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sys-kernel/coreos-sources: apply patch for CVE-2017-7184
This commit is contained in:
Euan Kemp
parent
d579f6f8e1
commit
c654aeb054
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
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EAPI=5
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
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inherit coreos-kernel
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DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel"
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
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EAPI=5
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
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COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
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inherit coreos-kernel savedconfig
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DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel modules"
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@ -36,4 +36,6 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-selinux-allow-context-mounts-on-tmpfs-ramfs-devpts-w.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch \
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"
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From b2abd80b69de4ea94e7d003a13160df562392c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 01/16] Add secure_modules() call
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Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Add secure_modules() call
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Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
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has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load
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@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ index 1cd2bf3..3161532 100644
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+}
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+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_modules);
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From ea565b4c32c1078914c2dd9903d2aebf67bab0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 02/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
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Subject: [PATCH 02/18] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
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enabled
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Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
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@ -114,5 +114,5 @@ index 9bf993e..922bdf6 100644
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dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 247ab2f0f22a52cc9b87a9e6dbd3c523cb02fd7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 03/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
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Subject: [PATCH 03/18] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
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enabled
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IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
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@ -68,5 +68,5 @@ index 6d9cc2d..a6eca51 100644
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return -EFAULT;
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while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 5eeb29907f925210621bd752aeca7f4826456ab3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 04/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
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Subject: [PATCH 04/18] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
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custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
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it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
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@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ index c68e724..4277938 100644
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/* parse the table header to get the table length */
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if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 30c3afa1c37c6c0adbd7cb4766d96ff2f8a3c3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 05/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
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Subject: [PATCH 05/18] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
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loading is restricted
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We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
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@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ index 43cb680..b5d77af 100644
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1, asus->debug.method_id,
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&input, &output);
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From c8a67b57068f99a212023507ffeea874ba658b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 06/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
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Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
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restricted
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Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
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@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ index a6eca51..191b2b0 100644
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unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
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(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 5359936a69b86d5fc0893eeac402f39db3d1364a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 07/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
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Subject: [PATCH 07/18] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
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loading is restricted
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This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
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@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index 57fb5f4..9174461 100644
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#endif
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From f7278e3a4ee1e978444966382f09fd59e8a760bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
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Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 18:55:53 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH 08/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
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Subject: [PATCH 08/18] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
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loading restrictions
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kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
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@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index 980936a..a0e4cb3 100644
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/*
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From e447d16529ac075611efff2a5b08a965b89f178a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH 09/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
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Subject: [PATCH 09/18] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
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restricted
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Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted,
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@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ index ef68880..74937d9 100644
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err = -EFAULT;
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break;
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 82c969da1e430f362b44bae864bf2da8e2d3b503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 10/16] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
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Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
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when in Secure Boot mode
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UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
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@ -181,5 +181,5 @@ index 3161532..19fe883 100644
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 91d4b04458c069b34b0ac00b0810ea430c3af757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 11/16] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
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Subject: [PATCH 11/18] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
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The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being
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UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps.
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@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index 5be38b4..efe6b42 100644
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---help---
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UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From fe4593724b038638a71e277cb2df62750a069af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 12/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
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Subject: [PATCH 12/18] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
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UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
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for use with efi_enabled.
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@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ index 5b1af30..1b12c29 100644
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#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
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/*
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 69d98ac51018ec84515a087873082f139072fc94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 13/16] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
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Subject: [PATCH 13/18] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
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There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
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from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
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@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ index b26dbc4..ab187ad 100644
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/**
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From ad97f1904d0ba6ce252a0af5c1601eb376e004d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
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Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH 14/16] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
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Subject: [PATCH 14/18] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
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This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
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provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for
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@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index 8df819e..65abe81 100644
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# Leave processing to above invocation of make
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 3014e6df9afba9273b942cbb85c912ccb58bcbd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
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Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH 15/16] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
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Subject: [PATCH 15/18] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
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Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
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---
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@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ index 4b1abac..a53fa57 100644
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* EFI will load .text onwards at the 4k section alignment
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* described in the PE/COFF header. To ensure that instruction
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 41afe48e7ce028e30d5da92c574a4663924281fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 10:07:31 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 16/16] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
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Subject: [PATCH 16/18] selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts
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within user namespaces
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commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for
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@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ index d98550a..fbf2d6d 100644
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defcontext_sid) {
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rc = -EACCES;
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--
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2.7.4
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2.9.3
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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From f541c301cbca8f4b1f0ebd31ddfa2e2b00557fc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 07:29:31 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH 17/18] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
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replay_window
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When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
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validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
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and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
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buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
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XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
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buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
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not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
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memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
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netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
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priviledge escalation.
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We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
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xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
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is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
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includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
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remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
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replay_window.
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CVE-2017-7184
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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---
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net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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index 9705c27..cdf887f 100644
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--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
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if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
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return -EINVAL;
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+ if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
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+ return -EINVAL;
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+
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return 0;
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}
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--
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2.9.3
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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From e8b4c221152ffb698218514866f0c0092972b2ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:45:44 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH 18/18] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size
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harder
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Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
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wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
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structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
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by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
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CVE-2017-7184
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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---
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net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 6 +++++-
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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index cdf887f..40a8aa3 100644
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--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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@@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
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up = nla_data(rp);
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ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
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- if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
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+ /* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
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+ * potential overflow. */
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+ if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
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+ xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
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+ replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
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--
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2.9.3
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