haproxy/src/quic_token.c
Amaury Denoyelle 4aa974f949 BUG/MAJOR: quic: reject invalid token
Token parsing code on INITIAL packet for the NEW_TOKEN format is not
robust enough and may even crash on some rare malformed packets.

This patch fixes this by adding a check on the expected length of the
received token. The packet is now rejected if the token does not match
QUIC_TOKEN_LEN. This check is legitimate as haproxy should only parse
tokens emitted by itself.

This issue has been introduced with the implementation of NEW_TOKEN
tokens parsing required for 0-RTT support.

This issue is assigned to CVE-2026-26081 report.

This must be backported up to 3.0.

Reported-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
2026-02-12 09:09:44 +01:00

176 lines
4.7 KiB
C

#include <haproxy/tools.h>
#include <haproxy/net_helper.h>
#include <haproxy/quic_tls.h>
#include <haproxy/quic_token.h>
#define TRACE_SOURCE &trace_quic
#define QUIC_TOKEN_RAND_DLEN 16
/* Build a token into <token> buffer with <len> as length and cipher
* it with AEAD as cryptographic algorithm. <addr> are use as AAD.
* Return 1 if succeeded, 0 if not.
*/
int quic_generate_token(unsigned char *token, size_t len,
struct sockaddr_storage *addr)
{
#ifdef QUIC_AEAD_API
const QUIC_AEAD *aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
#else
const QUIC_AEAD *aead = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
#endif
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char aad[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
size_t aadlen;
uint32_t ts = (uint32_t)date.tv_sec;
uint64_t rand_u64;
unsigned char rand[QUIC_TOKEN_RAND_DLEN];
unsigned char key[16];
unsigned char iv[QUIC_TLS_IV_LEN];
const unsigned char *sec = global.cluster_secret;
size_t seclen = sizeof(global.cluster_secret);
QUIC_AEAD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
TRACE_ENTER(QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
/* Generate random data to be used as salt to derive the token secret. */
rand_u64 = ha_random64();
write_u64(rand, rand_u64);
rand_u64 = ha_random64();
write_u64(rand + sizeof(rand_u64), rand_u64);
if (len < QUIC_TOKEN_LEN) {
TRACE_ERROR("too small buffer", QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the AAD. */
aadlen = ipaddrcpy(aad, addr);
if (!quic_tls_derive_token_secret(EVP_sha256(), key, sizeof key,
iv, sizeof iv, rand, sizeof(rand),
sec, seclen)) {
TRACE_ERROR("quic_tls_derive_token_secret() failed", QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
goto err;
}
if (!quic_tls_tx_ctx_init(&ctx, aead, key)) {
TRACE_ERROR("quic_tls_tx_ctx_init() failed", QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
goto err;
}
/* Clear token build */
p = token;
*p++ = QUIC_TOKEN_FMT_NEW;
write_u32(p, htonl(ts));
p += sizeof(ts);
if (!quic_tls_encrypt(token + 1, p - token - 1, aad, aadlen, ctx, aead, iv)) {
TRACE_ERROR("quic_tls_encrypt() failed", QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
goto err;
}
p += QUIC_TLS_TAG_LEN;
memcpy(p, rand, sizeof(rand));
p += sizeof(rand);
ret = p - token;
leave:
if (ctx)
QUIC_AEAD_CTX_free(ctx);
TRACE_LEAVE(QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
return ret;
err:
TRACE_DEVEL("leaving on error", QUIC_EV_CONN_TXPKT);
goto leave;
}
/* QUIC server only function.
*
* Check the validity of the token from Initial packet <pkt>. <dgram> is
* the UDP datagram containing <pkt> and <l> is the listener instance on which
* it was received. <qc> is used only for debugging purposes (traces).
*
* Return 1 if succeeded, 0 if not.
*/
int quic_token_check(struct quic_rx_packet *pkt,
struct quic_dgram *dgram,
struct quic_conn *qc)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *token = pkt->token;
size_t tokenlen = pkt->token_len;
const unsigned char *rand;
unsigned char buf[128];
unsigned char aad[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
size_t aadlen;
unsigned char key[16];
unsigned char iv[QUIC_TLS_IV_LEN];
const unsigned char *sec = global.cluster_secret;
size_t seclen = sizeof(global.cluster_secret);
uint32_t ts;
uint32_t now_sec = (uint32_t)date.tv_sec;
QUIC_AEAD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
#ifdef QUIC_AEAD_API
const QUIC_AEAD *aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
#else
const QUIC_AEAD *aead = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
#endif
TRACE_ENTER(QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
BUG_ON(!tokenlen || *token != QUIC_TOKEN_FMT_NEW);
if (sizeof(buf) < tokenlen) {
TRACE_ERROR("too short buffer", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
goto err;
}
if (tokenlen != QUIC_TOKEN_LEN) {
TRACE_ERROR("invalid token length", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the AAD. */
aadlen = ipaddrcpy(aad, &dgram->saddr);
rand = token + tokenlen - QUIC_TOKEN_RAND_DLEN;
if (!quic_tls_derive_token_secret(EVP_sha256(), key, sizeof key, iv, sizeof iv,
rand, QUIC_TOKEN_RAND_DLEN, sec, seclen)) {
TRACE_ERROR("Could not derive token secret", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
goto err;
}
if (!quic_tls_rx_ctx_init(&ctx, aead, key)) {
TRACE_ERROR("quic_tls_rx_ctx_init() failed", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
goto err;
}
/* The token is prefixed by a one-byte length format which is not ciphered. */
if (!quic_tls_decrypt2(buf, token + 1, tokenlen - QUIC_TOKEN_RAND_DLEN - 1, aad, aadlen,
ctx, aead, key, iv)) {
TRACE_ERROR("Could not decrypt token", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
goto err;
}
ts = ntohl(read_u32(buf));
if (now_sec - ts > QUIC_TOKEN_DURATION_SEC) {
TRACE_ERROR("expired token", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT, qc);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
leave:
if (ctx)
QUIC_AEAD_CTX_free(ctx);
TRACE_LEAVE(QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT);
return ret;
err:
TRACE_DEVEL("leaving on error", QUIC_EV_CONN_LPKT);
goto leave;
}