tailscale/tka/scenario_test.go
Will Norris 3ec5be3f51 all: remove AUTHORS file and references to it
This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in
the history of Tailscale's open source releases.

A Brief History of AUTHORS files
---

The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for
Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem
was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing
Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source
projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each
contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors
then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE
file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a
tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the
license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact.

The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the
copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then
include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The
Chromium Authors".

This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a
high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the
copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the
contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way
for the proejct maintainer to know.

Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to
keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to
it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors.
They are also clear that:

> Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the
> project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership.

It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors
that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was
entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even
the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright
holders.

In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists
Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes
confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header
in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so
it's ambiguous what that means.

Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever
they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We
also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which
provides some additional certification of their right to make the
contribution.

The source file changes were purely mechanical with:

    git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g'

Updates #cleanup

Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
2026-01-23 15:49:45 -08:00

378 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
package tka
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"sort"
"testing"
)
type scenarioNode struct {
Name string
A *Authority
AUMs map[string]AUM
storage Chonk
}
type scenarioTest struct {
t *testing.T
defaultKey *Key
defaultPriv ed25519.PrivateKey
initial *testChain
nodes map[string]*scenarioNode
}
func (s *scenarioTest) mkNode(name string) *scenarioNode {
storage := s.initial.Chonk()
authority, err := Open(storage)
if err != nil {
s.t.Fatal(err)
}
aums := make(map[string]AUM, len(s.initial.AUMs))
for k, v := range s.initial.AUMs {
aums[k] = v
}
n := &scenarioNode{
A: authority,
AUMs: aums,
Name: name,
storage: storage,
}
s.nodes[name] = n
return n
}
// mkNodeWithForks creates a new node based on the initial AUMs in the
// scenario, but additionally with the forking chains applied.
//
// chains is expected to be a map containing chains that should be known
// by this node, with the key being the parent AUM the chain extends from.
func (s *scenarioTest) mkNodeWithForks(name string, signWithDefault bool, chains map[string]*testChain) *scenarioNode {
n := s.mkNode(name)
// re-jig the provided chain to be based on the provided parent,
// and optionally signed with the default key.
for parentName, chain := range chains {
parent, exists := n.AUMs[parentName]
if !exists {
panic("cannot use nonexistent parent: " + parentName)
}
parentHash := parent.Hash()
chain.Nodes[chain.FirstIdent].ParentHash = &parentHash
if signWithDefault {
chain.Key["default_key"] = s.defaultKey
chain.KeyPrivs["default_key"] = s.defaultPriv
chain.SignAllKeys = append(chain.SignAllKeys, "default_key")
}
chain.buildChain()
aums := make([]AUM, 0, len(chain.AUMs))
for name, a := range chain.AUMs {
aums = append(aums, a)
n.AUMs[name] = a
}
// AUMs passed to Inform need to be ordered in
// from ancestor to leaf.
sort.SliceStable(aums, func(i, j int) bool {
jParent, _ := aums[j].Parent()
if aums[i].Hash() == jParent {
return true
}
return false
})
if err := n.A.Inform(n.storage, aums); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
return n
}
func (s *scenarioTest) syncBetween(n1, n2 *scenarioNode) error {
o1, err := n1.A.SyncOffer(n1.storage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
o2, err := n2.A.SyncOffer(n2.storage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
aumsFrom1, err := n1.A.MissingAUMs(n1.storage, o2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
aumsFrom2, err := n2.A.MissingAUMs(n2.storage, o1)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := n2.A.Inform(n2.storage, aumsFrom1); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := n1.A.Inform(n1.storage, aumsFrom2); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (s *scenarioTest) testSyncsBetween(n1, n2 *scenarioNode) {
if err := s.syncBetween(n1, n2); err != nil {
s.t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func (s *scenarioTest) checkHaveConsensus(n1, n2 *scenarioNode) {
if h1, h2 := n1.A.Head(), n2.A.Head(); h1 != h2 {
s.t.Errorf("node %s & %s are not in sync", n1.Name, n2.Name)
}
}
// testScenario implements scaffolding for testing that authorities
// with different head states can synchronize.
//
// sharedChain and sharedOptions are passed to testChain to create an
// initial set of AUMs which all nodes know about. A default key and genesis
// AUM are created for you under the template 'genesis' and key 'key'.
func testScenario(t *testing.T, sharedChain string, sharedOptions ...testchainOpt) *scenarioTest {
t.Helper()
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 1}
sharedOptions = append(sharedOptions,
optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
Keys: []Key{key},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
}}),
optKey("key", key, priv),
optSignAllUsing("key"))
return &scenarioTest{
t: t,
defaultKey: &key,
defaultPriv: priv,
initial: newTestchain(t, sharedChain, sharedOptions...),
nodes: map[string]*scenarioNode{},
}
}
func TestScenarioHelpers(t *testing.T) {
s := testScenario(t, `
G -> L1
G.template = genesis
`)
control := s.mkNode("control")
n := s.mkNodeWithForks("n", true, map[string]*testChain{
"L1": newTestchain(t, `L2 -> L3`),
})
// Make sure node has both the initial AUMs and the
// chain from L1.
if _, ok := n.AUMs["G"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("node n is missing %s", "G")
}
if _, ok := n.AUMs["L1"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("node n is missing %s", "L1")
}
if _, ok := n.AUMs["L2"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("node n is missing %s", "L2")
}
if _, ok := n.AUMs["L3"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("node n is missing %s", "L3")
}
if err := signatureVerify(&n.AUMs["L3"].Signatures[0], n.AUMs["L3"].SigHash(), *s.defaultKey); err != nil {
t.Errorf("chained AUM was not signed: %v", err)
}
s.testSyncsBetween(control, n)
s.checkHaveConsensus(control, n)
}
func TestNormalPropagation(t *testing.T) {
s := testScenario(t, `
G -> L1 -> L2
G.template = genesis
`)
control := s.mkNode("control")
// Let's say there's a node with some updates!
n1 := s.mkNodeWithForks("n1", true, map[string]*testChain{
"L2": newTestchain(t, `L3 -> L4`),
})
// Can control haz the updates?
s.testSyncsBetween(control, n1)
s.checkHaveConsensus(control, n1)
// A new node came online, can the new node learn everything
// just via control?
n2 := s.mkNode("n2")
s.testSyncsBetween(control, n2)
s.checkHaveConsensus(control, n2)
// So by virtue of syncing with control n2 should be at the same
// state as n1.
s.checkHaveConsensus(n1, n2)
}
func TestForkingPropagation(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 2)
key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
addKey2 := AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &key}
s := testScenario(t, `
G -> AddSecondKey -> L1 -> L2
G.template = genesis
AddSecondKey.template = addKey2
`,
optKey("key2", key, priv),
optTemplate("addKey2", addKey2))
control := s.mkNode("control")
// Random, non-forking updates from n1
n1 := s.mkNodeWithForks("n1", true, map[string]*testChain{
"L2": newTestchain(t, `L3 -> L4`),
})
// Can control haz the updates?
s.testSyncsBetween(control, n1)
s.checkHaveConsensus(control, n1)
// Ooooo what about a forking update?
n2 := s.mkNodeWithForks("n2", false, map[string]*testChain{
"L1": newTestchain(t,
`F1 -> F2
F1.template = removeKey1`,
optSignAllUsing("key2"),
optKey("key2", key, priv),
optTemplate("removeKey1", AUM{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: s.defaultKey.MustID()})),
})
s.testSyncsBetween(control, n2)
s.checkHaveConsensus(control, n2)
// No wozzles propagating from n2->CTRL, what about CTRL->n1?
s.testSyncsBetween(control, n1)
s.checkHaveConsensus(n1, n2)
if _, err := n1.A.state.GetKey(s.defaultKey.MustID()); err != ErrNoSuchKey {
t.Error("default key was still present")
}
if _, err := n1.A.state.GetKey(key.MustID()); err != nil {
t.Errorf("key2 was not trusted: %v", err)
}
}
func TestInvalidAUMPropagationRejected(t *testing.T) {
s := testScenario(t, `
G -> L1 -> L2
G.template = genesis
`)
control := s.mkNode("control")
// Construct an invalid L4 AUM, and manually apply it to n1,
// resulting in a corrupted Authority.
n1 := s.mkNodeWithForks("n1", true, map[string]*testChain{
"L2": newTestchain(t, `L3`),
})
l3 := n1.AUMs["L3"]
l3H := l3.Hash()
l4 := AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, PrevAUMHash: l3H[:]}
if err := l4.sign25519(s.defaultPriv); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
l4H := l4.Hash()
n1.storage.CommitVerifiedAUMs([]AUM{l4})
n1.A.state.LastAUMHash = &l4H
// Does control nope out with syncing?
if err := s.syncBetween(control, n1); err == nil {
t.Error("sync with invalid AUM was successful")
}
// Control should not have accepted ANY of the updates, even
// though L3 was well-formed.
l2 := control.AUMs["L2"]
l2H := l2.Hash()
if control.A.Head() != l2H {
t.Errorf("head was %x, expected %x", control.A.Head(), l2H)
}
}
func TestUnsignedAUMPropagationRejected(t *testing.T) {
s := testScenario(t, `
G -> L1 -> L2
G.template = genesis
`)
control := s.mkNode("control")
// Construct an unsigned L4 AUM, and manually apply it to n1,
// resulting in a corrupted Authority.
n1 := s.mkNodeWithForks("n1", true, map[string]*testChain{
"L2": newTestchain(t, `L3`),
})
l3 := n1.AUMs["L3"]
l3H := l3.Hash()
l4 := AUM{MessageKind: AUMNoOp, PrevAUMHash: l3H[:]}
l4H := l4.Hash()
n1.storage.CommitVerifiedAUMs([]AUM{l4})
n1.A.state.LastAUMHash = &l4H
// Does control nope out with syncing?
if err := s.syncBetween(control, n1); err == nil || err.Error() != "update 1 invalid: unsigned AUM" {
t.Errorf("sync with unsigned AUM was successful (err = %v)", err)
}
// Control should not have accepted ANY of the updates, even
// though L3 was well-formed.
l2 := control.AUMs["L2"]
l2H := l2.Hash()
if control.A.Head() != l2H {
t.Errorf("head was %x, expected %x", control.A.Head(), l2H)
}
}
func TestBadSigAUMPropagationRejected(t *testing.T) {
s := testScenario(t, `
G -> L1 -> L2
G.template = genesis
`)
control := s.mkNode("control")
// Construct a otherwise-valid L4 AUM but mess up the signature.
n1 := s.mkNodeWithForks("n1", true, map[string]*testChain{
"L2": newTestchain(t, `L3`),
})
l3 := n1.AUMs["L3"]
l3H := l3.Hash()
l4 := AUM{MessageKind: AUMNoOp, PrevAUMHash: l3H[:]}
if err := l4.sign25519(s.defaultPriv); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
l4.Signatures[0].Signature[3] = 42
l4H := l4.Hash()
n1.storage.CommitVerifiedAUMs([]AUM{l4})
n1.A.state.LastAUMHash = &l4H
// Does control nope out with syncing?
if err := s.syncBetween(control, n1); err == nil || err.Error() != "update 1 invalid: signature 0: invalid signature" {
t.Errorf("sync with unsigned AUM was successful (err = %v)", err)
}
// Control should not have accepted ANY of the updates, even
// though L3 was well-formed.
l2 := control.AUMs["L2"]
l2H := l2.Hash()
if control.A.Head() != l2H {
t.Errorf("head was %x, expected %x", control.A.Head(), l2H)
}
}