Merge pull request #787 from flatcar/dongsu/openssl-3.0.8-r4

dev-libs/openssl: update to 3.0.8-r4
This commit is contained in:
Dongsu Park 2023-05-09 10:41:02 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit ab814ddf9e
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
7 changed files with 413 additions and 19 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1 @@
- OpenSSL ([CVE-2023-0464](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0464), [CVE-2023-0465](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0465), [CVE-2023-0466](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0466), [CVE-2023-1255](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1255))

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@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
commit 959c59c7a0164117e7f8366466a32bb1f8d77ff1
Author: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
Date: Wed Mar 8 15:28:20 2023 +1100
x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.
Fixes CVE-2023-0464
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20568)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
};
struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_count;
+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_maximum;
+
/* This is the tree 'level' data */
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
int nlevel;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data);
void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data)
{
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
+ return NULL;
+
node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
if (node == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
node->data = data;
node->parent = parent;
- if (level) {
+ if (level != NULL) {
if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
if (level->anyPolicy)
goto node_error;
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
- if (tree) {
+ if (extra_data) {
if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
+ tree->node_count++;
if (parent)
parent->nchild++;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
#include "pcy_local.h"
+/*
+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
+ *
+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
+#endif
+
static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
int indent)
@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
}
+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
+
/*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
*
@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
goto bad_tree;
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
ossl_policy_data_free(data);
goto bad_tree;
}
@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
int i, matched = 0;
@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
matched = 1;
}
}
if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
int i;
@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
ossl_policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
if (last->anyPolicy &&
ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
- tree);
+ tree, 1);
}
if (!tree->user_policies) {
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
commit 1dd43e0709fece299b15208f36cc7c76209ba0bb
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 7 16:52:55 2023 +0000
Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf certs
Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
cert was bad.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
goto memerr;
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
- int i;
+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
+ cbcalled = 1;
CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
}
+ if (!cbcalled) {
+ /* Should not be able to get here */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
return 1;
}
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
commit 51e8a84ce742db0f6c70510d0159dad8f7825908
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 21 16:15:47 2023 +0100
Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20563)
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index 75a1677022..43c1900bca 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
+policy checking.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2009-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
commit 02ac9c9420275868472f33b01def01218742b8bb
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Mon Apr 17 16:51:20 2023 +0200
aesv8-armx.pl: Avoid buffer overrread in AES-XTS decryption
Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon)
Fixes: CVE-2023-1255
The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes.
Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759)
(cherry picked from commit 72dfe46550ee1f1bbfacd49f071419365bc23304)
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
index 6a7bf05d1b..bd583e2c89 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_tail4x:
add $inp,$inp,#16
- vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
+ tst $tailcnt,#0xf
veor $tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
veor $tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2
@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
veor $tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4
vst1.8 {$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32
+ b.eq .Lxts_dec_abort
+ vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
b .Lxts_done
.align 4
.Lxts_outer_dec_tail:

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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
https://bugs.gentoo.org/894140
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214
From d500b51791cd56e73065e3a7f4487fc33f31c91c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2023 17:56:58 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix Configure test for -mips in CFLAGS
We want to add -mips2 or -mips3 only if the user hasn't already
specified a mips version in CFLAGS. The existing test was a
double-negative.
Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214
---
Configure | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index b6bbec0a85c4..ec48614d6b99 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m)
}
if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm}
- && !grep { $_ !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) {
+ && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) {
# minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules
my $value;
$value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/);

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@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
else
SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )"
#KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~x86-linux"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~arm64-macos"
fi
S="${WORKDIR}"/${MY_P}
@ -55,6 +54,14 @@ MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
/usr/include/openssl/configuration.h
)
PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch
)
pkg_setup() {
if use ktls ; then
if kernel_is -lt 4 18 ; then
@ -93,13 +100,6 @@ src_unpack() {
}
src_prepare() {
# Allow openssl to be cross-compiled
cp "${FILESDIR}"/gentoo.config-1.0.4 gentoo.config || die
chmod a+rx gentoo.config || die
# Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
# Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
# that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
rm -f Makefile
@ -117,6 +117,14 @@ src_prepare() {
rm test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t || die
fi
# Test fails depending on kernel configuration, bug #699134
rm test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t || die
}
src_configure() {
# Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
# Quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
# doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
# and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (bug #417795 again)
@ -132,17 +140,13 @@ src_prepare() {
# Don't remove the no strict aliasing bits below!
filter-flags -fstrict-aliasing
append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing
# The OpenSSL developers don't test with LTO right now, it leads to various
# warnings/errors (which may or may not be false positives), it's considered
# unsupported, and it's not tested in CI: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663.
filter-lto
append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
local sslout=$(./gentoo.config)
einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
edo perl Configure ${sslout} --test-sanity
multilib_copy_sources
}
multilib_src_configure() {
# bug #197996
unset APPS
# bug #312551
@ -152,6 +156,10 @@ multilib_src_configure() {
tc-export AR CC CXX RANLIB RC
multilib-minimal_src_configure
}
multilib_src_configure() {
use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
@ -168,7 +176,7 @@ multilib_src_configure() {
# ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"
#fi
local sslout=$(./gentoo.config)
local sslout=$(bash "${FILESDIR}/gentoo.config-1.0.4")
einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/INSTALL.md#enable-and-disable-features
@ -202,7 +210,7 @@ multilib_src_configure() {
threads
)
edo perl Configure "${myeconfargs[@]}"
edo perl "${S}/Configure" "${myeconfargs[@]}"
}
multilib_src_compile() {
@ -223,6 +231,8 @@ multilib_src_install() {
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_sw
if use fips; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_fips
# Regen this in pkg_preinst, bug 900625
rm "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}"/fipsmodule.cnf || die
fi
if multilib_is_native_abi; then
@ -263,3 +273,15 @@ multilib_src_install_all() {
# flatcar changes: package `tmpfiles.d` setup for SDK bootstrapping.
systemd-tmpfiles --create --root="${ED}" "${FILESDIR}"/openssl.conf
}
pkg_preinst() {
if use fips; then
# Regen fipsmodule.cnf, bug 900625
ebegin "Running openssl fipsinstall"
"${ED}/usr/bin/openssl" fipsinstall -quiet \
-out "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/fipsmodule.cnf" \
-module "${ED}/usr/$(get_libdir)/ossl-modules/fips.so"
eend $?
fi
}