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sys-kernel/coreos-sources: bump to v4.9.9
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Gilbert
parent
efb914596c
commit
faf25d6dd9
@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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DIST linux-4.8.tar.xz 91966856 SHA256 3e9150065f193d3d94bcf46a1fe9f033c7ef7122ab71d75a7fb5a2f0c9a7e11a SHA512 a48a065f21e1c7c4de4cf8ca47b8b8d9a70f86b64e7cfa6e01be490f78895745b9c8790734b1d22182cf1f930fb87eaaa84e62ec8cc1f64ac4be9b949e7c0358 WHIRLPOOL 3888c8c07db0c069f827245d4d7306087f78f7d03e8240eb1fcd13622cd5dbe1c17cd8ed7dc11513f77f3efd5dbd84e2b48e82bdb9b9bfd2242fd62ae32812d5
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DIST patch-4.8.17.xz 320288 SHA256 1e4be6f6a8eab3edcd0899db382fe1a9330320c603a9ad2c32ebb1dc6f53b3db SHA512 df239d990077cdf697fd487b4b8abb97fe442ac9fac4ed2e90c626560fc15058363310cf40580fd000d4ad55198486594a608544ce9c2bcaf03704415aa45441 WHIRLPOOL 401c8ee9f41b78b355ab76f1f0ed25b53855f641e0c27c07461e82af4e322fe958f73ef3cce6d074de2a6be550c8c8615a0a53187f3f9d17c8bd8b928d3a6051
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DIST linux-4.9.tar.xz 93192404 SHA256 029098dcffab74875e086ae970e3828456838da6e0ba22ce3f64ef764f3d7f1a SHA512 bf67ff812cc3cb7e5059e82cc5db0d9a7c5637f7ed9a42e4730c715bf7047c81ed3a571225f92a33ef0b6d65f35595bc32d773356646df2627da55e9bc7f1f1a WHIRLPOOL 072505b29972ad120eb25a074217847c9c2813416c4903e605a0433574f5f87616dbea0b1454e4b19acc48107f11274b682958b1d773373156e99f8163e6606a
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DIST patch-4.9.9.xz 256400 SHA256 ec97e3bf8585865d409a804316b276a6b4e4939286de9757f99bfb41cf112078 SHA512 a7a2d44b83b00b20f1424d12af0f42e1c576d3053feacd13491ef185661fb1c789b9265c500b62f5ede39f57b72f358820000fa6c852a5f035e566ee1dfcd5d9 WHIRLPOOL 3d83b79dd6d4ca249638338cfd93153f2914142859d4126fbc499acc30f1aef2ba7d59c41c337fd45fb20b56b375fb2457319c933bdf8c38b656eb3e340fe95e
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@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
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# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
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EAPI="5"
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ETYPE="sources"
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inherit kernel-2
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detect_version
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DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
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HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
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SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
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KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
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IUSE=""
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_MINOR}"
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# XXX: Note we must prefix the patch filenames with "z" to ensure they are
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# applied _after_ a potential patch-${KV}.patch file, present when building a
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# patchlevel revision. We mustn't apply our patches first, it fails when the
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# local patches overlap with the upstream patch.
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# in $PATCH_DIR: ls -1 | sed -e 's/^/\t${PATCH_DIR}\//g' -e 's/$/ \\/g'
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UNIPATCH_LIST="
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-security-overlayfs-provide-copy-up-security-hook-for.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-selinux-Implementation-for-inode_copy_up-hook.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-security-overlayfs-Provide-security-hook-for-copy-up.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-selinux-Implementation-for-inode_copy_up_xattr-hook.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-selinux-Pass-security-pointer-to-determine_inode_lab.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-security-overlayfs-Provide-hook-to-correctly-label-n.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-selinux-Implement-dentry_create_files_as-hook.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0008-Add-secure_modules-call.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0009-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0010-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0011-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0012-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0013-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0019-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0020-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0021-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0022-Revert-tty-serial-8250-add-CON_CONSDEV-to-flags.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0024-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch \
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"
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
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EAPI="5"
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ETYPE="sources"
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inherit kernel-2
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detect_version
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DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
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HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
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SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
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KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
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IUSE=""
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_MINOR}"
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# XXX: Note we must prefix the patch filenames with "z" to ensure they are
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# applied _after_ a potential patch-${KV}.patch file, present when building a
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# patchlevel revision. We mustn't apply our patches first, it fails when the
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# local patches overlap with the upstream patch.
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# in $PATCH_DIR: ls -1 | sed -e 's/^/\t${PATCH_DIR}\//g' -e 's/$/ \\/g'
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UNIPATCH_LIST="
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0008-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0009-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0010-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0011-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0013-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-perf-x86-intel-rapl-Make-package-handling-more-robus.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-perf-x86-intel-uncore-Make-package-handling-more-rob.patch \
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"
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@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
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From 72f2135b077dd2e44d5bbd6b39194d009aeb2af2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:57 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 01/24] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for
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unioned files
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Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
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up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
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This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file
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creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then
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revert back to old creds and release new creds.
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Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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---
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fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
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include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 +++++++++++
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include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
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security/security.c | 8 ++++++++
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4 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
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index 767377e..14a892b 100644
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--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
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+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
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@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
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struct dentry *upper = NULL;
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umode_t mode = stat->mode;
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int err;
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+ const struct cred *old_creds = NULL;
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+ struct cred *new_creds = NULL;
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newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
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err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
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@@ -272,10 +274,23 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
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if (IS_ERR(upper))
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goto out1;
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+ err = security_inode_copy_up(dentry, &new_creds);
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+ if (err < 0)
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+ goto out2;
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+
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+ if (new_creds)
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+ old_creds = override_creds(new_creds);
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+
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/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
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stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
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err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
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stat->mode = mode;
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+
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+ if (new_creds) {
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+ revert_creds(old_creds);
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+ put_cred(new_creds);
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+ }
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+
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if (err)
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goto out2;
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diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
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index 101bf19..ba3c842 100644
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--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
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+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
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@@ -401,6 +401,15 @@
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* @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
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* @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
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* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
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+ * @inode_copy_up:
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+ * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
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+ * overlay filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds
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+ * and modify as need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to
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+ * new creds temporarily to create new file and release newly allocated
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+ * creds.
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+ * @src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up.
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+ * @new pointer to pointer to return newly allocated creds.
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+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
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*
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* Security hooks for file operations
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*
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@@ -1425,6 +1434,7 @@ union security_list_options {
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int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
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size_t buffer_size);
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void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
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+ int (*inode_copy_up) (struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
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int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
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int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
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@@ -1696,6 +1706,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
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struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
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struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
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struct list_head inode_getsecid;
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+ struct list_head inode_copy_up;
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struct list_head file_permission;
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struct list_head file_alloc_security;
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struct list_head file_free_security;
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diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
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index 7831cd5..c5b0ccd 100644
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--- a/include/linux/security.h
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+++ b/include/linux/security.h
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@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf
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int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
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int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
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void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
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+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
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int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
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int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
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void security_file_free(struct file *file);
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@@ -758,6 +759,11 @@ static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
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*secid = 0;
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}
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+static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
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+{
|
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
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{
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return 0;
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diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
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index 4838e7f..f2a7f27 100644
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--- a/security/security.c
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+++ b/security/security.c
|
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@@ -748,6 +748,12 @@ void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
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call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
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}
|
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|
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+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
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+{
|
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+ return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
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+}
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+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
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+
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int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
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{
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int ret;
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@@ -1684,6 +1690,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity),
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.inode_getsecid =
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
|
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+ .inode_copy_up =
|
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+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up),
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.file_permission =
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
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.file_alloc_security =
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--
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2.9.3
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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
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From b45eb80e5b2412980d38d2ea00aabc3057a91a05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
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Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:58 -0400
|
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Subject: [PATCH 02/24] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hook
|
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|
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A file is being copied up for overlay file system. Prepare a new set of
|
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creds and set create_sid appropriately so that new file is created with
|
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appropriate label.
|
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|
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Overlay inode has right label for both context and non-context mount
|
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cases. In case of non-context mount, overlay inode will have the label
|
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of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have
|
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the label from context= mount option.
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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---
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security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
|
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|
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diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
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index 13185a6..264ee90 100644
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--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
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+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
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@@ -3293,6 +3293,26 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
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*secid = isec->sid;
|
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}
|
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+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ u32 sid;
|
||||
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
|
||||
+ struct cred *new_creds = *new;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (new_creds == NULL) {
|
||||
+ new_creds = prepare_creds();
|
||||
+ if (!new_creds)
|
||||
+ return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ tsec = new_creds->security;
|
||||
+ /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
|
||||
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
|
||||
+ tsec->create_sid = sid;
|
||||
+ *new = new_creds;
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* file security operations */
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
||||
@@ -6088,6 +6108,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
|
||||
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
|
||||
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
|
||||
--
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||||
2.9.3
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||||
|
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@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
|
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From 8a5e4f3cd784d18008e2f32f07cf7ab2f949c00a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:58 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 03/24] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up
|
||||
of xattrs for overlay file
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
|
||||
copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return
|
||||
0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the
|
||||
security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP
|
||||
if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno
|
||||
upon an error.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
---
|
||||
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++++++++
|
||||
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
|
||||
security/security.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
|
||||
index 14a892b..8797c72 100644
|
||||
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
|
||||
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ retry:
|
||||
goto retry;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
|
||||
+ if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ if (error == 1) {
|
||||
+ error = 0;
|
||||
+ continue; /* Discard */
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
|
||||
if (error)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
|
||||
index ba3c842..336b3fb 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
|
||||
@@ -410,6 +410,14 @@
|
||||
* @src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up.
|
||||
* @new pointer to pointer to return newly allocated creds.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
|
||||
+ * @inode_copy_up_xattr:
|
||||
+ * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied
|
||||
+ * up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer.
|
||||
+ * @name indicates the name of the xattr.
|
||||
+ * Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if
|
||||
+ * security module does not know about attribute or a negative error code
|
||||
+ * to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading
|
||||
+ * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Security hooks for file operations
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -1435,6 +1443,7 @@ union security_list_options {
|
||||
size_t buffer_size);
|
||||
void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
|
||||
int (*inode_copy_up) (struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
|
||||
+ int (*inode_copy_up_xattr) (const char *name);
|
||||
|
||||
int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
|
||||
int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
|
||||
@@ -1707,6 +1716,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
|
||||
struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
|
||||
struct list_head inode_getsecid;
|
||||
struct list_head inode_copy_up;
|
||||
+ struct list_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
|
||||
struct list_head file_permission;
|
||||
struct list_head file_alloc_security;
|
||||
struct list_head file_free_security;
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
index c5b0ccd..536fafd 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void
|
||||
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
|
||||
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
|
||||
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
|
||||
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
|
||||
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
|
||||
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
|
||||
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
|
||||
@@ -764,6 +765,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
|
||||
index f2a7f27..a9e2bb9 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/security.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/security.c
|
||||
@@ -754,6 +754,12 @@ int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
|
||||
|
||||
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP, name);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
|
||||
+
|
||||
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
@@ -1692,6 +1698,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
|
||||
.inode_copy_up =
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up),
|
||||
+ .inode_copy_up_xattr =
|
||||
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr),
|
||||
.file_permission =
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
|
||||
.file_alloc_security =
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 6f9f7038760f6ed22de9beb621d1dcd5259bfa00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:58 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/24] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook
|
||||
|
||||
When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/
|
||||
with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from
|
||||
lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context mount, we don't want
|
||||
to copy up label as newly created file got its label from context= option.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
---
|
||||
security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
index 264ee90..d30d7b3 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
@@ -3313,6 +3313,21 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
|
||||
+ * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
|
||||
+ * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
|
||||
+ return 1; /* Discard */
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
|
||||
+ * by selinux.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* file security operations */
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
||||
@@ -6109,6 +6124,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
|
||||
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
|
||||
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 1104a4c8e3bdf480e5ca55b558a3812b5190bb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:59 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/24] selinux: Pass security pointer to
|
||||
determine_inode_label()
|
||||
|
||||
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
|
||||
current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
|
||||
from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
|
||||
where to fetch security pointer from.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
---
|
||||
security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
index d30d7b3..2bf0d00 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
@@ -1808,13 +1808,13 @@ out:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
-static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
|
||||
- const struct qstr *name,
|
||||
- u16 tclass,
|
||||
- u32 *_new_isid)
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
|
||||
+ struct inode *dir,
|
||||
+ const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
|
||||
+ u32 *_new_isid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
|
||||
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
|
||||
|
||||
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
|
||||
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
|
||||
@@ -1857,8 +1857,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
|
||||
- &newsid);
|
||||
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
|
||||
+ &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2838,7 +2838,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
u32 newsid;
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
|
||||
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
|
||||
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
|
||||
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
|
||||
&newsid);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
@@ -2863,7 +2864,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
||||
sid = tsec->sid;
|
||||
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
|
||||
|
||||
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
|
||||
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
|
||||
dir, qstr,
|
||||
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
|
||||
&newsid);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 6edae1670b755c5c747bdb30031ff9b24f2f585e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:59 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/24] security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label
|
||||
newly created files
|
||||
|
||||
During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the
|
||||
right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get
|
||||
label as if task had created file in upper/.
|
||||
|
||||
We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a
|
||||
whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then
|
||||
renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to
|
||||
be.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines
|
||||
the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper
|
||||
and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new
|
||||
creds for file creation.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
---
|
||||
fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 10 ++++++++++
|
||||
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
|
||||
include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
4 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
|
||||
index 74e6964..adfaa21 100644
|
||||
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
|
||||
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
|
||||
@@ -492,6 +492,15 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
|
||||
if (override_cred) {
|
||||
override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
|
||||
override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
|
||||
+ if (!hardlink) {
|
||||
+ err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
|
||||
+ stat->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
|
||||
+ override_cred);
|
||||
+ if (err) {
|
||||
+ put_cred(override_cred);
|
||||
+ goto out_revert_creds;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
|
||||
put_cred(override_cred);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -502,6 +511,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
|
||||
err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, stat,
|
||||
link, hardlink);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+out_revert_creds:
|
||||
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
||||
if (!err) {
|
||||
struct inode *realinode = d_inode(ovl_dentry_upper(dentry));
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
|
||||
index 336b3fb..55891c0 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
|
||||
@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@
|
||||
* @name name of the last path component used to create file
|
||||
* @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
|
||||
* @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
|
||||
+ * @dentry_create_files_as:
|
||||
+ * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
|
||||
+ * and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are
|
||||
+ * created using that context. Context is calculated using the
|
||||
+ * passed in creds and not the creds of the caller.
|
||||
+ * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
|
||||
+ * @mode mode used to determine resource type.
|
||||
+ * @name name of the last path component used to create file
|
||||
+ * @old creds which should be used for context calculation
|
||||
+ * @new creds to modify
|
||||
*
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Security hooks for inode operations.
|
||||
@@ -1375,6 +1385,10 @@ union security_list_options {
|
||||
int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
|
||||
u32 *ctxlen);
|
||||
+ int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
+ struct qstr *name,
|
||||
+ const struct cred *old,
|
||||
+ struct cred *new);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
|
||||
@@ -1675,6 +1689,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
|
||||
struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
|
||||
struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
|
||||
struct list_head dentry_init_security;
|
||||
+ struct list_head dentry_create_files_as;
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
|
||||
struct list_head path_unlink;
|
||||
struct list_head path_mkdir;
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
index 536fafd..a6c6d5d 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
|
||||
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
|
||||
u32 *ctxlen);
|
||||
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
+ struct qstr *name,
|
||||
+ const struct cred *old,
|
||||
+ struct cred *new);
|
||||
|
||||
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
|
||||
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
|
||||
@@ -600,6 +604,14 @@ static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
|
||||
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static inline int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry,
|
||||
+ int mode, struct qstr *name,
|
||||
+ const struct cred *old,
|
||||
+ struct cred *new)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
|
||||
struct inode *dir,
|
||||
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
|
||||
index a9e2bb9..69614f1 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/security.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/security.c
|
||||
@@ -364,6 +364,15 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
|
||||
|
||||
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
+ struct qstr *name,
|
||||
+ const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
|
||||
+ name, old, new);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
|
||||
+
|
||||
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
||||
const struct qstr *qstr,
|
||||
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
|
||||
@@ -1635,6 +1644,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str),
|
||||
.dentry_init_security =
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security),
|
||||
+ .dentry_create_files_as =
|
||||
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_create_files_as),
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
|
||||
.path_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
|
||||
.path_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From d1d5776d41d3c426ccb6984206d20769ba1ad01f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:59 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/24] selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hook
|
||||
|
||||
Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid
|
||||
in the passed creds.
|
||||
|
||||
Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from
|
||||
set of creds passed in. (old->security).
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
---
|
||||
security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
index 2bf0d00..603b600 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
@@ -2848,6 +2848,27 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
||||
+ struct qstr *name,
|
||||
+ const struct cred *old,
|
||||
+ struct cred *new)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ u32 newsid;
|
||||
+ int rc;
|
||||
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
|
||||
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
|
||||
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
|
||||
+ &newsid);
|
||||
+ if (rc)
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ tsec = new->security;
|
||||
+ tsec->create_sid = newsid;
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
||||
const struct qstr *qstr,
|
||||
const char **name,
|
||||
@@ -6098,6 +6119,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
|
||||
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
|
||||
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
|
||||
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From e47cbf707c26036420fec8846d07ec640b744c0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2016 10:05:49 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 22/24] Revert "tty: serial: 8250: add CON_CONSDEV to flags"
|
||||
|
||||
This commit needs to be reverted because it prevents people from
|
||||
using the serial console as a secondary console with input being
|
||||
directed to tty0.
|
||||
|
||||
IOW, if you boot with console=ttyS0 console=tty0 then all kernels
|
||||
prior to this commit will produce output on both ttyS0 and tty0
|
||||
but input will only be taken from tty0. With this patch the serial
|
||||
console will always be the primary console instead of tty0,
|
||||
potentially preventing people from getting into their machines in
|
||||
emergency situations.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: d03516df8375 ("tty: serial: 8250: add CON_CONSDEV to flags")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c
|
||||
index dcf43f6..fa823a5 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c
|
||||
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct console univ8250_console = {
|
||||
.device = uart_console_device,
|
||||
.setup = univ8250_console_setup,
|
||||
.match = univ8250_console_match,
|
||||
- .flags = CON_PRINTBUFFER | CON_ANYTIME | CON_CONSDEV,
|
||||
+ .flags = CON_PRINTBUFFER | CON_ANYTIME,
|
||||
.index = -1,
|
||||
.data = &serial8250_reg,
|
||||
};
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 14accb84196be11dbfc524cc24014f479c81e5e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 428385fe28e9523377ecf26c97dd36382468fd8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/24] Add secure_modules() call
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Add secure_modules() call
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
|
||||
has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load
|
||||
@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ index 0c3207d..c8b4ea0 100644
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
|
||||
index 529efae..0332fdd 100644
|
||||
index 0e54d5b..085b720 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/module.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/module.c
|
||||
@@ -4279,3 +4279,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
|
||||
@@ -4285,3 +4285,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From c1a2f1afbbccfb4c5659b4dae4f82b442c38f57b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From ac008727488d38debfe9d336bc3172c0cc6a55d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 02/18] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
|
||||
enabled
|
||||
|
||||
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From ef9962bc8d75916b7c2f70a4b13b53f3332efa40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 594c655d0c106fbc6c3789688d0f58dd741f2c49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 03/18] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
|
||||
enabled
|
||||
|
||||
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
|
||||
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ index 589b319..ab83724 100644
|
||||
}
|
||||
regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
index a33163d..48a2897 100644
|
||||
index 6d9cc2d..a6eca51 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
|
||||
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ index a33163d..48a2897 100644
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -574,6 +575,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
@@ -578,6 +579,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
unsigned long i = *ppos;
|
||||
const char __user *tmp = buf;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From d01d4b34ddae2cd731d4b8b08c53260a448806b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 6514dc7053261af884ba59e0a6c08a1c091dc9e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/18] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
|
||||
|
||||
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
|
||||
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 70e4a01956577b99322da3aa0ff3bc991fc23401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 459c4b5751f448645f26292fe780d97d47e84265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/18] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
|
||||
loading is restricted
|
||||
|
||||
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
|
||||
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
|
||||
index 7c093a0..21fd6b8 100644
|
||||
index ce6ca31..55d2399 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
|
||||
@@ -1872,6 +1872,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From c746f3492e8c039f9c85341d36cec803cbef9424 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 06dd44588d8aa2f2c4a903b858660d6d6860c22f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 13/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
|
||||
restricted
|
||||
|
||||
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
index 48a2897..08a7bff 100644
|
||||
index a6eca51..191b2b0 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ index 48a2897..08a7bff 100644
|
||||
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -510,6 +513,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
@@ -514,6 +517,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
|
||||
int err = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 5f74d421b9177d8f92a9462771744e26713b3110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 904f9519810723da81230c693b60510684990837 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/18] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
|
||||
loading is restricted
|
||||
|
||||
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
|
||||
index 4305ee9..fa1bcf0 100644
|
||||
index 416953a..4887e34 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
|
||||
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ index 4305ee9..fa1bcf0 100644
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm/io.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
||||
@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
|
||||
acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From fb93701fdbfbe966ea426cc02e6cd0abdc4e955a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 97b270a085859d5ada3614b45902c0b75df2be4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 18:55:53 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 15/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/18] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
|
||||
loading restrictions
|
||||
|
||||
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From c707e9d71a1beeecf41e75936c89587b68734a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 43e3113404497c837aa083b43b0a9e08dae73f53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 16/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/18] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
|
||||
restricted
|
||||
|
||||
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted,
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 22a7af2714d4dc7284c8070d305fb6d15a8f119b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 24fd0e7dcfb42abc8999f0bc3b55bdf02324da75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 17/24] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
|
||||
when in Secure Boot mode
|
||||
|
||||
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
|
||||
@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ index 95a4d34..b8527c6 100644
|
||||
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
|
||||
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
index 2a1f0ce..ba2c734 100644
|
||||
index bada636..882da2b 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
@@ -1774,6 +1774,16 @@ config EFI_MIXED
|
||||
@@ -1786,6 +1786,16 @@ config EFI_MIXED
|
||||
|
||||
If unsure, say N.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ index 2a1f0ce..ba2c734 100644
|
||||
def_bool y
|
||||
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
|
||||
index 94dd4a3..1959b82 100644
|
||||
index cc69e37..17b3765 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
|
||||
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ index 94dd4a3..1959b82 100644
|
||||
|
||||
#include "../string.h"
|
||||
#include "eboot.h"
|
||||
@@ -571,6 +572,36 @@ free_handle:
|
||||
@@ -537,6 +538,36 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params)
|
||||
efi_call_early(free_pool, pci_handle);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ index 94dd4a3..1959b82 100644
|
||||
static efi_status_t
|
||||
setup_uga32(void **uga_handle, unsigned long size, u32 *width, u32 *height)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1128,6 +1159,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
|
||||
@@ -1094,6 +1125,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
|
||||
else
|
||||
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ index c18ce67..2b3e542 100644
|
||||
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
|
||||
*
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
index d5219b1..d635886 100644
|
||||
index 9c337b0..f7f369b 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
@@ -1160,6 +1160,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
|
||||
@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ index c8b4ea0..8918ef4 100644
|
||||
|
||||
extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
|
||||
index 0332fdd..3f1ea6b 100644
|
||||
index 085b720..e0c6216 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/module.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/module.c
|
||||
@@ -4280,6 +4280,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
|
||||
@@ -4286,6 +4286,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 22710872487fdcb61445299f7cdd92d1b702fcc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 24e6c471ffdfed1d389c9bd033117e1ca4cbd97b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 18/24] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/18] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
|
||||
|
||||
The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being
|
||||
UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps.
|
||||
@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
index ba2c734..a5d6b58 100644
|
||||
index 882da2b..d666ef8b 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
@@ -1775,7 +1775,8 @@ config EFI_MIXED
|
||||
@@ -1787,7 +1787,8 @@ config EFI_MIXED
|
||||
If unsure, say N.
|
||||
|
||||
config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From b0f4c9e56311b1d894766e815570b240f5c5edbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 3891469497a0435fa026dca9fe58dc707d49c197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 19/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/18] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
||||
|
||||
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
||||
for use with efi_enabled.
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
index d635886..5824ae5 100644
|
||||
index f7f369b..60dccc2 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
@@ -1162,7 +1162,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
|
||||
@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ index d635886..5824ae5 100644
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
|
||||
index 0148a30..4b62b48 100644
|
||||
index cba7177..0d76705 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
|
||||
@@ -1012,6 +1012,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
|
||||
@@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
|
||||
#define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */
|
||||
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
|
||||
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From f342c4af0fd094a2ab367c5b5bf019d41337e7e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 804784cb138b64f247a1db03d2b43118e4d31e54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 20/24] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 13/18] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
|
||||
|
||||
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
|
||||
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
|
||||
index 33c79b6..d1420be 100644
|
||||
index b26dbc4..ab187ad 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From fd0e3487c3e608c27b03adad678df805eff0811f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 023410cc67fdf43960f44d73121e735aeee3fc35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 21/24] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/18] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
|
||||
|
||||
This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
|
||||
provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ by some undesirable path component.
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
|
||||
index ace32d3..66cfbaa 100644
|
||||
index c0c41c9..8ab8bd3 100644
|
||||
--- a/Makefile
|
||||
+++ b/Makefile
|
||||
@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From e3614cf4156b5b9eb7eb9e1a1081260ca404b0fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 888796efad08c03f7868fe02189e02132e925766 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 23/24] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 15/18] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
|
||||
index 4d19508..b7ecaf9 100644
|
||||
index 332e331..964bae1 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
|
||||
@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ section_table:
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From e5868fc1175409ad885926cbb66cb5dc5fc3e6fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 648e8f090f90f19237cfa70c047419341de49417 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 10:07:31 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 24/24] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 16/18] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
|
||||
within user namespaces
|
||||
|
||||
commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for
|
||||
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
index 603b600..feb29df 100644
|
||||
index 09fd610..7f4387f 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
@@ -832,10 +832,14 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
|
||||
From 463b9d55d967de5900c5097bc99c34f4207a85a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 23:58:38 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 17/18] perf/x86/intel/rapl: Make package handling more robust
|
||||
|
||||
The package management code in RAPL relies on package mapping being
|
||||
available before a CPU is started. This changed with:
|
||||
|
||||
9d85eb9119f4 ("x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust")
|
||||
|
||||
because the ACPI/BIOS information turned out to be unreliable, but that
|
||||
left RAPL in broken state. This was not noticed because on a regular boot
|
||||
all CPUs are online before RAPL is initialized.
|
||||
|
||||
A possible fix would be to reintroduce the mess which allocates a package
|
||||
data structure in CPU prepare and when it turns out to already exist in
|
||||
starting throw it away later in the CPU online callback. But that's a
|
||||
horrible hack and not required at all because RAPL becomes functional for
|
||||
perf only in the CPU online callback. That's correct because user space is
|
||||
not yet informed about the CPU being onlined, so nothing caan rely on RAPL
|
||||
being available on that particular CPU.
|
||||
|
||||
Move the allocation to the CPU online callback and simplify the hotplug
|
||||
handling. At this point the package mapping is established and correct.
|
||||
|
||||
This also adds a missing check for available package data in the
|
||||
event_init() function.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <yasu.isimatu@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
||||
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
|
||||
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
|
||||
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
|
||||
Fixes: 9d85eb9119f4 ("x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust")
|
||||
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170131230141.212593966@linutronix.de
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
|
||||
include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 1 -
|
||||
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
|
||||
index 0a535ce..1dba3c2 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
|
||||
@@ -161,7 +161,13 @@ static u64 rapl_timer_ms;
|
||||
|
||||
static inline struct rapl_pmu *cpu_to_rapl_pmu(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- return rapl_pmus->pmus[topology_logical_package_id(cpu)];
|
||||
+ unsigned int pkgid = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The unsigned check also catches the '-1' return value for non
|
||||
+ * existent mappings in the topology map.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ return pkgid < rapl_pmus->maxpkg ? rapl_pmus->pmus[pkgid] : NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline u64 rapl_read_counter(struct perf_event *event)
|
||||
@@ -402,6 +408,8 @@ static int rapl_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
|
||||
|
||||
/* must be done before validate_group */
|
||||
pmu = cpu_to_rapl_pmu(event->cpu);
|
||||
+ if (!pmu)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
event->cpu = pmu->cpu;
|
||||
event->pmu_private = pmu;
|
||||
event->hw.event_base = msr;
|
||||
@@ -585,6 +593,20 @@ static int rapl_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
struct rapl_pmu *pmu = cpu_to_rapl_pmu(cpu);
|
||||
int target;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!pmu) {
|
||||
+ pmu = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*pmu), GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
|
||||
+ if (!pmu)
|
||||
+ return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ raw_spin_lock_init(&pmu->lock);
|
||||
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pmu->active_list);
|
||||
+ pmu->pmu = &rapl_pmus->pmu;
|
||||
+ pmu->timer_interval = ms_to_ktime(rapl_timer_ms);
|
||||
+ rapl_hrtimer_init(pmu);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rapl_pmus->pmus[topology_logical_package_id(cpu)] = pmu;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check if there is an online cpu in the package which collects rapl
|
||||
* events already.
|
||||
@@ -598,27 +620,6 @@ static int rapl_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static int rapl_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- struct rapl_pmu *pmu = cpu_to_rapl_pmu(cpu);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (pmu)
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- pmu = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*pmu), GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
|
||||
- if (!pmu)
|
||||
- return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- raw_spin_lock_init(&pmu->lock);
|
||||
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pmu->active_list);
|
||||
- pmu->pmu = &rapl_pmus->pmu;
|
||||
- pmu->timer_interval = ms_to_ktime(rapl_timer_ms);
|
||||
- pmu->cpu = -1;
|
||||
- rapl_hrtimer_init(pmu);
|
||||
- rapl_pmus->pmus[topology_logical_package_id(cpu)] = pmu;
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
static int rapl_check_hw_unit(bool apply_quirk)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u64 msr_rapl_power_unit_bits;
|
||||
@@ -802,29 +803,21 @@ static int __init rapl_pmu_init(void)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Install callbacks. Core will call them for each online cpu.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
-
|
||||
- ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_PERF_X86_RAPL_PREP, "PERF_X86_RAPL_PREP",
|
||||
- rapl_cpu_prepare, NULL);
|
||||
- if (ret)
|
||||
- goto out;
|
||||
-
|
||||
ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_RAPL_ONLINE,
|
||||
"AP_PERF_X86_RAPL_ONLINE",
|
||||
rapl_cpu_online, rapl_cpu_offline);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
- goto out1;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = perf_pmu_register(&rapl_pmus->pmu, "power", -1);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
- goto out2;
|
||||
+ goto out1;
|
||||
|
||||
rapl_advertise();
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
-out2:
|
||||
- cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_RAPL_ONLINE);
|
||||
out1:
|
||||
- cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_PERF_X86_RAPL_PREP);
|
||||
+ cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_RAPL_ONLINE);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
pr_warn("Initialization failed (%d), disabled\n", ret);
|
||||
cleanup_rapl_pmus();
|
||||
@@ -835,7 +828,6 @@ module_init(rapl_pmu_init);
|
||||
static void __exit intel_rapl_exit(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_RAPL_ONLINE);
|
||||
- cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_PERF_X86_RAPL_PREP);
|
||||
perf_pmu_unregister(&rapl_pmus->pmu);
|
||||
cleanup_rapl_pmus();
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
|
||||
index ba1cad7..965cc56 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_X86_PREPARE,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_X86_AMD_UNCORE_PREP,
|
||||
- CPUHP_PERF_X86_RAPL_PREP,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_BFIN,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_POWER,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_SUPERH,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
|
||||
From c768c2f2907728b8ce5c43718221afcd1353da8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 23:58:40 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 18/18] perf/x86/intel/uncore: Make package handling more
|
||||
robust
|
||||
|
||||
The package management code in uncore relies on package mapping being
|
||||
available before a CPU is started. This changed with:
|
||||
|
||||
9d85eb9119f4 ("x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust")
|
||||
|
||||
because the ACPI/BIOS information turned out to be unreliable, but that
|
||||
left uncore in broken state. This was not noticed because on a regular boot
|
||||
all CPUs are online before uncore is initialized.
|
||||
|
||||
Move the allocation to the CPU online callback and simplify the hotplug
|
||||
handling. At this point the package mapping is established and correct.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
||||
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
|
||||
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
|
||||
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
|
||||
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <yasu.isimatu@gmail.com>
|
||||
Fixes: 9d85eb9119f4 ("x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust")
|
||||
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170131230141.377156255@linutronix.de
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
|
||||
include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 2 -
|
||||
2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
|
||||
index 19d646a..f2d760d 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
|
||||
@@ -100,7 +100,13 @@ ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj,
|
||||
|
||||
struct intel_uncore_box *uncore_pmu_to_box(struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu, int cpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- return pmu->boxes[topology_logical_package_id(cpu)];
|
||||
+ unsigned int pkgid = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The unsigned check also catches the '-1' return value for non
|
||||
+ * existent mappings in the topology map.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ return pkgid < max_packages ? pmu->boxes[pkgid] : NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u64 uncore_msr_read_counter(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *event)
|
||||
@@ -1033,76 +1039,6 @@ static void uncore_pci_exit(void)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static int uncore_cpu_dying(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_type *type, **types = uncore_msr_uncores;
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu;
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_box *box;
|
||||
- int i, pkg;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- pkg = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
- for (; *types; types++) {
|
||||
- type = *types;
|
||||
- pmu = type->pmus;
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < type->num_boxes; i++, pmu++) {
|
||||
- box = pmu->boxes[pkg];
|
||||
- if (box && atomic_dec_return(&box->refcnt) == 0)
|
||||
- uncore_box_exit(box);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
-static int uncore_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_type *type, **types = uncore_msr_uncores;
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu;
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_box *box;
|
||||
- int i, pkg;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- pkg = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
- for (; *types; types++) {
|
||||
- type = *types;
|
||||
- pmu = type->pmus;
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < type->num_boxes; i++, pmu++) {
|
||||
- box = pmu->boxes[pkg];
|
||||
- if (!box)
|
||||
- continue;
|
||||
- /* The first cpu on a package activates the box */
|
||||
- if (atomic_inc_return(&box->refcnt) == 1)
|
||||
- uncore_box_init(box);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
-static int uncore_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_type *type, **types = uncore_msr_uncores;
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu;
|
||||
- struct intel_uncore_box *box;
|
||||
- int i, pkg;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- pkg = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
- for (; *types; types++) {
|
||||
- type = *types;
|
||||
- pmu = type->pmus;
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < type->num_boxes; i++, pmu++) {
|
||||
- if (pmu->boxes[pkg])
|
||||
- continue;
|
||||
- /* First cpu of a package allocates the box */
|
||||
- box = uncore_alloc_box(type, cpu_to_node(cpu));
|
||||
- if (!box)
|
||||
- return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
- box->pmu = pmu;
|
||||
- box->pkgid = pkg;
|
||||
- pmu->boxes[pkg] = box;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
static void uncore_change_type_ctx(struct intel_uncore_type *type, int old_cpu,
|
||||
int new_cpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1142,12 +1078,14 @@ static void uncore_change_context(struct intel_uncore_type **uncores,
|
||||
|
||||
static int uncore_event_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- int target;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_type *type, **types = uncore_msr_uncores;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_box *box;
|
||||
+ int i, pkg, target;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if exiting cpu is used for collecting uncore events */
|
||||
if (!cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, &uncore_cpu_mask))
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ goto unref;
|
||||
/* Find a new cpu to collect uncore events */
|
||||
target = cpumask_any_but(topology_core_cpumask(cpu), cpu);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1159,12 +1097,82 @@ static int uncore_event_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
|
||||
uncore_change_context(uncore_msr_uncores, cpu, target);
|
||||
uncore_change_context(uncore_pci_uncores, cpu, target);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+unref:
|
||||
+ /* Clear the references */
|
||||
+ pkg = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
+ for (; *types; types++) {
|
||||
+ type = *types;
|
||||
+ pmu = type->pmus;
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < type->num_boxes; i++, pmu++) {
|
||||
+ box = pmu->boxes[pkg];
|
||||
+ if (box && atomic_dec_return(&box->refcnt) == 0)
|
||||
+ uncore_box_exit(box);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static int allocate_boxes(struct intel_uncore_type **types,
|
||||
+ unsigned int pkg, unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_box *box, *tmp;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_type *type;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu;
|
||||
+ LIST_HEAD(allocated);
|
||||
+ int i;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Try to allocate all required boxes */
|
||||
+ for (; *types; types++) {
|
||||
+ type = *types;
|
||||
+ pmu = type->pmus;
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < type->num_boxes; i++, pmu++) {
|
||||
+ if (pmu->boxes[pkg])
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ box = uncore_alloc_box(type, cpu_to_node(cpu));
|
||||
+ if (!box)
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
+ box->pmu = pmu;
|
||||
+ box->pkgid = pkg;
|
||||
+ list_add(&box->active_list, &allocated);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* Install them in the pmus */
|
||||
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(box, tmp, &allocated, active_list) {
|
||||
+ list_del_init(&box->active_list);
|
||||
+ box->pmu->boxes[pkg] = box;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+cleanup:
|
||||
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(box, tmp, &allocated, active_list) {
|
||||
+ list_del_init(&box->active_list);
|
||||
+ kfree(box);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
static int uncore_event_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- int target;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_type *type, **types = uncore_msr_uncores;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_pmu *pmu;
|
||||
+ struct intel_uncore_box *box;
|
||||
+ int i, ret, pkg, target;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pkg = topology_logical_package_id(cpu);
|
||||
+ ret = allocate_boxes(types, pkg, cpu);
|
||||
+ if (ret)
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (; *types; types++) {
|
||||
+ type = *types;
|
||||
+ pmu = type->pmus;
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < type->num_boxes; i++, pmu++) {
|
||||
+ box = pmu->boxes[pkg];
|
||||
+ if (!box && atomic_inc_return(&box->refcnt) == 1)
|
||||
+ uncore_box_init(box);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check if there is an online cpu in the package
|
||||
@@ -1354,33 +1362,13 @@ static int __init intel_uncore_init(void)
|
||||
if (cret && pret)
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
|
||||
- /*
|
||||
- * Install callbacks. Core will call them for each online cpu.
|
||||
- *
|
||||
- * The first online cpu of each package allocates and takes
|
||||
- * the refcounts for all other online cpus in that package.
|
||||
- * If msrs are not enabled no allocation is required and
|
||||
- * uncore_cpu_prepare() is not called for each online cpu.
|
||||
- */
|
||||
- if (!cret) {
|
||||
- ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP,
|
||||
- "PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP",
|
||||
- uncore_cpu_prepare, NULL);
|
||||
- if (ret)
|
||||
- goto err;
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP,
|
||||
- "PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP",
|
||||
- uncore_cpu_prepare, NULL);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_STARTING,
|
||||
- "AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_STARTING",
|
||||
- uncore_cpu_starting, uncore_cpu_dying);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE,
|
||||
- "AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE",
|
||||
- uncore_event_cpu_online, uncore_event_cpu_offline);
|
||||
+ /* Install hotplug callbacks to setup the targets for each package */
|
||||
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE,
|
||||
+ "AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE",
|
||||
+ uncore_event_cpu_online,
|
||||
+ uncore_event_cpu_offline);
|
||||
+ if (ret)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
@@ -1392,9 +1380,7 @@ module_init(intel_uncore_init);
|
||||
|
||||
static void __exit intel_uncore_exit(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE);
|
||||
- cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_STARTING);
|
||||
- cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP);
|
||||
+ cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE);
|
||||
uncore_types_exit(uncore_msr_uncores);
|
||||
uncore_pci_exit();
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
|
||||
index 965cc56..ce83119 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
|
||||
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
|
||||
CPUHP_CREATE_THREADS,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_PREPARE,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_X86_PREPARE,
|
||||
- CPUHP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_PREP,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_X86_AMD_UNCORE_PREP,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_BFIN,
|
||||
CPUHP_PERF_POWER,
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
|
||||
CPUHP_AP_IRQ_ARMADA_CASC_STARTING,
|
||||
CPUHP_AP_IRQ_BCM2836_STARTING,
|
||||
CPUHP_AP_ARM_MVEBU_COHERENCY,
|
||||
- CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_STARTING,
|
||||
CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_AMD_UNCORE_STARTING,
|
||||
CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_STARTING,
|
||||
CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_AMD_IBS_STARTING,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user