Adds debug and warn logging around AWS credential chain generation,
specifically to help users debugging auto-unseal problems on AWS, by
logging which role is being used in the case of a webidentity token.
Adds a deferred call to flush the log output as well, to ensure logs
are output in the event of an initialization failure.
* add first stepwise test env, Docker, with example transit test
* update transit stepwise test
* add other tests that use stepwise
* cleanup test, make names different than just 'transit'
* return the stderr if compile fails with error
* minor cleanups
* minor cleanups
* go mod vendor
* cleanups
* remove some extra code, and un-export some fields/methods
* update vendor
* remove reference to vault.CoreConfig, which really wasn't used anyway
* update with go mod vendor
* restore Precheck method to test cases
* clean up some networking things; create networks with UUID, clean up during teardown
* vendor stepwise
* Update sdk/testing/stepwise/environments/docker/environment.go
haha thanks :D
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update sdk/testing/stepwise/environments/docker/environment.go
Great catch, thanks
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix redundant name
* update error message in test
* Update builtin/credential/userpass/stepwise_test.go
More explicit error checking and responding
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update builtin/logical/aws/stepwise_test.go
`test` -> `testFunc`
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update builtin/logical/transit/stepwise_test.go
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix typos
* update error messages to provide clarity
* Update sdk/testing/stepwise/environments/docker/environment.go
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* update error handling / collection in Teardown
* panic if GenerateUUID returns an error
* Update sdk/testing/stepwise/environments/docker/environment.go
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update builtin/credential/userpass/stepwise_test.go
Co-authored-by: Calvin Leung Huang <cleung2010@gmail.com>
* Update builtin/logical/aws/stepwise_test.go
Co-authored-by: Calvin Leung Huang <cleung2010@gmail.com>
* Update builtin/logical/transit/stepwise_test.go
Co-authored-by: Calvin Leung Huang <cleung2010@gmail.com>
* Update sdk/testing/stepwise/environments/docker/environment.go
Co-authored-by: Calvin Leung Huang <cleung2010@gmail.com>
* import ordering
* standardize on dc from rc for cluster
* lowercase name
* CreateAPIClient -> NewAPIClient
* testWait -> ensure
* go mod cleanup
* cleanups
* move fields and method around
* make start and dockerclusternode private; use better random serial number
* use better random for SerialNumber
* add a timeout to the context used for terminating the docker container
* Use a constant for the Docker client version
* rearrange import statements
Co-authored-by: Michael Golowka <72365+pcman312@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Calvin Leung Huang <cleung2010@gmail.com>
Allows vault roles to be associated with IAM groups in the AWS
secrets engine, since IAM groups are a recommended way to manage
IAM user policies. IAM users generated against a vault role will
be added to the IAM Groups. For a credential type of
`assumed_role` or `federation_token`, the policies sent to the
corresponding AWS call (sts:AssumeRole or sts:GetFederation) will
be the policies from each group in `iam_groups` combined with the
`policy_document` and `policy_arns` parameters.
Co-authored-by: Jim Kalafut <jkalafut@hashicorp.com>
* secrets/aws: Support permissions boundaries on iam_user creds
This allows configuring Vault to attach a permissions boundary policy to
IAM users that it creates, configured on a per-Vault-role basis.
* Fix indentation of policy in docs
Use spaces instead of tabs
I probably left this cleanup commented out as part of debugging test
errors in #6789 and forgot to uncomment it, so actually cleaning up the
test user.
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
This refactors role validation for the AWS secrets engine to be in a
separate method. Previously, all validation was interspersed with the
parsing of parameters when creating/updating a role, which led to a high
degree of complexity. Now, all validation is centralized which makes it
easier to understand and also easier to test (and so a number of test
cases have been added).
The result will still pass gofmtcheck and won't trigger additional
changes if someone isn't using goimports, but it will avoid the
piecemeal imports changes we've been seeing.
* Added role-option max_sts_ttl to cap TTL for AWS STS credentials.
* Allow for setting max_sts_ttl to 0 after it has been set already.
* Fixed message in error response for default_sts_ttl > max_sts_ttl.
* Allow specifying role-default TTLs in AWS secret engine
* Add an acceptance test
* Add docs for AWS secret role-default TTLs
* Rename default_ttl to default_sts_ttl
* Return default_ttl as int64 instead of time.Duration
* Fix broken tests
The merge of #5383 broke the tests due to some changes in the test style
that didn't actually cause a git merge conflict. This updates the tests
to the new style.
* logical/aws: Harden WAL entry creation
If AWS IAM user creation failed in any way, the WAL corresponding to the
IAM user would get left around and Vault would try to roll it back.
However, because the user never existed, the rollback failed. Thus, the
WAL would essentially get "stuck" and Vault would continually attempt to
roll it back, failing every time. A similar situation could arise if the
IAM user that Vault created got deleted out of band, or if Vault deleted
it but was unable to write the lease revocation back to storage (e.g., a
storage failure).
This attempts to harden it in two ways. One is by deleting the WAL log
entry if the IAM user creation fails. However, the WAL deletion could
still fail, and this wouldn't help where the user is deleted out of
band, so second, consider the user rolled back if the user just doesn't
exist, under certain circumstances.
Fixes#5190
* Fix segfault in expiration unit tests
TestExpiration_Tidy was passing in a leaseEntry that had a nil Secret,
which then caused a segfault as the changes to revokeEntry didn't check
whether Secret was nil; this is probably unlikely to occur in real life,
but good to be extra cautious.
* Fix potential segfault
Missed the else...
* Respond to PR feedback
* Add AWS Secret Engine Root Credential Rotation
This allows the AWS Secret Engine to rotate its credentials used to
access AWS. This will only work when the AWS Secret Engine has been
provided explicit IAM credentials via the config/root endpoint, and
further, when the IAM credentials provided are the only access key on
the IAM user associated wtih the access key (because AWS allows a
maximum of 2 access keys per user).
Fixes#4385
* Add test for AWS root credential rotation
Also fix a typo in the root credential rotation code
* Add docs for AWS root rotation
* Add locks around reading and writing config/root
And wire the backend up in a bunch of places so the config can get the
lock
* Respond to PR feedback
* Fix casing in error messages
* Fix merge errors
* Fix locking bugs
* Parallelize a couple AWS acceptance tests
Starting an effort to paralleize AWS secret engine acceptance tests.
Currently they take over a minute to run, and this parallelizes the two
that explicitly call a 10-second sleep, reulting in a 10-second speedup
in test time.
* Parameterize IAM user name
Probably not needed, but future-proofing the code
* Make remainder of tests parallel
AWS_ACCOUNT_ID environment variable is no longer being used; global
mutable state is a recipe for disaster when trying to run things in
parallel, and parallelizing the tests exposed a race condition in which
they were depending on the AWS_ACCOUNT_ID environment variable to be set
before they were run.
AWS_DEFAULT_REGION is still left as an environment variable because it
is required by AWS SDKs, but its configuration is now protected by a
sync.Once to ensure it only ever gets called a single time.
* Replace generateUnique*Name with testhelpers method
* Initial implemntation of returning 529 for rate limits
- bump aws iam and sts packages to v1.14.31 to get mocking interface
- promote the iam and sts clients to the aws backend struct, for mocking in tests
- this also promotes some functions to methods on the Backend struct, so
that we can use the injected client
Generating creds requires reading config/root for credentials to contact
IAM. Here we make pathConfigRoot a method on aws/backend so we can clear
the clients on successful update of config/root path. Adds a mutex to
safely clear the clients
* refactor locking and unlocking into methods on *backend
* refactor/simply the locking
* check client after grabbing lock
* Make AWS credential types more explicit
The AWS secret engine had a lot of confusing overloading with role
paramemters and how they mapped to each of the three credential types
supported. This now adds parameters to remove the overloading while
maintaining backwards compatibility.
With the change, it also becomes easier to add other feature requests.
Attaching multiple managed policies to IAM users and adding a policy
document to STS AssumedRole credentials is now also supported.
Fixes#4229Fixes#3751Fixes#2817
* Add missing write action to STS endpoint
* Allow unsetting policy_document with empty string
This allows unsetting the policy_document by passing in an empty string.
Previously, it would fail because the empty string isn't a valid JSON
document.
* Respond to some PR feedback
* Refactor and simplify role reading/upgrading
This gets rid of the duplicated role upgrade code between both role
reading and role writing by handling the upgrade all in the role
reading.
* Eliminate duplicated AWS secret test code
The testAccStepReadUser and testAccStepReadSTS were virtually identical,
so they are consolidated into a single method with the path passed in.
* Switch to use AWS ARN parser
* govet cleanup in token store
* adding general ttl handling to login requests
* consolidating TTL calculation to system view
* deprecate LeaseExtend
* deprecate LeaseExtend
* set the increment to the correct value
* move calculateTTL out of SystemView
* remove unused value
* add back clearing of lease id
* implement core ttl in some backends
* removing increment and issue time from lease options
* adding ttl tests, fixing some compile issue
* adding ttl tests
* fixing some explicit max TTL logic
* fixing up some tests
* removing unneeded test
* off by one errors...
* adding back some logic for bc
* adding period to return on renewal
* tweaking max ttl capping slightly
* use the appropriate precision for ttl calculation
* deprecate proto fields instead of delete
* addressing feedback
* moving TTL handling for backends to core
* mongo is a secret backend not auth
* adding estimated ttl for backends that also manage the expiration time
* set the estimate values before calling the renew request
* moving calculate TTL to framework, revert removal of increment and issue time from logical
* minor edits
* addressing feedback
* address more feedback
* Accept temp creds in AWS secret backend acceptance tests
The AWS secret backend acceptance tests implicitly accepted long-lived
AWS credentials (i.e., AWS IAM user and/or root credentials) in two
ways:
1. It expected credentials to be passed in via the AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY environment variables. By not accepting
AWS_SESSION_TOKEN or AWS_SECURITY_TOKEN, temporary credentials could
not be passed in. (This also forced all credentials to be passed in
via environment variables, which is a bit ugly).
2. The AWS sts:GetFederationToken call is only allowed from long-term
credentials. This is called by the Vault code which the acceptance
tests exercise.
1 is solved by deleting explicit references to credentials, which allows
the SDK to do one of the things it does best -- find credentials via the
default chain.
2 is a little more complicated. Rather than pass in whatever creds the
acceptance test was run under to the backend, the acceptance test now
creates a new IAM user and gets an access key from it, then passes the
IAM user's creds back to the backend so that it can call
sts:GetFederationToken (and then tries to clean up afterwards).
* Fix Travis build failure
The Travis build was failing because the user creation was happening
regardless of whether it was running in acceptance test mode or not.
This moves the user creation into the acceptance test precheck, which
requires lazily evaluating the credentials when configuring the backend
in the STS accetpance test, and so moving that to a PreFlight closure.
* Reduce blind sleeps in AWS secret backend acceptance tests
This removes a blind "sleep 10 seconds and then attempt to reuse the
credential" codepath and instead just keeps attemtping to reuse the
credential for 10 seconds and fails if there aren't any successful uses
after 10 seconds. This adds a few seconds speedup of acceptance test
runs from my experiments.
