Merge pull request #2518 from bgilbert/kernel-4.10.9

sys-kernel/coreos-*: bump to v4.10.9; enable NVMe over RDMA

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.9.ebuild

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI=5
-COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
+COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
 inherit coreos-kernel
 
 DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.9.ebuild

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI=5
-COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
+COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
 inherit coreos-kernel savedconfig
 
 DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel modules"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.10

@@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ CONFIG_XEN_BLKDEV_BACKEND=m
 CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RBD=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NVME=m
+CONFIG_NVME_RDMA=m
+CONFIG_NVME_TARGET=m
+CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_LOOP=m
+CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_RDMA=m
 CONFIG_ENCLOSURE_SERVICES=m
 CONFIG_HP_ILO=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SR=m

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 DIST linux-4.10.tar.xz 94231404 SHA256 3c95d9f049bd085e5c346d2c77f063b8425f191460fcd3ae9fe7e94e0477dc4b SHA512 c3690125a8402df638095bd98a613fcf1a257b81de7611c84711d315cd11e2634ab4636302b3742aedf1e3ba9ce0fea53fe8c7d48e37865d8ee5db3565220d90 WHIRLPOOL 86d021bae2dbfc4ef80c22d9e886bed4fbd9476473a2851d7beaf8ed0c7f7fbc1fa0da230eb9e763eb231b7c164c17b2a73fd336ab233543f57be280d6173738
-DIST patch-4.10.4.xz 106756 SHA256 68e935fbe1c3faaf186824a44b79a26f1ab85f04a1dade2e5bce5f8c2941624d SHA512 a0631f3ee744984d9388d8e9ad98e7238d9305d94082db784b28080d9bae4f2c0cca84e4510ccfa562f5246ce1ed98c78cf41edc5a3b3bcc862ed62a1f2c8516 WHIRLPOOL a610e5d6e39fd07e8bf4e0056af7450cc6d0820c26e09052e8943ebdb8bfcdf89342f404ddc07ff2fddcada4504483ecd0688fb405549f189d6c387b3b553b48
+DIST patch-4.10.9.xz 205384 SHA256 9a00b962a5e30d61a0d488fc28f4a20b79c8c5c28fa21ee89c440c025c6c7c21 SHA512 867cdcf1e6ceee58dec7eb913e119dcaa75255cef1ad2dd9eb0eead6a918a202e3b6656770422d547a7758236a8589c70d49fa4045de867b77a04480f97c242d WHIRLPOOL 694eacdce67dc46f21fc5d1738e14c13e9d62e564d5f9e761a46e0c7cfba57fdf052286c625d246542deba146f1fb8cdba8987b721705cc961bb1cf990e524ce

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.9.ebuild

@@ -36,6 +36,4 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch \
-	${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch \
-	${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch \
 "

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From b2abd80b69de4ea94e7d003a13160df562392c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 25483d5582a84e12b9549c2723bbf6ca20b380cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Add secure_modules() call
+Subject: [PATCH 01/16] Add secure_modules() call
 
 Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
 has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0002-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From ea565b4c32c1078914c2dd9903d2aebf67bab0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1c7d420a3c2fd484acf2f57f40a358a62d205be7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 02/18] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
+Subject: [PATCH 02/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
  enabled
 
 Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0003-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 247ab2f0f22a52cc9b87a9e6dbd3c523cb02fd7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0809979ec779573c6519357aaa66b196134bd5fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 03/18] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
+Subject: [PATCH 03/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
  enabled
 
 IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0004-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 5eeb29907f925210621bd752aeca7f4826456ab3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 30c3700c562f87e1dfdef91062c32762c254e434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 04/18] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
+Subject: [PATCH 04/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
 
 custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
 it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0005-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 30c3afa1c37c6c0adbd7cb4766d96ff2f8a3c3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e1c6be9b1dc28d543f2f01540ecaf6aa892d0e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 05/18] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
+Subject: [PATCH 05/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
  loading is restricted
 
 We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0006-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From c8a67b57068f99a212023507ffeea874ba658b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0430e19e6a0f592724edf0a72627b8ded7d39942 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
+Subject: [PATCH 06/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
  restricted
 
 Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0007-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 5359936a69b86d5fc0893eeac402f39db3d1364a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e5ad175adb56e386dc53e82084116a3f086006c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 07/18] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
+Subject: [PATCH 07/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
  loading is restricted
 
 This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0008-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From f7278e3a4ee1e978444966382f09fd59e8a760bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4fb1128fbac6e54b54e55870b93ffa97d354eaf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
 Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 18:55:53 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 08/18] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
+Subject: [PATCH 08/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
  loading restrictions
 
 kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0009-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From e447d16529ac075611efff2a5b08a965b89f178a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 9683bd9d4a6a9603a98e54dcf6849ce1b09fd09d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 09/18] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
+Subject: [PATCH 09/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
  restricted
 
 Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted,

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0010-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 82c969da1e430f362b44bae864bf2da8e2d3b503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5ad82fbaf16c1fe56e12d18373b1477d3518b8e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
+Subject: [PATCH 10/16] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
  when in Secure Boot mode
 
 UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0011-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 91d4b04458c069b34b0ac00b0810ea430c3af757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 24a8299ab03c6fdfffb0e75279ea9ba3fe66d62e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 11/18] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
+Subject: [PATCH 11/16] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
 
 The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being
 UEFI based.  Reflect this in the config deps.

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From fe4593724b038638a71e277cb2df62750a069af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From d7f4afdbee0a79c7c49723b434a52d70ecfed470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 12/18] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
+Subject: [PATCH 12/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
 
 UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
 for use with efi_enabled.

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0013-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 69d98ac51018ec84515a087873082f139072fc94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5858e98a315cd78c59c744acbaed63b6cadf39b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 13/18] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
+Subject: [PATCH 13/16] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
 
 There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
 from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From ad97f1904d0ba6ce252a0af5c1601eb376e004d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0770bc355f017765e532d6f096a5521c289ef83f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
 Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 14/18] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
+Subject: [PATCH 14/16] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
 
 This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
 provided they stay reachable relative to one another.  Useful for
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ by some undesirable path component.
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 8df819e..65abe81 100644
+index 4ebd511..16c4138 100644
 --- a/Makefile
 +++ b/Makefile
 @@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 3014e6df9afba9273b942cbb85c912ccb58bcbd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2ce5844c758046656609505b4d3e55020e6846c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
 Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 15/18] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
+Subject: [PATCH 15/16] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
 
 Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
 ---

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 41afe48e7ce028e30d5da92c574a4663924281fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f744aa4454446d8b066700eb79819170586df9cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
 Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 10:07:31 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 16/18] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
+Subject: [PATCH 16/16] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
  within user namespaces
 
 commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From f541c301cbca8f4b1f0ebd31ddfa2e2b00557fc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 07:29:31 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 17/18] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
- replay_window
-
-When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
-validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
-and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
-buffer.  However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call.  There we again validate the size of the supplied
-buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents.  We do
-not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
-memory.  This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
-netlink packets.  This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
-priviledge escalation.
-
-We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
-xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len().  This confirms that the user
-is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
-includes the replay_esn.  It however does not check the replay_window
-remains within that buffer.  Add validation of the contained
-replay_window.
-
-CVE-2017-7184
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
----
- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-index 9705c27..cdf887f 100644
---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
- 	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
-+	if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.9.3
-

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From e8b4c221152ffb698218514866f0c0092972b2ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:45:44 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 18/18] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size
- harder
-
-Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
-wrapping issues.  To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
-structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
-by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
-
-CVE-2017-7184
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
----
- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-index cdf887f..40a8aa3 100644
---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-@@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
- 	up = nla_data(rp);
- 	ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
- 
--	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
-+	/* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
-+	 * potential overflow. */
-+	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
-+	    xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
-+	    replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
- 	if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
--- 
-2.9.3
-