will be configured to match the server's
default certificate name. This will work both when SNI is not used and
for health checks.
If the commit 2ab8867 is backported in 1.7 and/or 1.6, this one must be
backported too.
This patch fixes the commit 2ab8867 ("MINOR: ssl: compare server certificate
names to the SNI on outgoing connections")
When we check the certificate sent by a server, in the verify callback, we get
the SNI from the session (SSL_SESSION object). In OpenSSL, tlsext_hostname value
for this session is copied from the ssl connection (SSL object). But the copy is
done only if the "server_name" extension is found in the server hello
message. This means the server has found a certificate matching the client's
SNI.
When the server returns a default certificate not matching the client's SNI, it
doesn't set any "server_name" extension in the server hello message. So no SNI
is set on the SSL session and SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname always returns NULL.
To fix the problemn, we get the SNI directly from the SSL connection. It is
always defined with the value set by the client.
If the commit 2ab8867 is backported in 1.7 and/or 1.6, this one must be
backported too.
Note: it's worth mentionning that by making the SNI check work, we
introduce another problem by which failed SNI checks can cause
long connection retries on the server, and in certain cases the
SNI value used comes from the client. So this patch series must
not be backported until this issue is resolved.
Adis Nezirovic reports:
While playing with Lua API I've noticed that core.proxies attribute
doesn't return all the proxies, more precisely the ones with same names
(e.g. for frontend and backend with the same name it would only return
the latter one).
So, this patch fixes this problem without breaking the actual behaviour.
We have two case of proxies with frontend/backend capabilities:
The first case is the listen. This case is not a problem because the
proxy object process these two entities as only one and it is the
expected behavior. With these case the "proxies" list works fine.
The second case is the frontend and backend with the same name. i think
that this case is possible for compatibility with 'listen' declaration.
These two proxes with same name and different capabilities must not
processed with the same object (different statitics, differents orders).
In fact, one the the two object crush the other one whoch is no longer
accessible.
To fix this problem, this patch adds two lists which are "frontends" and
"backends", each of these list contains specialized proxy, but warning
the "listen" proxy are declare in each list.
By Adis Nezirovic:
This is just for convenience and uniformity, Proxy.servers/listeners
returns a table/hash of objects with names as keys, but for example when
I want to pass such object to some other Lua function I have to manually
copy the name (or wrap the object), since the object itself doesn't
expose name info.
This patch simply adds the proxy name as member of the proxy object.
The recent scheduler change broke the Lua co-sockets due to
hlua_applet_wakeup() returning NULL after waking the applet up. With the
previous scheduler, returning NULL was a way to do nothing on return.
With the new one it keeps TASK_RUNNING set, causing all new notifications
to end up into t->pending_state instead of t->state, and prevents the
task from being added into the run queue again, so and it's never woken
up anymore.
The applet keeps waking up, causing hlua_socket_handler() to do nothing
new, then si_applet_wake_cb() calling stream_int_notify() to try to wake
the task up, which it can't do due to the TASK_RUNNING flag, then decide
that since the associated task is not in the run queue, it needs to call
stream_int_update_applet() to propagate the update. This last one finds
that the applet needs to be woken up to deal with the last reported events
and calling appctx_wakeup() again. Previously, this situation didn't exist
because the task was always added in the run queue despite the TASK_RUNNING
flag.
By returning the task instead in hlua_applet_wakeup(), we can ensure its
flag is properly cleared and the task is requeued if needed or just sits
waiting for new events to happen.
This fix requires the previous ones ("BUG/MINOR: lua: always detach the
tcp/http tasks before freeing them") and MINOR: task: always preinitialize
the task's timeout in task_init().
Thanks to Thierry, Christopher and Emeric for the long head-scratching
session!
No backport is needed as the bug doesn't appear in older versions and
it's unsure whether we'll not break something by backporting it.
