vault/builtin/logical/pki/cert_util.go
Jeff Mitchell 122773ba71 Add slack on NotBefore value for generated certs.
This fixes an issue where, due to clock skew, one system can get a cert
and try to use it before it thinks it's actually valid. The tolerance of
30 seconds should be high enough for pretty much any set of systems
using NTP.

Fixes #1035
2016-02-07 14:00:03 -05:00

943 lines
26 KiB
Go

package pki
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"net"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/certutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical/framework"
)
type certUsage int
const (
serverUsage certUsage = 1 << iota
clientUsage
codeSigningUsage
emailProtectionUsage
caUsage
)
type creationBundle struct {
CommonName string
DNSNames []string
EmailAddresses []string
IPAddresses []net.IP
IsCA bool
KeyType string
KeyBits int
SigningBundle *caInfoBundle
TTL time.Duration
Usage certUsage
// Only used when signing a CA cert
UseCSRValues bool
// URLs to encode into the certificate
URLs *urlEntries
// The maximum path length to encode
MaxPathLength int
}
type caInfoBundle struct {
certutil.ParsedCertBundle
URLs *urlEntries
}
var (
hostnameRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^(([a-zA-Z0-9]|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9\-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])\.)*([A-Za-z0-9]|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\-]*[A-Za-z0-9])$`)
oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19}
)
func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool {
for _, e := range extensions {
if e.Id.Equal(oid) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func getFormat(data *framework.FieldData) string {
format := data.Get("format").(string)
switch format {
case "pem":
case "der":
case "pem_bundle":
default:
format = ""
}
return format
}
func validateKeyTypeLength(keyType string, keyBits int) *logical.Response {
switch keyType {
case "rsa":
switch keyBits {
case 1024:
case 2048:
case 4096:
case 8192:
default:
return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(
"unsupported bit length for RSA key: %d", keyBits))
}
case "ec":
switch keyBits {
case 224:
case 256:
case 384:
case 521:
default:
return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(
"unsupported bit length for EC key: %d", keyBits))
}
default:
return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(
"unknown key type %s", keyType))
}
return nil
}
// Fetches the CA info. Unlike other certificates, the CA info is stored
// in the backend as a CertBundle, because we are storing its private key
func fetchCAInfo(req *logical.Request) (*caInfoBundle, error) {
bundleEntry, err := req.Storage.Get("config/ca_bundle")
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch local CA certificate/key: %v", err)}
}
if bundleEntry == nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "backend must be configured with a CA certificate/key"}
}
var bundle certutil.CertBundle
if err := bundleEntry.DecodeJSON(&bundle); err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to decode local CA certificate/key: %v", err)}
}
parsedBundle, err := bundle.ToParsedCertBundle()
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
if parsedBundle.Certificate == nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: "stored CA information not able to be parsed"}
}
caInfo := &caInfoBundle{*parsedBundle, nil}
entries, err := getURLs(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch URL information: %v", err)}
}
if entries == nil {
entries = &urlEntries{
IssuingCertificates: []string{},
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{},
OCSPServers: []string{},
}
}
caInfo.URLs = entries
return caInfo, nil
}
// Allows fetching certificates from the backend; it handles the slightly
// separate pathing for CA, CRL, and revoked certificates.
func fetchCertBySerial(req *logical.Request, prefix, serial string) (*logical.StorageEntry, error) {
var path string
switch {
case serial == "ca":
path = "ca"
case serial == "crl":
path = "crl"
case strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "revoked/"):
path = "revoked/" + strings.Replace(strings.ToLower(serial), "-", ":", -1)
default:
path = "certs/" + strings.Replace(strings.ToLower(serial), "-", ":", -1)
}
certEntry, err := req.Storage.Get(path)
if err != nil || certEntry == nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("certificate with serial number %s not found", serial)}
}
if certEntry.Value == nil || len(certEntry.Value) == 0 {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("returned certificate bytes for serial %s were empty", serial)}
}
return certEntry, nil
}
// Given a set of requested names for a certificate, verifies that all of them
// match the various toggles set in the role for controlling issuance.
// If one does not pass, it is returned in the string argument.
func validateNames(req *logical.Request, names []string, role *roleEntry) (string, error) {
for _, name := range names {
sanitizedName := name
emailDomain := name
isEmail := false
isWildcard := false
// If it has an @, assume it is an email address and separate out the
// user from the hostname portion so that we can act on the hostname.
// Note that this matches behavior from the alt_names parameter. If it
// ends up being problematic for users, I guess that could be separated
// into dns_names and email_names in the future to be explicit, but I
// don't think this is likely.
if strings.Contains(name, "@") {
splitEmail := strings.Split(name, "@")
if len(splitEmail) != 2 {
return name, nil
}
sanitizedName = splitEmail[1]
emailDomain = splitEmail[1]
isEmail = true
}
// If we have an asterisk as the first part of the domain name, mark it
// as wildcard and set the sanitized name to the remainder of the
// domain
if strings.HasPrefix(sanitizedName, "*.") {
sanitizedName = sanitizedName[2:]
isWildcard = true
}
// Email addresses using wildcard domain names do not make sense
if isEmail && isWildcard {
return name, nil
}
// AllowAnyName is checked after this because EnforceHostnames still
// applies when allowing any name. Also, we check the sanitized name to
// ensure that we are not either checking a full email address or a
// wildcard prefix.
if role.EnforceHostnames {
if !hostnameRegex.MatchString(sanitizedName) {
return name, nil
}
}
// Self-explanatory
if role.AllowAnyName {
continue
}
// The following blocks all work the same basic way:
// 1) If a role allows a certain class of base (localhost, token
// display name, role-configured domains), perform further tests
//
// 2) If there is a perfect match on either the name itself or it's an
// email address with a perfect match on the hostname portion, allow it
//
// 3) If subdomains are allowed, we check based on the sanitized name;
// note that if not a wildcard, will be equivalent to the email domain
// for email checks, and we already checked above for both a wildcard
// and email address being present in the same name
// 3a) First we check for a non-wildcard subdomain, as in <name>.<base>
// 3b) Then we check if it's a wildcard and the base domain is a match
//
// Variances are noted in-line
if role.AllowLocalhost {
if name == "localhost" ||
name == "localdomain" ||
(isEmail && emailDomain == "localhost") ||
(isEmail && emailDomain == "localdomain") {
continue
}
if role.AllowSubdomains {
// It is possible, if unlikely, to have a subdomain of "localhost"
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, ".localhost") ||
(isWildcard && sanitizedName == "localhost") {
continue
}
// A subdomain of "localdomain" is also not entirely uncommon
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, ".localdomain") ||
(isWildcard && sanitizedName == "localdomain") {
continue
}
}
}
if role.AllowTokenDisplayName {
if name == req.DisplayName {
continue
}
if role.AllowSubdomains {
if isEmail {
// If it's an email address, we need to parse the token
// display name in order to do a proper comparison of the
// subdomain
if strings.Contains(req.DisplayName, "@") {
splitDisplay := strings.Split(req.DisplayName, "@")
if len(splitDisplay) == 2 {
// Compare the sanitized name against the hostname
// portion of the email address in the roken
// display name
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+splitDisplay[1]) {
continue
}
}
}
}
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+req.DisplayName) ||
(isWildcard && sanitizedName == req.DisplayName) {
continue
}
}
}
if role.AllowedDomains != "" {
valid := false
for _, currDomain := range strings.Split(role.AllowedDomains, ",") {
// If there is, say, a trailing comma, ignore it
if currDomain == "" {
continue
}
// First, allow an exact match of the base domain if that role flag
// is enabled
if role.AllowBareDomains &&
(name == currDomain ||
(isEmail && emailDomain == currDomain)) {
valid = true
break
}
if role.AllowSubdomains {
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+currDomain) ||
(isWildcard && sanitizedName == currDomain) {
valid = true
break
}
}
}
if valid {
continue
}
}
//panic(fmt.Sprintf("\nName is %s\nRole is\n%#v\n", name, role))
return name, nil
}
return "", nil
}
func generateCert(b *backend,
role *roleEntry,
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
isCA bool,
req *logical.Request,
data *framework.FieldData) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
creationBundle, err := generateCreationBundle(b, role, signingBundle, nil, req, data)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if isCA {
creationBundle.IsCA = isCA
if signingBundle == nil {
// Generating a self-signed root certificate
entries, err := getURLs(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch URL information: %v", err)}
}
if entries == nil {
entries = &urlEntries{
IssuingCertificates: []string{},
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{},
OCSPServers: []string{},
}
}
creationBundle.URLs = entries
if role.MaxPathLength == nil {
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = -1
} else {
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = *role.MaxPathLength
}
}
}
parsedBundle, err := createCertificate(creationBundle)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return parsedBundle, nil
}
// N.B.: This is only meant to be used for generating intermediate CAs.
// It skips some sanity checks.
func generateIntermediateCSR(b *backend,
role *roleEntry,
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
req *logical.Request,
data *framework.FieldData) (*certutil.ParsedCSRBundle, error) {
creationBundle, err := generateCreationBundle(b, role, signingBundle, nil, req, data)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
parsedBundle, err := createCSR(creationBundle)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return parsedBundle, nil
}
func signCert(b *backend,
role *roleEntry,
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
isCA bool,
useCSRValues bool,
req *logical.Request,
data *framework.FieldData) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
csrString := data.Get("csr").(string)
if csrString == "" {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("\"csr\" is empty")}
}
pemBytes := []byte(csrString)
pemBlock, pemBytes := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if pemBlock == nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "csr contains no data"}
}
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(pemBlock.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "certificate request could not be parsed"}
}
creationBundle, err := generateCreationBundle(b, role, signingBundle, csr, req, data)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if useCSRValues && !isCA {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "cannot use CSR values with a non-CA certificate"}
}
creationBundle.IsCA = isCA
creationBundle.UseCSRValues = useCSRValues
parsedBundle, err := signCertificate(creationBundle, csr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return parsedBundle, nil
}
// generateCreationBundle is a shared function that reads parameters supplied
// from the various endpoints and generates a creationBundle with the
// parameters that can be used to issue or sign
func generateCreationBundle(b *backend,
role *roleEntry,
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
csr *x509.CertificateRequest,
req *logical.Request,
data *framework.FieldData) (*creationBundle, error) {
var err error
var ok bool
// Get the common name
var cn string
{
if csr != nil {
if role.UseCSRCommonName {
cn = csr.Subject.CommonName
}
}
if cn == "" {
cn = data.Get("common_name").(string)
if cn == "" {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: `the common_name field is required, or must be provided in a CSR with "use_csr_common_name" set to true`}
}
}
}
// Read in alternate names -- DNS and email addresses
dnsNames := []string{}
emailAddresses := []string{}
{
if strings.Contains(cn, "@") {
// Note: emails are not disallowed if the role's email protection
// flag is false, because they may well be included for
// informational purposes; it is up to the verifying party to
// ensure that email addresses in a subject alternate name can be
// used for the purpose for which they are presented
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, cn)
} else {
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, cn)
}
cnAltInt, ok := data.GetOk("alt_names")
if ok {
cnAlt := cnAltInt.(string)
if len(cnAlt) != 0 {
for _, v := range strings.Split(cnAlt, ",") {
if strings.Contains(v, "@") {
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, cn)
} else {
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, v)
}
}
}
}
// Check for bad email and/or DNS names
badName, err := validateNames(req, dnsNames, role)
if len(badName) != 0 {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"name %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
} else if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"error validating name %s: %s", badName, err)}
}
badName, err = validateNames(req, emailAddresses, role)
if len(badName) != 0 {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"email %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
} else if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"error validating name %s: %s", badName, err)}
}
}
// Get and verify any IP SANs
ipAddresses := []net.IP{}
var ipAltInt interface{}
{
ipAltInt, ok = data.GetOk("ip_sans")
if ok {
ipAlt := ipAltInt.(string)
if len(ipAlt) != 0 {
if !role.AllowIPSANs {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"IP Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but was provided %s", ipAlt)}
}
for _, v := range strings.Split(ipAlt, ",") {
parsedIP := net.ParseIP(v)
if parsedIP == nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"the value '%s' is not a valid IP address", v)}
}
ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, parsedIP)
}
}
}
}
// Get the TTL and very it against the max allowed
var ttlField string
var ttl time.Duration
var maxTTL time.Duration
var ttlFieldInt interface{}
{
ttlFieldInt, ok = data.GetOk("ttl")
if !ok {
ttlField = role.TTL
} else {
ttlField = ttlFieldInt.(string)
}
if len(ttlField) == 0 {
ttl = b.System().DefaultLeaseTTL()
} else {
ttl, err = time.ParseDuration(ttlField)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"invalid requested ttl: %s", err)}
}
}
if len(role.MaxTTL) == 0 {
maxTTL = b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
} else {
maxTTL, err = time.ParseDuration(role.MaxTTL)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"invalid ttl: %s", err)}
}
}
if ttl > maxTTL {
// Don't error if they were using system defaults, only error if
// they specifically chose a bad TTL
if len(ttlField) == 0 {
ttl = maxTTL
} else {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"ttl is larger than maximum allowed (%d)", maxTTL/time.Second)}
}
}
// If it's not self-signed, verify that the issued certificate won't be
// valid past the lifetime of the CA certificate
if signingBundle != nil &&
time.Now().Add(ttl).After(signingBundle.Certificate.NotAfter) {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
"cannot satisfy request, as TTL is beyond the expiration of the CA certificate")}
}
}
// Build up usages
var usage certUsage
{
if role.ServerFlag {
usage = usage | serverUsage
}
if role.ClientFlag {
usage = usage | clientUsage
}
if role.CodeSigningFlag {
usage = usage | codeSigningUsage
}
if role.EmailProtectionFlag {
usage = usage | emailProtectionUsage
}
}
creationBundle := &creationBundle{
CommonName: cn,
DNSNames: dnsNames,
EmailAddresses: emailAddresses,
IPAddresses: ipAddresses,
KeyType: role.KeyType,
KeyBits: role.KeyBits,
SigningBundle: signingBundle,
TTL: ttl,
Usage: usage,
}
// Don't deal with URLs or max path length if it's self-signed, as these
// normally come from the signing bundle
if signingBundle == nil {
return creationBundle, nil
}
// This will have been read in from the getURLs function
creationBundle.URLs = signingBundle.URLs
// If the max path length in the role is not nil, it was specified at
// generation time with the max_path_length parameter; otherwise derive it
// from the signing certificate
if role.MaxPathLength != nil {
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = *role.MaxPathLength
} else {
switch {
case signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen < 0:
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = -1
case signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen == 0 &&
signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLenZero:
// The signing function will ensure that we do not issue a CA cert
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = 0
default:
// If this takes it to zero, we handle this case later if
// necessary
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen - 1
}
}
return creationBundle, nil
}
// addKeyUsages adds approrpiate key usages to the template given the creation
// information
func addKeyUsages(creationInfo *creationBundle, certTemplate *x509.Certificate) {
if creationInfo.IsCA {
certTemplate.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsage(x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign)
return
}
if creationInfo.Usage&serverUsage != 0 {
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth)
}
if creationInfo.Usage&clientUsage != 0 {
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth)
}
if creationInfo.Usage&codeSigningUsage != 0 {
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning)
}
if creationInfo.Usage&emailProtectionUsage != 0 {
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection)
}
}
// Performs the heavy lifting of creating a certificate. Returns
// a fully-filled-in ParsedCertBundle.
func createCertificate(creationInfo *creationBundle) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
var err error
result := &certutil.ParsedCertBundle{}
serialNumber, err := certutil.GenerateSerialNumber()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := certutil.GeneratePrivateKey(creationInfo.KeyType,
creationInfo.KeyBits,
result); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
subjKeyID, err := certutil.GetSubjKeyID(result.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error getting subject key ID: %s", err)}
}
subject := pkix.Name{
CommonName: creationInfo.CommonName,
}
certTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
Subject: subject,
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(creationInfo.TTL),
IsCA: false,
SubjectKeyId: subjKeyID,
DNSNames: creationInfo.DNSNames,
EmailAddresses: creationInfo.EmailAddresses,
IPAddresses: creationInfo.IPAddresses,
}
// Add this before calling addKeyUsages
if creationInfo.SigningBundle == nil {
certTemplate.IsCA = true
}
addKeyUsages(creationInfo, certTemplate)
certTemplate.IssuingCertificateURL = creationInfo.URLs.IssuingCertificates
certTemplate.CRLDistributionPoints = creationInfo.URLs.CRLDistributionPoints
certTemplate.OCSPServer = creationInfo.URLs.OCSPServers
var certBytes []byte
if creationInfo.SigningBundle != nil {
switch creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKeyType {
case certutil.RSAPrivateKey:
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
case certutil.ECPrivateKey:
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
}
caCert := creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate
certBytes, err = x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, caCert, result.PrivateKey.Public(), creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKey)
} else {
// Creating a self-signed root
if creationInfo.MaxPathLength == 0 {
certTemplate.MaxPathLen = 0
certTemplate.MaxPathLenZero = true
} else {
certTemplate.MaxPathLen = creationInfo.MaxPathLength
}
switch creationInfo.KeyType {
case "rsa":
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
case "ec":
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
}
certTemplate.BasicConstraintsValid = true
certBytes, err = x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, certTemplate, result.PrivateKey.Public(), result.PrivateKey)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to create certificate: %s", err)}
}
result.CertificateBytes = certBytes
result.Certificate, err = x509.ParseCertificate(certBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to parse created certificate: %s", err)}
}
if creationInfo.SigningBundle != nil {
result.IssuingCABytes = creationInfo.SigningBundle.CertificateBytes
result.IssuingCA = creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate
} else {
result.IssuingCABytes = result.CertificateBytes
result.IssuingCA = result.Certificate
}
return result, nil
}
// Creates a CSR. This is currently only meant for use when
// generating an intermediate certificate.
func createCSR(creationInfo *creationBundle) (*certutil.ParsedCSRBundle, error) {
var err error
result := &certutil.ParsedCSRBundle{}
if err := certutil.GeneratePrivateKey(creationInfo.KeyType,
creationInfo.KeyBits,
result); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Like many root CAs, other information is ignored
subject := pkix.Name{
CommonName: creationInfo.CommonName,
}
csrTemplate := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: subject,
DNSNames: creationInfo.DNSNames,
EmailAddresses: creationInfo.EmailAddresses,
IPAddresses: creationInfo.IPAddresses,
}
switch creationInfo.KeyType {
case "rsa":
csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
case "ec":
csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
}
csr, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, csrTemplate, result.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to create certificate: %s", err)}
}
result.CSRBytes = csr
result.CSR, err = x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csr)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to parse created certificate: %s", err)}
}
return result, nil
}
// Performs the heavy lifting of generating a certificate from a CSR.
// Returns a ParsedCertBundle sans private keys.
func signCertificate(creationInfo *creationBundle,
csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
switch {
case creationInfo == nil:
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "nil creation info given to signCertificate"}
case creationInfo.SigningBundle == nil:
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "nil signing bundle given to signCertificate"}
case csr == nil:
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "nil csr given to signCertificate"}
}
err := csr.CheckSignature()
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "request signature invalid"}
}
result := &certutil.ParsedCertBundle{}
serialNumber, err := certutil.GenerateSerialNumber()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
marshaledKey, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(csr.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error marshalling public key: %s", err)}
}
subjKeyID := sha1.Sum(marshaledKey)
subject := pkix.Name{
CommonName: creationInfo.CommonName,
}
certTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
Subject: subject,
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(creationInfo.TTL),
SubjectKeyId: subjKeyID[:],
}
switch creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKeyType {
case certutil.RSAPrivateKey:
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
case certutil.ECPrivateKey:
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
}
if creationInfo.UseCSRValues {
certTemplate.Subject = csr.Subject
certTemplate.DNSNames = csr.DNSNames
certTemplate.EmailAddresses = csr.EmailAddresses
certTemplate.IPAddresses = csr.IPAddresses
certTemplate.ExtraExtensions = csr.Extensions
} else {
certTemplate.DNSNames = creationInfo.DNSNames
certTemplate.EmailAddresses = creationInfo.EmailAddresses
certTemplate.IPAddresses = creationInfo.IPAddresses
}
addKeyUsages(creationInfo, certTemplate)
var certBytes []byte
caCert := creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate
certTemplate.IssuingCertificateURL = creationInfo.URLs.IssuingCertificates
certTemplate.CRLDistributionPoints = creationInfo.URLs.CRLDistributionPoints
certTemplate.OCSPServer = creationInfo.SigningBundle.URLs.OCSPServers
if creationInfo.IsCA {
certTemplate.BasicConstraintsValid = true
certTemplate.IsCA = true
if creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen == 0 &&
creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLenZero {
return nil, certutil.UserError{Err: "signing certificate has a max path length of zero, and cannot issue further CA certificates"}
}
certTemplate.MaxPathLen = creationInfo.MaxPathLength
if certTemplate.MaxPathLen == 0 {
certTemplate.MaxPathLenZero = true
}
}
certBytes, err = x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, caCert, csr.PublicKey, creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to create certificate: %s", err)}
}
result.CertificateBytes = certBytes
result.Certificate, err = x509.ParseCertificate(certBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, certutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to parse created certificate: %s", err)}
}
result.IssuingCABytes = creationInfo.SigningBundle.CertificateBytes
result.IssuingCA = creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate
return result, nil
}