Will Norris 3ec5be3f51 all: remove AUTHORS file and references to it
This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in
the history of Tailscale's open source releases.

A Brief History of AUTHORS files
---

The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for
Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem
was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing
Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source
projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each
contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors
then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE
file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a
tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the
license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact.

The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the
copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then
include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The
Chromium Authors".

This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a
high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the
copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the
contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way
for the proejct maintainer to know.

Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to
keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to
it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors.
They are also clear that:

> Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the
> project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership.

It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors
that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was
entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even
the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright
holders.

In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists
Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes
confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header
in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so
it's ambiguous what that means.

Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever
they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We
also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which
provides some additional certification of their right to make the
contribution.

The source file changes were purely mechanical with:

    git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g'

Updates #cleanup

Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
2026-01-23 15:49:45 -08:00

481 lines
13 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
// Package tpm implements support for TPM 2.0 devices.
package tpm
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"iter"
"log"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2/transport"
"golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox"
"tailscale.com/atomicfile"
"tailscale.com/envknob"
"tailscale.com/feature"
"tailscale.com/hostinfo"
"tailscale.com/ipn"
"tailscale.com/ipn/store"
"tailscale.com/paths"
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/types/key"
"tailscale.com/types/logger"
"tailscale.com/util/testenv"
)
var (
infoOnce = sync.OnceValue(info)
tpmSupportedOnce = sync.OnceValue(tpmSupported)
)
func init() {
feature.Register("tpm")
feature.HookTPMAvailable.Set(tpmSupportedOnce)
feature.HookHardwareAttestationAvailable.Set(tpmSupportedOnce)
hostinfo.RegisterHostinfoNewHook(func(hi *tailcfg.Hostinfo) {
hi.TPM = infoOnce()
})
store.Register(store.TPMPrefix, newStore)
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" || runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
key.RegisterHardwareAttestationKeyFns(
func() key.HardwareAttestationKey { return &attestationKey{} },
func() (key.HardwareAttestationKey, error) { return newAttestationKey() },
)
}
}
func tpmSupported() bool {
hi := infoOnce()
if hi == nil {
return false
}
if hi.FamilyIndicator != "2.0" {
return false
}
tpm, err := open()
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer tpm.Close()
if err := withSRK(logger.Discard, tpm, func(srk tpm2.AuthHandle) error {
return nil
}); err != nil {
return false
}
return true
}
var verboseTPM = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_TPM")
func info() *tailcfg.TPMInfo {
logf := logger.Discard
if !testenv.InTest() || verboseTPM() {
logf = log.New(log.Default().Writer(), "TPM: ", 0).Printf
}
tpm, err := open()
if err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) || verboseTPM() {
// Only log if it's an interesting error, not just "no TPM",
// as is very common, especially in VMs.
logf("error opening: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
if verboseTPM() {
logf("successfully opened")
}
defer tpm.Close()
info := new(tailcfg.TPMInfo)
toStr := func(s *string) func(*tailcfg.TPMInfo, uint32) {
return func(info *tailcfg.TPMInfo, value uint32) {
*s += propToString(value)
}
}
for _, cap := range []struct {
prop tpm2.TPMPT
apply func(info *tailcfg.TPMInfo, value uint32)
}{
{tpm2.TPMPTManufacturer, toStr(&info.Manufacturer)},
{tpm2.TPMPTVendorString1, toStr(&info.Vendor)},
{tpm2.TPMPTVendorString2, toStr(&info.Vendor)},
{tpm2.TPMPTVendorString3, toStr(&info.Vendor)},
{tpm2.TPMPTVendorString4, toStr(&info.Vendor)},
{tpm2.TPMPTRevision, func(info *tailcfg.TPMInfo, value uint32) { info.SpecRevision = int(value) }},
{tpm2.TPMPTVendorTPMType, func(info *tailcfg.TPMInfo, value uint32) { info.Model = int(value) }},
{tpm2.TPMPTFirmwareVersion1, func(info *tailcfg.TPMInfo, value uint32) { info.FirmwareVersion += uint64(value) << 32 }},
{tpm2.TPMPTFirmwareVersion2, func(info *tailcfg.TPMInfo, value uint32) { info.FirmwareVersion += uint64(value) }},
{tpm2.TPMPTFamilyIndicator, toStr(&info.FamilyIndicator)},
} {
resp, err := tpm2.GetCapability{
Capability: tpm2.TPMCapTPMProperties,
Property: uint32(cap.prop),
PropertyCount: 1,
}.Execute(tpm)
if err != nil {
logf("GetCapability %v: %v", cap.prop, err)
continue
}
props, err := resp.CapabilityData.Data.TPMProperties()
if err != nil {
logf("GetCapability %v: %v", cap.prop, err)
continue
}
if len(props.TPMProperty) == 0 {
continue
}
cap.apply(info, props.TPMProperty[0].Value)
}
logf("successfully read all properties")
return info
}
// propToString converts TPM_PT property value, which is a uint32, into a
// string of up to 4 ASCII characters. This encoding applies only to some
// properties, see
// https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/ Part
// 2, section 6.13.
func propToString(v uint32) string {
chars := []byte{
byte(v >> 24),
byte(v >> 16),
byte(v >> 8),
byte(v),
}
// Delete any non-printable ASCII characters.
return string(slices.DeleteFunc(chars, func(b byte) bool { return b < ' ' || b > '~' }))
}
func newStore(logf logger.Logf, path string) (ipn.StateStore, error) {
path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, store.TPMPrefix)
if err := paths.MkStateDir(filepath.Dir(path)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating state directory: %w", err)
}
var parsed map[ipn.StateKey][]byte
bs, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to open %q: %w", path, err)
}
logf("tpm.newStore: initializing state file")
var key [32]byte
// crypto/rand.Read never returns an error.
rand.Read(key[:])
store := &tpmStore{
logf: logf,
path: path,
key: key,
cache: make(map[ipn.StateKey][]byte),
}
if err := store.writeSealed(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write initial state file: %w", err)
}
return store, nil
}
// State file exists, unseal and parse it.
var sealed encryptedData
if err := json.Unmarshal(bs, &sealed); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal state file: %w", err)
}
if len(sealed.Data) == 0 || sealed.Key == nil || len(sealed.Nonce) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("state file %q has not been TPM-sealed or is corrupt", path)
}
data, err := unseal(logf, sealed)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unseal state file: %w", err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data.Data, &parsed); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse state file: %w", err)
}
return &tpmStore{
logf: logf,
path: path,
key: data.Key,
cache: parsed,
}, nil
}
// tpmStore is an ipn.StateStore that stores the state in a secretbox-encrypted
// file using a TPM-sealed symmetric key.
type tpmStore struct {
ipn.EncryptedStateStore
logf logger.Logf
path string
key [32]byte
mu sync.RWMutex
cache map[ipn.StateKey][]byte
}
func (s *tpmStore) ReadState(k ipn.StateKey) ([]byte, error) {
s.mu.RLock()
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
v, ok := s.cache[k]
if !ok {
return nil, ipn.ErrStateNotExist
}
return bytes.Clone(v), nil
}
func (s *tpmStore) WriteState(k ipn.StateKey, bs []byte) error {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if bytes.Equal(s.cache[k], bs) {
return nil
}
s.cache[k] = bytes.Clone(bs)
return s.writeSealed()
}
func (s *tpmStore) writeSealed() error {
bs, err := json.Marshal(s.cache)
if err != nil {
return err
}
sealed, err := seal(s.logf, decryptedData{Key: s.key, Data: bs})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to seal state file: %w", err)
}
buf, err := json.Marshal(sealed)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return atomicfile.WriteFile(s.path, buf, 0600)
}
func (s *tpmStore) All() iter.Seq2[ipn.StateKey, []byte] {
return func(yield func(ipn.StateKey, []byte) bool) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
for k, v := range s.cache {
if !yield(k, v) {
break
}
}
}
}
// Ensure tpmStore implements store.ExportableStore for migration to/from
// store.FileStore.
var _ store.ExportableStore = (*tpmStore)(nil)
// The nested levels of encoding and encryption are confusing, so here's what's
// going on in plain English.
//
// Not all TPM devices support symmetric encryption (TPM2_EncryptDecrypt2)
// natively, but they do support "sealing" small values (see
// tpmSeal/tpmUnseal). The size limit is too small for the actual state file,
// so we seal a symmetric key instead. This symmetric key is then used to seal
// the actual data using nacl/secretbox.
// Confusingly, both TPMs and secretbox use "seal" terminology.
//
// tpmSeal/tpmUnseal do the lower-level sealing of small []byte blobs, which we
// use to seal a 32-byte secretbox key.
//
// seal/unseal do the higher-level sealing of store data using secretbox, and
// also sealing of the symmetric key using TPM.
// decryptedData contains the fully decrypted raw data along with the symmetric
// key used for secretbox. This struct should only live in memory and never get
// stored to disk!
type decryptedData struct {
Key [32]byte
Data []byte
}
func (decryptedData) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errors.New("[unexpected]: decryptedData should never get JSON-marshaled!")
}
// encryptedData contains the secretbox-sealed data and nonce, along with a
// TPM-sealed key. All fields are required.
type encryptedData struct {
Key *tpmSealedData `json:"key"`
Nonce []byte `json:"nonce"`
Data []byte `json:"data"`
}
func seal(logf logger.Logf, dec decryptedData) (*encryptedData, error) {
var nonce [24]byte
// crypto/rand.Read never returns an error.
rand.Read(nonce[:])
sealedData := secretbox.Seal(nil, dec.Data, &nonce, &dec.Key)
sealedKey, err := tpmSeal(logf, dec.Key[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to seal encryption key to TPM: %w", err)
}
return &encryptedData{
Key: sealedKey,
Nonce: nonce[:],
Data: sealedData,
}, nil
}
func unseal(logf logger.Logf, data encryptedData) (*decryptedData, error) {
if len(data.Nonce) != 24 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("nonce should be 24 bytes long, got %d", len(data.Nonce))
}
unsealedKey, err := tpmUnseal(logf, data.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unseal encryption key with TPM: %w", err)
}
if len(unsealedKey) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsealed key should be 32 bytes long, got %d", len(unsealedKey))
}
unsealedData, ok := secretbox.Open(nil, data.Data, (*[24]byte)(data.Nonce), (*[32]byte)(unsealedKey))
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("failed to unseal data")
}
return &decryptedData{
Key: *(*[32]byte)(unsealedKey),
Data: unsealedData,
}, nil
}
type tpmSealedData struct {
Private []byte
Public []byte
}
// withSRK runs fn with the loaded Storage Root Key (SRK) handle. The SRK is
// flushed after fn returns.
func withSRK(logf logger.Logf, tpm transport.TPM, fn func(srk tpm2.AuthHandle) error) error {
srkCmd := tpm2.CreatePrimary{
PrimaryHandle: tpm2.TPMRHOwner,
InPublic: tpm2.New2B(tpm2.ECCSRKTemplate),
}
srkRes, err := srkCmd.Execute(tpm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tpm2.CreatePrimary: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cmd := tpm2.FlushContext{FlushHandle: srkRes.ObjectHandle}
if _, err := cmd.Execute(tpm); err != nil {
logf("tpm2.FlushContext: failed to flush SRK handle: %v", err)
}
}()
return fn(tpm2.AuthHandle{
Handle: srkRes.ObjectHandle,
Name: srkRes.Name,
Auth: tpm2.HMAC(tpm2.TPMAlgSHA256, 32),
})
}
// tpmSeal seals the data using SRK of the local TPM.
func tpmSeal(logf logger.Logf, data []byte) (*tpmSealedData, error) {
tpm, err := open()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening TPM: %w", err)
}
defer tpm.Close()
var res *tpmSealedData
err = withSRK(logf, tpm, func(srk tpm2.AuthHandle) error {
sealCmd := tpm2.Create{
ParentHandle: srk,
InSensitive: tpm2.TPM2BSensitiveCreate{
Sensitive: &tpm2.TPMSSensitiveCreate{
Data: tpm2.NewTPMUSensitiveCreate(&tpm2.TPM2BSensitiveData{
Buffer: data,
}),
},
},
InPublic: tpm2.New2B(tpm2.TPMTPublic{
Type: tpm2.TPMAlgKeyedHash,
NameAlg: tpm2.TPMAlgSHA256,
ObjectAttributes: tpm2.TPMAObject{
FixedTPM: true,
FixedParent: true,
UserWithAuth: true,
// We don't set an authorization policy on this key, so DA
// isn't helpful.
NoDA: true,
},
}),
}
sealRes, err := sealCmd.Execute(tpm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tpm2.Create: %w", err)
}
res = &tpmSealedData{
Private: sealRes.OutPrivate.Buffer,
Public: sealRes.OutPublic.Bytes(),
}
return nil
})
return res, err
}
// tpmUnseal unseals the data using SRK of the local TPM.
func tpmUnseal(logf logger.Logf, data *tpmSealedData) ([]byte, error) {
tpm, err := open()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening TPM: %w", err)
}
defer tpm.Close()
var res []byte
err = withSRK(logf, tpm, func(srk tpm2.AuthHandle) error {
// Load the sealed object into the TPM first under SRK.
loadCmd := tpm2.Load{
ParentHandle: srk,
InPrivate: tpm2.TPM2BPrivate{Buffer: data.Private},
InPublic: tpm2.BytesAs2B[tpm2.TPMTPublic](data.Public),
}
loadRes, err := loadCmd.Execute(tpm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tpm2.Load: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cmd := tpm2.FlushContext{FlushHandle: loadRes.ObjectHandle}
if _, err := cmd.Execute(tpm); err != nil {
log.Printf("tpm2.FlushContext: failed to flush loaded sealed blob handle: %v", err)
}
}()
// Then unseal the object.
unsealCmd := tpm2.Unseal{
ItemHandle: tpm2.NamedHandle{
Handle: loadRes.ObjectHandle,
Name: loadRes.Name,
},
}
unsealRes, err := unsealCmd.Execute(tpm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tpm2.Unseal: %w", err)
}
res = unsealRes.OutData.Buffer
return nil
})
return res, err
}