When a filter is registered on the data, it means it may change the payload
length by rewritting data. It means consumers of the message cannot trust the
expected length of payload as announced by the producer. The commit 8bd835b2d2
("MEDIUM: filters/htx: Don't rely on HTX extra field if payload is filtered")
was pushed to solve this issue. When the HTTP payload of a message is filtered,
the extra field is set to 0 to be sure it will never be used by error by any
consumer. However, it is not enough.
Indeed, the filters must be called before fowarding some data. They cannot be
by-passed. But if a consumer is unable to flush the HTX message, some outgoing
data can remain blocked in the channel's buffer. If some new data are then
pushed because there is some room in the channel's buffe, the producer will set
the HTX extra field. At this stage, if the consumer is unblocked and can send
again data, it is possible to call it to forward outgoing data blocked in the
channel's buffer before waking the stream up to filter new input data. It is the
purpose of the data fast-forwarding. In this case, the HTX extra field will be
seen by the consumer. It is unexpected and leads to undefined behavior.
One consequence of this bug is to perform a wrong chunking on compressed
messages, leading to processing errors at the end of the message, reported as
"ID--" in logs.
To fix the bug, a HTX flag is added to state the payload of the current HTX
message is altered. When this flag is set (HTX_FL_ALTERED_PAYLOAD), the HTX
extra field must not be trusted. And to keep things simple, when this flag is
set, the HTX extra field is automatically set to 0 when the HTX message is
loaded, in htxbuf() function.
It is probably the less intrusive way to fix the bug for now. But this part must
be reviewed to save meta-info of the HTX message outside of the message itself.
This commit should solve the issue #2741. It must be backported as far as 2.9.
The overhead induced by the HTX format was set to the HTX structure itself
and two HTX blocks. It was set this way to optimize zero-copy during
transfers. This value may (and will) be used at different places. Thus we
now use a macro, called HTX_BUF_OVERHEAD.
Implement a new HTX utility function htx_set_eom(). If the HTX message
is empty, it will first add a dummy EOT block. This is a small trick
needed to ensure readers will detect the HTX buffer as not empty and
retrieve the EOM flag.
Replace the H2 code related by a htx_set_eom() invocation. QUIC also has
the same code which will be replaced in the next commit.
This should be backported up to 2.7 before the related QUIC patch.
When the payload length cannot be determined, the htx extra field is set to
the magical vlaue ULLONG_MAX. It is not obvious. This a dedicated HTX value
is now used. Now, HTX_UNKOWN_PAYLOAD_LENGTH must be used in this case,
instead of ULLONG_MAX.
htx_get_head_blk() is used at plenty of places, many of which are known
to be safe, but the function checks for the presence of a first block
and returns NULL if it doesn't exist. While it's properly used, it makes
compilers complain at -Os on stream.c and mux_fcgi.c because they probably
don't propagate variables far enough to see that there's no risk.
Let's add an unchecked version for these use cases.
In htx_copy_msg(), if the destination buffer is empty, we perform a raw copy
of the message instead of a copy block per block. But we must be sure the
destianation buffer was really allocated. In other word, to perform a raw
copy, the HTX message must be empty _AND_ it must have some free space
available.
This function is only used to copy an HTTP reply (for instance, an error or
a redirect) in the buffer of the response channel. For now, we are sure the
buffer was allocated because it is a pre-requisite to call stream
analyzers. However, it may be a source of bug in future.
This patch may be backported as far as 2.3.
When the header list is added, after the message parsing, headers with no
value are now ignored. It is not the same than headers with empty value
fields. Only headers with a NULL pointer as value are skipped. This only
happens if the header value is removed during the message
parsing. Concretly, such headers are now ignored when htx_add_all_headers()
is called. However, htx_add_header() is not affected by this change.
Symetrically, the same is true for trailers. It may be backported to 2.4
because of the previous fix ("BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: Remove "Upgrade:" header
for requests with payload").
Ori Hollander of JFrog Security reported that htx_add_header() and
htx_add_trailer() were missing a length check on the header name. While
this does not allow to overwrite any memory area, it results in bits of
the header name length to slip into the header value length and may
result in forging certain header names on the input. The sad thing here
is that a FIXME comment was present suggesting to add the required length
checks :-(
The injected headers are visible to the HTTP internals and to the config
rules, so haproxy will generally stay synchronized with the server. But
there is one exception which is the content-length header field, because
it is already deduplicated on the input, but before being indexed. As
such, injecting a content-length header after the deduplication stage
may be abused to present a different, shorter one on the other side and
help build a request smuggling attack, or even maybe a response splitting
attack. CVE-2021-40346 was assigned to this problem.
As a mitigation measure, it is sufficient to verify that no more than
one such header is present in any message, which is normally the case
thanks to the duplicate checks:
http-request deny if { req.hdr_cnt(content-length) gt 1 }
http-response deny if { res.hdr_cnt(content-length) gt 1 }
This must be backported to all HTX-enabled versions, hence as far as 2.0.
In 2.3 and earlier, the functions are in src/htx.c instead.
Many thanks to Ori for his work and his responsible report!
Since commit "BUG/MINOR: config: reject configs using HTTP with bufsize
>= 256 MB" we are now sure that it's not possible anymore to have an HTX
block of a size 256 MB or more, even after concatenation thanks to the
tests for len >= htx_free_data_space(). Let's remove these now obsolete
comments.
A BUG_ON() was added in htx_add_blk() to track any such exception if
the conditions would change later, to complete the one that is performed
on the start address that must remain within the buffer.
When an HTX block is expanded, a defragmentation may be performed first to
have enough space to copy the new data. When it happens, the meta data of
the HTX message must take account of the new data length but copied data are
still unchanged at this stage (because we need more space to update the
message content). And here there is a bug because the meta data are updated
by the caller. It means that when the blocks content is copied, the new
length is already set. Thus a block larger than the reality is copied and
data outside the buffer may be accessed, leading to a crash.
To fix this bug, htx_defrag() is updated to use an extra argument with the
new meta data to use for the referenced block. Thus the caller does not need
to update the HTX message by itself. However, it still have to update the
data.
Most of time, the bug will be encountered in the HTTP compression
filter. But, even if it is highly unlikely, in theory it is also possible to
hit it when a HTTP header (or only its value) is replaced or when the
start-line is changed.
This patch must be backported as far as 2.0.
The HTX functions used to add new HTX blocks in a message have been moved to
the header file to inline them in calling functions. These functions are
small enough.
The function htx_reserve_max_data() should be used to get an HTX DATA block
with the max possible size. A current block may be extended or a new one
created, depending on the HTX message state. But the idea is to let the
caller to copy a bunch of data without requesting many new blocks. It is its
responsibility to resize the block at the end, to set the final block size.
This function will be used to parse messages with small chunks. Indeed, we
can have more than 2700 1-byte chunks in a 16Kb of input data. So it is easy
to understand how this function may help to improve the parsing of chunk
messages.
The EOM block may be removed. The HTX_FL_EOM flags is enough. Most of time,
to know if the end of the message is reached, we just need to have an empty
HTX message with HTX_FL_EOM flag set. It may also be detected when the last
block of a message with HTX_FL_EOM flag is manipulated.
Removing EOM blocks simplifies the HTX message filling. Indeed, there is no
more edge problems when the message ends but there is no more space to write
the EOM block. However, some part are more tricky. Especially the
compression filter or the FCGI mux. The compression filter must finish the
compression on the last DATA block. Before it was performed on the EOM
block, an extra DATA block with the checksum was added. Now, we must detect
the last DATA block to be sure to finish the compression. The FCGI mux on
its part must be sure to reserve the space for the empty STDIN record on the
last DATA block while this record was inserted on the EOM block.
The H2 multiplexer is probably the part that benefits the most from this
change. Indeed, it is now fairly easier to known when to set the ES flag.
The HTX documentaion has been updated accordingly.
The htx_is_unique_blk() function may now be used to know if a block is the
only one in an HTX message, excluding all unused blocks. Note the purpose of
this function is not to know if a block is the last one of an HTTP message.
This means no more data part from the message are expected, except tunneled
data. It only says if a block is alone in an HTX message.
When an internal response is returned to a client, the message payload must be
skipped if it is a reply to a HEAD request. The payload is removed from the HTX
message just before the message forwarding.
This bugs has been around for a long time. It was already there in the pre-HTX
versions. In legacy HTTP mode, internal errors are not parsed. So this bug
cannot be easily fixed. Thus, this patch should only be backported in all HTX
versions, as far as 2.0. However, the code has significantly changed in the
2.2. Thus in the 2.1 and 2.0, the patch must be entirely reworked.
The HTX_FL_EOI flag must now be set on a HTX message when no more data are
expected. Most of time, it must be set before adding the EOM block. Thus, if
there is no space for the EOM, there is still an information to know all data
were received and pushed in the HTX message. There is only an exception for the
HTTP replies (deny, return...). For these messages, the flag is set after all
blocks are pushed in the message, including the EOM block, because, on error,
we remove all inserted data.
This patch fixes all the leftovers from the include cleanup campaign. There
were not that many (~400 entries in ~150 files) but it was definitely worth
doing it as it revealed a few duplicates.
Most of the file was a large set of HTX elements manipulation functions
and few types, so splitting them allowed to further reduce dependencies
and shrink the build time. Doing so revealed that a few files (h2.c,
mux_pt.c) needed haproxy/buf.h and were previously getting it through
htx.h. They were fixed.
