mirror of
https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale.git
synced 2026-02-09 09:41:49 +01:00
This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in the history of Tailscale's open source releases. A Brief History of AUTHORS files --- The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact. The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The Chromium Authors". This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way for the proejct maintainer to know. Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors. They are also clear that: > Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the > project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership. It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright holders. In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so it's ambiguous what that means. Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which provides some additional certification of their right to make the contribution. The source file changes were purely mechanical with: git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g' Updates #cleanup Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
634 lines
19 KiB
Go
634 lines
19 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
|
|
|
|
package tka
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/ed25519"
|
|
"reflect"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
|
|
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp/cmpopts"
|
|
"tailscale.com/types/key"
|
|
"tailscale.com/types/tkatype"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func TestSigDirect(t *testing.T) {
|
|
node := key.NewNode()
|
|
nodeKeyPub, _ := node.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
// Verification key (the key used to sign)
|
|
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
k := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
|
|
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: k.MustID(),
|
|
Pubkey: nodeKeyPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
if sig.SigHash() != sigHash {
|
|
t.Errorf("sigHash changed after signing: %x != %x", sig.SigHash(), sigHash)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature() failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails when verifying for a different node
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(key.NewNode().Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature() did not error for different nodekey")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the wrong verification key is provided
|
|
copy(k.Public, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature() did not error for wrong verification key")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSigNested(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Network-lock key (the key used to sign the nested sig)
|
|
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
k := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
|
|
// Rotation key (the key used to sign the outer sig)
|
|
rPub, rPriv := testingKey25519(t, 2)
|
|
// The old node key which is being rotated out
|
|
oldNode := key.NewNode()
|
|
oldPub, _ := oldNode.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
// The new node key that is being rotated in
|
|
node := key.NewNode()
|
|
nodeKeyPub, _ := node.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
// The original signature for the old node key, signed by
|
|
// the network-lock key.
|
|
nestedSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: k.MustID(),
|
|
Pubkey: oldPub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: rPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
|
|
nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
if err := nestedSig.verifySignature(oldNode.Public(), k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(oldNode) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if ln := sigChainLength(nestedSig); ln != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("nestedSig chain length = %v, want 1", ln)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The signature authorizing the rotation, signed by the
|
|
// rotation key & embedding the original signature.
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: nodeKeyPub,
|
|
Nested: &nestedSig,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(rPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(node) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if ln := sigChainLength(sig); ln != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("sig chain length = %v, want 2", ln)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the wrong verification key is provided
|
|
kBad := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, Votes: 2}
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), kBad); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature() did not error for wrong verification key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the inner signature is invalid
|
|
tmp := make([]byte, ed25519.SignatureSize)
|
|
copy(tmp, nestedSig.Signature)
|
|
copy(nestedSig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad inner signature")
|
|
}
|
|
copy(nestedSig.Signature, tmp)
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the outer signature is invalid
|
|
copy(sig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad outer signature")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the outer signature is signed with a
|
|
// different public key to what's specified in WrappingPubkey
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with different signature")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSigNested_DeepNesting(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Network-lock key (the key used to sign the nested sig)
|
|
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
k := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
|
|
// Rotation key (the key used to sign the outer sig)
|
|
rPub, rPriv := testingKey25519(t, 2)
|
|
// The old node key which is being rotated out
|
|
oldNode := key.NewNode()
|
|
oldPub, _ := oldNode.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
// The original signature for the old node key, signed by
|
|
// the network-lock key.
|
|
nestedSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: k.MustID(),
|
|
Pubkey: oldPub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: rPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
|
|
nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
if err := nestedSig.verifySignature(oldNode.Public(), k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(oldNode) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
outer := nestedSig
|
|
var lastNodeKey key.NodePrivate
|
|
for range 15 { // 15 = max nesting level for CBOR
|
|
lastNodeKey = key.NewNode()
|
|
nodeKeyPub, _ := lastNodeKey.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
tmp := outer
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: nodeKeyPub,
|
|
Nested: &tmp,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(rPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
outer = sig
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := outer.verifySignature(lastNodeKey.Public(), k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(lastNodeKey) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test this works with our public API
|
|
a, _ := Open(newTestchain(t, "G1\nG1.template = genesis",
|
|
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
|
|
Keys: []Key{k},
|
|
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
|
|
}})).Chonk())
|
|
if err := a.NodeKeyAuthorized(lastNodeKey.Public(), outer.Serialize()); err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("NodeKeyAuthorized(lastNodeKey) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the inner signature is invalid
|
|
tmp := make([]byte, ed25519.SignatureSize)
|
|
copy(tmp, nestedSig.Signature)
|
|
copy(nestedSig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := outer.verifySignature(lastNodeKey.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(lastNodeKey) succeeded with bad inner signature")
|
|
}
|
|
copy(nestedSig.Signature, tmp)
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if an intermediate signature is invalid
|
|
copy(outer.Nested.Nested.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := outer.verifySignature(lastNodeKey.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(lastNodeKey) succeeded with bad outer signature")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSigCredential(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Network-lock key (the key used to sign the nested sig)
|
|
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
k := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
|
|
// 'credential' key (the one being delegated to)
|
|
cPub, cPriv := testingKey25519(t, 2)
|
|
// The node key being certified
|
|
node := key.NewNode()
|
|
nodeKeyPub, _ := node.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
// The signature certifying delegated trust to another
|
|
// public key.
|
|
nestedSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigCredential,
|
|
KeyID: k.MustID(),
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
|
|
nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
// The signature authorizing the node key, signed by the
|
|
// delegated key & embedding the original signature.
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: nodeKeyPub,
|
|
Nested: &nestedSig,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(node) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the wrong verification key is provided
|
|
kBad := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, Votes: 2}
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), kBad); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature() did not error for wrong verification key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test someone can't misuse our public API for verifying node-keys
|
|
a, _ := Open(newTestchain(t, "G1\nG1.template = genesis",
|
|
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
|
|
Keys: []Key{k},
|
|
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
|
|
}})).Chonk())
|
|
if err := a.NodeKeyAuthorized(node.Public(), nestedSig.Serialize()); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("NodeKeyAuthorized(SigCredential, node) did not fail")
|
|
}
|
|
// but that they can use it properly (nested in a SigRotation)
|
|
if err := a.NodeKeyAuthorized(node.Public(), sig.Serialize()); err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("NodeKeyAuthorized(SigRotation{SigCredential}, node) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the inner signature is invalid
|
|
tmp := make([]byte, ed25519.SignatureSize)
|
|
copy(tmp, nestedSig.Signature)
|
|
copy(nestedSig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad inner signature")
|
|
}
|
|
copy(nestedSig.Signature, tmp)
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the outer signature is invalid
|
|
copy(tmp, sig.Signature)
|
|
copy(sig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad outer signature")
|
|
}
|
|
copy(sig.Signature, tmp)
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if we attempt to check a different node-key
|
|
otherNode := key.NewNode()
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(otherNode.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(otherNode) succeeded with different principal")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test verification fails if the outer signature is signed with a
|
|
// different public key to what's specified in WrappingPubkey
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with different signature")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSigSerializeUnserialize(t *testing.T) {
|
|
nodeKeyPub := []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}
|
|
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: key.MustID(),
|
|
Pubkey: nodeKeyPub,
|
|
Nested: &NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: key.MustID(),
|
|
Pubkey: nodeKeyPub,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
var decoded NodeKeySignature
|
|
if err := decoded.Unserialize(sig.Serialize()); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Unserialize() failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if diff := cmp.Diff(sig, decoded); diff != "" {
|
|
t.Errorf("unmarshalled version differs (-want, +got):\n%s", diff)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestNodeKeySignatureRotationDetails(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Trusted network lock key
|
|
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
k := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
|
|
|
|
// 'credential' key (the one being delegated to)
|
|
cPub, cPriv := testingKey25519(t, 2)
|
|
|
|
n1, n2, n3 := key.NewNode(), key.NewNode(), key.NewNode()
|
|
n1pub, _ := n1.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
n2pub, _ := n2.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
n3pub, _ := n3.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
nodeKey key.NodePublic
|
|
sigFn func() NodeKeySignature
|
|
want *RotationDetails
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "SigDirect",
|
|
nodeKey: n1.Public(),
|
|
sigFn: func() NodeKeySignature {
|
|
s := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
Pubkey: n1pub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := s.SigHash()
|
|
s.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
return s
|
|
},
|
|
want: nil,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "SigWrappedCredential",
|
|
nodeKey: n1.Public(),
|
|
sigFn: func() NodeKeySignature {
|
|
nestedSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigCredential,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
|
|
nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: n1pub,
|
|
Nested: &nestedSig,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
return sig
|
|
},
|
|
want: &RotationDetails{
|
|
InitialSig: &NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigCredential,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "SigRotation",
|
|
nodeKey: n2.Public(),
|
|
sigFn: func() NodeKeySignature {
|
|
nestedSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
Pubkey: n1pub,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
|
|
nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: n2pub,
|
|
Nested: &nestedSig,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
return sig
|
|
},
|
|
want: &RotationDetails{
|
|
InitialSig: &NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
Pubkey: n1pub,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
},
|
|
PrevNodeKeys: []key.NodePublic{n1.Public()},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "SigRotationNestedTwice",
|
|
nodeKey: n3.Public(),
|
|
sigFn: func() NodeKeySignature {
|
|
initialSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
Pubkey: n1pub,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := initialSig.SigHash()
|
|
initialSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
prevRotation := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: n2pub,
|
|
Nested: &initialSig,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = prevRotation.SigHash()
|
|
prevRotation.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
sig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: n3pub,
|
|
Nested: &prevRotation,
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash = sig.SigHash()
|
|
sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
|
|
return sig
|
|
},
|
|
want: &RotationDetails{
|
|
InitialSig: &NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
Pubkey: n1pub,
|
|
KeyID: pub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: cPub,
|
|
},
|
|
PrevNodeKeys: []key.NodePublic{n2.Public(), n1.Public()},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if tt.want != nil {
|
|
initialHash := tt.want.InitialSig.SigHash()
|
|
tt.want.InitialSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, initialHash[:])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sig := tt.sigFn()
|
|
if err := sig.verifySignature(tt.nodeKey, k); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(node) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
got, err := sig.rotationDetails()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tt.want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("rotationDetails() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestDecodeWrappedAuthkey(t *testing.T) {
|
|
k, isWrapped, sig, priv := DecodeWrappedAuthkey("tskey-32mjsdkdsffds9o87dsfkjlh", nil)
|
|
if want := "tskey-32mjsdkdsffds9o87dsfkjlh"; k != want {
|
|
t.Errorf("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<unwrapped-key>).key = %q, want %q", k, want)
|
|
}
|
|
if isWrapped {
|
|
t.Error("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<unwrapped-key>).isWrapped = true, want false")
|
|
}
|
|
if sig != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<unwrapped-key>).sig = %v, want nil", sig)
|
|
}
|
|
if priv != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<unwrapped-key>).priv = %v, want nil", priv)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
k, isWrapped, sig, priv = DecodeWrappedAuthkey("tskey-auth-k7UagY1CNTRL-ZZZZZ--TLpAEDA1ggnXuw4/fWnNWUwcoOjLemhOvml1juMl5lhLmY5sBUsj8EWEAfL2gdeD9g8VDw5tgcxCiHGlEb67BgU2DlFzZApi4LheLJraA+pYjTGChVhpZz1iyiBPD+U2qxDQAbM3+WFY0EBlggxmVqG53Hu0Rg+KmHJFMlUhfgzo+AQP6+Kk9GzvJJOs4-k36RdoSFqaoARfQo0UncHAV0t3YTqrkD5r/z2jTrE43GZWobnce7RGD4qYckUyVSF+DOj4BA/r4qT0bO8kk6zg", nil)
|
|
if want := "tskey-auth-k7UagY1CNTRL-ZZZZZ"; k != want {
|
|
t.Errorf("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<wrapped-key>).key = %q, want %q", k, want)
|
|
}
|
|
if !isWrapped {
|
|
t.Error("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<wrapped-key>).isWrapped = false, want true")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sig == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("decodeWrappedAuthkey(<wrapped-key>).sig = nil, want non-nil signature")
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := sig.SigHash()
|
|
if !ed25519.Verify(sig.KeyID, sigHash[:], sig.Signature) {
|
|
t.Error("signature failed to verify")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Make sure the private is correct by using it.
|
|
someSig := ed25519.Sign(priv, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
|
|
if !ed25519.Verify(sig.WrappingPubkey, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, someSig) {
|
|
t.Error("failed to use priv")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestResignNKS(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Tailnet Lock keypair of a signing node.
|
|
authPub, authPriv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
|
|
authKey := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: authPub, Votes: 2}
|
|
|
|
// Node's own tailnet lock key used to sign rotation signatures.
|
|
tlPriv := key.NewNLPrivate()
|
|
|
|
// The original (oldest) node key, signed by a signing node.
|
|
origNode := key.NewNode()
|
|
origPub, _ := origNode.Public().MarshalBinary()
|
|
|
|
// The original signature for the old node key, signed by
|
|
// the network-lock key.
|
|
directSig := NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigDirect,
|
|
KeyID: authKey.MustID(),
|
|
Pubkey: origPub,
|
|
WrappingPubkey: tlPriv.Public().Verifier(),
|
|
}
|
|
sigHash := directSig.SigHash()
|
|
directSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(authPriv, sigHash[:])
|
|
if err := directSig.verifySignature(origNode.Public(), authKey); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verifySignature(origNode) failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate a bunch of node keys to be used by tests.
|
|
var nodeKeys []key.NodePublic
|
|
for range 20 {
|
|
n := key.NewNode()
|
|
nodeKeys = append(nodeKeys, n.Public())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mkSig creates a signature chain starting with a direct signature
|
|
// with rotation signatures matching provided keys (from the nodeKeys slice).
|
|
mkSig := func(prevKeyIDs ...int) tkatype.MarshaledSignature {
|
|
sig := &directSig
|
|
for _, i := range prevKeyIDs {
|
|
pk, _ := nodeKeys[i].MarshalBinary()
|
|
sig = &NodeKeySignature{
|
|
SigKind: SigRotation,
|
|
Pubkey: pk,
|
|
Nested: sig,
|
|
}
|
|
var err error
|
|
sig.Signature, err = tlPriv.SignNKS(sig.SigHash())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Error(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return sig.Serialize()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
oldSig tkatype.MarshaledSignature
|
|
wantPrevNodeKeys []key.NodePublic
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "first-rotation",
|
|
oldSig: directSig.Serialize(),
|
|
wantPrevNodeKeys: []key.NodePublic{origNode.Public()},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "second-rotation",
|
|
oldSig: mkSig(0),
|
|
wantPrevNodeKeys: []key.NodePublic{nodeKeys[0], origNode.Public()},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "truncate-chain",
|
|
oldSig: mkSig(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14),
|
|
wantPrevNodeKeys: []key.NodePublic{
|
|
nodeKeys[14],
|
|
nodeKeys[13],
|
|
nodeKeys[12],
|
|
nodeKeys[11],
|
|
nodeKeys[10],
|
|
nodeKeys[9],
|
|
nodeKeys[8],
|
|
nodeKeys[7],
|
|
nodeKeys[6],
|
|
nodeKeys[5],
|
|
nodeKeys[4],
|
|
nodeKeys[3],
|
|
nodeKeys[2],
|
|
nodeKeys[1],
|
|
origNode.Public(),
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
newNode := key.NewNode()
|
|
got, err := ResignNKS(tlPriv, newNode.Public(), tt.oldSig)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ResignNKS() error = %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
var gotSig NodeKeySignature
|
|
if err := gotSig.Unserialize(got); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Unserialize() failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := gotSig.verifySignature(newNode.Public(), authKey); err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("verifySignature(newNode) error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rd, err := gotSig.rotationDetails()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("rotationDetails() error = %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if sigChainLength(gotSig) != len(tt.wantPrevNodeKeys)+1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("sigChainLength() = %v, want %v", sigChainLength(gotSig), len(tt.wantPrevNodeKeys)+1)
|
|
}
|
|
if diff := cmp.Diff(tt.wantPrevNodeKeys, rd.PrevNodeKeys, cmpopts.EquateComparable(key.NodePublic{})); diff != "" {
|
|
t.Errorf("PrevNodeKeys mismatch (-want +got):\n%s", diff)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func sigChainLength(s NodeKeySignature) int {
|
|
if s.Nested != nil {
|
|
return 1 + sigChainLength(*s.Nested)
|
|
}
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|