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Merge pull request #2675 from euank/update-liunx

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sys-kernel/coreos-*: fix virtio net truesize
This commit is contained in:
Euan Kemp 2017-07-31 14:35:24 -07:00 committed by GitHub
commit db82d89fa2
29 changed files with 146 additions and 86 deletions
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2
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.12.4.ebuild → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.12.4-r1.ebuild vendored
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=5
COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
inherit coreos-kernel
DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel"

2
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.12.4.ebuild → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.12.4-r1.ebuild vendored
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=5
COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
inherit coreos-kernel savedconfig
DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel modules"

1
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.12.4.ebuild → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.12.4-r1.ebuild vendored
View File

@ -45,4 +45,5 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0025-bonding-commit-link-status-change-after-propose.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0026-virtio_net-fix-truesize-for-mergeable-buffers.patch \
"

8
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0001-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 8bc2cecfd74015c23051dc35f2923cd05767b51a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 01/25] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
Subject: [PATCH 01/26] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 36646f1..87ef54e 100644
index 36646f19d40b..87ef54e64842 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ index 36646f1..87ef54e 100644
break;
default:
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index ec36f42..381b3f6 100644
index ec36f42a2add..381b3f6670d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ index ec36f42..381b3f6 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

14
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0002-Add-the-ability-to-lock-down-access-to-the-running-k.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 9f93a1ebd276e37181a80ffec89568e88a1ddaaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:36:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 02/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
Subject: [PATCH 02/26] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
kernel image
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 13bc08a..282a168 100644
index 13bc08aba704..282a1684d6e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -276,6 +276,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ index 13bc08a..282a168 100644
int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b5..68bab18 100644
index af675b576645..68bab18ddd57 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1698,5 +1698,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ index af675b5..68bab18 100644
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 93027fd..4baac4a 100644
index 93027fdf47d1..4baac4aab277 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -189,6 +189,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ index 93027fd..4baac4a 100644
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index f2d71cd..8c4a43e 100644
index f2d71cdb8e19..8c4a43e3d4e0 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ index f2d71cd..8c4a43e 100644
+obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL) += lock_down.o
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5788c60
index 000000000000..5788c60ff4e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ index 0000000..5788c60
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_is_locked_down);
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

8
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0003-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 2c1331c4ba6e6df752e4c7068d84dc6d5bd1eba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 03/25] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Subject: [PATCH 03/26] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0efb4c9..4d1c53b 100644
index 0efb4c9497bc..4d1c53bb8411 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1827,6 +1827,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ index 0efb4c9..4d1c53b 100644
def_bool y
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 87ef54e..4c4d758 100644
index 87ef54e64842..4c4d758d4be1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ index 87ef54e..4c4d758 100644
default:
pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0004-Enforce-module-signatures-if-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 6080dd6abf77372d59d4b7b1f56fa0fa0cee8fe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:22:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 04/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
Subject: [PATCH 04/26] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 4a3665f..3f1de34 100644
index 4a3665f8f837..3f1de34c6d10 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2777,7 +2777,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ index 4a3665f..3f1de34 100644
return err;
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0005-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-the-kernel-is-loc.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 964b821d7a5f54197ef6d41d41da58a051ad0ffc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 05/25] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
Subject: [PATCH 05/26] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
locked down
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 593a881..ba68add 100644
index 593a8818aca9..ba68add9677f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ index 593a881..ba68add 100644
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0006-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-is-locked-dow.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 9fe3ac82c10eb3bcc3a9c0a9dd797862a8aeb6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 06/25] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
Subject: [PATCH 06/26] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 980936a..46de8e6 100644
index 980936a90ee6..46de8e6b42f4 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index 980936a..46de8e6 100644
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
*/
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0007-Copy-secure_boot-flag-in-boot-params-across-kexec-re.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 10c1542768bc3ff9f655da4315401065c600ea8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 07/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
Subject: [PATCH 07/26] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 9d7fd5e..7e6f00a 100644
index 9d7fd5e6689a..7e6f00ae8322 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ index 9d7fd5e..7e6f00a 100644
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0008-kexec_file-Disable-at-runtime-if-securelevel-has-bee.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 477e5612e6446d3b1df9ed49efee42d319721e74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:49:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 08/25] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
Subject: [PATCH 08/26] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
set
When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index b118735..f6937ee 100644
index b118735fea9d..f6937eecd1eb 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -268,6 +268,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index b118735..f6937ee 100644
if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0009-hibernate-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From ef8d6a280865af7b555327c33543f8b1ebb23902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 09/25] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
Subject: [PATCH 09/26] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index a8b978c..50cca5d 100644
index a8b978c35a6a..50cca5dcb62f 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ index a8b978c..50cca5d 100644
/**
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0010-uswsusp-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From c2cf47ce26f820f0c9d3ad6112b179c6c884e415 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:28:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/25] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
Subject: [PATCH 10/26] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
makes it possible to modify the running kernel. Disable this if the kernel
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 22df9f7..e4b926d 100644
index 22df9f7ff672..e4b926d329b7 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ index 22df9f7..e4b926d 100644
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

10
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0011-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-d.patch vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From a8175632e2d54fff6093cc5793d257b1968b8bf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 11/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
Subject: [PATCH 11/26] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
down
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 31e9961..5595560 100644
index 31e99613a12e..559556047d66 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -754,6 +754,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ index 31e9961..5595560 100644
}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 098360d..ef16fcc 100644
index 098360d7ff81..ef16fccb1923 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ index 098360d..ef16fcc 100644
if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index 9bf993e..c095247 100644
index 9bf993e1f71e..c09524738ceb 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
@ -99,5 +99,5 @@ index 9bf993e..c095247 100644
dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

8
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0012-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-the-kernel-is-lock.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From df08e412dc65f840fd2f17a38ca90e3c41bd39e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 12/25] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
Subject: [PATCH 12/26] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
down
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 9c3cf09..4a613fe 100644
index 9c3cf0944bce..4a613fed94b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ index 9c3cf09..4a613fe 100644
}
regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index ba68add..5e2a260 100644
index ba68add9677f..5e2a260fb89f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ index ba68add..5e2a260 100644
}
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0013-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From acce1508e26594ecc21c388f57390cde3fbae4d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 13/25] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
Subject: [PATCH 13/26] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
index ef68880..fbcce02 100644
index ef688804f80d..fbcce028e502 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ index ef68880..fbcce02 100644
err = -EFAULT;
break;
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0014-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-the-kernel-.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 7d73bb9bb6c50eaeb32dd6cb1f11f4ab815384df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 14/25] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
Subject: [PATCH 14/26] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
locked down
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
index 6c7d860..57b82cb 100644
index 6c7d86074b38..57b82cbc9a6b 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
@@ -1905,6 +1905,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ index 6c7d860..57b82cb 100644
1, asus->debug.method_id,
&input, &output);
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0015-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method-when-the-kernel-i.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From f4dde9c46875e6b5c0bde36af5888b8096398e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 15/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
Subject: [PATCH 15/26] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
locked down
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index c68e724..e4d721c 100644
index c68e72414a67..e4d721c330c0 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ index c68e724..e4d721c 100644
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0016-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-param-when-the-kernel-h.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From ede9a80c123614264dbf20f3e4f98ac6c9553930 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 16/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
Subject: [PATCH 16/26] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
been locked down
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index db78d35..d4d4ba3 100644
index db78d353bab1..d4d4ba348451 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ index db78d35..d4d4ba3 100644
#endif
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0017-acpi-Disable-ACPI-table-override-if-the-kernel-is-lo.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From d785b547deba4fcd1c84124a0093afd23103f134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:32:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 17/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
Subject: [PATCH 17/26] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
locked down
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
index ff42539..c72bfa9 100644
index ff425390bfa8..c72bfa97888a 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)
@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ index ff42539..c72bfa9 100644
memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS,
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0018-acpi-Disable-APEI-error-injection-if-the-kernel-is-l.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From ba162f6166b691dd390cff53080574b570f0c1a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:39:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 18/25] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
Subject: [PATCH 18/26] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
locked down
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
index ec50c32..e082718 100644
index ec50c32ea3da..e082718d01c2 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ index ec50c32..e082718 100644
if (flags && (flags &
~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0019-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From f75cba8e764cc7247b6237c80af6e73b3303aaee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:52:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 19/25] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
Subject: [PATCH 19/26] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
kernel is locked down
There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 460a031..58eb33d 100644
index 460a031c77e5..58eb33d5d6ae 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ index 460a031..58eb33d 100644
for (i = 0; i < fmt_size; i++) {
if ((!isprint(fmt[i]) && !isspace(fmt[i])) || !isascii(fmt[i]))
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0020-scsi-Lock-down-the-eata-driver.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 275c37641a64fdb13c2bf5b7c8c6c240080e7ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:10:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 20/25] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
Subject: [PATCH 20/26] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/eata.c b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
index 227dd2c..5c036d1 100644
index 227dd2c2ec2f..5c036d10c18b 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/eata.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
@@ -1552,8 +1552,13 @@ static int eata2x_detect(struct scsi_host_template *tpnt)
@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ index 227dd2c..5c036d1 100644
#if defined(MODULE)
/* io_port could have been modified when loading as a module */
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0021-Prohibit-PCMCIA-CIS-storage-when-the-kernel-is-locke.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From ab6c3943aaf0b45b422d77b8ef6e817e33758619 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 14:37:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 21/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
Subject: [PATCH 21/26] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
down
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
index 55ef7d1..193e4f7 100644
index 55ef7d1fd8da..193e4f7b73b1 100644
--- a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
+++ b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
@@ -1578,6 +1578,11 @@ static ssize_t pccard_store_cis(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ index 55ef7d1..193e4f7 100644
if (off)
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0022-Lock-down-TIOCSSERIAL.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 1fcbe5b939cec829f80dca667f6a1629cd7f8ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:28:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 22/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
Subject: [PATCH 22/26] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
index 13bfd5d..45fb768 100644
index 13bfd5dcffce..45fb7689bc1c 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
@@ -821,6 +821,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ index 13bfd5d..45fb768 100644
retval = -EPERM;
if (change_irq || change_port ||
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 498ba076f1f149e03dfd9fc4c52741f063d006f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/25] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
Subject: [PATCH 23/26] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ by some undesirable path component.
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index bfdc92c..2d56a74 100644
index bfdc92c2e47a..2d56a7441e02 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make
@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index bfdc92c..2d56a74 100644
# Leave processing to above invocation of make
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From de896f01efda42dddf52e0362db62d7f26a43b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 24/25] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
Subject: [PATCH 24/26] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
---
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S
index 613fc30..fdaf86c 100644
index 613fc3000677..fdaf86c78332 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ section_table:
@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ index 613fc30..fdaf86c 100644
/*
* The debug table is referenced via its Relative Virtual Address (RVA),
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

6
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0025-bonding-commit-link-status-change-after-propose.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 3849236f6d4900e255fea0c609887fc5901f9837 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 09:44:25 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 25/25] bonding: commit link status change after propose
Subject: [PATCH 25/26] bonding: commit link status change after propose
Commit de77ecd4ef02 ("bonding: improve link-status update in mii-monitoring")
moves link status commitment into bond_mii_monitor(), but it still relies
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index 8ab6bdb..0eab2fd 100644
index 8ab6bdbe1682..0eab2fdff8d7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ static int bond_miimon_inspect(struct bonding *bond)
@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ index 8ab6bdb..0eab2fd 100644
if (slave->delay) {
--
2.10.2
2.13.0

59
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0026-virtio_net-fix-truesize-for-mergeable-buffers.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From 53e714799440efa994d43e8ac7e3325cda3405d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 21:49:49 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 26/26] virtio_net: fix truesize for mergeable buffers
Seth Forshee noticed a performance degradation with some workloads.
This turns out to be due to packet drops. Euan Kemp noticed that this
is because we drop all packets where length exceeds the truesize, but
for some packets we add in extra memory without updating the truesize.
This in turn was kept around unchanged from ab7db91705e95 ("virtio-net:
auto-tune mergeable rx buffer size for improved performance"). That
commit had an internal reason not to account for the extra space: not
enough bits to do it. No longer true so let's account for the allocated
length exactly.
Many thanks to Seth Forshee for the report and bisecting and Euan Kemp
for debugging the issue.
Fixes: 680557cf79f8 ("virtio_net: rework mergeable buffer handling")
Reported-by: Euan Kemp <euan.kemp@coreos.com>
Tested-by: Euan Kemp <euan.kemp@coreos.com>
Reported-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
index 6633dd4bb649..acb754eb1ccb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
@@ -889,21 +889,20 @@ static int add_recvbuf_mergeable(struct virtnet_info *vi,
buf = (char *)page_address(alloc_frag->page) + alloc_frag->offset;
buf += headroom; /* advance address leaving hole at front of pkt */
- ctx = (void *)(unsigned long)len;
get_page(alloc_frag->page);
alloc_frag->offset += len + headroom;
hole = alloc_frag->size - alloc_frag->offset;
if (hole < len + headroom) {
/* To avoid internal fragmentation, if there is very likely not
* enough space for another buffer, add the remaining space to
- * the current buffer. This extra space is not included in
- * the truesize stored in ctx.
+ * the current buffer.
*/
len += hole;
alloc_frag->offset += hole;
}
sg_init_one(rq->sg, buf, len);
+ ctx = (void *)(unsigned long)len;
err = virtqueue_add_inbuf_ctx(rq->vq, rq->sg, 1, buf, ctx, gfp);
if (err < 0)
put_page(virt_to_head_page(buf));
--
2.13.0