This implements the first round of changes, replacing the volume backend
with the new implementation, while keeping most of the external
interfaces intact.
See #8367
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrey.smirnov@siderolabs.com>
Fixes#8995
There is no security impact, as the actual SecureBoot
state/configuration is measured into the PCR 7 and the disk encryption
key unsealing is tied to this value.
This is more to provide a way to avoid accidentally encrypting to the
TPM while SecureBoot is not enabled.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrey.smirnov@siderolabs.com>
The previous flow was using TPM PCR 11 values to bound the policy which
means TPM cannot unseal when UKI changes. Now it's fixed to use PCR 7
which is bound to the SecureBoot state (SecureBoot status and
Certificates). This provides a full chain of trust bound to SecureBoot
state and signed PCR signature.
Also the code has been refactored to use PolicyCalculator from the TPM
library.
Signed-off-by: Noel Georgi <git@frezbo.dev>