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Merge pull request #1682 from flatcar-linux/kai/revert-ipsec-change

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sys-kernel: Revert change to forbid using xfrm id 0
This commit is contained in:
Kai Lüke 2022-03-02 17:49:40 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit a0378f9338
3 changed files with 69 additions and 0 deletions
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1
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/changelog/bugfixes/2022-03-02-kernel-ipsec-id0-revert.md vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
- Reverted the Linux kernel change to forbid xfrm id 0 for IPSec state because it broke Cilium ([Flatcar#626](https://github.com/flatcar-linux/Flatcar/issues/626), [PR#1682](https://github.com/flatcar-linux/coreos-overlay/pull/1682))

1
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-5.15.25.ebuild vendored
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@ -36,4 +36,5 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-tools-objtool-Makefile-Don-t-fail-on-fallthrough-wit.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-PCI-hv-Make-the-code-arch-neutral-by-adding-arch-spe.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-PCI-hv-Add-arm64-Hyper-V-vPCI-support.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-Revert-xfrm-state-and-policy-should-fail-if-XFRMA_IF.patch \
"

67
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/5.15/z0005-Revert-xfrm-state-and-policy-should-fail-if-XFRMA_IF.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From 509a0cc7c909899d76b2d7b0afd0124966358515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Lueke <kailuke@microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 19:40:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Revert "xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID
0"
This reverts commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 because it
breaks userspace (e.g., Cilium is affected because it used id 0 for the
dummy state https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/18789).
Signed-off-by: Kai Lueke <kailuke@microsoft.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 21 +++------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 8cd6c8129004..be89a8ac54a4 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -630,13 +630,8 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net,
xfrm_smark_init(attrs, &x->props.smark);
- if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]) {
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
x->if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
- if (!x->if_id) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto error;
- }
- }
err = __xfrm_init_state(x, false, attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV]);
if (err)
@@ -1432,13 +1427,8 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]) {
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
- if (!if_id) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_noput;
- }
- }
if (p->info.seq) {
x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, mark, p->info.seq);
@@ -1751,13 +1741,8 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_construct(struct net *net, struct xfrm_us
xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &xp->mark);
- if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]) {
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
xp->if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
- if (!xp->if_id) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto error;
- }
- }
return xp;
error:
--
2.35.1