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2092322b31
The hashed-nodes property in a FIT signature node lists which FDT paths are included in the signature hash. It is intended as a hint so should not be used for verification. Add a function to build the node list from scratch by iterating the configuration's image references. Skip properties known not to be image references. For each image, collect the path plus all hash and cipher subnodes. Use the new function in fit_config_check_sig() instead of reading 'hashed-nodes'. Update the test_vboot kernel@ test case: fit_check_sign now catches the attack at signature-verification time (the @-suffixed node is hashed instead of the real one, causing a mismatch) rather than at fit_check_format() time. Update the docs to cover this. The FIT spec can be updated separately. Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <simon.glass@canonical.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/20260302220937.3682128-1-trini@konsulko.com/ Reported-by: Apple Security Engineering and Architecture (SEAR) Tested-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>