As reported in GH issue #109 and in discourse issue
https://discourse.haproxy.org/t/haproxy-returns-408-or-504-error-when-timeout-client-value-is-every-25d
the time parser doesn't error on overflows nor underflows. This is a
recurring problem which additionally has the bad taste of taking a long
time before hitting the user.
This patch makes parse_time_err() return special error codes for overflows
and underflows, and adds the control in the call places to report suitable
errors depending on the requested unit. In practice, underflows are almost
never returned as the parsing function takes care of rounding values up,
so this might possibly happen on 64-bit overflows returning exactly zero
after rounding though. It is not really possible to cut the patch into
pieces as it changes the function's API, hence all callers.
Tests were run on about every relevant part (cookie maxlife/maxidle,
server inter, stats timeout, timeout*, cli's set timeout command,
tcp-request/response inspect-delay).
When creating a new ssl_sock_ctx, don't forget to initialize its send_recv
and recv_wait to NULL, or we may end up dereferencing random values, and
crash.
Now that the various handshakes come with their own XPRT, there's no
need for the CONN_FL_SOCK* flags, and the conn_sock_want|stop functions,
so garbage-collect them.
Add a new method to xprt_ops, remove_xprt. When called, if the provided
xprt_ctx is the same as the xprt's underlying xprt_ctx, it then uses the
new xprt provided, otherwise it calls the remove_xprt method of the next
xprt.
The goal is to be able to add a temporary xprt, that removes itself from
the chain when it did what it had to do. This will be used to implement
a pseudo-xprt for anything that just requires a handshake (such as the
proxy protocol).
As the SSL code may have different needs than the upper layer, ie it may want
to receive when the upper layer wants to right, instead of directly forwarding
the subscribe to the underlying xprt, handle it ourself. The SSL code will
know remember any subscribe call, and wake the tasklet when it is ready
for more I/O.
This adds 4 sample fetches:
- ssl_fc_client_random
- ssl_fc_server_random
- ssl_bc_client_random
- ssl_bc_server_random
These fetches retrieve the client or server random value sent during the
handshake.
Their use is to be able to decrypt traffic sent using ephemeral ciphers. Tools
like wireshark expect a TLS log file with lines in a few known formats
(https://code.wireshark.org/review/gitweb?p=wireshark.git;a=blob;f=epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c;h=28a51fb1fb029eae5cea52d37ff5b67d9b11950f;hb=HEAD#l5209).
Previously the only format supported using data retrievable from HAProxy state
was the one utilizing the Session-ID. However an SSL/TLS session ID is
optional, and thus cannot be relied upon for this purpose.
This change introduces the ability to extract the client random instead which
can be used for one of the other formats. The change also adds the ability to
extract the server random, just in case it might have some other use, as the
code change to support this was trivial.
In ssl_sock_close(), don't forget to call the underlying xprt's close method
if it exists. For now it's harmless not to do so, because the only available
layer is the raw socket, which doesn't have a close method, but that will
change when we implement QUIC.
starting with OpenSSL 1.0.0 recommended way to disable compression is
using SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION when creating context.
manipulations with SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods, sk_SSL_COMP_num
are only required for OpenSSL < 1.0.0
according to manpage:
sk_TYPE_zero() sets the number of elements in sk to zero. It
does not free sk so after this call sk is still valid.
so we need to free all elements
[wt: seems like it has been there forever and should be backported
to all stable branches]
7b5fd1e ("MEDIUM: connections: Move some fields from struct connection
to ssl_sock_ctx.") introduced a bug in the heartbleed mitigation code.
Indeed the code used conn->ctx instead of conn->xprt_ctx for the ssl
context, resulting in a null dereference.
The following macros are now defined for openssl < 1.1 so that we
can remove the code performing direct access to the structures :
BIO_get_data(), BIO_set_data(), BIO_set_init(), BIO_meth_free(),
BIO_meth_new(), BIO_meth_set_gets(), BIO_meth_set_puts(),
BIO_meth_set_read(), BIO_meth_set_write(), BIO_meth_set_create(),
BIO_meth_set_ctrl(), BIO_meth_set_destroy()
Since we're providing a compatibility layer for multiple OpenSSL
implementations and their derivatives, it is important that no C file
directly includes openssl headers but only passes via openssl-compat
instead. As a bonus this also gets rid of redundant complex rules for
inclusion of certain files (engines etc).
Some defines like OPENSSL_VERSION or X509_getm_notBefore() have nothing
to do in ssl_sock and must move to openssl-compat.h so that they are
consistently shared by the whole code. A warning in the code was added
against wild additions of macros there.
Enabling aes-gcm-enc in last commit (MINOR: ssl: enable aes_gcm_dec
on LibreSSL) uncovered a wrong condition on the define of the
EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN macro which I forgot to add when making the
commit, resulting in breaking libressl build again. In case libressl
later defines this macro, the test will have to change for a version
range instead.
This one requires OpenSSL 1.0.1 and above, and libressl was forked from
1.0.1g and is compatible (build-tested). No need to exclude it anymore
from using this converter.
They were all check to comply with the advertised openssl version. Now
that libressl doesn't pretend to be a more recent openssl anymore, we
can simply rely on the regular openssl version tests without having to
deal with exceptions for libressl.
LibreSSL causes lots of build issues by pretending to be OpenSSL 2.0.0,
and it requires lots of care for each #if added to cover any specific
OpenSSL features.
This commit addresses the problem by making LibreSSL only advertise the
version it forked from (1.0.1g) and by starting to use tests based on
its real version to enable features instead of working by exclusion.
Most tests on OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER have become complex and break all
the time because this number is fake for some derivatives like LibreSSL.
This patch creates a new macro, HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, which will
carry the real openssl version defining the compatibility level, and
this version will be adjusted depending on the variants.
Libressl doesn't yet provide early data, so don't put the CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS
on the connection if we're building with libressl, or the handshake will
never be done.
SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context is introduced in LibreSSL-2.7.0
async operations are not supported by LibreSSL
early data is not supported by LibreSSL
packet_length is removed from SSL struct in LibreSSL
In ha_ssl_write() and ha_ssl_read(), don't pretend we can retry a read/write
if we got a shutr/shutw, or we will never properly shutdown the connection.
In ha_ssl_read()/ha_ssl_write(), if we couldn't send/receive data because
we got EAGAIN, return -1 and not 0, as older SSL versions expect that.
This should fix the problems with OpenSSL < 1.1.0.
Make sure it builds with OpenSSL < 1.1.0, a lot of the BIO_get/set methods
were introduced with OpenSSL 1.1.0, so fallback with the old way of doing
things if needed.
Instead of letting the OpenSSL code handle the file descriptor directly,
provide a custom BIO, that will use the underlying XPRT to send/recv data.
This will let us implement QUIC later, and probably clean the upper layer,
if/when the SSL code provide its own subscribe code, so that the upper layers
won't have to care if we're still waiting for the handshake to complete or not.
For most of the xprt methods, provide a xprt_ctx. This will be useful later
when we'll want to be able to stack xprts.
The init() method now has to create and provide the said xprt_ctx if needed.
In order to prepare for the possibility of using different kinds of xprt
with ssl, make the ssl code provide its own subscribe and unsubscribe
functions, right now it just calls conn_subscribe and conn_unsubsribe.
Instead of using directly a SSL * as xprt_ctx, give ssl_sock its own context.
It's useless for now, but will be useful later when we'll want to be able to
stack xprts.
Older compilers don't like to see "inline" placed after the type in a
function declaration, it must be "static inline <type>" only. This
patch touches various areas. The warnings were seen with gcc-3.4.
The converter can be used to decrypt the raw byte input using the
AES-GCM algorithm, using provided nonce, key and AEAD tag. This can
be useful to decrypt encrypted cookies for example and make decisions
based on the content.
Any attempt to put TLS 1.3 ciphers on servers failed with output 'unable
to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites'.
This was due to usage of SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list instead of
SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites in the TLS 1.3 block (protected by
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L & so).
This should be backported to 1.9 and 1.8.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Cheynier <p.cheynier@criteo.com>
Reported-by: Damien Claisse <d.claisse@criteo.com>
Cc: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
In 84e417d8 ("MINOR: ssl: support Openssl 1.1.1 early callback for
switchctx") the code was extended to also support OpenSSL 1.1.1
(code already supported BoringSSL). A configuration check warning
was updated but with the wrong logic, the #ifdef needs a && instead
of an ||.
Reported in #54.
Should be backported to 1.8.
In OpenSSL 1.1.1 TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages will trigger the callback
that is used to verify renegotiation is disabled. This means that these
KeyUpdate messages fail. In OpenSSL 1.1.1 a better mechanism is
available with the SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag that disables any TLS
1.2 and earlier negotiation.
So if this SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag is available, instead of having
a manual check, trust OpenSSL and disable the check. This means that TLS
1.3 KeyUpdate messages will work properly.
Reported-By: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
If a send succeeded, add the CO_FL_CONNECTED flag, the send may have been
called by the upper layers before we even realized we were connected, and we
may even read the response before we get the information, and si_cs_recv()
has to know if we were connected or not.
This should be backported to 1.9.
Openssl switched from aes128 to aes256 since may 2016 to compute
tls ticket secrets used by default. But Haproxy still handled only
128 bits keys for both tls key file and CLI.
This patch permit the user to set aes256 keys throught CLI or
the key file (80 bytes encoded in base64) in the same way that
aes128 keys were handled (48 bytes encoded in base64):
- first 16 bytes for the key name
- next 16/32 bytes for aes 128/256 key bits key
- last 16/32 bytes for hmac 128/256 bits
Both sizes are now supported (but keys from same file must be
of the same size and can but updated via CLI only using a key of
the same size).
Note: This feature need the fix "dec func ignores padding for output
size checking."
This patch fixes missing allocation checks loading tls key file
and avoid memory leak in some error cases.
This patch should be backport on branches 1.9 and 1.8
When using early data, disable the OpenSSL anti-replay protection, and set
the max amount of early data we're ready to accept, based on the size of
buffers, or early data won't work with the released OpenSSL 1.1.1.
This should be backported to 1.8.
Add a way to configure the ALPN used by check, with a new "check-alpn"
keyword. By default, the checks will use the server ALPN, but it may not
be convenient, for instance because the server may use HTTP/2, while checks
are unable to do HTTP/2 yet.
