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MEDIUM: ssl: implement rsa/ecdsa selection with WolfSSL
PR https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/6963 implements primitives to extract ciphers and algorithm signatures. It allows to chose a certificate depending on the sigals and ciphers presented by the client (RSA or ECDSA). Since WolfSSL does not implement the clienthello callback, the patch uses the certificate callback (SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb()) The callback is inspired by our clienthello callback, however the extraction of client ciphers and sigalgs is simpler, wolfSSL_get_sigalg_info() and wolfSSL_get_ciphersuite_info() are used. This is not enabled by default yet as the PR was not merged.
This commit is contained in:
William Lallemand
parent
d43e05d298
commit
3750442bc4
202
src/ssl_sock.c
202
src/ssl_sock.c
@ -2771,6 +2771,203 @@ int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *priv)
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#endif /* (!) OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
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#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */
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#if 0 && defined(USE_OPENSSL_WOLFSSL)
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/* This implement the equivalent of the clientHello Callback but using the cert_cb.
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* WolfSSL is able to extract the sigalgs and ciphers of the client byt using the API
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* provided in https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/6963
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*
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* Not activated for now since the PR is not merged.
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*/
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static int ssl_sock_switchctx_wolfSSL_cbk(WOLFSSL* ssl, void* arg)
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{
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struct bind_conf *s = arg;
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int has_rsa_sig = 0, has_ecdsa_sig = 0;
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char *wildp = NULL;
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const char *servername;
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struct ebmb_node *node, *n, *node_ecdsa = NULL, *node_rsa = NULL, *node_anonymous = NULL;
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int i;
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if (!s) {
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/* must never happen */
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ABORT_NOW();
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return 0;
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}
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servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
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if (!servername) {
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/* without SNI extension, is the default_ctx (need SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) */
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if (!s->strict_sni) {
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HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx);
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HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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goto allow_early;
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}
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goto abort;
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}
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/* extract sigalgs and ciphers */
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{
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const byte* suites = NULL;
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word16 suiteSz = 0;
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const byte* hashSigAlgo = NULL;
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word16 hashSigAlgoSz = 0;
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word16 idx = 0;
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wolfSSL_get_client_suites_sigalgs(ssl, &suites, &suiteSz, &hashSigAlgo, &hashSigAlgoSz);
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if (suites == NULL || suiteSz == 0 || hashSigAlgo == NULL || hashSigAlgoSz == 0)
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return 0;
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if (SSL_version(ssl) != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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for (idx = 0; idx < suiteSz; idx += 2) {
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WOLFSSL_CIPHERSUITE_INFO info;
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info = wolfSSL_get_ciphersuite_info(suites[idx], suites[idx+1]);
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if (info.rsaAuth)
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has_rsa_sig = 1;
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else if (info.eccAuth)
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has_ecdsa_sig = 1;
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}
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}
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if (hashSigAlgoSz > 0) {
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/* sigalgs extension takes precedence over ciphersuites */
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has_ecdsa_sig = 0;
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has_rsa_sig = 0;
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}
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for (idx = 0; idx < hashSigAlgoSz; idx += 2) {
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enum wc_HashType hashAlgo;
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enum Key_Sum sigAlgo;
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wolfSSL_get_sigalg_info(hashSigAlgo[idx+0], hashSigAlgo[idx+1], &hashAlgo, &sigAlgo);
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if (sigAlgo == RSAk || sigAlgo == RSAPSSk)
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has_rsa_sig = 1;
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else if (sigAlgo == ECDSAk)
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has_ecdsa_sig = 1;
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}
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}
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for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) {
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if (!servername[i])
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break;
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trash.area[i] = tolower((unsigned char)servername[i]);
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if (!wildp && (trash.area[i] == '.'))
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wildp = &trash.area[i];
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}
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trash.area[i] = 0;
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HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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/* Look for an ECDSA, RSA and DSA certificate, first in the single
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* name and if not found in the wildcard */
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for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
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if (i == 0) /* lookup in full qualified names */
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node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.area);
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else if (i == 1 && wildp) /* lookup in wildcards names */
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node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp);
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else
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break;
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for (n = node; n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) {
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/* lookup a not neg filter */
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if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
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struct sni_ctx *sni, *sni_tmp;
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int skip = 0;
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if (i == 1 && wildp) { /* wildcard */
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/* If this is a wildcard, look for an exclusion on the same crt-list line */
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sni = container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name);
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list_for_each_entry(sni_tmp, &sni->ckch_inst->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) {
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if (sni_tmp->neg && (strcmp((const char *)sni_tmp->name.key, trash.area) == 0)) {
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skip = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (skip)
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continue;
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}
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switch(container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->kinfo.sig) {
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case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
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if (!node_ecdsa)
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node_ecdsa = n;
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break;
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case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
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if (!node_rsa)
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node_rsa = n;
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break;
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default: /* TLSEXT_signature_anonymous|dsa */
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if (!node_anonymous)
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node_anonymous = n;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/* Once the certificates are found, select them depending on what is
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* supported in the client and by key_signature priority order: EDSA >
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* RSA > DSA */
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if (has_ecdsa_sig && node_ecdsa)
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node = node_ecdsa;
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else if (has_rsa_sig && node_rsa)
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node = node_rsa;
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else if (node_anonymous)
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node = node_anonymous;
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else if (node_ecdsa)
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node = node_ecdsa; /* no ecdsa signature case (< TLSv1.2) */
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else
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node = node_rsa; /* no rsa signature case (far far away) */
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if (node) {
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/* switch ctx */
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struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->conf;
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ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
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if (conf) {
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methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.min].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MIN);
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methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.max].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MAX);
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}
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HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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goto allow_early;
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}
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HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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if (!s->strict_sni) {
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/* no certificate match, is the default_ctx */
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HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx);
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HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
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goto allow_early;
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}
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/* We are about to raise an handshake error so the servername extension
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* callback will never be called and the SNI will never be stored in the
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* SSL context. In order for the ssl_fc_sni sample fetch to still work
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* in such a case, we store the SNI ourselves as an ex_data information
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* in the SSL context.
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*/
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{
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char *client_sni = pool_alloc(ssl_sock_client_sni_pool);
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if (client_sni) {
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strncpy(client_sni, trash.area, TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name);
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client_sni[TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name] = '\0';
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SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, ssl_client_sni_index, client_sni);
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}
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}
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/* other cases fallback on abort, if strict-sni is set but no node was found */
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abort:
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/* abort handshake (was SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL) */
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return 0;
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allow_early:
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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static inline HASSL_DH *ssl_new_dh_fromdata(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *g)
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@ -4197,7 +4394,10 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
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# endif /* ! SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY */
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SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk, NULL);
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SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
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# else /* ! OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && ! HAVE_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB */
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# elif 0 && defined(USE_OPENSSL_WOLFSSL)
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SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_wolfSSL_cbk, bind_conf);
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# else
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/* ! OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && ! HAVE_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB */
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SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
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# endif
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SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, bind_conf);
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