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* Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package. This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository. * Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package. This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository. * Updating the license from MPL to Business Source License. Going forward, this project will be licensed under the Business Source License v1.1. Please see our blog post for more details at https://hashi.co/bsl-blog, FAQ at www.hashicorp.com/licensing-faq, and details of the license at www.hashicorp.com/bsl. * add missing license headers * Update copyright file headers to BUS-1.1 * Fix test that expected exact offset on hcl file --------- Co-authored-by: hashicorp-copywrite[bot] <110428419+hashicorp-copywrite[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sarah Thompson <sthompson@hashicorp.com> Co-authored-by: Brian Kassouf <bkassouf@hashicorp.com>
415 lines
12 KiB
Go
415 lines
12 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
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package http
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/consts"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/vault"
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)
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func handleSysRekeyInit(core *vault.Core, recovery bool) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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standby, _ := core.Standby()
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if standby {
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respondStandby(core, w, r.URL)
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return
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}
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repState := core.ReplicationState()
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if repState.HasState(consts.ReplicationPerformanceSecondary) {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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fmt.Errorf("rekeying can only be performed on the primary cluster when replication is activated"))
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return
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}
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ctx, cancel := core.GetContext()
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defer cancel()
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switch {
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case recovery && !core.SealAccess().RecoveryKeySupported():
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("recovery rekeying not supported"))
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case r.Method == "GET":
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handleSysRekeyInitGet(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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case r.Method == "POST" || r.Method == "PUT":
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handleSysRekeyInitPut(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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case r.Method == "DELETE":
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handleSysRekeyInitDelete(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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default:
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respondError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, nil)
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}
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})
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}
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func handleSysRekeyInitGet(ctx context.Context, core *vault.Core, recovery bool, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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barrierConfig, barrierConfErr := core.SealAccess().BarrierConfig(ctx)
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if barrierConfErr != nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, barrierConfErr)
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return
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}
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if barrierConfig == nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("server is not yet initialized"))
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return
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}
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// Get the rekey configuration
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rekeyConf, err := core.RekeyConfig(recovery)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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sealThreshold, err := core.RekeyThreshold(ctx, recovery)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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// Format the status
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status := &RekeyStatusResponse{
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Started: false,
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T: 0,
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N: 0,
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Required: sealThreshold,
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}
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if rekeyConf != nil {
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// Get the progress
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started, progress, err := core.RekeyProgress(recovery, false)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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status.Nonce = rekeyConf.Nonce
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status.Started = started
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status.T = rekeyConf.SecretThreshold
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status.N = rekeyConf.SecretShares
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status.Progress = progress
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status.VerificationRequired = rekeyConf.VerificationRequired
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status.VerificationNonce = rekeyConf.VerificationNonce
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if rekeyConf.PGPKeys != nil && len(rekeyConf.PGPKeys) != 0 {
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pgpFingerprints, err := pgpkeys.GetFingerprints(rekeyConf.PGPKeys, nil)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err)
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return
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}
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status.PGPFingerprints = pgpFingerprints
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status.Backup = rekeyConf.Backup
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}
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}
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respondOk(w, status)
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}
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func handleSysRekeyInitPut(ctx context.Context, core *vault.Core, recovery bool, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Parse the request
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var req RekeyRequest
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if _, err := parseJSONRequest(core.PerfStandby(), r, w, &req); err != nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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return
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}
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if req.Backup && len(req.PGPKeys) == 0 {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("cannot request a backup of the new keys without providing PGP keys for encryption"))
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return
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}
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if len(req.PGPKeys) > 0 && len(req.PGPKeys) != req.SecretShares {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("incorrect number of PGP keys for rekey"))
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return
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}
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// Initialize the rekey
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err := core.RekeyInit(&vault.SealConfig{
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SecretShares: req.SecretShares,
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SecretThreshold: req.SecretThreshold,
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StoredShares: req.StoredShares,
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PGPKeys: req.PGPKeys,
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Backup: req.Backup,
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VerificationRequired: req.RequireVerification,
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}, recovery)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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handleSysRekeyInitGet(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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}
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func handleSysRekeyInitDelete(ctx context.Context, core *vault.Core, recovery bool, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err := core.RekeyCancel(recovery); err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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respondOk(w, nil)
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}
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func handleSysRekeyUpdate(core *vault.Core, recovery bool) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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standby, _ := core.Standby()
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if standby {
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respondStandby(core, w, r.URL)
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return
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}
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// Parse the request
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var req RekeyUpdateRequest
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if _, err := parseJSONRequest(core.PerfStandby(), r, w, &req); err != nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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return
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}
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if req.Key == "" {
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respondError(
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w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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errors.New("'key' must be specified in request body as JSON"))
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return
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}
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// Decode the key, which is base64 or hex encoded
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min, max := core.BarrierKeyLength()
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key, err := hex.DecodeString(req.Key)
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// We check min and max here to ensure that a string that is base64
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// encoded but also valid hex will not be valid and we instead base64
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// decode it
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if err != nil || len(key) < min || len(key) > max {
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key, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.Key)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(
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w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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errors.New("'key' must be a valid hex or base64 string"))
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return
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}
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}
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ctx, cancel := core.GetContext()
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defer cancel()
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// Use the key to make progress on rekey
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result, rekeyErr := core.RekeyUpdate(ctx, key, req.Nonce, recovery)
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if rekeyErr != nil {
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respondError(w, rekeyErr.Code(), rekeyErr)
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return
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}
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// Format the response
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resp := &RekeyUpdateResponse{}
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if result != nil {
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resp.Complete = true
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resp.Nonce = req.Nonce
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resp.Backup = result.Backup
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resp.PGPFingerprints = result.PGPFingerprints
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resp.VerificationRequired = result.VerificationRequired
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resp.VerificationNonce = result.VerificationNonce
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// Encode the keys
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keys := make([]string, 0, len(result.SecretShares))
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keysB64 := make([]string, 0, len(result.SecretShares))
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for _, k := range result.SecretShares {
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keys = append(keys, hex.EncodeToString(k))
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keysB64 = append(keysB64, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k))
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}
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resp.Keys = keys
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resp.KeysB64 = keysB64
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respondOk(w, resp)
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} else {
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handleSysRekeyInitGet(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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}
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})
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}
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func handleSysRekeyVerify(core *vault.Core, recovery bool) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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standby, _ := core.Standby()
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if standby {
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respondStandby(core, w, r.URL)
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return
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}
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repState := core.ReplicationState()
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if repState.HasState(consts.ReplicationPerformanceSecondary) {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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fmt.Errorf("rekeying can only be performed on the primary cluster when replication is activated"))
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return
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}
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ctx, cancel := core.GetContext()
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defer cancel()
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switch {
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case recovery && !core.SealAccess().RecoveryKeySupported():
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("recovery rekeying not supported"))
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case r.Method == "GET":
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handleSysRekeyVerifyGet(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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case r.Method == "POST" || r.Method == "PUT":
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handleSysRekeyVerifyPut(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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case r.Method == "DELETE":
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handleSysRekeyVerifyDelete(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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default:
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respondError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, nil)
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}
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})
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}
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func handleSysRekeyVerifyGet(ctx context.Context, core *vault.Core, recovery bool, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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barrierConfig, barrierConfErr := core.SealAccess().BarrierConfig(ctx)
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if barrierConfErr != nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, barrierConfErr)
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return
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}
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if barrierConfig == nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("server is not yet initialized"))
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return
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}
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// Get the rekey configuration
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rekeyConf, err := core.RekeyConfig(recovery)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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if rekeyConf == nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New("no rekey configuration found"))
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return
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}
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// Get the progress
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started, progress, err := core.RekeyProgress(recovery, true)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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// Format the status
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status := &RekeyVerificationStatusResponse{
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Started: started,
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Nonce: rekeyConf.VerificationNonce,
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T: rekeyConf.SecretThreshold,
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N: rekeyConf.SecretShares,
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Progress: progress,
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}
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respondOk(w, status)
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}
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func handleSysRekeyVerifyDelete(ctx context.Context, core *vault.Core, recovery bool, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err := core.RekeyVerifyRestart(recovery); err != nil {
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respondError(w, err.Code(), err)
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return
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}
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handleSysRekeyVerifyGet(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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}
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func handleSysRekeyVerifyPut(ctx context.Context, core *vault.Core, recovery bool, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Parse the request
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var req RekeyVerificationUpdateRequest
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if _, err := parseJSONRequest(core.PerfStandby(), r, w, &req); err != nil {
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respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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return
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}
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if req.Key == "" {
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respondError(
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w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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errors.New("'key' must be specified in request body as JSON"))
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return
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}
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// Decode the key, which is base64 or hex encoded
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min, max := core.BarrierKeyLength()
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key, err := hex.DecodeString(req.Key)
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// We check min and max here to ensure that a string that is base64
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// encoded but also valid hex will not be valid and we instead base64
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// decode it
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if err != nil || len(key) < min || len(key) > max {
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key, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.Key)
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if err != nil {
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respondError(
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w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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errors.New("'key' must be a valid hex or base64 string"))
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return
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}
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}
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ctx, cancel := core.GetContext()
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defer cancel()
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// Use the key to make progress on rekey
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result, rekeyErr := core.RekeyVerify(ctx, key, req.Nonce, recovery)
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if rekeyErr != nil {
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respondError(w, rekeyErr.Code(), rekeyErr)
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return
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}
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// Format the response
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resp := &RekeyVerificationUpdateResponse{}
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if result != nil {
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resp.Complete = true
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resp.Nonce = result.Nonce
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respondOk(w, resp)
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} else {
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handleSysRekeyVerifyGet(ctx, core, recovery, w, r)
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}
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}
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type RekeyRequest struct {
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SecretShares int `json:"secret_shares"`
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SecretThreshold int `json:"secret_threshold"`
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StoredShares int `json:"stored_shares"`
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PGPKeys []string `json:"pgp_keys"`
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Backup bool `json:"backup"`
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RequireVerification bool `json:"require_verification"`
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}
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type RekeyStatusResponse struct {
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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Started bool `json:"started"`
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T int `json:"t"`
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N int `json:"n"`
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Progress int `json:"progress"`
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Required int `json:"required"`
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PGPFingerprints []string `json:"pgp_fingerprints"`
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Backup bool `json:"backup"`
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VerificationRequired bool `json:"verification_required"`
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VerificationNonce string `json:"verification_nonce,omitempty"`
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}
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type RekeyUpdateRequest struct {
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Nonce string
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Key string
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}
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type RekeyUpdateResponse struct {
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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Complete bool `json:"complete"`
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Keys []string `json:"keys"`
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KeysB64 []string `json:"keys_base64"`
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PGPFingerprints []string `json:"pgp_fingerprints"`
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Backup bool `json:"backup"`
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VerificationRequired bool `json:"verification_required"`
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VerificationNonce string `json:"verification_nonce,omitempty"`
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}
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type RekeyVerificationUpdateRequest struct {
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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Key string `json:"key"`
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}
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type RekeyVerificationStatusResponse struct {
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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Started bool `json:"started"`
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T int `json:"t"`
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N int `json:"n"`
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Progress int `json:"progress"`
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}
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type RekeyVerificationUpdateResponse struct {
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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Complete bool `json:"complete"`
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}
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