diff --git a/changelog/security/2023-05-04-openssl-3.0.8-r4.md b/changelog/security/2023-05-04-openssl-3.0.8-r4.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b72d2298a --- /dev/null +++ b/changelog/security/2023-05-04-openssl-3.0.8-r4.md @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +- OpenSSL ([CVE-2023-0464](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0464), [CVE-2023-0465](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0465), [CVE-2023-0466](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0466), [CVE-2023-1255](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1255)) diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3cf1d3b38e --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +commit 959c59c7a0164117e7f8366466a32bb1f8d77ff1 +Author: Pauli +Date: Wed Mar 8 15:28:20 2023 +1100 + + x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints + + A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions + of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains + that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this + vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers + exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service + (DoS) attack on affected systems. + + Fixes CVE-2023-0464 + + Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz + Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis + (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20568) + +diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h +index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h ++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h +@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { + }; + + struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { ++ /* The number of nodes in the tree */ ++ size_t node_count; ++ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */ ++ size_t node_maximum; ++ + /* This is the tree 'level' data */ + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; + int nlevel; +@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk, + X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, + X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, +- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, ++ int extra_data); + void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); + int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, + const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); +diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c +index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c +@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, + X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, +- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, ++ int extra_data) + { + X509_POLICY_NODE *node; + ++ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */ ++ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum) ++ return NULL; ++ + node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); + if (node == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + } + node->data = data; + node->parent = parent; +- if (level) { ++ if (level != NULL) { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { + if (level->anyPolicy) + goto node_error; +@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + } + } + +- if (tree) { ++ if (extra_data) { + if (tree->extra_data == NULL) + tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); + if (tree->extra_data == NULL){ +@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + } + } + ++ tree->node_count++; + if (parent) + parent->nchild++; + +diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c +index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c +@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ + + #include "pcy_local.h" + ++/* ++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to ++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes. ++ * ++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the ++ * door on CVE-2023-0464. ++ */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX ++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000 ++#endif ++ + static void expected_print(BIO *channel, + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, + int indent) +@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; + } + ++ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */ ++ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX; ++ + /* + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. + * +@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL, + OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) + goto bad_tree; +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) { + ossl_policy_data_free(data); + goto bad_tree; + } +@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise + */ + static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, +- X509_POLICY_DATA *data) ++ X509_POLICY_DATA *data, ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + { + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; + int i, matched = 0; +@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); + + if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + matched = 1; + } + } + if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. + */ + static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, +- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) ++ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + { + int i; + +@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); + + /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ +- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) ++ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ + data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; + data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) { + ossl_policy_data_free(data); + return 0; + } +@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ + if (last->anyPolicy && + ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, +- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) ++ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + return 1; + } +@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, + extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS + | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; + node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, +- tree); ++ tree, 1); + } + if (!tree->user_policies) { + tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); +@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + + for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { + cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert); +- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) ++ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree)) + return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; + + if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..852706d8aa --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +commit 1dd43e0709fece299b15208f36cc7c76209ba0bb +Author: Matt Caswell +Date: Tue Mar 7 16:52:55 2023 +0000 + + Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf certs + + Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we + later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf + cert was bad. + + Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 + + Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau + Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz + (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587) + +diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + goto memerr; + /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { +- int i; ++ int i, cbcalled = 0; + + /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ +- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { ++ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + ++ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0) ++ cbcalled = 1; + CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); + } ++ if (!cbcalled) { ++ /* Should not be able to get here */ ++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ + return 1; + } + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c71665d82e --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +commit 51e8a84ce742db0f6c70510d0159dad8f7825908 +Author: Tomas Mraz +Date: Tue Mar 21 16:15:47 2023 +0100 + + Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() + + The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking. + + Fixes: CVE-2023-0466 + + Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell + Reviewed-by: Paul Dale + (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20563) + +diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod +index 75a1677022..43c1900bca 100644 +--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod ++++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod +@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B. + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B to + B. Normally the current time is used. + +-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled +-by default) and adds B to the acceptable policy set. ++X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B to the acceptable policy set. ++Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable ++policy checking. + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled + by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B. Any existing +@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i. + The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(), + and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0. + ++The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as ++enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this. ++The documentation was changed to align with the implementation. ++ + =head1 COPYRIGHT + + Copyright 2009-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b1a657d51 --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +commit 02ac9c9420275868472f33b01def01218742b8bb +Author: Tomas Mraz +Date: Mon Apr 17 16:51:20 2023 +0200 + + aesv8-armx.pl: Avoid buffer overrread in AES-XTS decryption + + Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon) + Fixes: CVE-2023-1255 + + The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes. + Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless. + + Reviewed-by: Paul Dale + Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove + (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759) + + (cherry picked from commit 72dfe46550ee1f1bbfacd49f071419365bc23304) + +diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl +index 6a7bf05d1b..bd583e2c89 100755 +--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl ++++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl +@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); + .align 4 + .Lxts_dec_tail4x: + add $inp,$inp,#16 +- vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16 ++ tst $tailcnt,#0xf + veor $tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0 + vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16 + veor $tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2 +@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); + veor $tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4 + vst1.8 {$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32 + ++ b.eq .Lxts_dec_abort ++ vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16 + b .Lxts_done + .align 4 + .Lxts_outer_dec_tail: diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..111681f27d --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +https://bugs.gentoo.org/894140 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214 + +From d500b51791cd56e73065e3a7f4487fc33f31c91c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike Gilbert +Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2023 17:56:58 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix Configure test for -mips in CFLAGS + +We want to add -mips2 or -mips3 only if the user hasn't already +specified a mips version in CFLAGS. The existing test was a +double-negative. + +Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214 +--- + Configure | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Configure b/Configure +index b6bbec0a85c4..ec48614d6b99 100755 +--- a/Configure ++++ b/Configure +@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m) + } + + if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} +- && !grep { $_ !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { ++ && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { + # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules + my $value; + $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/); diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8-r4.ebuild similarity index 86% rename from sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8.ebuild rename to sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8-r4.ebuild index 27820abb08..d567c3e820 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8-r4.ebuild @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then else SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )" - #KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~x86-linux" - KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86" + KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~arm64-macos" fi S="${WORKDIR}"/${MY_P} @@ -55,6 +54,14 @@ MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=( /usr/include/openssl/configuration.h ) +PATCHES=( + "${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch + "${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch + "${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch + "${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch + "${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch +) + pkg_setup() { if use ktls ; then if kernel_is -lt 4 18 ; then @@ -93,13 +100,6 @@ src_unpack() { } src_prepare() { - # Allow openssl to be cross-compiled - cp "${FILESDIR}"/gentoo.config-1.0.4 gentoo.config || die - chmod a+rx gentoo.config || die - - # Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash - SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl" - # Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file # that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure rm -f Makefile @@ -117,6 +117,14 @@ src_prepare() { rm test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t || die fi + # Test fails depending on kernel configuration, bug #699134 + rm test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t || die +} + +src_configure() { + # Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash + SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl" + # Quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl # doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse # and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (bug #417795 again) @@ -132,17 +140,13 @@ src_prepare() { # Don't remove the no strict aliasing bits below! filter-flags -fstrict-aliasing append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing + # The OpenSSL developers don't test with LTO right now, it leads to various + # warnings/errors (which may or may not be false positives), it's considered + # unsupported, and it's not tested in CI: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663. + filter-lto append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack) - local sslout=$(./gentoo.config) - einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}" - edo perl Configure ${sslout} --test-sanity - - multilib_copy_sources -} - -multilib_src_configure() { # bug #197996 unset APPS # bug #312551 @@ -152,6 +156,10 @@ multilib_src_configure() { tc-export AR CC CXX RANLIB RC + multilib-minimal_src_configure +} + +multilib_src_configure() { use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; } local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal") @@ -168,7 +176,7 @@ multilib_src_configure() { # ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" #fi - local sslout=$(./gentoo.config) + local sslout=$(bash "${FILESDIR}/gentoo.config-1.0.4") einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}" # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/INSTALL.md#enable-and-disable-features @@ -202,7 +210,7 @@ multilib_src_configure() { threads ) - edo perl Configure "${myeconfargs[@]}" + edo perl "${S}/Configure" "${myeconfargs[@]}" } multilib_src_compile() { @@ -223,6 +231,8 @@ multilib_src_install() { emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_sw if use fips; then emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_fips + # Regen this in pkg_preinst, bug 900625 + rm "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}"/fipsmodule.cnf || die fi if multilib_is_native_abi; then @@ -263,3 +273,15 @@ multilib_src_install_all() { # flatcar changes: package `tmpfiles.d` setup for SDK bootstrapping. systemd-tmpfiles --create --root="${ED}" "${FILESDIR}"/openssl.conf } + +pkg_preinst() { + if use fips; then + # Regen fipsmodule.cnf, bug 900625 + ebegin "Running openssl fipsinstall" + "${ED}/usr/bin/openssl" fipsinstall -quiet \ + -out "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/fipsmodule.cnf" \ + -module "${ED}/usr/$(get_libdir)/ossl-modules/fips.so" + eend $? + fi +} +