BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Fix handling of TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages

In OpenSSL 1.1.1 TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages will trigger the callback
that is used to verify renegotiation is disabled. This means that these
KeyUpdate messages fail. In OpenSSL 1.1.1 a better mechanism is
available with the SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag that disables any TLS
1.2 and earlier negotiation.

So if this SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag is available, instead of having
a manual check, trust OpenSSL and disable the check. This means that TLS
1.3 KeyUpdate messages will work properly.

Reported-By: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
This commit is contained in:
Dirkjan Bussink 2019-01-21 09:35:03 -08:00 committed by Willy Tarreau
parent 774c486cec
commit 526894ff39

View File

@ -1468,6 +1468,10 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
BIO *write_bio;
(void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
/* Please note that BoringSSL defines this macro to zero so don't
* change this to #if and do not assign a default value to this macro!
*/
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
/* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
if ((conn->flags & (CO_FL_CONNECTED | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == CO_FL_CONNECTED) {
@ -1475,6 +1479,7 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG;
}
}
#endif
if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) {
if (!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) {
@ -3895,6 +3900,11 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_PREF_CLIE_CIPH)
options &= ~SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
options |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC)