This patch introduces the "sigalgs" keyword for the bind line, which
allows to configure the list of server signature algorithms negociated
during the handshake. Also available as "ssl-default-bind-sigalgs" in
the default section.
This patch was originally written by Bruno Henc.
WolfSSL is enabling by default the CRL checks even if a CRL file wasn't
provided. This patch resets the default X509_STORE flags so this is
not checked by default.
While it does not have any effect, it's better not to try to setup an
ALPN callback nor to try to lookup algorithms when the configured ALPN
string is empty as a result of "no-alpn" being used.
strcpy() is quite nasty but tolerable to copy constants, but here
it copies a variable path into a node in a code path that's not
trivial to follow given that it takes the node as the result of
a tree lookup. Let's get rid of it and mention where the entry
is retrieved.
Previously performing a config check of `.github/h2spec.config` would report a
20 byte leak as reported in GitHub Issue #2082.
The leak was introduced in a6c0a59e9a, which is
dev only. No backport needed.
Despite having replaced the SSL BIOs to use our own raw_sock layer, we
still didn't exploit the CO_SFL_MSG_MORE flag which is pretty useful to
avoid sending incomplete packets. It's particularly important for SSL
since the extra overhead almost guarantees that each send() will be
followed by an incomplete (and often odd-sided) segment.
We already have an xprt_st set of flags to pass info to the various
layers, so let's just add a new one, SSL_SOCK_SEND_MORE, that is set
or cleared during ssl_sock_from_buf() to transfer the knowledge of
CO_SFL_MSG_MORE. This way we can recover this information and pass
it to raw_sock.
This alone is sufficient to increase by ~5-10% the H2 bandwidth over
SSL when multiple streams are used in parallel.
The commit 5e1b0e7bf ("BUG/MEDIUM: connection: Clear flags when a conn is
removed from an idle list") introduced a regression. CO_FL_SAFE_LIST and
CO_FL_IDLE_LIST flags are used when the connection is released to properly
decrement used/idle connection counters. if a connection is idle, these
flags must be preserved till the connection is really released. It may be
removed from the list but not immediately released. If these flags are lost
when it is finally released, the current number of used connections is
erroneously decremented. If means this counter may become negative and the
counters tracking the number of idle connecitons is not decremented,
suggesting a leak.
So, the above commit is reverted and instead we improve a bit the way to
detect an idle connection. The function conn_get_idle_flag() must now be
used to know if a connection is in an idle list. It returns the connection
flag corresponding to the idle list if the connection is idle
(CO_FL_SAFE_LIST or CO_FL_IDLE_LIST) or 0 otherwise. But if the connection
is scheduled to be removed, 0 is also returned, regardless the connection
flags.
This new function is used when the connection is temporarily removed from
the list to be used, mainly in muxes.
This patch should fix#2078 and #2057. It must be backported as far as 2.2.
Like for connection error code, when FD are dumps, the ssl error code is now
displayed. This may help to diagnose why a connection error occurred.
This patch may be backported to help debugging.
Instead of having a dedicated httpclient instance and its own code
decorrelated from the actual auto update one, the "update ssl
ocsp-response" will now use the update task in order to perform updates.
Since the cli command allows to update responses that were never
included in the auto update tree, a new flag was added to the
certificate_ocsp structure so that the said entry can be inserted into
the tree "by hand" and it won't be reinserted back into the tree after
the update process is performed. The 'update_once' flag "stole" a bit
from the 'fail_count' counter since it is the one less likely to reach
UINT_MAX among the ocsp counters of the certificate_ocsp structure.
This new logic required that every certificate_ocsp entry contained all
the ocsp-related information at all time since entries that are not
supposed to be configured automatically can still be updated through the
cli. The logic of the ssl_sock_load_ocsp was changed accordingly.
When adding a new certificate through the CLI and appending it to a
crt-list with the 'ocsp-update' option set, the new certificate would
not be added to the OCSP response update list.
The only thing that was missing was the copy of the ocsp_update mode
from the ssl_bind_conf into the ckch_store's object.
An extra wakeup of the update task also needed to happen in case the
newly inserted entry needs to be updated before the next wakeup of the
task.
This patch does not need to be backported.
The minimum and maximum delays between two automatic updates of a given
OCSP response can now be set via global options. It allows to limit the
update rate of OCSP responses for configurations that use many frontend
certificates with the ocsp-update option set if the updates are deemed
too costly.
In order to have some information about the frontend certificate when
dumping the contents of the ocsp update tree from the cli, we could
either keep a reference to a ckch_store in the certificate_ocsp
structure, which might cause some dangling reference problems, or
simply copy the path to the certificate in the ocsp response structure.
This latter solution was chosen because of its simplicity.
This is a bad idea to make the TLS ClientHello callback call qc_conn_finalize().
If this latter fails, this would generate a TLS alert and make the connection
send packet whereas it is not functional. But qc_conn_finalize() job was to
install the transport parameters sent by the QUIC listener. This installation
cannot be done at any time. This must be done after having possibly negotiated
the QUIC version and before sending the first Handshake packets. It seems
the better moment to do that in when the Handshake TX secrets are derived. This
has been found inspecting the ngtcp2 code. Calling SSL_set_quic_transport_params()
too late would make the ServerHello to be sent without the transport parameters.
The code for the connection update which was done from qc_conn_finalize() has
been moved to quic_transport_params_store(). So, this update is done as soon as
possible.
Add QUIC_FL_CONN_TX_TP_RECEIVED to flag the connection as having received the
peer transport parameters. Indeed this is required when the ClientHello message
is splitted between packets.
Add QUIC_FL_CONN_FINALIZED to protect the connection from calling qc_conn_finalize()
more than one time. This latter is called only when the connection has received
the transport parameters and after returning from SSL_do_hanshake() which is the
function which trigger the TLS ClientHello callback call.
Remove the calls to qc_conn_finalize() from from the TLS ClientHello callbacks.
Must be backported to 2.6. and 2.7.
When using WolfSSL, there are some cases were the SSL_CTX_sess_new_cb is
called with an existing session ID. These cases are not met with
OpenSSL.
When the ID is found in the session tree during the insertion, the
shared_block len is not set to 0 and is not used. However if later the
block is reused, since the len is not set to 0, the release callback
will be called an ebmb_delete will be tried on the block, even if it's
not in the tree, provoking a crash.
The code was buggy from the beginning, but the case never happen with
openssl which changes the ID.
Must be backported in every maintained branches.
CF_READ_NULL flag is not really useful and used. It is a transient event
used to wakeup the stream. As we will see, all read events on a channel may
be resumed to only one and are all used to wake up the stream.
In this patch, we introduce CF_READ_EVENT flag as a replacement to
CF_READ_NULL. There is no breaking change for now, it is just a
rename. Gradually, other read events will be merged with this one.
The ocsp_uri field of the certificate_ocsp structure was a 16k buffer
when it could be hand allocated to just the required size to store the
OCSP uri. This field is now behaving the same way as the sctl and
ocsp_response buffers of the ckch_store structure.
If a given certificate is used multiple times in a configuration, the
ocsp_cid field would have been overwritten during each
ssl_sock_load_ocsp call even if it was previously filled.
This patch does not need to be backported.
If the ocsp issuer certificate was actually taken from the certificate
chain in ssl_sock_load_ocsp, we don't need to keep an extra reference on
it since we already keep a reference to the full certificate chain.
This patch effectively enables the ocsp auto update mechanism. If a
least one ocsp-update option is enabled in a crt-list, then the ocsp
auto update task is created. It will look into the dedicated ocsp update
tree for the next update to be updated, use the http_client to send the
ocsp request to the proper responder, validate the received ocsp
response and update the ocsp response tree before finally reinserting
the entry in the ocsp update tree (with a next update time set to
now+1H).
The main task will then sleep until another entry needs to be updated.
The task gets scheduled after config check in order to avoid trying to
update ocsp responses while configuration is still being parsed (and
certificates and actual ocsp responses are loaded).
This patch contains the main function of the ocsp auto update mechanism
as well as an init and destroy function of the task used for this.
The task is not created in this patch but in a later one.
The function has two distinct parts and the branching to one or the
other is completely based on the fact that the cur_ocsp pointer of the
ssl_ocsp_task_ctx member is set.
If the pointer is not set, we need to look at the first item of the
update tree and see if it needs to be updated. If it does not we simply
wait until the time is right and let the task asleep. If it does need to
be updated, we simply build and send the corresponding ocsp request
thanks to the http_client. The task is then sent to sleep with an expire
time set to infinity. The http_client will wake it back up once the
response is received (or a timeout occurs). Just note that during this
whole process the cetificate_ocsp object corresponding to the entry
being updated is taken out of the update tree and only stored in the
ssl_ocsp_task_ctx context.
Once the task is waken up by the http_client, it branches on the
response processing part of the function which basically checks that the
response is valid and inserts it into the ocsp_response tree. The task
then goes back to sleep until another entry needs to be updated.
When 'ocsp-update' is enabled for a given certificate, we need to insert
the certificate_ocsp member of this certificate in the OCSP update tree
as well as the already existing OCSP response tree. For such an entry to
be created, the certificate needs to contain an "OCSP URI" field, and we
also need to know the certificate's issuer, that is used to build the
OCSP_CERTID. When no OCSP response is known for a given certificate, an
empty certificate_ocsp object gets created so that it can be inserted in
the ocsp update tree.
The entry is inserted on the first spot of the update tree since its
expire time is 0. Then whenever the update task is started, it will try
to get responses for those certificates first.
In order for the update process to work, we also need to store some
information relative to the main certificate into the certificate_ocsp
structure. This avoids having to keep a reference to a ckch in an ocsp
tree entry.
This patch adds a reference to the certificate chain as well as the ocsp
issuer that might have been filled during init into the certificate_ocsp
object. It also gets the ocsp uri at this time since it is contained in
the server's certificate. We only take the first uri that might be
contained in the certificate though.
Those fields are only filled when ocsp auto update is enabled for the
concerned certificate.
The OCSP update tree holds ocsp responses that will need to be updated
automatically. The entries are inserted in an eb64_tree where the keys
are the absolute time after which the entry will need to be updated.
The ocsp_response member of the cert_key_and_chain structure is only
used temporarily. During a standard init process where an ocsp response
is provided, this ocsp file is first copied into the ocsp_response
buffer without any ocsp-related parsing (see
ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response_from_file), and then the contents are
actually interpreted and inserted into the actual ocsp tree
(cert_ocsp_tree) later in the process (see ssl_sock_load_ocsp). If the
response was deemed valid, it is then copied into the actual
ocsp_response structure's 'response' field (see
ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response). From this point, the ocsp_response field
of the cert_key_and_chain object could be discarded since actual ocsp
operations will be based of the certificate_ocsp object.
The only remaining runtime use of the ckch's ocsp_response field was in
the CLI, and more precisely in the 'show ssl cert' mechanism.
This constraint could be removed by adding an OCSP_CERTID directly in
the ckch because the buffer was only used to get this id.
This patch then adds the OCSP_CERTID pointer in the ckch, it clears the
ocsp_response buffer early and simplifies the ckch_store_build_certid
function.
The new "update ssl ocsp-response <certfile>" CLI command allows to
update the stored OCSP response for a given certificate. It relies on
the http_client which is used to send an HTTP request to the OCSP
responder whose URI can be extracted from the certificate.
This command won't work for a certificate that did not have a stored
OCSP response yet.
This helper function will check that an OCSP response is valid, meaning
that the proper "Content-Type: application/ocsp-response" header is
present and the data itself is a proper OCSP_RESPONSE that can be
checked thanks to the issuer certificate.
The tree that contains OCSP responses is never locked despite being used
at runtime for OCSP stapling as well as the CLI through "set ssl cert"
and "set ssl ocsp-response" commands.
Everything works though because the certificate_ocsp structure is
refcounted and the tree's entries are cleaned up when SSL_CTXs are
destroyed (thanks to an ex_data entry in which the certificate_ocsp
pointer is stored).
This new lock will come to use when the OCSP auto update mechanism is
fully implemented because this new feature will be based on another tree
that stores the same certificate_ocsp members and updates their contents
periodically.
The certificate chain that gets passed in the SSL_CTX through
SSL_CTX_set1_chain has its reference counter increased by OpenSSL
itself. But since the ssl_sock_load_cert_chain function might create a
brand new certificate chain if none exists in the ckch_data
(sk_X509_new_null), then we ended up returning a new certificate chain
to the caller that was never destroyed.
This patch can be backported to all stable branches but it might need to
be reworked for branches older than 2.4 because of commit ec805a32b9
that refactorized the modified code.
When calling 'show ssl ocsp-response' from the CLI, a temporary buffer
was created in parse_binary when we could just use a local static buffer
instead. This does not change the behavior of the function, it just
simplifies it.
With internal proxies using the SSL activated (httpclient for example)
the automatic computation of the maxconn is wrong because these proxies
are always activated by default.
This patch fixes the issue by not counting these internal proxies during
the computation.
Must be backported as far as 2.5.
Rename the structure "cert_key_and_chain" to "ckch_data" in order to
avoid confusion with the store whcih often called "ckchs".
The "cert_key_and_chain *ckch" were renamed "ckch_data *data", so we now
have store->data instead of ckchs->ckch.
Marked medium because it changes the API.
This adds a USE_OPENSSL_WOLFSSL option, wolfSSL must be used with the
OpenSSL compatibility layer. This must be used with USE_OPENSSL=1.
WolfSSL build options:
./configure --prefix=/opt/wolfssl --enable-haproxy
HAProxy build options:
USE_OPENSSL=1 USE_OPENSSL_WOLFSSL=1 WOLFSSL_INC=/opt/wolfssl/include/ WOLFSSL_LIB=/opt/wolfssl/lib/ ADDLIB='-Wl,-rpath=/opt/wolfssl/lib'
Using at least the commit 54466b6 ("Merge pull request #5810 from
Uriah-wolfSSL/haproxy-integration") from WolfSSL. (2022-11-23).
This is still to be improved, reg-tests are not supported yet, and more
tests are to be done.
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
In ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(), when compiled without QUIC support, the
compiler may report an error during compilation about a possible NULL
dereference:
src/ssl_sock.c: In function ‘ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk’:
src/ssl_sock.c:1738:12: error: potential null pointer dereference [-Werror=null-dereference]
1738 | ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE;
| ~~~^~~~~~~~~
A BUG_ON() was addeded because it must never happen. But when compiled
without DEBUG_STRICT, there is nothing to help the compiler. Thus
ALREADY_CHECKED() macro is used. The ssl-sock context and the bind config
are concerned.
This patch must be backported to 2.6.
The registering of the keylog callback seems to provoke a loss of
performance. Disable the registration as well as the fetches if
tune.ssl.keylog is off.
Must be backported as far as 2.2.
Since commit 9b2598 ("BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Verify error codes can exceed
63"), the ca_ignerr_bitfield and crt_ignerr_bietfield are incorrecly
accessed from __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf which is not
avaiable from QUIC. The bind_conf variable was mistakenly replaced.
This patch fixes the issue by using again the bind_conf variable.
Must be backported where 9b2598 was backported.
The CRT and CA verify error codes were stored in 6 bits each in the
xprt_st field of the ssl_sock_ctx meaning that only error code up to 63
could be stored. Likewise, the ca-ignore-err and crt-ignore-err options
relied on two unsigned long longs that were used as bitfields for all
the ignored error codes. On the latest OpenSSL1.1.1 and with OpenSSLv3
and newer, verify errors have exceeded this value so these two storages
must be increased. The error codes will now be stored on 7 bits each and
the ignore-err bitfields are replaced by a big enough array and
dedicated bit get and set functions.
It can be backported on all stable branches.
[wla: let it be tested a little while before backport]
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
In case of error, the ocsp item might already be in the ocsp certificate
tree but simply freed instead of destroyed through ssl_sock_free_ocsp.
This patch can be backported to all stable versions.
When calling ssl_get0_issuer_chain, if akid is not NULL but its keyid
is, then the AUTHORITY_KEYID is not freed.
This patch can be backported to all stable branches.
When running HAProxy with OpenSSLv3, the two BIGNUMs used to build our
own DH parameters are not freed. It was not necessary previously because
ownership of those parameters was transferred to OpenSSL through the
DH_set0_pqg call.
This patch should be backported to 2.6.
A previous commit tries to fix uninitialized GCC warning on ssl code for
QUIC build. See the fix here :
48e46f98cc
BUILD: ssl_sock: bind_conf uninitialized in ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk()
However, this is incomplete as it still reports possible NULL
dereference on ctx variable (GCC v12.2.0). Here is the compilation
result :
src/ssl_sock.c: In function ‘ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk’:
src/ssl_sock.c:1739:12: error: potential null pointer dereference [-Werror=null-dereference]
1739 | ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE;
|
To fix this, remove check on qc which can also never happens and replace
it with a BUG_ON. This seems to satisfy GCC on my machine.
This must be backported up to 2.6.
Even if this cannot happen, ensure <bind_conf> is initialized in this
function to please some compilers.
Takes the opportunity of this patch to replace an ABORT_NOW() by
a BUG_ON() because if the variable values they test are not initialized,
this is really because there is a bug.
Must be backported to 2.6.
xprt_quic module was too large and did not reflect the true architecture
by contrast to the other protocols in haproxy.
Extract code related to XPRT layer and keep it under xprt_quic module.
This code should only contains a simple API to communicate between QUIC
lower layer and connection/MUX.
The vast majority of the code has been moved into a new module named
quic_conn. This module is responsible to the implementation of QUIC
lower layer. Conceptually, it overlaps with TCP kernel implementation
when comparing QUIC and HTTP1/2 stacks of haproxy.
This should be backported up to 2.6.
Idle connections do not work on 32-bit machines due to an alignment issue
causing the connection nodes to be indexed with their lower 32-bits set to
zero and the higher 32 ones containing the 32 lower bitss of the hash. The
cause is the use of ebmb_node with an aligned data, as on this platform
ebmb_node is only 32-bit aligned, leaving a hole before the following hash
which is a uint64_t:
$ pahole -C conn_hash_node ./haproxy
struct conn_hash_node {
struct ebmb_node node; /* 0 20 */
/* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */
int64_t hash; /* 24 8 */
struct connection * conn; /* 32 4 */
/* size: 40, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* sum members: 32, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */
/* padding: 4 */
/* last cacheline: 40 bytes */
};
Instead, eb64 nodes should be used when it comes to simply storing a
64-bit key, and that is what this patch does.
For backports, a variant consisting in simply marking the "hash" member
with a "packed" attribute on the struct also does the job (tested), and
might be preferable if the fix is difficult to adapt. Only 2.6 and 2.5
are affected by this.
This fixes 4 tiny and harmless typos in mux_quic.c, quic_tls.c and
ssl_sock.c. Originally sent via GitHub PR #1843.
Signed-off-by: cui fliter <imcusg@gmail.com>
[Tim: Rephrased the commit message]
[wt: further complete the commit message]
Add QUIC support to the ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk() variant used only when
no client_hello_cb is available.
This could be used with libreSSL implementation of QUIC for example.
It also works with quictls when HAVE_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB is removed from
openss-compat.h
When building HAProxy with USE_QUIC and libressl 3.6.0, the
ssl_sock_switchtx_cbk symbol is not found because libressl does not
implement the client_hello_cb.
A ssl_sock_switchtx_cbk version for the servername callback is available
but wasn't exported correctly.
This verification is done by ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk() which is set at different
locations in the ssl_sock.c code . About QUIC connections, there are a lot of chances
the connection object is not initialized when entering this function. What must
be accessed is the SSL object to retrieve the connection or quic_conn objects,
then the bind_conf object of the listener. If the connection object is not found,
we try to find the quic_conn object.
Modify ssl_sock_dump_errors() interface which takes a connection object as parameter
to also passed a quic_conn object as parameter. Again this function try first
to access the connection object if not NULL or the quic_conn object if not.
There is a remaining thing to do for QUIC: store the certificate verification error
code as it is currently stored in the connection object. This error code is at least
used by the "bc_err" and "fc_err" sample fetches.
There are chances this bug is in relation with GH #1851. Thank you to @tasavis
for the report.
Must be merged into 2.6.
ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb() is called when "tls-ticket-keys" option is used on a
"bind" line. It needs to have an access to the TLS ticket keys which have been
stored into the listener bind_conf struct. The fix consists in nitializing the
<ref> variable (references to TLS secret keys) the correct way when this callback
is called for a QUIC connection. The bind_conf struct is store into the quic_conn
object (QUIC connection).
This issue may be in relation with GH #1851. Thank you for @tasavis for the report.
Must be backported to 2.6.
dh of length 1024 were chosen for EVP_PKEY_EC key type.
let us pick "default_dh_param" instead.
issue was found on Ubuntu 22.04 which is shipped with OpenSSL configured
with SECLEVEL=2 by default. such SECLEVEL value prohibits DH shorter than
2048:
OpenSSL error[0xa00018a] SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey: dh key too small
better strategy for chosing DH still may be considered though.
fd_insert() was already given a thread group ID and a global thread mask.
Now we're changing the few callers to take the group-local thread mask
instead. It's passed directly into the FD's thread mask. Just like for
previous commit, it must not change anything when a single group is
configured.
The file descriptors will need to know the thread group ID in addition
to the mask. This extends fd_insert() to take the tgid, and will store
it into the FD.
In the FD, the tgid is stored as a combination of tgid on the lower 16
bits and a refcount on the higher 16 bits. This allows to know when it's
really possible to trust the tgid and the running mask. If a refcount is
higher than 1 it indeed indicates another thread else might be in the
process of updating these values.
Since a closed FD must necessarily have a zero refcount, a test was
added to fd_insert() to make sure that it is the case.
Before 2.3, after an async crypto processing or on session close, the engine
async file's descriptors were removed from the fdtab but not closed because
it is the engine which has created the file descriptor, and it is responsible
for closing it. In 2.3 the fd_remove() call was replaced by fd_stop_both()
which stops the polling but does not remove the fd from the fdtab and the
fd remains indefinitively in the fdtab.
A simple replacement by fd_delete() is not a valid fix because fd_delete()
removes the fd from the fdtab but also closes the fd. And the fd will be
closed twice: by the haproxy's core and by the engine itself.
Instead, let's set FD_DISOWN on the FD before calling fd_delete() which will
take care of not closing it.
This patch must be backported on branches >= 2.3, and it relies on this
previous patch:
MINOR: fd: add a new FD_DISOWN flag to prevent from closing a deleted FD
As mentioned in the patch above, a different flag will be needed in 2.3.
A curious practise seems to have started long ago and contaminated various
code areas, consisting in appending "_pool" at the end of the name of a
given pool. That makes no sense as the name is only used to name the pool
in diags such as "show pools", and since names are truncated there, this
adds some confusion when analysing the dump outputs. Let's just clean all
of them at once. there were essentially in SSL and QUIC.
At this time haproxy supported only incompatible version negotiation feature which
consists in sending a Version Negotiation packet after having received a long packet
without compatible value in its version field. This version value is the version
use to build the current packet. This patch does not modify this behavior.
This patch adds the support for compatible version negotiation feature which
allows endpoints to negotiate during the first flight or packets sent by the
client the QUIC version to use for the connection (or after the first flight).
This is done thanks to "version_information" parameter sent by both endpoints.
To be short, the client offers a list of supported versions by preference order.
The server (or haproxy listener) chooses the first version it also supported as
negotiated version.
This implementation has an impact on the tranport parameters handling (in both
direcetions). Indeed, the server must sent its version information, but only
after received and parsed the client transport parameters). So we cannot
encode these parameters at the same time we instantiated a new connection.
Add QUIC_TP_DRAFT_VERSION_INFORMATION(0xff73db) new transport parameter.
Add tp_version_information new C struct to handle this new parameter.
Implement quic_transport_param_enc_version_info() (resp.
quic_transport_param_dec_version_info()) to encode (resp. decode) this
parameter.
Add qc_conn_finalize() which encodes the transport parameters and configure
the TLS stack to send them.
Add ->negotiated_ictx quic_conn C struct new member to store the Initial
QUIC TLS context for the negotiated version. The Initial secrets derivation
is version dependent.
Rename ->version to ->original_version and add ->negotiated_version to
this C struct to reflect the QUIC-VN RFC denomination.
Modify most of the QUIC TLS API functions to pass a version as parameter.
Export the QUIC version definitions to be reused at least from quic_tp.c
(transport parameters.
Move the token check after the QUIC connection lookup. As this is the original
version which is sent into a Retry packet, and because this original version is
stored into the connection, we must check the token after having retreived this
connection.
Add packet version to traces.
See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation-08
for more information about this new feature.
Make the transport parameters be standlone as much as possible as
it consists only in encoding/decoding data into/from buffers.
Reduce the size of xprt_quic.h. Unfortunalety, I think we will
have to continue to include <xprt_quic-t.h> to use the trace API
into this module.
In ssl_action_wait_for_hs() the local variables called "cs" is just a
copy of s->scf that's only used once, so it can be removed. In addition
the check was removed as well since it's not possible to have a NULL SC
on a stream.
There's no more reason for keepin the code and definitions in conn_stream,
let's move all that to stconn. The alphabetical ordering of include files
was adjusted.
This file contains all the stream-connector functions that are specific
to application layers of type stream. So let's name it accordingly so
that it's easier to figure what's located there.
The alphabetical ordering of include files was preserved.
This applies the change so that the applet code stops using ci_putchk()
and friends everywhere possible, for the much saferapplet_put*() instead.
The change is mechanical but large. Two or three functions used to have no
appctx and a cs derived from the appctx instead, which was a reminiscence
of old times' stream_interface. These were simply changed to directly take
the appctx. No sensitive change was performed, and the old (more complex)
API is still usable when needed (e.g. the channel is already known).
The change touched roughly a hundred of locations, with no less than 124
lines removed.
It's worth noting that the stats applet, the oldest of the series, could
get a serious lifting, as it's still very channel-centric instead of
propagating the appctx along the chain. Given that this code doesn't
change often, there's no emergency to clean it up but it would look
better.
This renames the "struct conn_stream" to "struct stconn" and updates
the descriptions in all comments (and the rare help descriptions) to
"stream connector" or "connector". This touches a lot of files but
the change is minimal. The local variables were not even renamed, so
there's still a lot of "cs" everywhere.
This changes all main uses of cs->endp->flags to the sc_ep_*() equivalent
by applying coccinelle script cs_endp_flags.cocci.
Note: 143 locations were touched, manually reviewed and found to be OK,
except a single one that was adjusted in cs_reset_endp() where the flags
are read and filtered to be used as-is and not as a boolean, hence was
replaced with sc_ep_get() & $FLAGS.
The script was applied with all includes:
spatch --in-place --recursive-includes -I include --sp-file $script $files
When HAProxy is linked to an OpenSSLv3 library, this option can be used
to load a provider during init. You can specify multiple ssl-provider
options, which will be loaded in the order they appear. This does not
prevent OpenSSL from parsing its own configuration file in which some
other providers might be specified.
A linked list of the providers loaded from the configuration file is
kept so that all those providers can be unloaded during cleanup. The
providers loaded directly by OpenSSL will be freed by OpenSSL.
This one is the pointer to the conn_stream which is always in the
endpoint that is always present in the appctx, thus it's not needed.
This patch removes it and replaces it with appctx_cs() instead. A
few occurences that were using __cs_strm(appctx->owner) were moved
directly to appctx_strm() which does the equivalent.
Low footprint client machines may not have enough memory to download a
complete 16KB TLS record at once. With the new option the maximum
record size can be defined on the server side.
Note: Before limiting the the record size on the server side, a client should
consider using the TLS Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation Extension defined
in RFC6066.
This patch fixes GitHub issue #1679.
There were plenty of leftovers from old code that were never removed
and that are not needed at all since these files do not use any
definition depending on fcntl.h, let's drop them.
Some older systems may routinely return EWOULDBLOCK for some syscalls
while we tend to check only for EAGAIN nowadays. Modern systems define
EWOULDBLOCK as EAGAIN so that solves it, but on a few older ones (AIX,
VMS etc) both are different, and for portability we'd need to test for
both or we never know if we risk to confuse some status codes with
plain errors.
There were few entries, the most annoying ones are the switch/case
because they require to only add the entry when it differs, but the
other ones are really trivial.
Transport layers (raw_sock, ssl_sock, xprt_handshake and xprt_quic)
were using 4 constructors and 2 destructors. The 4 constructors were
replaced with INITCALL and the destructors with REGISTER_POST_DEINIT()
so that we do not depend on this anymore.
Starting from OpenSSLv3, providers are at the core of cryptography
functions. Depending on the provider used, the way the SSL
functionalities work could change. This new 'show ssl providers' CLI
command allows to show what providers were loaded by the SSL library.
This is required because the provider configuration is exclusively done
in the OpenSSL configuration file (/usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf for
instance).
A new line is also added to the 'haproxy -vv' output containing the same
information.
The DH parameters used for OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and earlier where
changed. For OpenSSL 1.0.2 and LibreSSL the newly introduced
ssl_get_dh_by_nid function is not used since we keep the original
parameters.
DHE ciphers do not present a security risk if the key is big enough but
they are slow and mostly obsoleted by ECDHE. This patch removes any
default DH parameters. This will effectively disable all DHE ciphers
unless a global ssl-dh-param-file is defined, or
tune.ssl.default-dh-param is set, or a frontend has DH parameters
included in its PEM certificate. In this latter case, only the frontends
that have DH parameters will have DHE ciphers enabled.
Adding explicitely a DHE ciphers in a "bind" line will not be enough to
actually enable DHE. We would still need to know which DH parameters to
use so one of the three conditions described above must be met.
This request was described in GitHub issue #1604.
RFC7919 defined sets of DH parameters supposedly strong enough to be
used safely. We will then use them when we can instead of our hard coded
ones (namely the ffdhe2048 and ffdhe4096 named groups).
The ffdhe2048 and ffdhe4096 named groups were integrated in OpenSSL
starting with version 1.1.1. Instead of duplicating those parameters in
haproxy for older versions of OpenSSL, we will keep using our own
parameters when they are not provided by the SSL library.
We will also need to keep our 1024 bits DH parameters since they are
considered not safe enough to have a dedicated named group in RFC7919
but we must still keep it for retrocompatibility with old Java clients.
This request was described in GitHub issue #1604.
Remaining flags and associated functions are move in the conn-stream
scope. These flags are added on the endpoint and not the conn-stream
itself. This way it will be possible to get them from the mux or the
applet. The functions to get or set these flags are renamed accordingly with
the "cs_" prefix and updated to manipualte a conn-stream instead of a
stream-interface.
At many places, we now use the new CS functions to get a stream or a channel
from a conn-stream instead of using the stream-interface API. It is the
first step to reduce the scope of the stream-interfaces. The main change
here is about the applet I/O callback functions. Before the refactoring, the
stream-interface was the appctx owner. Thus, it was heavily used. Now, as
far as possible,the conn-stream is used. Of course, it remains many calls to
the stream-interface API.
Some CS flags, only related to the endpoint, are moved into the endpoint
struct. More will probably moved later. Those ones are not critical. So it
is pretty safe to move them now and this will ease next changes.
First gcc, then now coverity report possible null derefs in situations
where we know these cannot happen since we call the functions in
contexts that guarantee the existence of the connection and the method
used. Let's introduce an unchecked version of the function for such
cases, just like we had to do with objt_*. This allows us to remove the
ALREADY_CHECKED() statements (which coverity doesn't see), and addresses
github issues #1643, #1644, #1647.
Some compilers see a possible null deref after conn_get_ssl_sock_ctx()
in ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat, which cannot happen there, so let's mark
it as safe. No backport needed.
The SSL functions must not use conn->xprt_ctx anymore but find the context
by calling conn_get_ssl_sock_ctx(), which will properly pass through the
transport layers to retrieve the desired information. Otherwise when the
functions are called on a QUIC connection, they refuse to work for not
being called on the proper transport.
Historically there was a single way to have an SSL transport on a
connection, so detecting if the transport layer was SSL and a context
was present was sufficient to detect SSL. With QUIC, things have changed
because QUIC also relies on SSL, but the context is embedded inside the
quic_conn and the transport layer doesn't match expectations outside,
making it difficult to detect that SSL is in use over the connection.
The approach taken here to improve this consists in adding a new method
at the transport layer, get_ssl_sock_ctx(), to retrieve this often needed
ssl_sock_ctx, and to use this to detect the presence of SSL. This will
even allow some simplifications and cleanups to be made in the SSL code
itself, and QUIC will be able to provide one to export its ssl_sock_ctx.
Certain functions cannot be called on an FD-less conn because they are
normally called as part of the protocol-specific setup/teardown sequence.
Better place a few BUG_ON() to make sure none of them is called in other
situations. If any of them would trigger in ambiguous conditions, it would
always be possible to replace it with an error.
