Merge pull request #1326 from mjg59/master

Enable kernel lockdowns in Secure Boot environments

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.0.7-r2.ebuild

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI=5
-COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r1"
+COREOS_SOURCE_REVISION="-r2"
 inherit coreos-kernel
 
 DESCRIPTION="CoreOS Linux kernel"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/files/amd64_defconfig-4.0

@@ -936,3 +936,4 @@ CONFIG_KVM_AMD=m
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_ARM is not set
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_ARMTHUMB is not set
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_SPARC is not set
+CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE=y

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.0.7-r1.ebuild

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI="5"
-ETYPE="sources"
-inherit kernel-2
-detect_version
-
-DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
-HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
-SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
-
-KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
-IUSE=""

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.0.7-r2.ebuild

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI="5"
+ETYPE="sources"
+inherit kernel-2
+detect_version
+
+DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
+SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
+
+KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
+IUSE=""
+
+UNIPATCH_LIST="${FILESDIR}/01-Add-secure_modules-call.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/02-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/03-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/04-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/05-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/06-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/07-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/08-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/09-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/10-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/12-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/13-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch \
+${FILESDIR}/14-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/01-Add-secure_modules-call.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Add secure_modules() call
+
+Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
+has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load
+only modules signed with a trusted key.
+
+Bugzilla: N/A
+Upstream-status: Fedora mustard.  Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ include/linux/module.h |  7 +++++++
+ kernel/module.c        | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
+index b03485bcb82a..b033dab5c8bf 100644
+--- a/include/linux/module.h
++++ b/include/linux/module.h
+@@ -506,6 +506,8 @@ int unregister_module_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+ 
+ extern void print_modules(void);
+ 
++extern bool secure_modules(void);
++
+ #else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */
+ 
+ /* Given an address, look for it in the exception tables. */
+@@ -616,6 +618,11 @@ static inline int unregister_module_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+ static inline void print_modules(void)
+ {
+ }
++
++static inline bool secure_modules(void)
++{
++	return false;
++}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
+index 538794ce3cc7..f3489ef9e409 100644
+--- a/kernel/module.c
++++ b/kernel/module.c
+@@ -3911,3 +3911,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
+ #endif
++
++bool secure_modules(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
++	return (sig_enforce || modules_disabled);
++#else
++	return modules_disabled;
++#endif
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_modules);

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/02-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-module-security-is-ena.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled
+
+Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
+userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify
+kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module
+signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
+sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ drivers/pci/proc.c      |  8 +++++++-
+ drivers/pci/syscall.c   |  3 ++-
+ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+index 312f23a8429c..93e6ac103dd0 100644
+--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include <linux/vgaarb.h>
+ #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
+ #include <linux/of.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ #include "pci.h"
+ 
+ static int sysfs_initialized;	/* = 0 */
+@@ -710,6 +711,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ 	loff_t init_off = off;
+ 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
+@@ -1004,6 +1008,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ 	resource_size_t start, end;
+ 	int i;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
+ 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
+ 			break;
+@@ -1105,6 +1112,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
+ 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
+ {
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
+index 3f155e78513f..4265ea07e3b0 100644
+--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
+ 	int cnt;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (pos >= size)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if (nbytes >= size)
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	switch (cmd) {
+ 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
+ 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
+@@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+ 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ 	int i, ret;
+ 
+-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules())
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
+diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+index b91c4da68365..98f5637304d1 100644
+--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/pci.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "pci.h"
+ 
+@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
+ 	u32 dword;
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || secure_modules())
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/03-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-module-security-is.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is enabled
+
+IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
+registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
+space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
+it down by default.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 5 +++--
+ drivers/char/mem.c       | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+index 4ddaf66ea35f..00b440307419 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/bitmap.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <asm/syscalls.h>
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
+ 
+ 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules()))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
+ 	if (level > old) {
+-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules())
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 	}
+ 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
+diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
+index 297110c12635..efe38c1bc234 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/export.h>
+ #include <linux/io.h>
+ #include <linux/aio.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -577,6 +578,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
+ 	const char __user *tmp = buf;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/04-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
+
+custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
+it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
+Disable it if any such restrictions have been enabled.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+index c68e72414a67..4277938af700 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
+ 	struct acpi_table_header table;
+ 	acpi_status status;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (!(*ppos)) {
+ 		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
+ 		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/05-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-module-load.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is
+ restricted
+
+We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
+given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
+be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
+kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if any of
+these features are enabled.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+index 7543a56e0f45..93b5a6998371 100644
+--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
++++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+@@ -1589,6 +1589,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+ 	int err;
+ 	u32 retval = -1;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
+ 
+ 	if (err < 0)
+@@ -1605,6 +1608,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+ 	int err;
+ 	u32 retval = -1;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
+ 				    &retval);
+ 
+@@ -1629,6 +1635,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+ 	union acpi_object *obj;
+ 	acpi_status status;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
+ 				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
+ 				     &input, &output);

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/06-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-module-loading-is.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
+ restricted
+
+Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
+to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when
+any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
+index efe38c1bc234..16b8af1188e1 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ 	if (p != *ppos)
+ 		return -EFBIG;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+@@ -513,6 +516,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
+ 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
+ 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/07-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-parameter-when-module-l.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module loading
+ is restricted
+
+This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
+makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on
+loading modules. Disable it in that case.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/osl.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+index 5aa1f6e281d2..58ae459937a4 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
+ #include <linux/list.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+ #include <linux/semaphore.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
+ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
+-	if (acpi_rsdp)
++	if (acpi_rsdp && !secure_modules())
+ 		return acpi_rsdp;
+ #endif
+ 

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/08-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-enforces-modu.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 03:33:56 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
+ loading restrictions
+
+kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
+is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes
+sense to disable kexec in this situation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
+index 38c25b1f2fd5..f2b5272156ce 100644
+--- a/kernel/kexec.c
++++ b/kernel/kexec.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+ #include <linux/compiler.h>
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -1247,6 +1248,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	/*
++	 * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
++	 * prevent loading in that case
++	 */
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
++	/*
+ 	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
+ 	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.
+ 	 */

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/09-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-module-loading-is-restr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted
+
+Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted,
+since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based
+on a patch by Kees Cook.
+
+Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+index 113e70784854..26c2f83fc470 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ 
++	if (secure_modules())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (count % 8)
+ 		return -EINVAL;	/* Invalid chunk size */
+ 
+@@ -152,6 +155,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
+ 			err = -EBADF;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
++		if (secure_modules()) {
++			err = -EPERM;
++			break;
++		}
+ 		if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
+ 			err = -EFAULT;
+ 			break;

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/10-Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in
+ Secure Boot mode
+
+UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
+only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
+require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
+that enforces this automatically when enabled.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
+---
+ Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
+ arch/x86/Kconfig                      | 10 ++++++++++
+ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  6 ++++++
+ include/linux/module.h                |  6 ++++++
+ kernel/module.c                       |  7 +++++++
+ 7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+index 82fbdbc1e0b0..a811210ad486 100644
+--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
++++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
+ 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
+ 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
+ 				(below)
++1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
++1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
+ 1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
+ 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
+ 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
+diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+index b7d31ca55187..ab403a636357 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+@@ -1695,6 +1695,16 @@ config EFI_MIXED
+ 
+ 	   If unsure, say N.
+ 
++config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
++        def_bool n
++	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
++	---help---
++	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
++	  firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain
++	  use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed.
++	  Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement
++	  when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
++
+ config SECCOMP
+ 	def_bool y
+ 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+index ef17683484e9..105e7360d747 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #include <asm/efi.h>
+ #include <asm/setup.h>
+ #include <asm/desc.h>
++#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
+ 
+ #include "../string.h"
+ #include "eboot.h"
+@@ -827,6 +828,37 @@ out:
+ 	return status;
+ }
+ 
++static int get_secure_boot(void)
++{
++	u8 sb, setup;
++	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
++	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
++	efi_status_t status;
++
++	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
++				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
++
++	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (sb == 0)
++		return 0;
++
++
++	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
++				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
++				&setup);
++
++	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (setup == 1)
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++
+ /*
+  * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol
+  */
+@@ -1406,6 +1438,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
+ 	else
+ 		setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
+ 
++	sanitize_boot_params(boot_params);
++
++	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot();
++
+ 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
+ 
+ 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+index 225b0988043a..90dbfb73e11f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ struct boot_params {
+ 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
+ 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
+ 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
+-	__u8  _pad5[3];					/* 0x1ec */
++	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
++	__u8  _pad5[2];					/* 0x1ed */
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
+ 	 *
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+index 0a2421cca01f..a3d8174dedf9 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -1151,6 +1151,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 
+ 	io_delay_init();
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
++	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
++		enforce_signed_modules();
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
+ 	 */
+diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
+index b033dab5c8bf..f526b6e02f59 100644
+--- a/include/linux/module.h
++++ b/include/linux/module.h
+@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ const struct exception_table_entry *search_exception_tables(unsigned long add);
+ 
+ struct notifier_block;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
++extern void enforce_signed_modules(void);
++#else
++static inline void enforce_signed_modules(void) {};
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+ 
+ extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */
+diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
+index f3489ef9e409..3bb7c01b3c9f 100644
+--- a/kernel/module.c
++++ b/kernel/module.c
+@@ -3912,6 +3912,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
++void enforce_signed_modules(void)
++{
++	sig_enforce = true;
++}
++#endif
++
+ bool secure_modules(void)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/11-efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
+
+A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
+images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
+MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set.  Given that the
+user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
+secure boot mode if that variable is set.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+index 105e7360d747..83fc4e9888ee 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+@@ -830,8 +830,9 @@ out:
+ 
+ static int get_secure_boot(void)
+ {
+-	u8 sb, setup;
++	u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
+ 	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
++	u32 attr;
+ 	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+ 	efi_status_t status;
+ 
+@@ -855,6 +856,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void)
+ 	if (setup == 1)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	/* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode.  If so, and the variable
++	 * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
++	 */
++	var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
++	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
++				L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
++				&moksbstate);
++
++	/* If it fails, we don't care why.  Default to secure */
++	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
++		if (moksbstate == 1)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/12-efi-Make-EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE-depend-on-EFI.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
+
+The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being
+UEFI based.  Reflect this in the config deps.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+index ab403a636357..5dac78119fa7 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+@@ -1696,7 +1696,8 @@ config EFI_MIXED
+ 	   If unsure, say N.
+ 
+ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
+-        def_bool n
++	def_bool n
++	depends on EFI
+ 	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+ 	---help---
+ 	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/13-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
+
+UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
+for use with efi_enabled.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++
+ include/linux/efi.h     | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+index a3d8174dedf9..26c5d54124c1 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -1153,7 +1153,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
+ 	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
++		set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
+ 		enforce_signed_modules();
++		pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
+index cf7e431cbc73..c74cbd892032 100644
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -942,6 +942,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
+ #define EFI_64BIT		5	/* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
+ #define EFI_PARAVIRT		6	/* Access is via a paravirt interface */
+ #define EFI_ARCH_1		7	/* First arch-specific bit */
++#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		8	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ /*

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/14-hibernate-Disable-in-a-signed-modules-environment.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment
+
+There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
+from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
+so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
+a secure modules environment.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+index 2329daae5255..48a8e82c7e2e 100644
+--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
++++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ctype.h>
+ #include <linux/genhd.h>
+ #include <linux/ktime.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <trace/events/power.h>
+ 
+ #include "power.h"
+@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
+ 
+ bool hibernation_available(void)
+ {
+-	return (nohibernate == 0);
++	return ((nohibernate == 0) && !secure_modules());
+ }
+ 
+ /**