tailscale/tka/tka_test.go
Will Norris 3ec5be3f51 all: remove AUTHORS file and references to it
This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in
the history of Tailscale's open source releases.

A Brief History of AUTHORS files
---

The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for
Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem
was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing
Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source
projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each
contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors
then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE
file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a
tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the
license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact.

The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the
copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then
include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The
Chromium Authors".

This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a
high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the
copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the
contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way
for the proejct maintainer to know.

Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to
keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to
it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors.
They are also clear that:

> Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the
> project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership.

It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors
that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was
entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even
the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright
holders.

In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists
Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes
confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header
in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so
it's ambiguous what that means.

Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever
they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We
also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which
provides some additional certification of their right to make the
contribution.

The source file changes were purely mechanical with:

    git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g'

Updates #cleanup

Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
2026-01-23 15:49:45 -08:00

715 lines
20 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
package tka
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
"tailscale.com/types/key"
"tailscale.com/types/tkatype"
)
func TestComputeChainCandidates(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> I1 -> I2 -> I3 -> L2
| -> L1 | -> L3
G2 -> L4
// We tweak these AUMs so they are different hashes.
G2.hashSeed = 2
L1.hashSeed = 2
L3.hashSeed = 2
L4.hashSeed = 3
`)
// Should result in 4 chains:
// G1->L1, G1->L2, G1->L3, G2->L4
i1H := c.AUMHashes["I1"]
got, err := computeChainCandidates(c.Chonk(), &i1H, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeChainCandidates() failed: %v", err)
}
want := []chain{
{Oldest: c.AUMs["G2"], Head: c.AUMs["L4"]},
{Oldest: c.AUMs["G1"], Head: c.AUMs["L3"], chainsThroughActive: true},
{Oldest: c.AUMs["G1"], Head: c.AUMs["L1"], chainsThroughActive: true},
{Oldest: c.AUMs["G1"], Head: c.AUMs["L2"], chainsThroughActive: true},
}
if diff := cmp.Diff(want, got, cmp.AllowUnexported(chain{})); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("chains differ (-want, +got):\n%s", diff)
}
}
func TestForkResolutionHash(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1
| -> L2
// tweak hashes so L1 & L2 are not identical
L1.hashSeed = 2
L2.hashSeed = 3
`)
got, err := computeActiveChain(c.Chonk(), nil, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeActiveChain() failed: %v", err)
}
// The fork with the lowest AUM hash should have been chosen.
l1H := c.AUMHashes["L1"]
l2H := c.AUMHashes["L2"]
want := l1H
if bytes.Compare(l2H[:], l1H[:]) < 0 {
want = l2H
}
if got := got.Head.Hash(); got != want {
t.Errorf("head was %x, want %x", got, want)
}
}
func TestForkResolutionSigWeight(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1
| -> L2
G1.template = addKey
L1.hashSeed = 11
L2.signedWith = key
`,
optTemplate("addKey", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &key}),
optKey("key", key, priv))
l1H := c.AUMHashes["L1"]
l2H := c.AUMHashes["L2"]
if bytes.Compare(l2H[:], l1H[:]) < 0 {
t.Fatal("failed assert: h(l1) > h(l2)\nTweak hashSeed till this passes")
}
got, err := computeActiveChain(c.Chonk(), nil, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeActiveChain() failed: %v", err)
}
// Based on the hash, l1H should be chosen.
// But based on the signature weight (which has higher
// precedence), it should be l2H
want := l2H
if got := got.Head.Hash(); got != want {
t.Errorf("head was %x, want %x", got, want)
}
}
func TestForkResolutionMessageType(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1
| -> L2
| -> L3
G1.template = addKey
L1.hashSeed = 11
L2.template = removeKey
L3.hashSeed = 18
`,
optTemplate("addKey", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &key}),
optTemplate("removeKey", AUM{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: key.MustID()}))
l1H := c.AUMHashes["L1"]
l2H := c.AUMHashes["L2"]
l3H := c.AUMHashes["L3"]
if bytes.Compare(l2H[:], l1H[:]) < 0 {
t.Fatal("failed assert: h(l1) > h(l2)\nTweak hashSeed till this passes")
}
if bytes.Compare(l2H[:], l3H[:]) < 0 {
t.Fatal("failed assert: h(l3) > h(l2)\nTweak hashSeed till this passes")
}
got, err := computeActiveChain(c.Chonk(), nil, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeActiveChain() failed: %v", err)
}
// Based on the hash, L1 or L3 should be chosen.
// But based on the preference for AUMRemoveKey messages,
// it should be L2.
want := l2H
if got := got.Head.Hash(); got != want {
t.Errorf("head was %x, want %x", got, want)
}
}
func TestComputeStateAt(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> I1 -> I2
I1.template = addKey
`,
optTemplate("addKey", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &key}))
// G1 is before the key, so there shouldn't be a key there.
state, err := computeStateAt(c.Chonk(), 500, c.AUMHashes["G1"])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeStateAt(G1) failed: %v", err)
}
if _, err := state.GetKey(key.MustID()); err != ErrNoSuchKey {
t.Errorf("expected key to be missing: err = %v", err)
}
if *state.LastAUMHash != c.AUMHashes["G1"] {
t.Errorf("LastAUMHash = %x, want %x", *state.LastAUMHash, c.AUMHashes["G1"])
}
// I1 & I2 are after the key, so the computed state should contain
// the key.
for _, wantHash := range []AUMHash{c.AUMHashes["I1"], c.AUMHashes["I2"]} {
state, err = computeStateAt(c.Chonk(), 500, wantHash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeStateAt(%X) failed: %v", wantHash, err)
}
if *state.LastAUMHash != wantHash {
t.Errorf("LastAUMHash = %x, want %x", *state.LastAUMHash, wantHash)
}
if _, err := state.GetKey(key.MustID()); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected key to be present at state: err = %v", err)
}
}
}
// fakeAUM generates an AUM structure based on the template.
// If parent is provided, PrevAUMHash is set to that value.
//
// If template is an AUM, the returned AUM is based on that.
// If template is an int, a NOOP AUM is returned, and the
// provided int can be used to tweak the resulting hash (needed
// for tests you want one AUM to be 'lower' than another, so that
// that chain is taken based on fork resolution rules).
func fakeAUM(t *testing.T, template any, parent *AUMHash) (AUM, AUMHash) {
if seed, ok := template.(int); ok {
a := AUM{MessageKind: AUMNoOp, KeyID: []byte{byte(seed)}}
if parent != nil {
a.PrevAUMHash = (*parent)[:]
}
h := a.Hash()
return a, h
}
if a, ok := template.(AUM); ok {
if parent != nil {
a.PrevAUMHash = (*parent)[:]
}
h := a.Hash()
return a, h
}
panic("template must be an int or an AUM")
}
func TestOpenAuthority(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
// /- L1
// G1 - I1 - I2 - I3 -L2
// \-L3
// G2 - L4
//
// We set the previous-known ancestor to G1, so the
// ancestor to start from should be G1.
g1, g1H := fakeAUM(t, AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &key}, nil)
i1, i1H := fakeAUM(t, 2, &g1H) // AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &key2}
l1, l1H := fakeAUM(t, 13, &i1H)
i2, i2H := fakeAUM(t, 2, &i1H)
i3, i3H := fakeAUM(t, 5, &i2H)
l2, l2H := fakeAUM(t, AUM{MessageKind: AUMNoOp, KeyID: []byte{7}, Signatures: []tkatype.Signature{{KeyID: key.MustID()}}}, &i3H)
l3, l3H := fakeAUM(t, 4, &i3H)
g2, g2H := fakeAUM(t, 8, nil)
l4, _ := fakeAUM(t, 9, &g2H)
// We make sure that I2 has a lower hash than L1, so
// it should take that path rather than L1.
if bytes.Compare(l1H[:], i2H[:]) < 0 {
t.Fatal("failed assert: h(i2) > h(l1)\nTweak parameters to fakeAUM till this passes")
}
// We make sure L2 has a signature with key, so it should
// take that path over L3. We assert that the L3 hash
// is less than L2 so the test will fail if the signature
// preference logic is broken.
if bytes.Compare(l2H[:], l3H[:]) < 0 {
t.Fatal("failed assert: h(l3) > h(l2)\nTweak parameters to fakeAUM till this passes")
}
// Construct the state of durable storage.
chonk := ChonkMem()
err := chonk.CommitVerifiedAUMs([]AUM{g1, i1, l1, i2, i3, l2, l3, g2, l4})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
chonk.SetLastActiveAncestor(i1H)
a, err := Open(chonk)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New() failed: %v", err)
}
// Should include the key added in G1
if _, err := a.state.GetKey(key.MustID()); err != nil {
t.Errorf("missing G1 key: %v", err)
}
// The head of the chain should be L2.
if a.Head() != l2H {
t.Errorf("head was %x, want %x", a.state.LastAUMHash, l2H)
}
}
func TestOpenAuthority_EmptyErrors(t *testing.T) {
_, err := Open(ChonkMem())
if err == nil {
t.Error("Expected an error initializing an empty authority, got nil")
}
}
func TestAuthorityHead(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1
| -> L2
L1.hashSeed = 2
`)
a, _ := Open(c.Chonk())
if got, want := a.head.Hash(), a.Head(); got != want {
t.Errorf("Hash() returned %x, want %x", got, want)
}
}
func TestAuthorityValidDisablement(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1
G1.template = genesis
`,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
)
a, _ := Open(c.Chonk())
if valid := a.ValidDisablement([]byte{1, 2, 3}); !valid {
t.Error("ValidDisablement() returned false, want true")
}
}
func TestCreateBootstrapAuthority(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
a1, genesisAUM, err := Create(ChonkMem(), State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}, signer25519(priv))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Create() failed: %v", err)
}
a2, err := Bootstrap(ChonkMem(), genesisAUM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Bootstrap() failed: %v", err)
}
if a1.Head() != a2.Head() {
t.Fatal("created and bootstrapped authority differ")
}
// Both authorities should trust the key laid down in the genesis state.
if !a1.KeyTrusted(key.MustID()) {
t.Error("a1 did not trust genesis key")
}
if !a2.KeyTrusted(key.MustID()) {
t.Error("a2 did not trust genesis key")
}
}
// Trying to bootstrap an already-bootstrapped Chonk is an error.
func TestBootstrapChonkMustBeEmpty(t *testing.T) {
chonk := ChonkMem()
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
state := State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}
// Bootstrap our chonk for the first time, which should succeed.
_, _, err := Create(chonk, state, signer25519(priv))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Create() failed: %v", err)
}
// Bootstrap our chonk for the second time, which should fail, because
// it already contains data.
_, _, err = Create(chonk, state, signer25519(priv))
if wantErr := "tailchonk is not empty"; err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Create() did not fail with expected error: want %q, got %v", wantErr, err)
}
}
func TestBootstrapWithInvalidAUMs(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
Name string
GenesisAUM AUM
WantErr string
}{
{
Name: "invalid-message-kind",
GenesisAUM: AUM{MessageKind: AUMNoOp},
WantErr: "bootstrap AUMs must be checkpoint messages",
},
{
Name: "missing-state",
GenesisAUM: AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint},
WantErr: "bootstrap AUM is missing state",
},
{
Name: "no-disablement-secret",
GenesisAUM: AUM{
MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint,
State: &State{},
},
WantErr: "at least one disablement secret required",
},
} {
t.Run(tt.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := Bootstrap(ChonkMem(), tt.GenesisAUM)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.WantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Bootstrap() did not fail with expected error: want %q, got %v", tt.WantErr, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestAuthorityInformNonLinear(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1
| -> L2 -> L3
| -> L4 -> L5
G1.template = genesis
L1.hashSeed = 3
L2.hashSeed = 2
L4.hashSeed = 2
`,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optKey("key", key, priv),
optSignAllUsing("key"))
storage := ChonkMem()
a, err := Bootstrap(storage, c.AUMs["G1"])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Bootstrap() failed: %v", err)
}
// L2 does not chain from L1, disabling the isHeadChain optimization
// and forcing Inform() to take the slow path.
informAUMs := []AUM{c.AUMs["L1"], c.AUMs["L2"], c.AUMs["L3"], c.AUMs["L4"], c.AUMs["L5"]}
if err := a.Inform(storage, informAUMs); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Inform() failed: %v", err)
}
for i, update := range informAUMs {
stored, err := storage.AUM(update.Hash())
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("reading stored update %d: %v", i, err)
continue
}
if diff := cmp.Diff(update, stored); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("update %d differs (-want, +got):\n%s", i, diff)
}
}
if a.Head() != c.AUMHashes["L3"] {
t.Fatal("authority did not converge to correct AUM")
}
}
func TestAuthorityInformLinear(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G1 -> L1 -> L2 -> L3
G1.template = genesis
`,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optKey("key", key, priv),
optSignAllUsing("key"))
storage := ChonkMem()
a, err := Bootstrap(storage, c.AUMs["G1"])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Bootstrap() failed: %v", err)
}
informAUMs := []AUM{c.AUMs["L1"], c.AUMs["L2"], c.AUMs["L3"]}
if err := a.Inform(storage, informAUMs); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Inform() failed: %v", err)
}
for i, update := range informAUMs {
stored, err := storage.AUM(update.Hash())
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("reading stored update %d: %v", i, err)
continue
}
if diff := cmp.Diff(update, stored); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("update %d differs (-want, +got):\n%s", i, diff)
}
}
if a.Head() != c.AUMHashes["L3"] {
t.Fatal("authority did not converge to correct AUM")
}
}
func TestInteropWithNLKey(t *testing.T) {
priv1 := key.NewNLPrivate()
pub1 := priv1.Public()
pub2 := key.NewNLPrivate().Public()
pub3 := key.NewNLPrivate().Public()
a, _, err := Create(ChonkMem(), State{
Keys: []Key{
{
Kind: Key25519,
Votes: 1,
Public: pub1.KeyID(),
},
{
Kind: Key25519,
Votes: 1,
Public: pub2.KeyID(),
},
},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}, priv1)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("tka.Create: %v", err)
return
}
if !a.KeyTrusted(pub1.KeyID()) {
t.Error("pub1 want trusted, got untrusted")
}
if !a.KeyTrusted(pub2.KeyID()) {
t.Error("pub2 want trusted, got untrusted")
}
if a.KeyTrusted(pub3.KeyID()) {
t.Error("pub3 want untrusted, got trusted")
}
}
func TestAuthorityCompact(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
c := newTestchain(t, `
G -> A -> B -> C -> D -> E
G.template = genesis
C.template = checkpoint2
`,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optTemplate("checkpoint2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optKey("key", key, priv),
optSignAllUsing("key"))
storage := &FS{base: t.TempDir()}
a, err := Bootstrap(storage, c.AUMs["G"])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Bootstrap() failed: %v", err)
}
a.Inform(storage, []AUM{c.AUMs["A"], c.AUMs["B"], c.AUMs["C"], c.AUMs["D"], c.AUMs["E"]})
// Should compact down to C -> D -> E
if err := a.Compact(storage, CompactionOptions{MinChain: 2, MinAge: 1}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if a.oldestAncestor.Hash() != c.AUMHashes["C"] {
t.Errorf("ancestor = %v, want %v", a.oldestAncestor.Hash(), c.AUMHashes["C"])
}
// Make sure the stored authority is still openable and resolves to the same state.
stored, err := Open(storage)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to open stored authority: %v", err)
}
if stored.Head() != a.Head() {
t.Errorf("Stored authority head differs: head = %v, want %v", stored.Head(), a.Head())
}
t.Logf("original ancestor = %v", c.AUMHashes["G"])
if anc, _ := storage.LastActiveAncestor(); *anc != c.AUMHashes["C"] {
t.Errorf("ancestor = %v, want %v", anc, c.AUMHashes["C"])
}
}
func TestFindParentForRewrite(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
k1 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 1}
pub2, _ := testingKey25519(t, 2)
k2 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub2, Votes: 1}
k2ID, _ := k2.ID()
pub3, _ := testingKey25519(t, 3)
k3 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub3, Votes: 1}
c := newTestchain(t, `
A -> B -> C -> D -> E
A.template = genesis
B.template = add2
C.template = add3
D.template = remove2
`,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{k1},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optTemplate("add2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k2}),
optTemplate("add3", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k3}),
optTemplate("remove2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: k2ID}))
a, err := Open(c.Chonk())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// k1 was trusted at genesis, so there's no better rewrite parent
// than the genesis.
k1ID, _ := k1.ID()
k1P, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k1ID}, k1ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite(k1) failed: %v", err)
}
if k1P != a.oldestAncestor.Hash() {
t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite(k1) = %v, want %v", k1P, a.oldestAncestor.Hash())
}
// k3 was trusted at C, so B would be an ideal rewrite point.
k3ID, _ := k3.ID()
k3P, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k3ID}, k1ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite(k3) failed: %v", err)
}
if k3P != c.AUMHashes["B"] {
t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite(k3) = %v, want %v", k3P, c.AUMHashes["B"])
}
// k2 was added but then removed, so HEAD is an appropriate rewrite point.
k2P, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k2ID}, k1ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite(k2) failed: %v", err)
}
if k3P != c.AUMHashes["B"] {
t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite(k2) = %v, want %v", k2P, a.Head())
}
// There's no appropriate point where both k2 and k3 are simultaneously not trusted,
// so the best rewrite point is the genesis AUM.
doubleP, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k2ID, k3ID}, k1ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite({k2, k3}) failed: %v", err)
}
if doubleP != a.oldestAncestor.Hash() {
t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite({k2, k3}) = %v, want %v", doubleP, a.oldestAncestor.Hash())
}
}
func TestMakeRetroactiveRevocation(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
k1 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 1}
pub2, _ := testingKey25519(t, 2)
k2 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub2, Votes: 1}
pub3, _ := testingKey25519(t, 3)
k3 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub3, Votes: 1}
c := newTestchain(t, `
A -> B -> C -> D
A.template = genesis
C.template = add2
D.template = add3
`,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{k1},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optTemplate("add2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k2}),
optTemplate("add3", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k3}))
a, err := Open(c.Chonk())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// k2 was added by C, so a forking revocation should:
// - have B as a parent
// - trust the remaining keys at the time, k1 & k3.
k1ID, _ := k1.ID()
k2ID, _ := k2.ID()
k3ID, _ := k3.ID()
forkingAUM, err := a.MakeRetroactiveRevocation(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k2ID}, k1ID, AUMHash{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MakeRetroactiveRevocation(k2) failed: %v", err)
}
if bHash := c.AUMHashes["B"]; !bytes.Equal(forkingAUM.PrevAUMHash, bHash[:]) {
t.Errorf("forking AUM has parent %v, want %v", forkingAUM.PrevAUMHash, bHash[:])
}
if _, err := forkingAUM.State.GetKey(k1ID); err != nil {
t.Error("Forked state did not trust k1")
}
if _, err := forkingAUM.State.GetKey(k3ID); err != nil {
t.Error("Forked state did not trust k3")
}
if _, err := forkingAUM.State.GetKey(k2ID); err == nil {
t.Error("Forked state trusted removed-key k2")
}
// Test that removing all trusted keys results in an error.
_, err = a.MakeRetroactiveRevocation(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k1ID, k2ID, k3ID}, k1ID, AUMHash{})
if wantErr := "cannot revoke all trusted keys"; err == nil || err.Error() != wantErr {
t.Fatalf("MakeRetroactiveRevocation({k1, k2, k3}) returned %v, expected %q", err, wantErr)
}
}