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Merge pull request #2417 from bgilbert/tty0
sys-kernel/coreos-sources: Stop routing primary console to ttyS0
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Gilbert
GitHub
commit
efb914596c
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
||||
|
||||
EAPI=5
|
||||
COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
|
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r2"
|
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inherit coreos-kernel
|
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|
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DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel"
|
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
||||
|
||||
EAPI=5
|
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
|
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r2"
|
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inherit coreos-kernel savedconfig
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|
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DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel modules"
|
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@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
|
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# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
|
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
||||
|
||||
EAPI="5"
|
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ETYPE="sources"
|
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inherit kernel-2
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detect_version
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|
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DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
|
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HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
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SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
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|
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KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
|
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IUSE=""
|
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|
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_MINOR}"
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|
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# XXX: Note we must prefix the patch filenames with "z" to ensure they are
|
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# applied _after_ a potential patch-${KV}.patch file, present when building a
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# patchlevel revision. We mustn't apply our patches first, it fails when the
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# local patches overlap with the upstream patch.
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|
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# in $PATCH_DIR: ls -1 | sed -e 's/^/\t${PATCH_DIR}\//g' -e 's/$/ \\/g'
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UNIPATCH_LIST="
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-security-overlayfs-provide-copy-up-security-hook-for.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-selinux-Implementation-for-inode_copy_up-hook.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-security-overlayfs-Provide-security-hook-for-copy-up.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-selinux-Implementation-for-inode_copy_up_xattr-hook.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-selinux-Pass-security-pointer-to-determine_inode_lab.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-security-overlayfs-Provide-hook-to-correctly-label-n.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-selinux-Implement-dentry_create_files_as-hook.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0008-Add-secure_modules-call.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0009-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0010-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0011-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0012-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0013-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0019-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0020-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0021-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0022-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-within-user-namespaces.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
||||
# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
|
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
||||
|
||||
EAPI="5"
|
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ETYPE="sources"
|
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inherit kernel-2
|
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detect_version
|
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|
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DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
|
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HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
|
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SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
|
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|
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KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
|
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IUSE=""
|
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|
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_MINOR}"
|
||||
|
||||
# XXX: Note we must prefix the patch filenames with "z" to ensure they are
|
||||
# applied _after_ a potential patch-${KV}.patch file, present when building a
|
||||
# patchlevel revision. We mustn't apply our patches first, it fails when the
|
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# local patches overlap with the upstream patch.
|
||||
|
||||
# in $PATCH_DIR: ls -1 | sed -e 's/^/\t${PATCH_DIR}\//g' -e 's/$/ \\/g'
|
||||
UNIPATCH_LIST="
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-security-overlayfs-provide-copy-up-security-hook-for.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-selinux-Implementation-for-inode_copy_up-hook.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-security-overlayfs-Provide-security-hook-for-copy-up.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-selinux-Implementation-for-inode_copy_up_xattr-hook.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-selinux-Pass-security-pointer-to-determine_inode_lab.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-security-overlayfs-Provide-hook-to-correctly-label-n.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-selinux-Implement-dentry_create_files_as-hook.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0008-Add-secure_modules-call.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0009-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0010-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0011-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0012-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0013-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0019-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0020-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0021-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0022-Revert-tty-serial-8250-add-CON_CONSDEV-to-flags.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0024-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch \
|
||||
"
|
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
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From 72f2135b077dd2e44d5bbd6b39194d009aeb2af2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:57 -0400
|
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Subject: [PATCH 01/21] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for
|
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Subject: [PATCH 01/24] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for
|
||||
unioned files
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
|
||||
@ -144,5 +144,5 @@ index 4838e7f..f2a7f27 100644
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
|
||||
.file_alloc_security =
|
||||
--
|
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2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From b45eb80e5b2412980d38d2ea00aabc3057a91a05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:58 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 02/21] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hook
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 02/24] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hook
|
||||
|
||||
A file is being copied up for overlay file system. Prepare a new set of
|
||||
creds and set create_sid appropriately so that new file is created with
|
||||
@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ index 13185a6..264ee90 100644
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 8a5e4f3cd784d18008e2f32f07cf7ab2f949c00a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:58 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 03/21] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 03/24] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up
|
||||
of xattrs for overlay file
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
|
||||
@ -125,5 +125,5 @@ index f2a7f27..a9e2bb9 100644
|
||||
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
|
||||
.file_alloc_security =
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 6f9f7038760f6ed22de9beb621d1dcd5259bfa00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:58 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/21] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/24] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook
|
||||
|
||||
When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/
|
||||
with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from
|
||||
@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ index 264ee90..d30d7b3 100644
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
|
||||
--
|
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2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 1104a4c8e3bdf480e5ca55b558a3812b5190bb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:59 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/21] selinux: Pass security pointer to
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/24] selinux: Pass security pointer to
|
||||
determine_inode_label()
|
||||
|
||||
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
|
||||
@ -69,5 +69,5 @@ index d30d7b3..2bf0d00 100644
|
||||
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
|
||||
&newsid);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 6edae1670b755c5c747bdb30031ff9b24f2f585e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:59 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/21] security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/24] security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label
|
||||
newly created files
|
||||
|
||||
During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the
|
||||
@ -155,5 +155,5 @@ index a9e2bb9..69614f1 100644
|
||||
.path_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
|
||||
.path_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From d1d5776d41d3c426ccb6984206d20769ba1ad01f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:34:59 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/21] selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hook
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/24] selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hook
|
||||
|
||||
Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid
|
||||
in the passed creds.
|
||||
@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ index 2bf0d00..603b600 100644
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 14accb84196be11dbfc524cc24014f479c81e5e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/21] Add secure_modules() call
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/24] Add secure_modules() call
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
|
||||
has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load
|
||||
@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ index 529efae..0332fdd 100644
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_modules);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From c1a2f1afbbccfb4c5659b4dae4f82b442c38f57b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/21] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
|
||||
enabled
|
||||
|
||||
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
|
||||
@ -114,5 +114,5 @@ index b91c4da..98f5637 100644
|
||||
|
||||
dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From ef9962bc8d75916b7c2f70a4b13b53f3332efa40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/21] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
|
||||
enabled
|
||||
|
||||
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
|
||||
@ -68,5 +68,5 @@ index a33163d..48a2897 100644
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From d01d4b34ddae2cd731d4b8b08c53260a448806b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/21] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
|
||||
|
||||
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
|
||||
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
|
||||
@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ index c68e724..4277938 100644
|
||||
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
|
||||
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 70e4a01956577b99322da3aa0ff3bc991fc23401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/21] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
|
||||
loading is restricted
|
||||
|
||||
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
|
||||
@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ index 7c093a0..21fd6b8 100644
|
||||
1, asus->debug.method_id,
|
||||
&input, &output);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From c746f3492e8c039f9c85341d36cec803cbef9424 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 13/21] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 13/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
|
||||
restricted
|
||||
|
||||
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
|
||||
@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ index 48a2897..08a7bff 100644
|
||||
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
|
||||
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 5f74d421b9177d8f92a9462771744e26713b3110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/21] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
|
||||
loading is restricted
|
||||
|
||||
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
|
||||
@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index 4305ee9..fa1bcf0 100644
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From fb93701fdbfbe966ea426cc02e6cd0abdc4e955a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 18:55:53 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 15/21] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 15/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
|
||||
loading restrictions
|
||||
|
||||
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
|
||||
@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index 980936a..a0e4cb3 100644
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From c707e9d71a1beeecf41e75936c89587b68734a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 16/21] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 16/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
|
||||
restricted
|
||||
|
||||
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted,
|
||||
@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ index 7f3550a..963ba40 100644
|
||||
err = -EFAULT;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 22a7af2714d4dc7284c8070d305fb6d15a8f119b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 17/21] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 17/24] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
|
||||
when in Secure Boot mode
|
||||
|
||||
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
|
||||
@ -181,5 +181,5 @@ index 0332fdd..3f1ea6b 100644
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 22710872487fdcb61445299f7cdd92d1b702fcc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 18/21] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 18/24] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
|
||||
|
||||
The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being
|
||||
UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps.
|
||||
@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index ba2c734..a5d6b58 100644
|
||||
---help---
|
||||
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From b0f4c9e56311b1d894766e815570b240f5c5edbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 19/21] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 19/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
||||
|
||||
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
||||
for use with efi_enabled.
|
||||
@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ index 0148a30..4b62b48 100644
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
|
||||
/*
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From f342c4af0fd094a2ab367c5b5bf019d41337e7e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 20/21] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 20/24] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
|
||||
|
||||
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
|
||||
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
|
||||
@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index 33c79b6..d1420be 100644
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From fd0e3487c3e608c27b03adad678df805eff0811f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 21/21] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 21/24] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
|
||||
|
||||
This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
|
||||
provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for
|
||||
@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index ace32d3..66cfbaa 100644
|
||||
|
||||
# Leave processing to above invocation of make
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.10.2
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
From e47cbf707c26036420fec8846d07ec640b744c0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2016 10:05:49 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 22/24] Revert "tty: serial: 8250: add CON_CONSDEV to flags"
|
||||
|
||||
This commit needs to be reverted because it prevents people from
|
||||
using the serial console as a secondary console with input being
|
||||
directed to tty0.
|
||||
|
||||
IOW, if you boot with console=ttyS0 console=tty0 then all kernels
|
||||
prior to this commit will produce output on both ttyS0 and tty0
|
||||
but input will only be taken from tty0. With this patch the serial
|
||||
console will always be the primary console instead of tty0,
|
||||
potentially preventing people from getting into their machines in
|
||||
emergency situations.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: d03516df8375 ("tty: serial: 8250: add CON_CONSDEV to flags")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c
|
||||
index dcf43f6..fa823a5 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c
|
||||
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct console univ8250_console = {
|
||||
.device = uart_console_device,
|
||||
.setup = univ8250_console_setup,
|
||||
.match = univ8250_console_match,
|
||||
- .flags = CON_PRINTBUFFER | CON_ANYTIME | CON_CONSDEV,
|
||||
+ .flags = CON_PRINTBUFFER | CON_ANYTIME,
|
||||
.index = -1,
|
||||
.data = &serial8250_reg,
|
||||
};
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 4c66942f5f1ce010fbe028256940ea9d50eb069e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From e3614cf4156b5b9eb7eb9e1a1081260ca404b0fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 23/24] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
|
||||
index 332e331..964bae1 100644
|
||||
index 4d19508..b7ecaf9 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
|
||||
@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ section_table:
|
||||
@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ index 332e331..964bae1 100644
|
||||
* EFI will load .text onwards at the 4k section alignment
|
||||
* described in the PE/COFF header. To ensure that instruction
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.7.4
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
From 01593d3299a1cfdb5e08acf95f63ec59dd674906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From e5868fc1175409ad885926cbb66cb5dc5fc3e6fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 10:07:31 -0500
|
||||
Subject: selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
|
||||
namespaces
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 24/24] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
|
||||
within user namespaces
|
||||
|
||||
commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for
|
||||
unprivileged mounts from user namespaces") prohibited any use of context
|
||||
@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
index e4b953f..e32f4b5 100644
|
||||
index 603b600..feb29df 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
|
||||
@@ -834,10 +834,14 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
|
||||
@@ -832,10 +832,14 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ index e4b953f..e32f4b5 100644
|
||||
defcontext_sid) {
|
||||
rc = -EACCES;
|
||||
--
|
||||
cgit v0.12
|
||||
2.9.3
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user