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Merge pull request #2874 from bgilbert/4.14
sys-kernel/coreos-*: bump to 4.14-rc7
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Gilbert
GitHub
commit
965621db0f
@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY=y
|
||||
CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_X86_BOOTPARAM_MEMORY_CORRUPTION_CHECK is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER_ENABLE_DEFAULT=1
|
||||
CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN=y
|
||||
CONFIG_KEXEC=y
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CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
|
||||
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG=y
|
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@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ CONFIG_NFT_HASH=m
|
||||
CONFIG_NFT_FIB_INET=m
|
||||
CONFIG_NFT_DUP_NETDEV=m
|
||||
CONFIG_NFT_FWD_NETDEV=m
|
||||
CONFIG_NFT_FIB_NETDEV=m
|
||||
CONFIG_NF_SOCKET_IPV4=m
|
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CONFIG_NF_TABLES_IPV4=m
|
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CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_ROUTE_IPV4=m
|
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@ -455,7 +456,6 @@ CONFIG_CONNECTOR=m
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CONFIG_MTD=m
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CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX=m
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CONFIG_ZRAM=m
|
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CONFIG_BLK_CPQ_CISS_DA=m
|
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CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DRBD=m
|
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CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NBD=m
|
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CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM=m
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@ -706,6 +706,7 @@ CONFIG_HWMON=m
|
||||
CONFIG_WATCHDOG=y
|
||||
CONFIG_SOFT_WATCHDOG=m
|
||||
CONFIG_XEN_WDT=m
|
||||
# CONFIG_RC_CORE is not set
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CONFIG_FB=y
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CONFIG_FB_EFI=y
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CONFIG_XEN_FBDEV_FRONTEND=m
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@ -861,6 +862,7 @@ CONFIG_KPROBE_EVENTS=y
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CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS=y
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CONFIG_MEMTEST=y
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||||
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
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CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
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CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
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CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
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||||
CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=m
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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DIST linux-4.13.tar.xz 100579888 SHA256 2db3d6066c3ad93eb25b973a3d2951e022a7e975ee2fa7cbe5bddf84d9a49a2c SHA512 a557c2f0303ae618910b7106ff63d9978afddf470f03cb72aa748213e099a0ecd5f3119aea6cbd7b61df30ca6ef3ec57044d524b7babbaabddf8b08b8bafa7d2 WHIRLPOOL d3d332e02cd3c5056c76c28cf1f81504c6f7b8f2caed7238e7dd7866747fb03154b88d8d7aec4d0eddf5760624bc7d6c5485fb52a3e32d098a2742eba96c0d05
|
||||
DIST patch-4.13.10.xz 212680 SHA256 b9efa9c6375f79f6a041a5f0666d4ced1a49bfe8c4662d26517a6b4cfd9bf2f6 SHA512 634d81ea509aac5555d8d11631babe9bb04ea771c873f084cea7067313a566d5cad291b0c311002ae8d1d6dd498a93a9a43517923aa449eebb405fb4c1e34753 WHIRLPOOL f033d0bd9e6b95cdcb356a69ee4ea3054b96f991973445e94aeba664f3e91dcadd46a6c0620ad4f044503ccfa28a6deb2ed20890ef0c65b34f27a83b1847b8b1
|
||||
DIST patch-4.14-rc7.patch 51715185 SHA256 35e1f2d42c383c5796331c08a9536e2bd1604ee284ce063a41c567fa3fc582e0 SHA512 4b33b60a223359936e546498f9651f7bad21528beac404ca580ba6fd725fe6637845a80ba1079fa0cf4c6f614768d4b361e1e1b04ce7edde6dde686e623f1ed1 WHIRLPOOL e266a98b221fc84d73a3073f934137cbb077224f784f029f65a5f25108dc4ffedd5b1a548cde6f5396dec32343bd74ec97c502207b74f5b99c5dd97c06b1d334
|
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|
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@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
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# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
||||
|
||||
EAPI="5"
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||||
ETYPE="sources"
|
||||
|
||||
# -rc releases should be versioned L.M_rcN
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# Final releases should be versioned L.M.N, even for n == 0
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|
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# Only needed for RCs
|
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K_BASE_VER="4.13"
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inherit kernel-2
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detect_version
|
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DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
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HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
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if [[ "${PV%%_rc*}" != "${PV}" ]]; then
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SRC_URI="https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/p/v${KV%-coreos}/v${OKV} -> patch-${KV%-coreos}.patch ${KERNEL_BASE_URI}/linux-${OKV}.tar.xz"
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_PATCH}"
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else
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SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_MINOR}"
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fi
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KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
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IUSE=""
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|
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# XXX: Note we must prefix the patch filenames with "z" to ensure they are
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# applied _after_ a potential patch-${KV}.patch file, present when building a
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# patchlevel revision. We mustn't apply our patches first, it fails when the
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# local patches overlap with the upstream patch.
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UNIPATCH_LIST="
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-Add-the-ability-to-lock-down-access-to-the-running-k.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-Enforce-module-signatures-if-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-the-kernel-is-loc.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-is-locked-dow.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-Copy-secure_boot-flag-in-boot-params-across-kexec-re.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0008-kexec_file-Disable-at-runtime-if-securelevel-has-bee.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0009-hibernate-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch \
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0010-uswsusp-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0011-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-d.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0012-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-the-kernel-is-lock.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0013-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0014-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-the-kernel-.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0015-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method-when-the-kernel-i.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0016-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-param-when-the-kernel-h.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0017-acpi-Disable-ACPI-table-override-if-the-kernel-is-lo.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0018-acpi-Disable-APEI-error-injection-if-the-kernel-is-l.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0019-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0020-scsi-Lock-down-the-eata-driver.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0021-Prohibit-PCMCIA-CIS-storage-when-the-kernel-is-locke.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0022-Lock-down-TIOCSSERIAL.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
|
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${PATCH_DIR}/z0025-cifs-Select-all-required-crypto-modules.patch \
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"
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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# Copyright 2014 CoreOS, Inc.
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
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|
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EAPI="5"
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ETYPE="sources"
|
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|
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# -rc releases should be versioned L.M_rcN
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# Final releases should be versioned L.M.N, even for N == 0
|
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|
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# Only needed for RCs
|
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K_BASE_VER="4.13"
|
||||
|
||||
# Avoid failures when an -rc patch adds a file that replaces a symlink
|
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K_FROM_GIT=1
|
||||
|
||||
inherit kernel-2
|
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detect_version
|
||||
|
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DESCRIPTION="Full sources for the CoreOS Linux kernel"
|
||||
HOMEPAGE="http://www.kernel.org"
|
||||
if [[ "${PV%%_rc*}" != "${PV}" ]]; then
|
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SRC_URI="https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/p/v${KV%-coreos}/v${OKV} -> patch-${KV%-coreos}.patch ${KERNEL_BASE_URI}/linux-${OKV}.tar.xz"
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_PATCH}"
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else
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SRC_URI="${KERNEL_URI}"
|
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PATCH_DIR="${FILESDIR}/${KV_MAJOR}.${KV_MINOR}"
|
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fi
|
||||
|
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KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64"
|
||||
IUSE=""
|
||||
|
||||
# XXX: Note we must prefix the patch filenames with "z" to ensure they are
|
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# applied _after_ a potential patch-${KV}.patch file, present when building a
|
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# patchlevel revision. We mustn't apply our patches first, it fails when the
|
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# local patches overlap with the upstream patch.
|
||||
UNIPATCH_LIST="
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
|
||||
${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 10b38041f4d82de14cbc2183c86f96bfbbff0980 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
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Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
|
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Subject: [PATCH 01/25] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
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|
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UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
|
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that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
|
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enabled.
|
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|
||||
This will be used by the SysRq+x handler, registered by the x86 arch, to find
|
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out whether secure boot mode is enabled so that it can be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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---
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arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 1 +
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include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
|
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
|
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|
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diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
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index 3486d0498800..319995f58345 100644
|
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--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
|
||||
pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
|
||||
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
|
||||
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
|
||||
index 8269bcb8ccf7..7952dd3ffa73 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
|
||||
@@ -1081,6 +1081,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
|
||||
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
|
||||
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
|
||||
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
|
||||
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 11 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
|
||||
/*
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 5a941458bb16c1c3c5e5f9bc1311a58d952d5c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:36:17 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 02/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
|
||||
kernel image
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
|
||||
should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
|
||||
allow the running kernel image to be changed including the loading of
|
||||
modules that aren't validly signed with a key we recognise, fiddling with
|
||||
MSR registers and disallowing hibernation,
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/linux/kernel.h | 9 +++++++++
|
||||
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
security/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
|
||||
security/Makefile | 3 +++
|
||||
security/lock_down.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
5 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
|
||||
index bd6d96cf80b1..65692c80aa1a 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
|
||||
@@ -277,6 +277,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
|
||||
void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
|
||||
void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
|
||||
+extern bool kernel_is_locked_down(void);
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+static inline bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Internal, do not use. */
|
||||
int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
|
||||
int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
index b6ea1dc9cc9d..834b355fa298 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
|
||||
@@ -1764,5 +1764,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
|
||||
{ }
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
|
||||
+extern void lock_kernel_down(void);
|
||||
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
|
||||
+extern void lift_kernel_lockdown(void);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+static inline void lock_kernel_down(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
|
||||
index e8e449444e65..1a84ed33c09a 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/Kconfig
|
||||
+++ b/security/Kconfig
|
||||
@@ -205,6 +205,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
|
||||
If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
|
||||
specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
|
||||
|
||||
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
|
||||
+ bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
|
||||
+ help
|
||||
+ Allow the kernel to be locked down under certain circumstances, for
|
||||
+ instance if UEFI secure boot is enabled. Locking down the kernel
|
||||
+ turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the
|
||||
+ kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers).
|
||||
+
|
||||
+config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
|
||||
+ bool
|
||||
+ help
|
||||
+ Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, thereby restoring the
|
||||
+ ability of userspace to access the kernel image (eg. by SysRq+x under
|
||||
+ x86).
|
||||
+
|
||||
source security/selinux/Kconfig
|
||||
source security/smack/Kconfig
|
||||
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
|
||||
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
|
||||
index f2d71cdb8e19..8c4a43e3d4e0 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/Makefile
|
||||
+++ b/security/Makefile
|
||||
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
|
||||
# Object integrity file lists
|
||||
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# Allow the kernel to be locked down
|
||||
+obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL) += lock_down.o
|
||||
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 000000000000..5788c60ff4e1
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
+/* Lock down the kernel
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
||||
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
|
||||
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
|
||||
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <linux/security.h>
|
||||
+#include <linux/export.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+void lock_kernel_down(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ kernel_locked_down = true;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Take the kernel out of lockdown mode.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+void lift_kernel_lockdown(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ kernel_locked_down = false;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ * kernel_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return kernel_locked_down;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_is_locked_down);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 56f553942d8b99fe5eff6e329cc6844cbb6ee4b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 03/25] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
|
||||
|
||||
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
|
||||
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
|
||||
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
|
||||
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
|
||||
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 8 +++++++-
|
||||
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
index 323cb065be5e..8e41d54d6498 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
|
||||
@@ -1836,6 +1836,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
|
||||
|
||||
If unsure, say N.
|
||||
|
||||
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
|
||||
+ def_bool n
|
||||
+ depends on EFI
|
||||
+ prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
|
||||
+ ---help---
|
||||
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
|
||||
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may
|
||||
+ also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
|
||||
+ userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
|
||||
+ image. Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
|
||||
+ system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
|
||||
+
|
||||
config SECCOMP
|
||||
def_bool y
|
||||
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
index 319995f58345..d0128aef43ce 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
|
||||
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
|
||||
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/tboot.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
|
||||
+#include <linux/security.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
|
||||
#include <video/edid.h>
|
||||
@@ -1191,7 +1192,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
|
||||
set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
|
||||
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
|
||||
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
|
||||
+ lock_kernel_down();
|
||||
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From cc5ea82adefc9d4039a713e8b5cf99baa917636e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:22:22 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
|
||||
|
||||
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
|
||||
signatures that we can verify.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
|
||||
index 40f983cbea81..e5b878b26906 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/module.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/module.c
|
||||
@@ -2781,7 +2781,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
|
||||
- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
|
||||
+ if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
err = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 235ba6af59f7cee12187cf733b447fe8d3463184 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/25] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
|
||||
locked down
|
||||
|
||||
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
|
||||
be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when the
|
||||
kernel has been locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
index 593a8818aca9..ba68add9677f 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
if (p != *ppos)
|
||||
return -EFBIG;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -540,6 +543,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
|
||||
int err = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
|
||||
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
|
||||
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 75d101e041cef9ffd5c4320183ed9120c33384bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/25] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
|
||||
|
||||
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
|
||||
is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable
|
||||
kexec in this situation.
|
||||
|
||||
This does not affect kexec_file_load() which can check for a signature on the
|
||||
image to be booted.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/kexec.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
|
||||
index e62ec4dc6620..37f75d0b75de 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
|
||||
@@ -201,6 +201,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
|
||||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
|
||||
+ * prevent loading in that case
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
|
||||
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 9e5f94ab9e11f46c91612db0e82077f9e56066d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
|
||||
reboot
|
||||
|
||||
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
|
||||
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
|
||||
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
|
||||
by secure boot.
|
||||
|
||||
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
|
||||
kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
|
||||
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
|
||||
index fb095ba0c02f..7d0fac5bcbbe 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
|
||||
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
|
||||
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
|
||||
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
|
||||
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
|
||||
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 72726c9e0d1063885f9226a78f1aa70c508d9284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:49:19 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/25] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
|
||||
set
|
||||
|
||||
When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image
|
||||
through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set.
|
||||
|
||||
This code was showed in Matthew's patch but not in git:
|
||||
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/13/778
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
|
||||
index 9f48f4412297..7da87007c202 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
|
||||
@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
|
||||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Don't permit images to be loaded into trusted kernels if we're not
|
||||
+ * going to verify the signature on them
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */
|
||||
if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 62487920402b56b8eab77f515d7890df6473ca29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/25] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
|
||||
|
||||
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
|
||||
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
|
||||
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
|
||||
kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
|
||||
index e1914c7b85b1..7859ba79e181 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
|
||||
|
||||
bool hibernation_available(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- return (nohibernate == 0);
|
||||
+ return nohibernate == 0 && !kernel_is_locked_down();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 203bff56c8b1a2c0ae98944258daa3c684994054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:28:17 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/25] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
|
||||
|
||||
uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
|
||||
makes it possible to modify the running kernel. Disable this if the kernel
|
||||
is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
|
||||
index 22df9f7ff672..e4b926d329b7 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
|
||||
if (!hibernation_available())
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
lock_system_sleep();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 973da35b4b6b11f677d991efab6e54f93b0f0e2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
|
||||
down
|
||||
|
||||
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
|
||||
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
|
||||
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
|
||||
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
|
||||
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
|
||||
drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++-
|
||||
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
|
||||
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
|
||||
index 6337bce27c36..eb7c0dcca351 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
|
||||
@@ -888,6 +888,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
|
||||
loff_t init_off = off;
|
||||
u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (off > dev->cfg_size)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
|
||||
@@ -1182,6 +1185,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
|
||||
enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
|
||||
struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1265,6 +1271,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
|
||||
struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
|
||||
loff_t off, size_t count)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
|
||||
index 098360d7ff81..ef16fccb1923 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
|
||||
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
int size = dev->cfg_size;
|
||||
int cnt;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (pos >= size)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (nbytes >= size)
|
||||
@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
|
||||
#endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
switch (cmd) {
|
||||
case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
|
||||
ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
|
||||
@@ -236,7 +242,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
|
||||
struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
|
||||
int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
|
||||
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
|
||||
index 9bf993e1f71e..c09524738ceb 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
|
||||
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
|
||||
u32 dword;
|
||||
int err = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||||
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From bcf04501de6a0db26d11994d4e3757da793fec96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/25] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
|
||||
down
|
||||
|
||||
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
|
||||
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
|
||||
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
|
||||
DMA, so lock it down by default.
|
||||
|
||||
This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
|
||||
KDDISABIO console ioctls.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
|
||||
drivers/char/mem.c | 2 ++
|
||||
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
|
||||
index 9c3cf0944bce..4a613fed94b6 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
|
||||
|
||||
if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
|
||||
+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down()))
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
|
||||
if (level > old) {
|
||||
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
|
||||
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
index ba68add9677f..5e2a260fb89f 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
|
||||
@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
|
||||
|
||||
static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 205948d870a1e995e0b5f332b5a0e3fc15371327 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:17 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 13/25] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
|
||||
|
||||
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
|
||||
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a
|
||||
patch by Kees Cook.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
|
||||
index ef688804f80d..fbcce028e502 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
|
||||
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
int err = 0;
|
||||
ssize_t bytes = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (count % 8)
|
||||
return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -131,6 +134,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
|
||||
err = -EBADF;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
|
||||
+ err = -EPERM;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (copy_from_user(®s, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
|
||||
err = -EFAULT;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 5b4be098985432633142dee28ad9176499af5f9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/25] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
|
||||
locked down
|
||||
|
||||
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
|
||||
machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
|
||||
manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
|
||||
kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if the
|
||||
kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
|
||||
index 709e3a67391a..2d8db47698b2 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
|
||||
@@ -1905,6 +1905,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
|
||||
int err;
|
||||
u32 retval = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
|
||||
|
||||
if (err < 0)
|
||||
@@ -1921,6 +1924,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
|
||||
int err;
|
||||
u32 retval = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
|
||||
&retval);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1945,6 +1951,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
|
||||
union acpi_object *obj;
|
||||
acpi_status status;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
|
||||
1, asus->debug.method_id,
|
||||
&input, &output);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 8b0ac11c7a779c7e3410309a2a3149e3569d4be3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 15/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
|
||||
locked down
|
||||
|
||||
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
|
||||
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
|
||||
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
|
||||
index c68e72414a67..e4d721c330c0 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
|
||||
struct acpi_table_header table;
|
||||
acpi_status status;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!(*ppos)) {
|
||||
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
|
||||
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 32ed0045e519827e0d28461e917f33fb2a06e096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 16/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
|
||||
been locked down
|
||||
|
||||
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
|
||||
makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on
|
||||
loading modules. Ignore the option when the kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
|
||||
index db78d353bab1..d4d4ba348451 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
|
||||
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
|
||||
acpi_physical_address pa = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
|
||||
- if (acpi_rsdp)
|
||||
+ if (acpi_rsdp && !kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
return acpi_rsdp;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 86e762ccc5c54715db1bacaa3af07b3e78853fa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:32:27 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 17/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
|
||||
locked down
|
||||
|
||||
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
|
||||
|
||||
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
|
||||
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
|
||||
instrumented, modified one.
|
||||
|
||||
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
|
||||
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel,
|
||||
so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 5 +++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
|
||||
index ff425390bfa8..c72bfa97888a 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
|
||||
@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)
|
||||
if (table_nr == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
|
||||
+ pr_notice("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n");
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
acpi_tables_addr =
|
||||
memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS,
|
||||
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From a8524e54341eaec538518b84404a2750cc54726e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:39:41 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 18/25] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
|
||||
locked down
|
||||
|
||||
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
|
||||
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
|
||||
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
|
||||
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
|
||||
|
||||
Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
|
||||
indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
|
||||
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
|
||||
replacement.
|
||||
|
||||
While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
|
||||
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
|
||||
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
|
||||
the kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
|
||||
index ec50c32ea3da..e082718d01c2 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
|
||||
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
u64 base_addr, size;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
|
||||
if (flags && (flags &
|
||||
~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 7ef44d71258767987f7eb9707d6931dd14a6dabb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:52:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 19/25] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
|
||||
kernel is locked down
|
||||
|
||||
There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
|
||||
bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk. These allow
|
||||
private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
|
||||
be read by an eBPF program. Prohibit those functions when the kernel is
|
||||
locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
|
||||
index dc498b605d5d..fb240222b89b 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
|
||||
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
|
||||
+ memset(dst, 0, size);
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
|
||||
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
|
||||
memset(dst, 0, size);
|
||||
@@ -84,6 +89,9 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_proto = {
|
||||
BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
|
||||
u32, size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Ensure we're in user context which is safe for the helper to
|
||||
* run. This helper has no business in a kthread.
|
||||
@@ -143,6 +151,9 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
|
||||
if (fmt[--fmt_size] != 0)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
|
||||
+ return __trace_printk(1, fmt, 0, 0, 0);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* check format string for allowed specifiers */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < fmt_size; i++) {
|
||||
if ((!isprint(fmt[i]) && !isspace(fmt[i])) || !isascii(fmt[i]))
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From d6318af7b03564be2094d496321d797e7e5fff38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:10:34 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 20/25] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
|
||||
|
||||
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
|
||||
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
|
||||
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
|
||||
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
|
||||
device to access or modify the kernel image.
|
||||
|
||||
The eata driver takes a single string parameter that contains a slew of
|
||||
settings, including hardware resource configuration. Prohibit use of the
|
||||
parameter if the kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
cc: Dario Ballabio <ballabio_dario@emc.com>
|
||||
cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
||||
cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
||||
cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/scsi/eata.c | 7 ++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/eata.c b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
|
||||
index 227dd2c2ec2f..5c036d10c18b 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/scsi/eata.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
|
||||
@@ -1552,8 +1552,13 @@ static int eata2x_detect(struct scsi_host_template *tpnt)
|
||||
|
||||
tpnt->proc_name = "eata2x";
|
||||
|
||||
- if (strlen(boot_options))
|
||||
+ if (strlen(boot_options)) {
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
|
||||
+ pr_err("Command line-specified device addresses, irqs and dma channels are not permitted when the kernel is locked down\n");
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
option_setup(boot_options);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MODULE)
|
||||
/* io_port could have been modified when loading as a module */
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 8a34e69703cc6ee10538aa6139cac1cd7707e2b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 14:37:45 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 21/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
|
||||
down
|
||||
|
||||
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
|
||||
kernel is locked down.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 5 +++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
|
||||
index 55ef7d1fd8da..193e4f7b73b1 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
|
||||
@@ -1578,6 +1578,11 @@ static ssize_t pccard_store_cis(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
|
||||
struct pcmcia_socket *s;
|
||||
int error;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
|
||||
+ pr_err("Direct CIS storage isn't permitted when the kernel is locked down\n");
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
s = to_socket(container_of(kobj, struct device, kobj));
|
||||
|
||||
if (off)
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 69b2167a1b1521b6e5fc30df84afbebc428c9616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:28:39 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 22/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
|
||||
|
||||
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
|
||||
settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial
|
||||
drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either
|
||||
ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
|
||||
index f534a40aebde..e32c0179f423 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
|
||||
@@ -821,6 +821,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
|
||||
new_flags = new_info->flags;
|
||||
old_custom_divisor = uport->custom_divisor;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if ((change_port || change_irq) && kernel_is_locked_down()) {
|
||||
+ pr_err("Using TIOCSSERIAL to change device addresses, irqs and dma channels is not permitted when the kernel is locked down\n");
|
||||
+ retval = -EPERM;
|
||||
+ goto exit;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
|
||||
retval = -EPERM;
|
||||
if (change_irq || change_port ||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From c9232d15690a040d3145df1524feb16adc7cc1e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 11:36:02 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 25/25] cifs: Select all required crypto modules
|
||||
|
||||
Some dependencies were lost when CIFS_SMB2 was merged into CIFS.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 2a38e12053b7 ("[SMB3] Remove ifdef since SMB3 (and later) now STRONGLY preferred")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
fs/cifs/Kconfig | 5 +++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/fs/cifs/Kconfig b/fs/cifs/Kconfig
|
||||
index f7243617316c..d5b2e12b5d02 100644
|
||||
--- a/fs/cifs/Kconfig
|
||||
+++ b/fs/cifs/Kconfig
|
||||
@@ -5,9 +5,14 @@ config CIFS
|
||||
select CRYPTO
|
||||
select CRYPTO_MD4
|
||||
select CRYPTO_MD5
|
||||
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
|
||||
+ select CRYPTO_CMAC
|
||||
select CRYPTO_HMAC
|
||||
select CRYPTO_ARC4
|
||||
+ select CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
||||
+ select CRYPTO_CCM
|
||||
select CRYPTO_ECB
|
||||
+ select CRYPTO_AES
|
||||
select CRYPTO_DES
|
||||
help
|
||||
This is the client VFS module for the SMB3 family of NAS protocols,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 6c2e0596ec4e0ece32270d154fba77bdb935c90f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 7329baa990ea7d362c3309d632c643369a19b3b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 23/25] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
|
||||
|
||||
This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
|
||||
provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ by some undesirable path component.
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
|
||||
index 0e30a0d282e8..7e77d910cfe3 100644
|
||||
index 5f91a28a3cea..3e1a2bf33df4 100644
|
||||
--- a/Makefile
|
||||
+++ b/Makefile
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make
|
||||
@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index 0e30a0d282e8..7e77d910cfe3 100644
|
||||
|
||||
# Leave processing to above invocation of make
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
2.13.6
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
From 593c5f6202f0119be99c8d677fda9935e72cd2c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From 62e678f4c3d7f967e61843c7d6887c09464f815d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 24/25] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ index 613fc3000677..fdaf86c78332 100644
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The debug table is referenced via its Relative Virtual Address (RVA),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.14.1
|
||||
2.13.6
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user