sys-kernel/coreos-*: fix VM_BUG_ON() in stack gap fix

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.11.6-r1.ebuild

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI=5
-COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
+COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
 inherit coreos-kernel
 
 DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.11.6-r1.ebuild

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI=5
-COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION=""
+COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
 inherit coreos-kernel savedconfig
 
 DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel modules"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.11.6-r1.ebuild

@@ -45,4 +45,5 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0025-mm-larger-stack-guard-gap-between-vmas.patch \
+	${PATCH_DIR}/z0026-mm-fix-new-crash-in-unmapped_area_topdown.patch \
 "

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0001-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From fd884cf2511d381bbf180714adabbf49f3b2779a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 01/25] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
+Subject: [PATCH 01/26] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
 
 UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
 that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0002-Add-the-ability-to-lock-down-access-to-the-running-k.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 031d0e66222dcc1f8e659ea4dec906828739b442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:36:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 02/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
+Subject: [PATCH 02/26] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
  kernel image
 
 Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0003-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 8b8192d581d483984d4bff7ba86acfb748bb13c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 03/25] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
+Subject: [PATCH 03/26] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
 
 UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
 only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0004-Enforce-module-signatures-if-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 44c06553478bda830c83cfcff1169386757bfa5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:22:22 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 04/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 04/26] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
 
 If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
 signatures that we can verify.

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0005-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-the-kernel-is-loc.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From ebcf469083241dcddd27f65d8465957d9c5374c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 05/25] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 05/26] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
  locked down
 
 Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0006-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-is-locked-dow.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 9db5ea1dbc604754bf41fab3383fd8743ae6a42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 06/25] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 06/26] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
 
 kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
 is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0007-Copy-secure_boot-flag-in-boot-params-across-kexec-re.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 84196308f898ed6739af65d69e2b077b541153e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 07/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
+Subject: [PATCH 07/26] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
  reboot
 
 Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0008-kexec_file-Disable-at-runtime-if-securelevel-has-bee.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 6d464109d41e58169e6121d844765443a23f0a37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:49:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 08/25] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
+Subject: [PATCH 08/26] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
  set
 
 When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0009-hibernate-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From ca4d2b0d492a011f3f04ca27112dc897afa6cd6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 09/25] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 09/26] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
 
 There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
 from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0010-uswsusp-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 71a51cb3bf8ccadcd8909fd83d69ded308654c17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:28:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 10/25] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 10/26] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
 
 uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
 makes it possible to modify the running kernel.  Disable this if the kernel

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0011-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-d.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 723299a61788af79dde4257a756aeba12ba1ae4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 11/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
+Subject: [PATCH 11/26] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
  down
 
 Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0012-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-the-kernel-is-lock.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 6082b23ef0f4f4e8ab59d3bb4a9f0fd5847f560e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 12/25] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
+Subject: [PATCH 12/26] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
  down
 
 IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0013-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From c281b90cf4a02a233765fcf5901b9d6ec3718966 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 13/25] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 13/26] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
 
 Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
 it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.  Based on a

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0014-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-the-kernel-.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 3991f2855a05f21641d223f05b822abc46b388b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 14/25] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 14/26] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
  locked down
 
 We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0015-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method-when-the-kernel-i.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 8d62701b2c57b2e472a80393e3e976f1ade21dac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 15/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 15/26] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
  locked down
 
 custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0016-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-param-when-the-kernel-h.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 953a0fc5063cd15031a4d6b328b5c9f1d2e71902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 16/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
+Subject: [PATCH 16/26] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
  been locked down
 
 This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0017-acpi-Disable-ACPI-table-override-if-the-kernel-is-lo.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 7ad375dfa5b163a2d1918647f245d4f18811fbdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:32:27 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 17/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 17/26] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
  locked down
 
 From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0018-acpi-Disable-APEI-error-injection-if-the-kernel-is-l.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 0aaecda5c1b5f825b9cd2046e40d82b7ab811a95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:39:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 18/25] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 18/26] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
  locked down
 
 ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0019-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From cbdbd3c0ff6d98dba590cd3f4978c9b318ef1656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:52:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 19/25] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
+Subject: [PATCH 19/26] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
  kernel is locked down
 
 There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0020-scsi-Lock-down-the-eata-driver.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 32c85f7a1d68ae1b947d305b2f73c1e2c46ecb1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:10:34 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 20/25] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
+Subject: [PATCH 20/26] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
 
 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
 prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0021-Prohibit-PCMCIA-CIS-storage-when-the-kernel-is-locke.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From e835b3d609297875784bc7835cde55bfc8a40f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 14:37:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 21/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
+Subject: [PATCH 21/26] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
  down
 
 Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0022-Lock-down-TIOCSSERIAL.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 9b09194823ad294e0a41de6b7ff9ee47e8e1e9cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:28:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 22/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
+Subject: [PATCH 22/26] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
 
 Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
 settings on a serial port.  This only appears to be an issue for the serial

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From cec28fd85530cf618a0c5412e5845130cdec93ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
 Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 23/25] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
+Subject: [PATCH 23/26] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
 
 This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
 provided they stay reachable relative to one another.  Useful for

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From 6869be30ef74913549956bcaa4c90f98e85d9ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
 Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 24/25] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
+Subject: [PATCH 24/26] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
 
 Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
 ---

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0025-mm-larger-stack-guard-gap-between-vmas.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 From f87c64a5210a044c70a3f3b1e1f94c0d5e77e25d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 04:03:24 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 25/25] mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
+Subject: [PATCH 25/26] mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
 
 commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.
 

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0026-mm-fix-new-crash-in-unmapped_area_topdown.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From c462b13be57c29509b945f12b239bb90eba89d3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 02:10:44 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 26/26] mm: fix new crash in unmapped_area_topdown()
+
+Trinity gets kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:1963! in about 3 minutes of
+mmap testing.  That's the VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start) at the
+end of unmapped_area_topdown().  Linus points out how MAP_FIXED
+(which does not have to respect our stack guard gap intentions)
+could result in gap_end below gap_start there.  Fix that, and
+the similar case in its alternative, unmapped_area().
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
+Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
+Debugged-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
+Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+---
+ mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
+index 116ea08..ad54b9f 100644
+--- a/mm/mmap.c
++++ b/mm/mmap.c
+@@ -1817,7 +1817,8 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
+ 		/* Check if current node has a suitable gap */
+ 		if (gap_start > high_limit)
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+-		if (gap_end >= low_limit && gap_end - gap_start >= length)
++		if (gap_end >= low_limit &&
++		    gap_end > gap_start && gap_end - gap_start >= length)
+ 			goto found;
+ 
+ 		/* Visit right subtree if it looks promising */
+@@ -1920,7 +1921,8 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area_topdown(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
+ 		gap_end = vm_start_gap(vma);
+ 		if (gap_end < low_limit)
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+-		if (gap_start <= high_limit && gap_end - gap_start >= length)
++		if (gap_start <= high_limit &&
++		    gap_end > gap_start && gap_end - gap_start >= length)
+ 			goto found;
+ 
+ 		/* Visit left subtree if it looks promising */
+-- 
+2.9.4
+