Merge pull request #2492 from flatcar/tormath1/openssl

dev-libs/openssl: upgrade to 3.2.3
This commit is contained in:
Mathieu Tortuyaux 2024-12-03 14:13:30 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit f9cc0c8a89
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
8 changed files with 211 additions and 90 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1 @@
- OpenSSL ([CVE-2024-2511](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2511), [CVE-2024-4603](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4603), [CVE-2024-4741](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4741), [CVE-2024-5535](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5535), [CVE-2024-6119](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6119), [CVE-2024-9143](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9143))

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@ -0,0 +1 @@
- OpenSSL ([3.2.3](https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.2/CHANGES.md#openssl-32))

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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
DIST openssl-3.2.1.tar.gz 17733249 BLAKE2B 960222e0305166160e5ab000e29650b92063bf726551ee9ad46060166d99738d1e3a5b86fd28b14c8f4fb3a72f5aa70850defb87c02990acff3dbcbdac40b347 SHA512 bab2b2419319f1feffaba4692f03edbf13b44d1090c6e075a2d69dad67a2d51e64e6edbf83456a26c83900a726d20d2c4ee4ead9c94b322fd0b536f3b5a863c4 DIST openssl-3.2.3.tar.gz 17762604 BLAKE2B 1445336aa92d0fd9df266ad570fe2bf5701279e462dd3fccd4cf662f328bfee923dc6c72c42c1921fd38bce43e1c60cacdec3f1c2963fe0ffda6a0e8e34ac6e4 SHA512 9e9f06ab630914e32e64bfb945dfa375ea3595b3db4eb8ef68288a58909baf753b34998439907c22ff2b8561cfd3f3f6b7fbf22981479e66a98c2e92fda172a2
DIST openssl-3.2.1.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B a1d25fe30bf1804d13a8b6b98edf56be5bf744d9e2706f4169455c24efe2e3a361487d00d0d4bac240c3f0170693d77a39dd0d4ee5c792d2247aa00c47e74ebf SHA512 de39516c7b77612f33cdc830a8d13ef6bcd91c03d24a6ed105480f140f9e1ad7049844e234c96a516d62e0e33ce90442ffd0f309ea674884c735f04d8562f372 DIST openssl-3.2.3.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B 5a7289ed40534a058b9eb7686ce444b9d453a2973ab7ebda01c99f7245f6ba19197123f8bb3b16940d4bfbc5e313babc0249f280e55911190b47da3a47ed1e6a SHA512 e727adb88f84c48082ef0cae963bf999cce11619f7322014cc7f36c16e8375a60542f518c1b86319208cf8da33044e942b3d65208bc59fd4a5f522ab78ff1c23

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@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ if [[ $1 == "test" ]] ; then
"i686-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \ "i686-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \
"i386-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \ "i386-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \
"powerpc-apple-darwinX |darwin-ppc-cc" \ "powerpc-apple-darwinX |darwin-ppc-cc" \
"arm64-apple-darwinX |darwin-arm64-cc" \
"i586-pc-winnt |winnt-parity" \ "i586-pc-winnt |winnt-parity" \
"s390-ibm-linux-gnu |linux-generic32 -DB_ENDIAN" \ "s390-ibm-linux-gnu |linux-generic32 -DB_ENDIAN" \
"s390x-linux-gnu |linux64-s390x" \ "s390x-linux-gnu |linux64-s390x" \
@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ darwin)
powerpc) machine=ppc-cc;; powerpc) machine=ppc-cc;;
i?86*) machine=i386-cc;; i?86*) machine=i386-cc;;
x86_64) machine=x86_64-cc; system=${system}64;; x86_64) machine=x86_64-cc; system=${system}64;;
arm64) machine=arm64-cc; system=${system}64;;
esac esac
;; ;;
hpux) hpux)

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@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
https://bugs.gentoo.org/916328
https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/729
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22508
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/934943281267259fa928f4a5814b176525461a65
From 934943281267259fa928f4a5814b176525461a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:45:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improved detection of engine-provided private
"classic" keys"
This reverts commit 2b74e75331a27fc89cad9c8ea6a26c70019300b5.
The commit was wrong. With 3.x versions the engines must be themselves
responsible for creating their EVP_PKEYs in a way that they are treated
as legacy - either by using the respective set1 calls or by setting
non-default EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
The workaround has caused more problems than it solved.
Fixes #22945
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23063)
(cherry picked from commit 39ea78379826fa98e8dc8c0d2b07e2c17cd68380)
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c
@@ -79,48 +79,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
return NULL;
}
- /* We enforce check for legacy key */
- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey)) {
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- {
- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- }
- break;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- case EVP_PKEY_SM2:
- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
- {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
- EC_KEY_free(ec);
- }
- break;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
- {
- DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, dsa);
- DSA_free(dsa);
- }
- break;
-#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case EVP_PKEY_DH:
- {
- DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey, dh);
- DH_free(dh);
- }
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- /*Do nothing */
- break;
- }
-
return pkey;
}

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@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
https://bugs.gentoo.org/941643
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bc7e04d7c8d509fb78fc0e285aa948fb0da04700
From bc7e04d7c8d509fb78fc0e285aa948fb0da04700 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.
The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
its final element).
Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
basis X9.62 forms.
This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
for non-sentinel values.
Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These
generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
problem values as noted above.
Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
A closely related issue was earlier reported in
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "bn_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
/*
* Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
@@ -1130,16 +1131,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/*
* Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
* x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
- * be filled if array was large enough.
+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with
+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
+ *
+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements
+ * of the array will be filled.
+ *
+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a`
+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
+ *
+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
*/
int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
{
int i, j, k = 0;
BN_ULONG mask;
- if (BN_is_zero(a))
+ if (!BN_is_odd(a))
return 0;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -1157,12 +1168,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
}
}
- if (k < max) {
+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (k < max)
p[k] = -1;
- k++;
- }
- return k;
+ return k + 1;
}
/*
--- a/test/ec_internal_test.c
+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
+
+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
+ goto out;
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
+
+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
+ goto out;
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
+
+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
+ goto out;
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
+
+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
+
+ out:
+ EC_GROUP_free(group1);
+ EC_GROUP_free(group2);
+ EC_GROUP_free(group3);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
{
@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
#endif
ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);

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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
<flag name="bindist">Disable/Restrict EC algorithms (as they seem to be patented) -- note: changes the ABI</flag> <flag name="bindist">Disable/Restrict EC algorithms (as they seem to be patented) -- note: changes the ABI</flag>
<flag name="fips">Enable FIPS provider</flag> <flag name="fips">Enable FIPS provider</flag>
<flag name="ktls">Enable support for Kernel implementation of TLS (kTLS)</flag> <flag name="ktls">Enable support for Kernel implementation of TLS (kTLS)</flag>
<flag name="quic">Enable support for QUIC (RFC 9000); a UDP-based protocol intended to replace TCP</flag>
<flag name="rfc3779">Enable support for RFC 3779 (X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers)</flag> <flag name="rfc3779">Enable support for RFC 3779 (X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers)</flag>
<flag name="sslv2">Support for the old/insecure SSLv2 protocol -- note: not required for TLS/https</flag> <flag name="sslv2">Support for the old/insecure SSLv2 protocol -- note: not required for TLS/https</flag>
<flag name="sslv3">Support for the old/insecure SSLv3 protocol -- note: not required for TLS/https</flag> <flag name="sslv3">Support for the old/insecure SSLv3 protocol -- note: not required for TLS/https</flag>

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ inherit edo flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs
inherit multilib multilib-minimal multiprocessing preserve-libs verify-sig tmpfiles inherit multilib multilib-minimal multiprocessing preserve-libs verify-sig tmpfiles
DESCRIPTION="Robust, full-featured Open Source Toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)" DESCRIPTION="Robust, full-featured Open Source Toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssl.org/" HOMEPAGE="https://openssl-library.org/"
MY_P=${P/_/-} MY_P=${P/_/-}
@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
inherit git-r3 inherit git-r3
else else
SRC_URI=" SRC_URI="
mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/${P}/${P}.tar.gz
verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc ) verify-sig? (
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/${P}/${P}.tar.gz.asc
)
" "
if [[ ${PV} != *_alpha* && ${PV} != *_beta* ]] ; then if [[ ${PV} != *_alpha* && ${PV} != *_beta* ]] ; then
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~arm64-macos ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x64-solaris" KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~arm64-macos ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x64-solaris"
fi fi
fi fi
@ -51,8 +53,8 @@ BDEPEND="
app-alternatives/bc app-alternatives/bc
sys-process/procps sys-process/procps
) )
verify-sig? ( >=sec-keys/openpgp-keys-openssl-20230801 )" verify-sig? ( >=sec-keys/openpgp-keys-openssl-20240920 )
"
DEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}" DEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}"
RDEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}" RDEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}"
PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates" PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates"
@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
) )
PATCHES=( PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-p11-segfault.patch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2024-9143.patch
) )
pkg_setup() { pkg_setup() {
@ -151,8 +153,8 @@ src_configure() {
append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack) append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
# bug #895308 # bug #895308 -- check inserts GNU ld-compatible arguments
append-atomic-flags [[ ${CHOST} == *-darwin* ]] || append-atomic-flags
# Configure doesn't respect LIBS # Configure doesn't respect LIBS
export LDLIBS="${LIBS}" export LDLIBS="${LIBS}"