---
layout: docs
page_title: Production hardening
description: >-
  Harden your Vault deployments for production operations.
---

# Production hardening

You can use the best practices in this document to harden Vault when planning
your production deployment. These recommendations follow the
[Vault security model](/vault/docs/internals/security), and focus on defense
in depth.

You should follow the **baseline recommendations** if at all possible for any
production Vault deployment. The **extended recommendations** detail extra
layers of security which may require more administrative overhead, and might
not be suitable for every deployment.

## Baseline recommendations

- **Do not run as root**. Use a dedicated, unprivileged service account to run
  Vault, rather than running as the root or Administrator account. Vault is
  designed to run as an unprivileged user, and doing so adds significant
  defense against various privilege-escalation attacks.

- **Allow minimal write privileges**. The unprivileged Vault service account
  should not have access to overwrite its executable binary or any Vault
  configuration files. Limit what is writable by the Vault user to just
  directories and files for local Vault storage (for example, Integrated
  Storage) or file audit device logs.

- **Use end-to-end TLS**. You should always use Vault with TLS in production.
  If you use intermediate load balancers or reverse proxies to front Vault,
  you should enable TLS for all network connections between every part of the
  system (including external storage) to ensure encryption of all traffic in
  transit to and from Vault. When possible, you should set the HTTP Strict
  Transport Security (HSTS) header using Vault's [custom response headers](/vault/docs/configuration/listener/tcp#configuring-custom-http-response-headers) feature.

- **Disable swap**. Vault encrypts data in transit and at rest, however it must
  still have sensitive data in memory to function. Risk of exposure should be
  minimized by disabling swap to prevent the operating system from paging
  sensitive data to disk. Disabling swap is even more critical when your
  Vault deployment uses Integrated Storage.

- **Disable core dumps**. A user or administrator that can force a core dump
  and has access to the resulting file can potentially access Vault encryption
  keys. Preventing core dumps is a platform-specific process; on Linux setting
  the resource limit `RLIMIT_CORE` to `0` disables core dumps. In the systemd
  service unit file, setting `LimitCORE=0` will enforce this setting for the
  Vault service.

- **Use single tenancy**. Vault should be the sole user process running on a
  machine. This reduces the risk that another process running on the same
  machine gets compromised and gains the ability to interact with the Vault
  process. Similarly, you should prefer running Vault on bare metal instead
  of a virtual machine, and you prefer running in a virtual machine instead
  of running in a containerized environment.

- **Firewall traffic**. Use a local firewall or network security features of
  your cloud provider to restrict incoming and outgoing traffic to Vault and
  essential system services like NTP. This includes restricting incoming
  traffic to permitted sub-networks and outgoing traffic to services Vault
  needs to connect to, such as databases.

- **Avoid root tokens**. When you initialize Vault, it emits an initial
  root token. You should use this token just to perform initial setup,
  such as enabling auth methods so that users can authenticate. You should
  treat Vault [configuration as
  code](https://www.hashicorp.com/blog/codifying-vault-policies-and-configuration/),
  and use version control to manage policies. Once you complete initial Vault
  setup, you should revoke the initial root token to reduce risk of exposure. Root tokens can be
  [generated when needed](/vault/docs/commands/operator/generate-root), and should be
  revoked when no longer needed.

- **Configure user lockout**. Vault provides a [user lockout](/vault/docs/concepts/user-lockout) function
  for the [approle](/vault/docs/auth/approle), [ldap](/vault/docs/auth/ldap) and [userpass](/vault/docs/auth/userpass)
  auth methods. **Vault enables user lockout by default**. Verify the lockout threshold, and lockout duration matches your organizations security policies.

- **Enable audit device logs**. Vault supports several [audit
  devices](/vault/docs/audit). When you enable audit device logs, you gain
  a detailed history of all operations performed by Vault, and a forensics
  trail in the case of misuse or compromise. Audit logs [securely
  hash](/vault/docs/audit#sensitive-information)
  sensitive data, but you should still restrict access to prevent any
  unintended information disclosure.

- **Disable shell command history**. You may want the `vault` command itself to
  not appear in history at all.

- **Keep a frequent upgrade cadence**. Vault is actively developed, and you
  should upgrade Vault often to incorporate security fixes and any changes in
  default settings such as key lengths or cipher suites. Subscribe to the
  [HashiCorp Announcement mailing list](https://groups.google.com/g/hashicorp-announce)
  to receive announcements of new releases and visit the [Vault
  CHANGELOG](https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) for
  details on the changes made in each release.

- **Synchronize clocks**. Use NTP or whatever mechanism is appropriate for your
  environment to ensure that all the Vault nodes agree about what time it is.
  Vault uses the clock for things like enforcing TTLs and setting dates in PKI
  certificates, and if the nodes have significant clock skew, a failover can wreak havoc.

- **Restrict storage access**. Vault encrypts all data at rest, regardless of
  which storage type it uses. Although Vault encrypts the data, an [attacker
  with arbitrary
  control](/vault/docs/internals/security) can cause
  data corruption or loss by modifying or deleting keys. You should restrict
  storage access outside of Vault to avoid unauthorized access or operations.

- **Do not use clear text credentials**. The Vault configuration [`seal`
  stanza](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) configures the seal type to use for
  extra data protection such as using HSM or Cloud KMS solutions to encrypt and
  decrypt the root key. **DO NOT** store your cloud credentials or HSM pin in
  clear text within the `seal` stanza. If you host the Vault server on the same
  cloud platform as the KMS service, use the platform-specific identity
  solutions. For example:

  - [Resource Access Management (RAM) on AliCloud](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/alicloudkms#authentication)
  - [Instance Profiles on AWS](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/awskms#authentication)
  - [Managed Service Identities (MSI) on Azure](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/azurekeyvault#authentication)
  - [Service Account on Google Cloud Platform](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/gcpckms#authentication-permissions)

  When using platform-specific identity solutions, you should be mindful of auth
  method and secret engine configuration within namespaces. You can share
  platform identity across Vault namespaces, as these provider features
  generally offer host-based identity solutions.

  If that is not applicable, set the credentials as environment variables
  (for example, `VAULT_HSM_PIN`).

- **Use the safest algorithms available**. [Vault's TLS listener](/vault/docs/configuration/listener/tcp#tls_cipher_suites)
  supports a variety of legacy algorithms for backwards compatibility. While
  these algorithms are available, they are not recommended for use when
  a stronger alternative is available. If possible, use TLS 1.3 to ensure
  that modern encryption algorithms encrypt data in transit and offer
  forward secrecy.

- **Follow best practices for plugins**. While HashiCorp-developed plugins
  generally default to a safe configuration, you should be mindful of
  misconfigured or malicious Vault plugins. These plugin issues can harm the
  security posture of your Vault deployment.

- **Be aware of non-deterministic configuration file merging**. Vault's
  configuration file merging is non-deterministic, and inconsistencies in
  settings between files can lead to inconsistencies in Vault settings.
  Ensure set configurations are consistent across all files (and any files merged together get denoted by a `-config` flag).

- **Use correct filesystem permissions**. Always ensure appropriate permissions
  get applied to files before starting Vault. This is even more critical for files which contain sensitive information.

- **Use standard input for vault secrets**. [Vault login](/vault/docs/commands/login)
  and [Vault unseal](/vault/api-docs/system/unseal#key) allow operators to
  give secret values from either standard input or with command-line arguments.
  Command-line arguments can persisted in shell history, and are readable by other unprivileged users on the same host.

- **Develop an off-boarding process**. Removing accounts in Vault or associated
  identity providers may not immediately revoke [token-based access](/vault/docs/concepts/tokens#user-management-considerations).
  Depending on how you manage access to Vault, operators should consider:

  - Removing the entity from groups granting access to resources.
  - [Revoking](/vault/docs/concepts/lease#prefix-based-revocation) the active leases for a given user account.
  - Deleting the canonical entity of the user after removing accounts in Vault or associated identity providers.
    Deleting the canonical entity alone is insufficient as one is automatically created on successful login if it does not exist.
  - [Disabling](/vault/docs/commands/auth/disable) auth methods instead of deleting them, which revokes all
    tokens generated by this auth method.

- **Use short TTLs** When possible, credentials issued from Vault (for example
  tokens, X.509 certificates) should be short-lived, as to guard against their potential compromise, and reduce the need to use revocation methods.

## Extended recommendations

- **Disable SSH / remote desktop**. When running a Vault as a single tenant
  application, users should never access the machine directly. Instead, they
  should access Vault through its API over the network. Use a centralized
  logging and telemetry solution for debugging. Be sure to restrict access to
  logs as need to know.

- **Use systemd security features**. Systemd provides a number of features
  that you can use to lock down access to the filesystem and to
  administrative capabilities. The service unit file provided with the
  official Vault Linux packages sets a number of these by default, including:

  ```plaintext
  ProtectSystem=full
  PrivateTmp=yes
  CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SYSLOG CAP_IPC_LOCK
  AmbientCapabilities=CAP_IPC_LOCK
  ProtectHome=read-only
  PrivateDevices=yes
  NoNewPrivileges=yes
  ```

  See the [systemd.exec manual page](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html) for more details.

- **Perform immutable upgrades**. Vault relies on external storage for
  persistence, and this decoupling allows the servers running Vault to be
  immutably managed. When you upgrade to a new version, you can bring new
  servers with the upgraded version of Vault online. You can attach the new
  servers to the same shared storage and unseal them. Then you can destroy the
  older version servers. This reduces the need for remote access and upgrade orchestration which may introduce security gaps.

- **Configure SELinux / AppArmor**. Using mechanisms like
  [SELinux](https://github.com/hashicorp/vault-selinux-policies)
  and AppArmor can help you gain layers of security when using Vault.
  While Vault can run on several popular operating systems, Linux is
  recommended due to the various security primitives mentioned here.

- **Adjust user limits**. It is possible that your Linux distribution enforces
  strict process user limits (`ulimits`). Consider a review of `ulimits` for maximum amount of open files, connections, etc. before going into production. You might need to increase the default values to avoid errors about too
  many open files.

- **Be aware of special container considerations**. To use memory locking
  (mlock) inside a Vault container, you need to use the `overlayfs2` or another
  supporting driver.

-	**Consider memory usage when configuring `disable_mlock` with integrated storage**.
  When you leave `mlock` enabled, Vault disallows data swaps from memory to disk.
  Disallowing swaps ensures that sensitive data remains in RAM, but also
  increases the risk of out-of-memory (OOM) errors in under-provisioned systems.
  Conversely, disabling `mlock` lets the operating system swap memory to disk
  under pressure, which can reduce the risk of OOM errors but increase the
  exposure risk for secrets that end up in the swap file. If you choose to
  disable `mlock`, we recommend encrypting your swap file to limit the exposure
  risk.
