* Update README
Let contributors know that docs will now be located in UDR
* Add comments to each mdx doc
Comment has been added to all mdx docs that are not partials
* chore: added changelog
changelog check failure
* wip: removed changelog
* Fix content errors
* Doc spacing
* Update website/content/docs/deploy/kubernetes/vso/helm.mdx
Co-authored-by: Tu Nguyen <im2nguyen@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jonathanfrappier <92055993+jonathanfrappier@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Tu Nguyen <im2nguyen@users.noreply.github.com>
* Add key usage information to clarify the critical nature of the extension.
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/considerations.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven@sclark.me>
---------
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven@sclark.me>
Support all fields of the name constraints extension when generating CA certs.
The PKI secrets engine only provided parameter permitted_dns_domains to create
the name constraints extension when generating CA certificates.
Add the following parameters to provide full support for the extension:
* permitted_email_addresses
* permitted_ip_ranges
* permitted_uri_domains
* excluded_dns_domains
* excluded_email_addresses
* excluded_ip_ranges
* excluded_uri_domains
Specifying any combination of these parameters will trigger the creation of the
name constraints extension as per RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10.
* Support trimming trailing slashes via a mount tuneable to support CMPv2
* changelog/
* Perform trimming in handleLoginRequest too
* Eagerly fetch the mount entry so we only test this once
* Add a mount match function that gets path and entry
* Update vault/request_handling.go
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* more docs
* Some patches (from ENT) didnt apply
* patch fail
* Update vault/router.go
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* PR feedback
* dupe
* another dupe
* Add support for enabling trim_request_trailing_slashes on mount creation
* Fix read mount api returning configuration for trim_request_trailing_slashes
* Fix test assertion
* Switch enable and tune arguments to BoolPtrVal to allow end-users to specify false flag
* Add trim-request-trailing-slashes to the auth enable API and CLI
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* CMPv2 Documentation, and restructuring of Issuance Protocols into its own section for PKI.
* title
* CMPv2 API
* Add default path policy
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cmpv2.mdx
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cmpv2.mdx
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cmpv2.mdx
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cmpv2.mdx
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
* respond to some PR feedback
* pr feedback
* Fix nav and add key_usage
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cmpv2.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cmpv2.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/api-docs/secret/pki/issuance.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Docs fixes
---------
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Update cert metadata docs
- Add missing enterprise notices on parameters and titles
- Mention that the metadata parameter is a base64 encoded string
- Tweak the no_store_metadata description
- Update some entries within the PKI considerations page
* Add serial_number to read certificate metadata sample response
* Update fields sign-verbatim is affected by the specified role
* PKI EST docs
Initial draft of the PKI EST setup and API docs for feedback
* Add missing enable_sentinel_parsing param to API docs
* Update grammar
* Some API doc feedback
* Note about dedicated auth mounts
* Additional PR feedback
---------
Co-authored-by: Scott G. Miller <smiller@hashicorp.com>
* Add note around OCSP GET request issue
- Fix some broken TOC links
- Add a note in the api-docs and in the considerations page
around Vault having issues with OCSP GET requests and that
POST requests should be preferred.
- Add existing known issue to all branches that are affected.
* Fix links to partial file for 1.12 and 1.13 upgrade docs
* Add documentation on troubleshooting ACME
---------
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Sarah Chavis <62406755+schavis@users.noreply.github.com>
* Add documentation on CIEPS protocol
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cieps.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/cieps.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Fix indentation, link to Vault SDK
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
These don't do anything but reject requests:
> The server will not issue certificates for the identifier:
> role (something) will not issue certificate for name
> xps15.local.cipherboy.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add notes on PKI performance and key types
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add ACME Public Internet section
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note on importance of tidy
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note on cluster scalability
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about server log location
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Fix ToC, finish public ACME discussion
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note on role restrictions and ACLs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note on security considerations of ACME
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add consideration note about cluster URLs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note on 90 day certificates
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about client counts and ACME
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* VAULT-15546 First pass at Vault Proxy docs
* VAULT-15546 correct errors
* VAULT-15546 fully qualify paths
* VAULT-15546 remove index
* VAULT-15546 Some typos and clean up
* VAULT-15546 fix link
* VAULT-15546 Add redirects so old links stay working
* VAULT-15546 more explicit redirects
* VAULT-15546 typo fixes
* Suggestions for Vault Agent & Vault Proxy docs (#20612)
* Rename 'agentandproxy' to 'agent-and-proxy' for better URL
* Update the index pages for each section
* VAULT-15546 fix link typo
---------
Co-authored-by: Yoko Hyakuna <yoko@hashicorp.com>
* Add known issue about PKI secrets engine with Consul
* Added KB article URL
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/index.mdx
Co-authored-by: Jared Kirschner <85913323+jkirschner-hashicorp@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jared Kirschner <85913323+jkirschner-hashicorp@users.noreply.github.com>
Thanks to Khai Tran for identifying that syslogging has a lower limit
on message size and sometimes large CRLs can hit that limit.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add clarifications on revocation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Talk about rationale for separating roots from intermediates
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Ensure correct write ordering in rebuildIssuersChains
When troubleshooting a recent migration failure from 1.10->1.11, it was
noted that some PKI mounts had bad chain construction despite having
valid, chaining issuers. Due to the cluster's leadership trashing
between nodes, the migration logic was re-executed several times,
partially succeeding each time. While the legacy CA bundle migration
logic was written with this in mind, one shortcoming in the chain
building code lead us to truncate the ca_chain: by sorting the list of
issuers after including non-written issuers (with random IDs), these
issuers would occasionally be persisted prior to storage _prior_ to
existing CAs with modified chains.
The migration code carefully imported the active issuer prior to its
parents. However, due to this bug, there was a chance that, if write to
the pending parent succeeded but updating the active issuer didn't, the
active issuer's ca_chain field would only contain the self-reference and
not the parent's reference as well. Ultimately, a workaround of setting
and subsequently unsetting a manual chain would force a chain
regeneration.
In this patch, we simply fix the write ordering: because we need to
ensure a stable chain sorting, we leave the sort location in the same
place, but delay writing the provided referenceCert to the last
position. This is because the reference is meant to be the user-facing
action: without transactional write capabilities, other chains may
succeed, but if the last user-facing action fails, the user will
hopefully retry the action. This will also correct migration, by
ensuring the subsequent issuer import will be attempted again,
triggering another chain build and only persisting this issuer when
all other issuers have also been updated.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Remigrate ca_chains to fix any missing issuers
In the previous commit, we identified an issue that would occur on
legacy issuer migration to the new storage format. This is easy enough
to detect for any given mount (by an operator), but automating scanning
and remediating all PKI mounts in large deployments might be difficult.
Write a new storage migration version to regenerate all chains on
upgrade, once.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog entry
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add issue to PKI considerations documentation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Correct %v -> %w in chain building errs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify language around PSS CSR issues
Also point out that PKCS#11 tokens have the same problem.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/considerations.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Allow OCSP to use issuer's RevocationSigAlgo
When an issuer specifies a RevocationSigAlgo, we should largely follow
this for both CRLs and OCSP. However, x/crypto/ocsp lacks support for
PSS signatures, so we drop these down to PKCS#1v1.5 instead.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add warning when issuer has PSS-based RevSigAlgo
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about OCSP and PSS support
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* PKI: Add support for signature_bits param to the intermediate/generate api
- Mainly to work properly with GCP backed managed keys, we need to
issue signatures that would match the GCP key algorithm.
- At this time due to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/45990 we
can't issue PSS signed CSRs, as the libraries in Go always request
a PKCS1v15.
- Add an extra check in intermediate/generate that validates the CSR's
signature before providing it back to the client in case we generated
a bad signature such as if an end-user used a GCP backed managed key
with a RSA PSS algorithm.
- GCP ignores the requested signature type and always signs with the
key's algorithm which can lead to a CSR that says it is signed with
a PKCS1v15 algorithm but is actually a RSA PSS signature
* Add cl
* PR feedback
* Fix interoperability concerns with PSS
When Go parses a certificate with rsaPSS OID, it will accept this
certificate but not parse the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, leaving the
PublicKeyAlgorithm and PublicKey fields blank, but otherwise not erring.
The same behavior occurs with rsaPSS OID CSRs.
On the other hand, when Go parses rsaPSS OID PKCS8 private keys, these
keys will fail to parse completely.
Thus, detect and fail on any empty PublicKey certs and CSRs, warning the
user that we cannot parse these correctly and thus refuse to operate.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Run more PKI tests in parallel
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add notes about PSS shortcomings to considerations
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add more notes about issuer revocation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Note BYOC in considerations
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about http access to CRLs, OCSP
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Recommend enabling auto-tidy & crl rebuilding
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add missing paths to personas
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add per-issuer AIA URI information
Per discussion on GitHub with @maxb, this allows issuers to have their
own copy of AIA URIs. Because each issuer has its own URLs (for CA and
CRL access), its necessary to mint their issued certs pointing to the
correct issuer and not to the global default issuer. For anyone using
multiple issuers within a mount, this change allows the issuer to point
back to itself via leaf's AIA info.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add documentation on per-issuer AIA info
Also add it to the considerations page as something to watch out for.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add tests for per-issuer AIA information
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Refactor AIA setting on the issuer
This introduces a common helper per Steve's suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify error messages w.r.t. AIA naming
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify error messages regarding AIA URLs
This clarifies which request parameter the invalid URL is contained
in, disambiguating the sometimes ambiguous usage of AIA, per suggestion
by Max.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Rename getURLs -> getGlobalAIAURLs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Correct AIA acronym expansion word orders
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Fix bad comment suggesting re-generating roots
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add two entries to URL tests
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Allow marking issuers as revoked
This allows PKI's issuers to be considered revoked and appear on each
others' CRLs. We disable issuance (via removing the usage) and prohibit
modifying the usage via the regular issuer management interface.
A separate endpoint is necessary because issuers (especially if signed
by a third-party CA using incremental serial numbers) might share a
serial number (e.g., an intermediate under cross-signing might share the
same number as an external root or an unrelated intermediate).
When the next CRL rebuild happens, this issuer will then appear on
others issuers CRLs, if they validate this issuer's certificate.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog entry
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add documentation on revoking issuers
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add tests for issuer revocation semantics
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Notate that CRLs will be rebuilt
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Fix timestamp field from _utc -> to _rfc3339
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Ensure serial-based accesses shows as revoked
Thanks Kit!
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add warning when revoking default issuer
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Allow Proof of Possession based revocation
Revocation by proof of possession ensures that we have a private key
matching the (provided or stored) certificate. This allows callers to
revoke certificate they own (as proven by holding the corresponding
private key), without having an admin create innumerable ACLs around
the serial_number parameter for every issuance/user.
We base this on Go TLS stack's verification of certificate<->key
matching, but extend it where applicable to ensure curves match, the
private key is indeed valid, and has the same structure as the
corresponding public key from the certificate.
This endpoint currently is authenticated, allowing operators to disable
the endpoint if it isn't desirable to use, via ACL policies.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify error message on ParseDERKey
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog entry
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Leave revoke-with-key authenticated
After some discussion, given the potential for DoS (via submitting a lot
of keys/certs to validate, including invalid pairs), it seems best to
leave this as an authenticated endpoint. Presently in Vault, there's no
way to have an authenticated-but-unauthorized path (i.e., one which
bypasses ACL controls), so it is recommended (but not enforced) to make
this endpoint generally available by permissive ACL policies.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add API documentation on PoP
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add acceptance tests for Proof of Possession
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Exercise negative cases in PoP tests
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
