From 007c5b14305a00195d72193f6a6d0b80375a5c1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Gilbert Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2017 19:26:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] sys-kernel/coreos-*: bump to v4.10.9 --- ...-r1.ebuild => coreos-kernel-4.10.9.ebuild} | 2 +- ...r1.ebuild => coreos-modules-4.10.9.ebuild} | 2 +- .../sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest | 2 +- ...r1.ebuild => coreos-sources-4.10.9.ebuild} | 2 - .../4.10/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch | 4 +- ...R-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch | 4 +- ...-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch | 4 +- ...4-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch | 4 +- ...t-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch | 4 +- ...-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch | 4 +- ..._rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch | 4 +- ...-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch | 4 +- ...-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch | 4 +- ...tomatically-enforce-module-signature.patch | 4 +- ...ECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch | 4 +- .../z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch | 4 +- ...able-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch | 4 +- ...lative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch | 6 +-- .../z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch | 4 +- ...ntext-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch | 4 +- ...te-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch | 49 ------------------- ...te-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch | 39 --------------- 22 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-) rename sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/{coreos-kernel-4.10.4-r1.ebuild => coreos-kernel-4.10.9.ebuild} (98%) rename sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/{coreos-modules-4.10.4-r1.ebuild => coreos-modules-4.10.9.ebuild} (98%) rename sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/{coreos-sources-4.10.4-r1.ebuild => coreos-sources-4.10.9.ebuild} (91%) delete mode 100644 sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch delete mode 100644 sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.4-r1.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.9.ebuild similarity index 98% rename from sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.4-r1.ebuild rename to sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.9.ebuild index 1a6a9c3550..2fe3d5d496 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.4-r1.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.10.9.ebuild @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 EAPI=5 -COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1" +COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="" inherit coreos-kernel DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel" diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.4-r1.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.9.ebuild similarity index 98% rename from sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.4-r1.ebuild rename to sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.9.ebuild index 5f7ad1c646..763d6d9dfe 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.4-r1.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.10.9.ebuild @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 EAPI=5 -COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1" +COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="" inherit coreos-kernel savedconfig DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel modules" diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest index 2b34a70baf..5cdcebc84e 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ DIST linux-4.10.tar.xz 94231404 SHA256 3c95d9f049bd085e5c346d2c77f063b8425f191460fcd3ae9fe7e94e0477dc4b SHA512 c3690125a8402df638095bd98a613fcf1a257b81de7611c84711d315cd11e2634ab4636302b3742aedf1e3ba9ce0fea53fe8c7d48e37865d8ee5db3565220d90 WHIRLPOOL 86d021bae2dbfc4ef80c22d9e886bed4fbd9476473a2851d7beaf8ed0c7f7fbc1fa0da230eb9e763eb231b7c164c17b2a73fd336ab233543f57be280d6173738 -DIST patch-4.10.4.xz 106756 SHA256 68e935fbe1c3faaf186824a44b79a26f1ab85f04a1dade2e5bce5f8c2941624d SHA512 a0631f3ee744984d9388d8e9ad98e7238d9305d94082db784b28080d9bae4f2c0cca84e4510ccfa562f5246ce1ed98c78cf41edc5a3b3bcc862ed62a1f2c8516 WHIRLPOOL a610e5d6e39fd07e8bf4e0056af7450cc6d0820c26e09052e8943ebdb8bfcdf89342f404ddc07ff2fddcada4504483ecd0688fb405549f189d6c387b3b553b48 +DIST patch-4.10.9.xz 205384 SHA256 9a00b962a5e30d61a0d488fc28f4a20b79c8c5c28fa21ee89c440c025c6c7c21 SHA512 867cdcf1e6ceee58dec7eb913e119dcaa75255cef1ad2dd9eb0eead6a918a202e3b6656770422d547a7758236a8589c70d49fa4045de867b77a04480f97c242d WHIRLPOOL 694eacdce67dc46f21fc5d1738e14c13e9d62e564d5f9e761a46e0c7cfba57fdf052286c625d246542deba146f1fb8cdba8987b721705cc961bb1cf990e524ce diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.4-r1.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.9.ebuild similarity index 91% rename from sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.4-r1.ebuild rename to sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.9.ebuild index f9dad927da..d34ba81d76 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.4-r1.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.10.9.ebuild @@ -36,6 +36,4 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST=" ${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \ ${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \ ${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch \ - ${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch \ - ${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch \ " diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch index 8abdc499b0..8386a150a7 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0001-Add-secure_modules-call.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From b2abd80b69de4ea94e7d003a13160df562392c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 25483d5582a84e12b9549c2723bbf6ca20b380cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Add secure_modules() call +Subject: [PATCH 01/16] Add secure_modules() call Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0002-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0002-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch index 00b1f0c5f5..feb3ad6ac6 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0002-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0002-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From ea565b4c32c1078914c2dd9903d2aebf67bab0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 1c7d420a3c2fd484acf2f57f40a358a62d205be7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 02/18] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is +Subject: [PATCH 02/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0003-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0003-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch index 7b7e268e4c..2647f394d5 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0003-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0003-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 247ab2f0f22a52cc9b87a9e6dbd3c523cb02fd7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0809979ec779573c6519357aaa66b196134bd5fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 03/18] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is +Subject: [PATCH 03/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is enabled IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0004-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0004-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch index 2c1d8b553f..c9f4fef29a 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0004-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0004-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 5eeb29907f925210621bd752aeca7f4826456ab3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 30c3700c562f87e1dfdef91062c32762c254e434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 04/18] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method +Subject: [PATCH 04/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0005-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0005-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch index 47f1115581..dae012096b 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0005-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0005-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 30c3afa1c37c6c0adbd7cb4766d96ff2f8a3c3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e1c6be9b1dc28d543f2f01540ecaf6aa892d0e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 05/18] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module +Subject: [PATCH 05/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0006-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0006-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch index 273bcbae27..17b253516e 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0006-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0006-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From c8a67b57068f99a212023507ffeea874ba658b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0430e19e6a0f592724edf0a72627b8ded7d39942 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is +Subject: [PATCH 06/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is restricted Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0007-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0007-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch index ac390c24e6..a3472c1954 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0007-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0007-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 5359936a69b86d5fc0893eeac402f39db3d1364a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e5ad175adb56e386dc53e82084116a3f086006c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 07/18] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module +Subject: [PATCH 07/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module loading is restricted This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0008-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0008-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch index ea4a3c0b65..dfc71371d2 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0008-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0008-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From f7278e3a4ee1e978444966382f09fd59e8a760bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 4fb1128fbac6e54b54e55870b93ffa97d354eaf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 18:55:53 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 08/18] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module +Subject: [PATCH 08/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0009-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0009-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch index eb3a2e3b35..6a5feeacb3 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0009-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0009-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From e447d16529ac075611efff2a5b08a965b89f178a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 9683bd9d4a6a9603a98e54dcf6849ce1b09fd09d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 09/18] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is +Subject: [PATCH 09/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted, diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0010-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0010-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch index 08f8c8e702..26eccd7f85 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0010-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0010-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 82c969da1e430f362b44bae864bf2da8e2d3b503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 5ad82fbaf16c1fe56e12d18373b1477d3518b8e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures +Subject: [PATCH 10/16] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0011-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0011-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch index 2277b5e85d..fe8f9e147f 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0011-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0011-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 91d4b04458c069b34b0ac00b0810ea430c3af757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 24a8299ab03c6fdfffb0e75279ea9ba3fe66d62e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 11/18] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI +Subject: [PATCH 11/16] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch index 63bcf991b6..825596e0d5 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0012-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From fe4593724b038638a71e277cb2df62750a069af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From d7f4afdbee0a79c7c49723b434a52d70ecfed470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 12/18] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit +Subject: [PATCH 12/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0013-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0013-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch index 8a17f4dcde..fb6fb4c183 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0013-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0013-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 69d98ac51018ec84515a087873082f139072fc94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 5858e98a315cd78c59c744acbaed63b6cadf39b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 13/18] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment +Subject: [PATCH 13/16] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch index 42fe6b2923..313dab76af 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From ad97f1904d0ba6ce252a0af5c1601eb376e004d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0770bc355f017765e532d6f096a5521c289ef83f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vito Caputo Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 14/18] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR +Subject: [PATCH 14/16] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots, provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ by some undesirable path component. 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index 8df819e..65abe81 100644 +index 4ebd511..16c4138 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch index e9dadb80a8..e272245626 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 3014e6df9afba9273b942cbb85c912ccb58bcbd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 2ce5844c758046656609505b4d3e55020e6846c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geoff Levand Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 15/18] Add arm64 coreos verity hash +Subject: [PATCH 15/16] Add arm64 coreos verity hash Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand --- diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch index bf8bba10c0..63998730a3 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 41afe48e7ce028e30d5da92c574a4663924281fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From f744aa4454446d8b066700eb79819170586df9cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 10:07:31 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 16/18] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts +Subject: [PATCH 16/16] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user namespaces commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fc663075eb..0000000000 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -From f541c301cbca8f4b1f0ebd31ddfa2e2b00557fc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Andy Whitcroft -Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 07:29:31 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 17/18] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL - replay_window - -When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we -validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid -and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated -buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a -XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied -buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do -not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated -memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by -netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for -priviledge escalation. - -We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in -xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user -is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which -includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window -remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained -replay_window. - -CVE-2017-7184 -Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft -Acked-by: Steffen Klassert -Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds ---- - net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c -index 9705c27..cdf887f 100644 ---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c -+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c -@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es - if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen) - return -EINVAL; - -+ if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ - return 0; - } - --- -2.9.3 - diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4c5fdc112d..0000000000 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.10/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From e8b4c221152ffb698218514866f0c0092972b2ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Andy Whitcroft -Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:45:44 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 18/18] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size - harder - -Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to -wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN -structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported -by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. - -CVE-2017-7184 -Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft -Acked-by: Steffen Klassert -Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds ---- - net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 6 +++++- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c -index cdf887f..40a8aa3 100644 ---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c -+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c -@@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es - up = nla_data(rp); - ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up); - -- if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen) -+ /* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid -+ * potential overflow. */ -+ if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || -+ xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen || -+ replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len) - return -EINVAL; - - if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8) --- -2.9.3 - From 04c48fe7ee67e235d9d47266f0d25e2e21777cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Gilbert Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2017 19:28:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] sys-kernel/coreos-modules: Enable NVMe over RDMA --- .../sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.10 | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.10 b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.10 index 2d150b6360..43903961da 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.10 +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.10 @@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ CONFIG_XEN_BLKDEV_BACKEND=m CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK=m CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RBD=m CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NVME=m +CONFIG_NVME_RDMA=m +CONFIG_NVME_TARGET=m +CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_LOOP=m +CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_RDMA=m CONFIG_ENCLOSURE_SERVICES=m CONFIG_HP_ILO=m CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SR=m