For openssl 1.0.2, SSLv3_server_method and SSLv3_client_method are undefined if
OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD is set. So we must add a check on this macro before using
these functions.
This patch modifies the way to re-enable the connection from the async fd
handler calling conn_update_sock_polling instead of the conn_fd_handler.
It also ensures that the polling is really stopped on the async fd.
The Openssl's ASYNC API does'nt support moving buffers on SSL_read/write
This patch disables the ASYNC mode dynamically when the handshake
is left and re-enables it on reneg.
This patch ensure that the ASYNC fd handlers won't be wake up
too early, disabling the event cache for this fd on connection close
and when a WANT_ASYNC is rised by Openssl.
The calls to SSL_read/SSL_write/SSL_do_handshake before rising a real read
event from the ASYNC fd, generated an EAGAIN followed by a context switch
for some engines, or a blocked read for the others.
On connection close it resulted in a too early call to SSL_free followed
by a segmentation fault.
SSL/TLS version can be changed per certificat if and only if openssl lib support
earlier callback on handshake and, of course, is implemented in haproxy. It's ok
for BoringSSL. For Openssl, version 1.1.1 have such callback and could support it.
This patch cleanup the usage of set_version func with a more suitable name:
ctx_set_version. It introduce ssl_set_version func (unused for the moment).
This patch adds the support of a maximum of 32 engines
in async mode.
Some tests have been done using 2 engines simultaneously.
This patch also removes specific 'async' attribute from the connection
structure. All the code relies only on Openssl functions.
ssl-mode-async is a global configuration parameter which enables
asynchronous processing in OPENSSL for all SSL connections haproxy
handles. With SSL_MODE_ASYNC set, TLS I/O operations may indicate a
retry with SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC with this mode set if an asynchronous
capable engine is used to perform cryptographic operations. Currently
async mode only supports one async-capable engine.
This is the latest version of the patchset which includes Emeric's
updates :
- improved async fd cleaning when openssl reports an fd to delete
- prevent conn_fd_handler from calling SSL_{read,write,handshake} until
the async fd is ready, as these operations are very slow and waste CPU
- postpone of SSL_free to ensure the async operation can complete and
does not cause a dereference a released SSL.
- proper removal of async fd from the fdtab and removal of the unused async
flag.
This patch adds the global 'ssl-engine' keyword. First arg is an engine
identifier followed by a list of default_algorithms the engine will
operate.
If the openssl version is too old, an error is reported when the option
is used.
In haproxy < 1.8, no-sslv3/no-tlsv1x are ignored when force-sslv3/force-tlsv1x
is used (without warning). With this patch, no-sslv3/no-tlsv1x are ignored when
ssl-min-ver or ssl-max-ver is used (with warning).
When all SSL/TLS versions are disable: generate an error, not a warning.
example: ssl-min-ver TLSV1.3 (or force-tlsv13) with a openssl <= 1.1.0.
'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' with argument SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2
or TLSv1.3 limit the SSL negotiation version to a continuous range. ssl-min-ver
and ssl-max-ver should be used in replacement of no-tls* and no-sslv3. Warning
and documentation are set accordingly.
Plan is to add min-tlsxx max-tlsxx configuration, more consistent than no-tlsxx.
Find the real min/max versions (openssl capabilities and haproxy configuration)
and generate warning with bad versions range.
'no-tlsxx' can generate 'holes':
"The list of protocols available can be further limited using the SSL_OP_NO_X
options of the SSL_CTX_set_options or SSL_set_options functions. Clients should
avoid creating 'holes' in the set of protocols they support, when disabling a
protocol, make sure that you also disable either all previous or all subsequent
protocol versions. In clients, when a protocol version is disabled without
disabling all previous protocol versions, the effect is to also disable all
subsequent protocol versions."
To not break compatibility, "holes" is authorized with warning, because openssl
1.1.0 and boringssl deal with it (keep the upper or lower range depending the
case and version).
Plan is to add min-tlsxx max-tlsxx configuration, more consistent than no-tlsxx.
This patch introduce internal min/max and replace force-tlsxx implementation.
SSL method configuration is store in 'struct tls_version_filter'.
SSL method configuration to openssl setting is abstract in 'methodVersions' table.
With openssl < 1.1.0, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version is used for force (min == max).
With openssl >= 1.1.0, SSL_CTX_set_min/max_proto_version is used.
Plan is to add min-tlsxx max-tlsxx configuration, more consistent than no-tlsxx.
min-tlsxx and max-tlsxx can be overwrite on local definition. This directives
should be the only ones needed in default-server.
To simplify next patches (rework of tls versions settings with min/max) all
ssl/tls version settings relative to default-server are reverted first:
remove: 'sslv3', 'tls*', 'no-force-sslv3', 'no-force-tls*'.
remove from default-server: 'no-sslv3', 'no-tls*'.
Note:
. force-tlsxx == min-tlsxx + max-tlsxx : would be ok in default-server.
. no-tlsxx is keep for compatibility: should not be propagated to default-server.
Currently we unconditionally set SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE [1],
which may not always be a good thing.
The benefit of server side cipher prioritization may not apply to all
cases out there, and it appears that the various SSL libs are going away
from this recommendation ([2], [3]), as insecure ciphers suites are
properly blacklisted/removed and honoring the client's preference is
more likely to improve user experience (for example using SW-friendly
ciphers on devices without HW AES support).
This is especially true for TLSv1.3, which will restrict the cipher
suites to just AES-GCM and Chacha20/Poly1305.
Apache [4], nginx [5] and others give admins full flexibility, we should
as well.
The initial proposal to change the current default and add a
"prefer-server-ciphers" option (as implemented in e566ecb) has been
declined due to the possible security impact.
This patch implements prefer-client-ciphers without changing the defaults.
[1] https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.html
[2] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/541
[3] https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable/issues/66
[4] https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.0/en/mod/mod_ssl.html#sslhonorcipherorder
[5] https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_ssl_module.html#ssl_prefer_server_ciphers
This patch replaces the calls to TLSvX_X_client/server/_method
by the new TLS_client/server_method and it uses the new functions
SSL_set_min_proto_version and SSL_set_max_proto_version, setting them
at the wanted protocol version using 'force-' statements.
This patch makes 'default-server' directives support 'sni' settings.
A field 'sni_expr' has been added to 'struct server' to temporary
stores SNI expressions as strings during both 'default-server' and 'server'
lines parsing. So, to duplicate SNI expressions from 'default-server' 'sni' setting
for new 'server' instances we only have to "strdup" these strings as this is
often done for most of the 'server' settings.
Then, sample expressions are computed calling sample_parse_expr() (only for 'server'
instances).
A new function has been added to produce the same error output as before in case
of any error during 'sni' settings parsing (display_parser_err()).
Should not break anything.
This patch makes 'default-server' directive support 'verifyhost' setting.
Note: there was a little memory leak when several 'verifyhost' arguments were
supplied on the same 'server' line.
This patch makes 'default-server' directive support 'send-proxy-v2-ssl'
(resp. 'send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn') setting.
A new keyword 'no-send-proxy-v2-ssl' (resp. 'no-send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn') has been
added to disable 'send-proxy-v2-ssl' (resp. 'send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn') setting both
in 'server' and 'default-server' directives.
This patch makes 'default-server' directive support 'ssl' setting.
A new keyword 'no-ssl' has been added to disable this setting both
in 'server' and 'default-server' directives.
This patch makes 'default-server' directive support 'no-sslv3' (resp. 'no-ssl-reuse',
'no-tlsv10', 'no-tlsv11', 'no-tlsv12', and 'no-tls-tickets') setting.
New keywords 'sslv3' (resp. 'ssl-reuse', 'tlsv10', 'tlsv11', 'tlsv12', and
'tls-no-tickets') have been added to disable these settings both in 'server' and
'default-server' directives.
This patch makes 'default-server' directive support 'force-sslv3'
and 'force-tlsv1[0-2]' settings.
New keywords 'no-force-sslv3' (resp. 'no-tlsv1[0-2]') have been added
to disable 'force-sslv3' (resp. 'force-tlsv1[0-2]') setting both in 'server' and
'default-server' directives.
This patch makes 'default-server' directive support 'check-ssl' setting
to enable SSL for health checks.
A new keyword 'no-check-ssl' has been added to disable this setting both in
'server' and 'default-server' directives.
SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto is declared (when present) with #define. A simple #ifdef
avoid to list all cases of ssllibs. It's a placebo in new ssllibs. It's ok with
openssl 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.1.0, libressl and boringssl.
Thanks to Piotr Kubaj for postponing and testing with libressl.
Invalid OCSP file (for example empty one that can be used to enable
OCSP response to be set dynamically later) causes errors that are
placed on OpenSSL error stack. Those errors are not cleared so
anything that checks this stack later will fail.
Following configuration:
bind :443 ssl crt crt1.pem crt crt2.pem
With following files:
crt1.pem
crt1.pem.ocsp - empty one
crt2.pem.rsa
crt2.pem.ecdsa
Will fail to load.
This patch should be backported to 1.7.
Use SSL_set_ex_data/SSL_get_ex_data standard API call to store capture.
We need to avoid internal structures/undocumented calls usage to try to
control the beast and limit painful compatibilities.
Bug introduced with "removes SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version call and cleanup CTX
creation": ssl_sock_new_ctx is called before all the bind line is parsed.
The fix consists of separating the use of default_ctx as the initialization
context of the SSL connection via bind_conf->initial_ctx. Initial_ctx contains
all the necessary parameters before performing the selection of the CTX:
default_ctx is processed as others ctx without unnecessary parameters.
This new sample-fetches captures the cipher list offer by the client
SSL connection during the client-hello phase. This is useful for
fingerprint the SSL connection.
BoringSSL doesn't support SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version. To remove this call, the
CTX creation is cleanup to clarify what is happening. SSL_CTX_new is used to
match the original behavior, in order: force-<method> according the method
version then the default method with no-<method> options.
OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 error message is now in force-sslv3 parsing (as force-tls*).
For CTX creation in bind environement, all CTX set related to the initial ctx
are aggregate to ssl_sock_new_ctx function for clarity.
Tests with crt-list have shown that server_method, options and mode are
linked to the initial CTX (default_ctx): all ssl-options are link to each
bind line and must be removed from crt-list.
Extract from RFC 6066:
"If the server understood the ClientHello extension but does not recognize
the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two actions: either abort the
handshake by sending a fatal-level unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the
handshake. It is NOT RECOMMENDED to send a warning-level unrecognized_name(112)
alert, because the client's behavior in response to warning-level alerts is
unpredictable. If there is a mismatch between the server name used by the
client application and the server name of the credential chosen by the server,
this mismatch will become apparent when the client application performs the
server endpoint identification, at which point the client application will have
to decide whether to proceed with the communication."
Thanks Roberto Guimaraes for the bug repport, spotted with openssl-1.1.0.
This fix must be backported.
SSL verify and client_CA inherits from the initial ctx (default_ctx).
When a certificate is found, the SSL connection environment must be replaced by
the certificate configuration (via SSL_set_verify and SSL_set_client_CA_list).
This patch used boringssl's callback to analyse CLientHello before any
handshake to extract key signature capabilities.
Certificat with better signature (ECDSA before RSA) is choosed
transparenty, if client can support it. RSA and ECDSA certificates can
be declare in a row (without order). This makes it possible to set
different ssl and filter parameter with crt-list.
Commit 405ff31 ("BUG/MINOR: ssl: assert on SSL_set_shutdown with BoringSSL")
introduced a regression causing some random crashes apparently due to
memory corruption. The issue is the use of SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown()
instead of SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(), making it use a different structure
and causing the flag to be put who-knows-where.
Many thanks to Jarno Huuskonen who reported this bug early and who
bisected the issue to spot this patch. No backport is needed, this
is 1.8-specific.
A recent patch to support BoringSSL caused this warning to appear on
OpenSSL 1.1.0 :
src/ssl_sock.c:3062:4: warning: statement with no effect [-Wunused-value]
It's caused by SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto() which is now only a macro testing
that the last argument is zero, and the result is not used here. Let's
just kill it for both versions.
Tested with 0.9.8, 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.1.0. This fix may be backported
to 1.7 if the boringssl fix is as well.
Limitations:
. disable force-ssl/tls (need more work)
should be set earlier with SSL_CTX_new (SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version is removed)
. disable generate-certificates (need more work)
introduce SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES to disable generate-certificates.
Cleanup some #ifdef and type related to boringssl env.
