Merge pull request #2455 from dm0-/qemu

app-emulation/qemu: sync with latest upstream stable

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/Manifest

@@ -1 +1 @@
-DIST qemu-2.7.0.tar.bz2 26867760 SHA256 326e739506ba690daf69fc17bd3913a6c313d9928d743bd8eddb82f403f81e53 SHA512 654acaa7b3724a288e5d7e2a26ab780d9c9ed9f647fba00a906cbaffbe9d58fd666f2d962514aa2c5b391b4c53811ac3170d2eb51727f090bd19dfe45ca9a9db WHIRLPOOL dcb3e5f7da89dd8e14d636d7ebd476e076e0043880bb9ea3fb1c03cb4bcd4e5c7d3c4719da26c3ce521e3a3db5ae671e86f198ac1bc3474e774d75504fef8b8d
+DIST qemu-2.8.0.tar.bz2 28368517 SHA256 dafd5d7f649907b6b617b822692f4c82e60cf29bc0fc58bc2036219b591e5e62 SHA512 50f2988d822388ba9fd1bf5dbe68359033ed7432d7f0f9790299f32f63faa6dc72979256b5632ba572d47ee3e74ed40e3e8e331dc6303ec1599f1b4367cb78c2 WHIRLPOOL 0ce4e0539657eb832e4039819e7360c792b6aa41c718f0e0d762f4933217f0d370af94b1d6d9776853575b4a6811d8c85db069bf09d21bd15399ac8b50440ff5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/65-kvm.rules-r1

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+KERNEL=="kvm", GROUP="kvm", MODE="0660"
+KERNEL=="vhost-net", GROUP="kvm", MODE="0660", OPTIONS+="static_node=vhost-net"

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-6836.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In Vmxnet3 device emulator while processing transmit(tx) queue,
-when it reaches end of packet, it calls vmxnet3_complete_packet.
-In that local 'txcq_descr' object is not initialised, which could
-leak host memory bytes a guest.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/vmxnet3.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
-index 90f6943..92f6af9 100644
---- a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
-+++ b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
-@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
- 
-     VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
- 
-+    memset(&txcq_descr, 0, sizeof(txcq_descr));
-     txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
-     txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
- 
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7155.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulation uses command descriptors to
-process SCSI commands. These descriptors come with their ring
-buffers. A guest could set the page count for these rings to
-an arbitrary value, leading to infinite loop or OOB access.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Tom Victor <address@hidden>
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-Update per review
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg00019.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index 5116f4a..4245c15 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ pvscsi_log2(uint32_t input)
-     return log;
- }
- 
--static int
-+static void
- pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
- {
-     int i;
-@@ -160,10 +160,6 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
-     uint32_t req_ring_size, cmp_ring_size;
-     m->rs_pa = ri->ringsStatePPN << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
- 
--    if ((ri->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)
--        || (ri->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)) {
--        return -1;
--    }
-     req_ring_size = ri->reqRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-     cmp_ring_size = ri->cmpRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-     txr_len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(req_ring_size - 1);
-@@ -195,8 +191,6 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
- 
-     /* Flush ring state page changes */
-     smp_wmb();
--
--    return 0;
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -746,7 +740,7 @@ pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *rc)
- 
-     trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_num_pages("Confirm Ring", rc->cmpRingNumPages);
-     for (i = 0; i < rc->cmpRingNumPages; i++) {
--        trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_ppn("Confirm Ring", rc->reqRingPPNs[i]);
-+        trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_ppn("Confirm Ring", rc->cmpRingPPNs[i]);
-     }
- }
- 
-@@ -779,10 +773,15 @@ pvscsi_on_cmd_setup_rings(PVSCSIState *s)
- 
-     trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_arrived("PVSCSI_CMD_SETUP_RINGS");
- 
-+    if (!rc->reqRingNumPages
-+        || rc->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES
-+        || !rc->cmpRingNumPages
-+        || rc->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
-+        return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
-+    }
-+
-     pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(rc);
--    if (pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc) < 0) {
--        return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
--    }
-+    pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc);
- 
-     s->rings_info_valid = TRUE;
-     return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_SUCCEEDED;
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7156.patch

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-In PVSCSI paravirtual SCSI bus, pvscsi_convert_sglist can take a very
-long time or go into an infinite loop due to two different bugs:
-
-1) the request descriptor data length is defined to be 64 bit. While
-building SG list from a request descriptor, it gets truncated to 32bit
-in routine 'pvscsi_convert_sglist'. This could lead to an infinite loop
-situation for large 'dataLen' values, when data_length is cast to uint32_t
-and chunk_size becomes always zero.  Fix this by removing the incorrect
-cast.
-
-2) pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem can be called arbitrarily many times if the
-element has a zero length.  Get out of the loop early when this happens,
-by introducing an upper limit on the number of SG list elements.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 11 ++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg01172.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index 4245c15..babac5a 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
- #define PVSCSI_MAX_DEVS                   (64)
- #define PVSCSI_MSIX_NUM_VECTORS           (1)
- 
-+#define PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM                2048
-+
- #define PVSCSI_MAX_CMD_DATA_WORDS \
-     (sizeof(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings)/sizeof(uint32_t))
- 
-@@ -628,17 +630,16 @@ pvscsi_queue_pending_descriptor(PVSCSIState *s, SCSIDevice **d,
- static void
- pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
- {
--    int chunk_size;
-+    uint32_t chunk_size, elmcnt = 0;
-     uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
-     PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
--    while (data_length) {
--        while (!sg.resid) {
-+    while (data_length && elmcnt < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
-+        while (!sg.resid && elmcnt++ < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
-             pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
-             trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
-                                         r->sg.resid);
-         }
--        assert(data_length > 0);
--        chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
-+        chunk_size = MIN(data_length, sg.resid);
-         if (chunk_size) {
-             qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
-         }
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-1.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When LSI SAS1068 Host Bus emulator builds configuration page
-headers, the format string used in 'mptsas_config_manufacturing_1'
-was wrong. It could lead to an invalid memory access.
-
-Reported-by: Tom Victor <address@hidden>
-Fix-suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/mptconfig.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-index 7071854..1ec895b 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address
- {
-     /* VPD - all zeros */
-     return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(1, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
--                              "s256");
-+                              "*s256");
- }
- 
- static
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-2.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When LSI SAS1068 Host Bus emulator builds configuration page
-headers, mptsas_config_pack() asserts to check returned size
-value is within limit of 256 bytes. Fix that assert expression.
-
-Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/mptconfig.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-index 1ec895b..531947f 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static size_t mptsas_config_pack(uint8_t **data, const char *fmt, ...)
-     va_end(ap);
- 
-     if (data) {
--        assert(ret < 256 && (ret % 4) == 0);
-+        assert(ret / 4 < 256);
-         stb_p(*data + 1, ret / 4);
-     }
-     return ret;
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7170.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When processing svga command DEFINE_CURSOR in vmsvga_fifo_run,
-the computed BITMAP and PIXMAP size are checked against the
-'cursor.mask[]' and 'cursor.image[]' array sizes in bytes.
-Correct these checks to avoid OOB memory access.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/vmware_vga.c | 12 +++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-index e51a05e..6599cf0 100644
---- a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-@@ -676,11 +676,13 @@ static void vmsvga_fifo_run(struct vmsvga_state_s *s)
-             cursor.bpp = vmsvga_fifo_read(s);
- 
-             args = SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) + SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp);
--            if (cursor.width > 256 ||
--                cursor.height > 256 ||
--                cursor.bpp > 32 ||
--                SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) > sizeof cursor.mask ||
--                SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp) > sizeof cursor.image) {
-+            if (cursor.width > 256
-+                || cursor.height > 256
-+                || cursor.bpp > 32
-+                || SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y)
-+                    > sizeof(cursor.mask) / sizeof(cursor.mask[0])
-+                || SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp)
-+                    > sizeof(cursor.image) / sizeof(cursor.image[0])) {
-                     goto badcmd;
-             }
- 
--- 
-2.5.5
-

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7421.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulator while processing IO requests
-could run into an infinite loop if 'pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr'
-always returned positive value. Limit IO loop to the ring size.
-
-Cc: address@hidden
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-Message-Id: <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index babac5a..a5ce7de 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static hwaddr
- pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
- {
-     uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
-+    uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
-+                            * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
- 
--    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
-+    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
-+        && ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
-         uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
-             mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
-         uint32_t next_ready_page =
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7422.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-virtio back end uses set of buffers to facilitate I/O operations.
-If its size is too large, 'cpu_physical_memory_map' could return
-a null address. This would result in a null dereference
-while un-mapping descriptors. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/virtio/virtio.c | 10 ++++++----
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-index 15ee3a7..0a4c5b6 100644
---- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-@@ -472,12 +472,14 @@ static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iove
-         }
- 
-         iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
--        iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
--        addr[num_sg] = pa;
-+        if (iov[num_sg].iov_base) {
-+            iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
-+            addr[num_sg] = pa;
- 
-+            pa += len;
-+            num_sg++;
-+        }
-         sz -= len;
--        pa += len;
--        num_sg++;
-     }
-     *p_num_sg = num_sg;
- }
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7423.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-When processing IO request in mptsas, it uses g_new to allocate
-a 'req' object. If an error occurs before 'req->sreq' is
-allocated, It could lead to an OOB write in mptsas_free_request
-function. Use g_new0 to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-Message-Id: <address@hidden>
-Cc: address@hidden
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/mptsas.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-index 0e0a22f..eaae1bb 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
-         goto bad;
-     }
- 
--    req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
-+    req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
-     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
-     req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
-     req->dev = s;
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7466.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-If the xhci uses msix, it doesn't free the corresponding
-memory, thus leading a memory leak. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 3 +--
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-index 188f954..281a2a5 100644
---- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-@@ -3709,8 +3709,7 @@ static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
-     /* destroy msix memory region */
-     if (dev->msix_table && dev->msix_pba
-         && dev->msix_entry_used) {
--        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_table_mmio);
--        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_pba_mmio);
-+        msix_uninit(dev, &xhci->mem, &xhci->mem);
-     }
- 
-     usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7907.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-i.MX Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
-data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
-packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
-descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
-Set an upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/imx_fec.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-Update per
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg05284.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/imx_fec.c b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
-index 1c415ab..1d74827 100644
---- a/hw/net/imx_fec.c
-+++ b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
-@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_imx_eth = {
- #define PHY_INT_PARFAULT            (1 << 2)
- #define PHY_INT_AUTONEG_PAGE        (1 << 1)
- 
-+#define IMX_MAX_DESC                1024
-+
- static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s);
- 
- /*
-@@ -402,12 +404,12 @@ static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s)
- 
- static void imx_fec_do_tx(IMXFECState *s)
- {
--    int frame_size = 0;
-+    int frame_size = 0, descnt = 0;
-     uint8_t frame[ENET_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
-     uint8_t *ptr = frame;
-     uint32_t addr = s->tx_descriptor;
- 
--    while (1) {
-+    while (descnt++ < IMX_MAX_DESC) {
-         IMXFECBufDesc bd;
-         int len;
- 

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7908.patch

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 070c4b92b8cd5390889716677a0b92444d6e087a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 16:02:37 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: limit buffer descriptor count
-
-ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
-data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
-packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
-descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
-Set upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/mcf_fec.c |    5 +++--
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-index 0ee8ad9..d31fea1 100644
---- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-+++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ do { printf("mcf_fec: " fmt , ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
- #define DPRINTF(fmt, ...) do {} while(0)
- #endif
- 
-+#define FEC_MAX_DESC 1024
- #define FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE 2032
- 
- typedef struct {
-@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
-     uint32_t addr;
-     mcf_fec_bd bd;
-     int frame_size;
--    int len;
-+    int len, descnt = 0;
-     uint8_t frame[FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
-     uint8_t *ptr;
- 
-@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
-     ptr = frame;
-     frame_size = 0;
-     addr = s->tx_descriptor;
--    while (1) {
-+    while (descnt++ < FEC_MAX_DESC) {
-         mcf_fec_read_bd(&bd, addr);
-         DPRINTF("tx_bd %x flags %04x len %d data %08x\n",
-                 addr, bd.flags, bd.length, bd.data);
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7909.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The AMD PC-Net II emulator has set of control and status(CSR)
-registers. Of these, CSR76 and CSR78 hold receive and transmit
-descriptor ring length respectively. This ring length could range
-from 1 to 65535. Setting ring length to zero leads to an infinite
-loop in pcnet_rdra_addr. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/pcnet.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
-index 198a01f..3078de8 100644
---- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
-+++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
-@@ -1429,8 +1429,11 @@ static void pcnet_csr_writew(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap, uint32_t new_value)
-     case 47: /* POLLINT */
-     case 72:
-     case 74:
-+        break;
-     case 76: /* RCVRL */
-     case 78: /* XMTRL */
-+        val = (val > 0) ? val : 512;
-+        break;
-     case 112:
-        if (CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s))
-            break;
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In virtio gpu resource create dispatch, if the pixman format is zero
-it doesn't free the resource object allocated previously. Thus leading
-a host memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
-index 7fe6ed8..5b6d17b 100644
---- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
-+++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
-@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
-         qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
-                       "%s: host couldn't handle guest format %d\n",
-                       __func__, c2d.format);
-+        g_free(res);
-         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-         return;
-     }
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-While processing isochronous transfer descriptors(iTD), if the page
-select(PG) field value is out of bands it will return. In this
-situation the ehci's sg list doesn't be freed thus leading a memory
-leak issue. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-index b093db7..f4ece9a 100644
---- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-@@ -1426,6 +1426,7 @@ static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
-             if (off + len > 4096) {
-                 /* transfer crosses page border */
-                 if (pg == 6) {
-+                    qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
-                     return -1;  /* avoid page pg + 1 */
-                 }
-                 ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg + 1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8576.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 20009bdaf95d10bf748fa69b104672d3cfaceddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
-Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 10:15:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] xhci: limit the number of link trbs we are willing to process
-
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-index 726435c..ee4fa48 100644
---- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
-  * to the specs when it gets them */
- #define ER_FULL_HACK
- 
-+#define TRB_LINK_LIMIT  4
-+
- #define LEN_CAP         0x40
- #define LEN_OPER        (0x400 + 0x10 * MAXPORTS)
- #define LEN_RUNTIME     ((MAXINTRS + 1) * 0x20)
-@@ -1000,6 +1002,7 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
-                                dma_addr_t *addr)
- {
-     PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci);
-+    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
- 
-     while (1) {
-         TRBType type;
-@@ -1026,6 +1029,9 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
-             ring->dequeue += TRB_SIZE;
-             return type;
-         } else {
-+            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
-+                return 0;
-+            }
-             ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter);
-             if (trb->control & TRB_LK_TC) {
-                 ring->ccs = !ring->ccs;
-@@ -1043,6 +1049,7 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
-     bool ccs = ring->ccs;
-     /* hack to bundle together the two/three TDs that make a setup transfer */
-     bool control_td_set = 0;
-+    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
- 
-     while (1) {
-         TRBType type;
-@@ -1058,6 +1065,9 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
-         type = TRB_TYPE(trb);
- 
-         if (type == TR_LINK) {
-+            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
-+                return -length;
-+            }
-             dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb.parameter);
-             if (trb.control & TRB_LK_TC) {
-                 ccs = !ccs;
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8577.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In 9pfs read dispatch function, it doesn't free two QEMUIOVector
-object thus causing potential memory leak. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 119ee58..543a791 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -1826,14 +1826,15 @@ static void v9fs_read(void *opaque)
-             if (len < 0) {
-                 /* IO error return the error */
-                 err = len;
--                goto out;
-+                goto out_free_iovec;
-             }
-         } while (count < max_count && len > 0);
-         err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
-         if (err < 0) {
--            goto out;
-+            goto out_free_iovec;
-         }
-         err += offset + count;
-+out_free_iovec:
-         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
-         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
-     } else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8578.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From ba42ebb863ab7d40adc79298422ed9596df8f73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: allocate space for guest originated empty strings
-
-If a guest sends an empty string paramater to any 9P operation, the current
-code unmarshals it into a V9fsString equal to { .size = 0, .data = NULL }.
-
-This is unfortunate because it can cause NULL pointer dereference to happen
-at various locations in the 9pfs code. And we don't want to check str->data
-everywhere we pass it to strcmp() or any other function which expects a
-dereferenceable pointer.
-
-This patch enforces the allocation of genuine C empty strings instead, so
-callers don't have to bother.
-
-Out of all v9fs_iov_vunmarshal() users, only v9fs_xattrwalk() checks if
-the returned string is empty. It now uses v9fs_string_size() since
-name.data cannot be NULL anymore.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-[groug, rewritten title and changelog,
- fix empty string check in v9fs_xattrwalk()]
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
----
- fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c | 2 +-
- hw/9pfs/9p.c           | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
-index 663cad5..1d16f8d 100644
---- a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
-+++ b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
-@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ssize_t v9fs_iov_vunmarshal(struct iovec *out_sg, int out_num, size_t offset,
-                 str->data = g_malloc(str->size + 1);
-                 copied = v9fs_unpack(str->data, out_sg, out_num, offset,
-                                      str->size);
--                if (copied > 0) {
-+                if (copied >= 0) {
-                     str->data[str->size] = 0;
-                 } else {
-                     v9fs_string_free(str);
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 119ee58..39a7e1d 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -3174,7 +3174,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
-         goto out;
-     }
-     v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
--    if (name.data == NULL) {
-+    if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
-         /*
-          * listxattr request. Get the size first
-          */
--- 
-2.7.3
-

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8668.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Rocker network switch emulator has test registers to help debug
-DMA operations. While testing host DMA access, a buffer address
-is written to register 'TEST_DMA_ADDR' and its size is written to
-register 'TEST_DMA_SIZE'. When performing TEST_DMA_CTRL_INVERT
-test, if DMA buffer size was greater than 'INT_MAX', it leads to
-an invalid buffer access. Limit the DMA buffer size to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/rocker/rocker.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
-index 30f2ce4..e9d215a 100644
---- a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
-@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void rocker_io_writel(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val)
-         rocker_msix_irq(r, val);
-         break;
-     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_SIZE:
--        r->test_dma_size = val;
-+        r->test_dma_size = val & 0xFFFF;
-         break;
-     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_ADDR + 4:
-         r->test_dma_addr = ((uint64_t)val) << 32 | r->lower32;
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-1.patch

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/597108
+https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-10/msg02577.html
+
 From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
 
 The JAZZ RC4030 chipset emulator has a periodic timer and

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
-(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
-be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
-greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
-divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/char/serial.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-Update per
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-10/msg02400.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
-index 3442f47..eec72b7 100644
---- a/hw/char/serial.c
-+++ b/hw/char/serial.c
-@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
-     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
-     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
- 
--    if (s->divider == 0)
-+    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     /* Start bit. */
-     frame_size = 1;
--- 
-2.5.5

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8909.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Intel HDA emulator uses stream of buffers during DMA data
-transfers. Each entry has buffer length and buffer pointer
-position, which are used to derive bytes to 'copy'. If this
-length and buffer pointer were to be same, 'copy' could be
-set to zero(0), leading to an infinite loop. Add check to
-avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/audio/intel-hda.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
-index cd95340..537face 100644
---- a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
-+++ b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
-@@ -416,7 +416,8 @@ static bool intel_hda_xfer(HDACodecDevice *dev, uint32_t stnr, bool output,
-     }
- 
-     left = len;
--    while (left > 0) {
-+    s = st->bentries;
-+    while (left > 0 && s-- > 0) {
-         copy = left;
-         if (copy > st->bsize - st->lpib)
-             copy = st->bsize - st->lpib;
--- 
-2.7.4

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8910.patch

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
-descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
-processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
-it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
-check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index 3345bc6..f05e59c 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
- {
-     int txcount = 0;
- 
--    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-+    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-     {
-         ++txcount;
-     }
--- 
-2.7.4

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9102.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-The 'fs.xattr.value' field in V9fsFidState object doesn't consider the
-situation that this field has been allocated previously. Every time, it
-will be allocated directly. This leads a host memory leak issue. This
-patch fix this.
-
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 75ba5f1..a4c7109 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -3269,6 +3269,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
-     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
-     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
-     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
-+    g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
-     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
-     err = offset;
-     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9103.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-Author: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date:   Mon Oct 17 14:13:58 2016 +0200
-
-    9pfs: fix information leak in xattr read
-    
-    9pfs uses g_malloc() to allocate the xattr memory space, if the guest
-    reads this memory before writing to it, this will leak host heap memory
-    to the guest. This patch avoid this.
-    
-    Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-    Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-    Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 26aa7d5..bf23b01 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -3269,8 +3269,8 @@ static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
-     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
-     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
-     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
-     g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
--    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
-+    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
-     err = offset;
-     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
- out_nofid:

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From 7e55d65c56a03dcd2c5d7c49d37c5a74b55d4bd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix integer overflow issue in xattr read/write
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The v9fs_xattr_read() and v9fs_xattr_write() are passed a guest
-originated offset: they must ensure this offset does not go beyond
-the size of the extended attribute that was set in v9fs_xattrcreate().
-Unfortunately, the current code implement these checks with unsafe
-calculations on 32 and 64 bit values, which may allow a malicious
-guest to cause OOB access anyway.
-
-Fix this by comparing the offset and the xattr size, which are
-both uint64_t, before trying to compute the effective number of bytes
-to read or write.
-
-Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-Reviewed-By: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
----
- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index ab18ef2..7705ead 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -1637,20 +1637,17 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_read(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
- {
-     ssize_t err;
-     size_t offset = 7;
--    int read_count;
--    int64_t xattr_len;
-+    uint64_t read_count;
-     V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
-     VirtQueueElement *elem = v->elems[pdu->idx];
- 
--    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
--    read_count = xattr_len - off;
-+    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
-+        read_count = 0;
-+    } else {
-+        read_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
-+    }
-     if (read_count > max_count) {
-         read_count = max_count;
--    } else if (read_count < 0) {
--        /*
--         * read beyond XATTR value
--         */
--        read_count = 0;
-     }
-     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", read_count);
-     if (err < 0) {
-@@ -1979,23 +1976,18 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_write(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
- {
-     int i, to_copy;
-     ssize_t err = 0;
--    int write_count;
--    int64_t xattr_len;
-+    uint64_t write_count;
-     size_t offset = 7;
- 
- 
--    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
--    write_count = xattr_len - off;
--    if (write_count > count) {
--        write_count = count;
--    } else if (write_count < 0) {
--        /*
--         * write beyond XATTR value len specified in
--         * xattrcreate
--         */
-+    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
-         err = -ENOSPC;
-         goto out;
-     }
-+    write_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
-+    if (write_count > count) {
-+        write_count = count;
-+    }
-     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", write_count);
-     if (err < 0) {
-         return err;
--- 
-2.7.3
-

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9105.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In v9fs_link dispatch function, it doesn't put the 'oldfidp'
-fid object, this will make the 'oldfidp->ref' never reach to 0,
-thus leading a memory leak issue. This patch fix this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 8b50bfb..29f8b7a 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -2413,6 +2413,7 @@ static void v9fs_link(void *opaque)
-     if (!err) {
-         err = offset;
-     }
-+    put_fid(pdu, oldfidp);
- out:
-     put_fid(pdu, dfidp);
- out_nofid:
--- 
-1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9106.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-Author: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date:   Mon Oct 17 14:13:58 2016 +0200
-
-    9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_write
-    
-    If an error occurs when marshalling the transfer length to the guest, the
-    v9fs_write() function doesn't free an IO vector, thus leading to a memory
-    leak. This patch fixes the issue.
-    
-    Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-    Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-    [groug, rephrased the changelog]
-    Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index d43a552..e88cf25 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
-     offset = 7;
-     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
-     if (err < 0) {
--        goto out;
-+        goto out_qiov;
-     }
-     err += offset;
-

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2016-10028.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-12/msg01903.html
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/603444
+
+From:	P J P
+Subject:	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH] display: virtio-gpu-3d: check virgl capabilities max_size
+Date:	Wed, 14 Dec 2016 12:31:56 +0530
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+Virtio GPU device while processing 'VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_GET_CAPSET'
+command, retrieves the maximum capabilities size to fill in the
+response object. It continues to fill in capabilities even if
+retrieved 'max_size' is zero(0), thus resulting in OOB access.
+Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Zhenhao Hong <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 758d33a..6ceeba3 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -370,8 +370,12 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(gc.capset_id, &max_ver,
+                                &max_size);
++    if (!max_size) {
++        cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++        return;
++    }
++
+     resp = g_malloc0(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+-
+     resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+     virgl_renderer_fill_caps(gc.capset_id,
+                              gc.capset_version,
+-- 
+2.9.3

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2016-10155.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From eb7a20a3616085d46aa6b4b4224e15587ec67e6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 17:49:04 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] watchdog: 6300esb: add exit function
+
+When the Intel 6300ESB watchdog is hot unplug. The timer allocated
+in realize isn't freed thus leaking memory leak. This patch avoid
+this through adding the exit function.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-Id: <583cde9c.3223ed0a.7f0c2.886e@mx.google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c b/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
+index a83d951..49b3cd1 100644
+--- a/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
++++ b/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
+@@ -428,6 +428,14 @@ static void i6300esb_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     /* qemu_register_coalesced_mmio (addr, 0x10); ? */
+ }
+ 
++static void i6300esb_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    I6300State *d = WATCHDOG_I6300ESB_DEVICE(dev);
++
++    timer_del(d->timer);
++    timer_free(d->timer);
++}
++
+ static WatchdogTimerModel model = {
+     .wdt_name = "i6300esb",
+     .wdt_description = "Intel 6300ESB",
+@@ -441,6 +449,7 @@ static void i6300esb_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     k->config_read = i6300esb_config_read;
+     k->config_write = i6300esb_config_write;
+     k->realize = i6300esb_realize;
++    k->exit = i6300esb_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_ESB_9;
+     k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_SYSTEM_OTHER;
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2016-9908.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-11/msg00059.html
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/601826
+
+From:	Li Qiang
+Subject:	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix information leak in capset get dispatch
+Date:	Tue, 1 Nov 2016 05:37:57 -0700
+From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+In virgl_cmd_get_capset function, it uses g_malloc to allocate
+a response struct to the guest. As the 'resp'struct hasn't been full
+initialized it will lead the 'resp->padding' field to the guest.
+Use g_malloc0 to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 23f39de..d98b140 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(gc.capset_id, &max_ver,
+                                &max_size);
+-    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
++    resp = g_malloc0(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+ 
+     resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+     virgl_renderer_fill_caps(gc.capset_id,
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2016-9912.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-11/msg05043.html
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/602630
+
+From:	Li Qiang
+Subject:	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH] virtio-gpu: call cleanup mapping function in resource destroy
+Date:	Mon, 28 Nov 2016 21:29:25 -0500
+If the guest destroy the resource before detach banking, the 'iov'
+and 'addrs' field in resource is not freed thus leading memory
+leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 60bce94..98dadf2 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ static struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource*
+ virtio_gpu_find_resource(VirtIOGPU *g, uint32_t resource_id);
+ 
++static void virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VIRGL
+ #include <virglrenderer.h>
+ #define VIRGL(_g, _virgl, _simple, ...)                     \
+@@ -358,6 +360,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_destroy(VirtIOGPU *g,
+                                         struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res)
+ {
+     pixman_image_unref(res->image);
++    virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(res);
+     QTAILQ_REMOVE(&g->reslist, res, next);
+     g_free(res);
+ }
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-2615.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 09:35:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
+
+When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
+blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
+can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+
+{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
+          address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 7db6409..16f27e8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+ {
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+-            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+-        int32_t max = addr
+-            + s->cirrus_blt_width;
+-        if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
++            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
++            - s->cirrus_blt_width;
++        if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
+             return true;
+         }
+     } else {
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-2620.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
+
+CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
+and blit width, at all.  Oops.  Fix it.
+
+Security impact: high.
+
+The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
+Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
+
+The missing blit width check allows to overflow cirrus_bltbuf,
+with the attractive target cirrus_srcptr (current cirrus_bltbuf write
+position) being located right after cirrus_bltbuf in CirrusVGAState.
+
+Due to cirrus emulation writing cirrus_bltbuf bytewise the attacker
+hasn't full control over cirrus_srcptr though, only one byte can be
+changed.  Once the first byte has been modified further writes land
+elsewhere.
+
+[ This is CVE-2017-2620 / XSA-209  - Ian Jackson ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 0e47cf8..a093dc8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -899,6 +899,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+     int w;
+ 
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
+     s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+@@ -924,6 +928,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ 	}
+         s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
+     }
++
++    /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
++    assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
++
+     s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+     cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-2630.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Comparison symbol is misused. It may lead to memory corruption.
+
+Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <address@hidden>
+---
+ nbd/client.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/nbd/client.c b/nbd/client.c
+index 6caf6bda6d..351731bc63 100644
+--- a/nbd/client.c
++++ b/nbd/client.c
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static ssize_t drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
+     char small[1024];
+     char *buffer;
+ 
+-    buffer = sizeof(small) < size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
++    buffer = sizeof(small) > size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
+     while (size > 0) {
+         ssize_t count = read_sync(ioc, buffer, MIN(65536, size));
+ 
+-- 
+2.11.0

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5525-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 12351a91da97b414eec8cdb09f1d9f41e535a401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:30:21 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: ac97: add exit function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently the ac97 device emulation doesn't have a exit function,
+hot unplug this device will leak some memory. Add a exit function to
+avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58520052.4825ed0a.27a71.6cae@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/audio/ac97.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/ac97.c b/hw/audio/ac97.c
+index cbd959e..c306575 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/ac97.c
++++ b/hw/audio/ac97.c
+@@ -1387,6 +1387,16 @@ static void ac97_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     ac97_on_reset (&s->dev.qdev);
+ }
+ 
++static void ac97_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    AC97LinkState *s = DO_UPCAST(AC97LinkState, dev, dev);
++
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->voice_pi);
++    AUD_close_out(&s->card, s->voice_po);
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->voice_mc);
++    AUD_remove_card(&s->card);
++}
++
+ static int ac97_init (PCIBus *bus)
+ {
+     pci_create_simple (bus, -1, "AC97");
+@@ -1404,6 +1414,7 @@ static void ac97_class_init (ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS (klass);
+ 
+     k->realize = ac97_realize;
++    k->exit = ac97_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AA_5;
+     k->revision = 0x01;
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5525-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 069eb7b2b8fc47c7cb52e5a4af23ea98d939e3da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:32:22 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: es1370: add exit function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently the es1370 device emulation doesn't have a exit function,
+hot unplug this device will leak some memory. Add a exit function to
+avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 585200c9.a968ca0a.1ab80.4c98@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/audio/es1370.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/es1370.c b/hw/audio/es1370.c
+index 8449b5f..883ec69 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/es1370.c
++++ b/hw/audio/es1370.c
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,19 @@ static void es1370_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     es1370_reset (s);
+ }
+ 
++static void es1370_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    ES1370State *s = ES1370(dev);
++    int i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
++        AUD_close_out(&s->card, s->dac_voice[i]);
++    }
++
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->adc_voice);
++    AUD_remove_card(&s->card);
++}
++
+ static int es1370_init (PCIBus *bus)
+ {
+     pci_create_simple (bus, -1, TYPE_ES1370);
+@@ -1053,6 +1066,7 @@ static void es1370_class_init (ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS (klass);
+ 
+     k->realize = es1370_realize;
++    k->exit = es1370_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ENSONIQ;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ENSONIQ_ES1370;
+     k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_MULTIMEDIA_AUDIO;
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5552.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 33243031dad02d161225ba99d782616da133f689 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2016 03:11:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu-3d: fix memory leak in resource attach backing
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov function fails the
+'res_iovs' will be leaked. Add check of the return value to
+free the 'res_iovs' when failing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1482999086-59795-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index e29f099..b13ced3 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -291,8 +291,11 @@ static void virgl_resource_attach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
+-                                       res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++    ret = virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
++                                             res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++
++    if (ret != 0)
++        virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
+ }
+ 
+ static void virgl_resource_detach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5578.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 204f01b30975923c64006f8067f0937b91eea68b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2016 04:28:41 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in resource attach backing
+
+In the resource attach backing function, everytime it will
+allocate 'res->iov' thus can leading a memory leak. This
+patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Message-id: 1483003721-65360-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 6a26258..ca88cf4 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,11 @@ virtio_gpu_resource_attach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    if (res->iov) {
++        cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
++        return;
++    }
++
+     ret = virtio_gpu_create_mapping_iov(&ab, cmd, &res->addrs, &res->iov);
+     if (ret != 0) {
+         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5579.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 8409dc884a201bf74b30a9d232b6bbdd00cb7e2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 00:43:16 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] serial: fix memory leak in serial exit
+
+The serial_exit_core function doesn't free some resources.
+This can lead memory leak when hotplug and unplug. This
+patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-Id: <586cb5ab.f31d9d0a.38ac3.acf2@mx.google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
+index ffbacd8..67b18ed 100644
+--- a/hw/char/serial.c
++++ b/hw/char/serial.c
+@@ -906,6 +906,16 @@ void serial_realize_core(SerialState *s, Error **errp)
+ void serial_exit_core(SerialState *s)
+ {
+     qemu_chr_fe_deinit(&s->chr);
++
++    timer_del(s->modem_status_poll);
++    timer_free(s->modem_status_poll);
++
++    timer_del(s->fifo_timeout_timer);
++    timer_free(s->fifo_timeout_timer);
++
++    fifo8_destroy(&s->recv_fifo);
++    fifo8_destroy(&s->xmit_fifo);
++
+     qemu_unregister_reset(serial_reset, s);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5667.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
+
+While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
+'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
+index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
+This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
+to avoid it.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Message-id: 20170130064736.9236-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 01fbf22..5bd5ab6 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+                 boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
+             }
+             dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
+-                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
++                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
+             s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
+             if (s->data_count == block_size) {
+                 for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5856.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 765a707000e838c30b18d712fe6cb3dd8e0435f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 11:03:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] megasas: fix guest-triggered memory leak
+
+If the guest sets the sglist size to a value >=2GB, megasas_handle_dcmd
+will return MFI_STAT_MEMORY_NOT_AVAILABLE without freeing the memory.
+Avoid this by returning only the status from map_dcmd, and loading
+cmd->iov_size in the caller.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/megasas.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+index 67fc1e7..6233865 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+@@ -683,14 +683,14 @@ static int megasas_map_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
+         trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_sge(cmd->index,
+                                        cmd->frame->header.sge_count);
+         cmd->iov_size = 0;
+-        return -1;
++        return -EINVAL;
+     }
+     iov_pa = megasas_sgl_get_addr(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
+     iov_size = megasas_sgl_get_len(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
+     pci_dma_sglist_init(&cmd->qsg, PCI_DEVICE(s), 1);
+     qemu_sglist_add(&cmd->qsg, iov_pa, iov_size);
+     cmd->iov_size = iov_size;
+-    return cmd->iov_size;
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static void megasas_finish_dcmd(MegasasCmd *cmd, uint32_t iov_size)
+@@ -1559,19 +1559,20 @@ static const struct dcmd_cmd_tbl_t {
+ 
+ static int megasas_handle_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
+ {
+-    int opcode, len;
++    int opcode;
+     int retval = 0;
++    size_t len;
+     const struct dcmd_cmd_tbl_t *cmdptr = dcmd_cmd_tbl;
+ 
+     opcode = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->dcmd.opcode);
+     trace_megasas_handle_dcmd(cmd->index, opcode);
+-    len = megasas_map_dcmd(s, cmd);
+-    if (len < 0) {
++    if (megasas_map_dcmd(s, cmd) < 0) {
+         return MFI_STAT_MEMORY_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+     }
+     while (cmdptr->opcode != -1 && cmdptr->opcode != opcode) {
+         cmdptr++;
+     }
++    len = cmd->iov_size;
+     if (cmdptr->opcode == -1) {
+         trace_megasas_dcmd_unhandled(cmd->index, opcode, len);
+         retval = megasas_dcmd_dummy(s, cmd);
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5857.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+When the guest sends VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_UNREF without detaching the
+backing storage beforehand (VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_DETACH_BACKING)
+we'll leak memory.
+
+This patch fixes it for 3d mode, simliar to the 2d mode fix in commit
+"b8e2392 virtio-gpu: call cleanup mapping function in resource destroy".
+
+Reported-by: 李强 <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index f96a0c2..ecb09d1 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -77,10 +77,18 @@ static void virgl_cmd_resource_unref(VirtIOGPU *g,
+                                      struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
+ {
+     struct virtio_gpu_resource_unref unref;
++    struct iovec *res_iovs = NULL;
++    int num_iovs = 0;
+ 
+     VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(unref);
+     trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ 
++    virgl_renderer_resource_detach_iov(unref.resource_id,
++                                       &res_iovs,
++                                       &num_iovs);
++    if (res_iovs != NULL && num_iovs != 0) {
++        virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res_iovs, num_iovs);
++    }
+     virgl_renderer_resource_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5898.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From c7dfbf322595ded4e70b626bf83158a9f3807c6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:52:28 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ccid: check ccid apdu length
+
+CCID device emulator uses Application Protocol Data Units(APDU)
+to exchange command and responses to and from the host.
+The length in these units couldn't be greater than 65536. Add
+check to ensure the same. It'd also avoid potential integer
+overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170202192228.10847-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
+index 89e11b6..1325ea1 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
++++ b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
+@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static void ccid_on_apdu_from_guest(USBCCIDState *s, CCID_XferBlock *recv)
+     DPRINTF(s, 1, "%s: seq %d, len %d\n", __func__,
+                 recv->hdr.bSeq, len);
+     ccid_add_pending_answer(s, (CCID_Header *)recv);
+-    if (s->card) {
++    if (s->card && len <= BULK_OUT_DATA_SIZE) {
+         ccid_card_apdu_from_guest(s->card, recv->abData, len);
+     } else {
+         DPRINTF(s, D_WARN, "warning: discarded apdu\n");
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5931.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
+Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:50:03 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: fix possible integer and heap overflow
+
+Because the 'size_t' type is 4 bytes in 32-bit platform, which
+is the same with 'int'. It's easy to make 'max_len' to zero when
+integer overflow and then cause heap overflow if 'max_len' is zero.
+
+Using uint_64 instead of size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
+Tested-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+index 2f2467e..c23e1ad 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
+     uint32_t hash_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_hash = 0;
+     uint32_t cipher_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_cipher = 0;
+ 
+-    size_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
++    uint64_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
+     size_t s;
+ 
+     /* Plain cipher */
+@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+-    max_len = iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
++    max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
+     if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
+         virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
+         return NULL;
+-- 
+2.10.2
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5973.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+Limits should be big enough that normal guest should not hit it.
+Add a tracepoint to log them, just in case.  Also, while being
+at it, log the existing link trb limit too.
+
+Reported-by: 李强 <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c   | 15 ++++++++++++++-
+ hw/usb/trace-events |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+index fbf8a8b..28dd2f2 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
+ #define EV_QUEUE (((3 * 24) + 16) * MAXSLOTS)
+ 
+ #define TRB_LINK_LIMIT  4
++#define COMMAND_LIMIT   256
++#define TRANSFER_LIMIT  256
+ 
+ #define LEN_CAP         0x40
+ #define LEN_OPER        (0x400 + 0x10 * MAXPORTS)
+@@ -943,6 +945,7 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
+             return type;
+         } else {
+             if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
++                trace_usb_xhci_enforced_limit("trb-link");
+                 return 0;
+             }
+             ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter);
+@@ -2060,6 +2063,7 @@ static void xhci_kick_epctx(XHCIEPContext *epctx, unsigned int streamid)
+     XHCIRing *ring;
+     USBEndpoint *ep = NULL;
+     uint64_t mfindex;
++    unsigned int count = 0;
+     int length;
+     int i;
+ 
+@@ -2172,6 +2176,10 @@ static void xhci_kick_epctx(XHCIEPContext *epctx, unsigned int streamid)
+             epctx->retry = xfer;
+             break;
+         }
++        if (count++ > TRANSFER_LIMIT) {
++            trace_usb_xhci_enforced_limit("transfers");
++            break;
++        }
+     }
+     epctx->kick_active--;
+ 
+@@ -2618,7 +2626,7 @@ static void xhci_process_commands(XHCIState *xhci)
+     TRBType type;
+     XHCIEvent event = {ER_COMMAND_COMPLETE, CC_SUCCESS};
+     dma_addr_t addr;
+-    unsigned int i, slotid = 0;
++    unsigned int i, slotid = 0, count = 0;
+ 
+     DPRINTF("xhci_process_commands()\n");
+     if (!xhci_running(xhci)) {
+@@ -2735,6 +2743,11 @@ static void xhci_process_commands(XHCIState *xhci)
+         }
+         event.slotid = slotid;
+         xhci_event(xhci, &event, 0);
++
++        if (count++ > COMMAND_LIMIT) {
++            trace_usb_xhci_enforced_limit("commands");
++            return;
++        }
+     }
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/hw/usb/trace-events b/hw/usb/trace-events
+index fdd1d29..0c323d4 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/trace-events
++++ b/hw/usb/trace-events
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ usb_xhci_xfer_retry(void *xfer) "%p"
+ usb_xhci_xfer_success(void *xfer, uint32_t bytes) "%p: len %d"
+ usb_xhci_xfer_error(void *xfer, uint32_t ret) "%p: ret %d"
+ usb_xhci_unimplemented(const char *item, int nr) "%s (0x%x)"
++usb_xhci_enforced_limit(const char *item) "%s"
+ 
+ # hw/usb/desc.c
+ usb_desc_device(int addr, int len, int ret) "dev %d query device, len %d, ret %d"
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5987.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+In the SDHCI protocol, the transfer mode register value
+is used during multi block transfer to check if block count
+register is enabled and should be updated. Transfer mode
+register could be set such that, block count register would
+not be updated, thus leading to an infinite loop. Add check
+to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Wjjzhang <address@hidden>
+Reported-by: Jiang Xin <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+Update: use qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, ...)
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg02354.html
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 5bd5ab6..a9c744b 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -486,6 +486,11 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+     uint32_t boundary_chk = 1 << (((s->blksize & 0xf000) >> 12) + 12);
+     uint32_t boundary_count = boundary_chk - (s->sdmasysad % boundary_chk);
+ 
++    if (!(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_BLK_CNT_EN) || !s->blkcnt) {
++        qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "infinite transfer is not supported\n");
++        return;
++    }
++
+     /* XXX: Some sd/mmc drivers (for example, u-boot-slp) do not account for
+      * possible stop at page boundary if initial address is not page aligned,
+      * allow them to work properly */
+@@ -797,11 +802,6 @@ static void sdhci_data_transfer(void *opaque)
+     if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_DMA) {
+         switch (SDHC_DMA_TYPE(s->hostctl)) {
+         case SDHC_CTRL_SDMA:
+-            if ((s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI) &&
+-                    (!(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_BLK_CNT_EN) || s->blkcnt == 0)) {
+-                break;
+-            }
+-
+             if ((s->blkcnt == 1) || !(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI)) {
+                 sdhci_sdma_transfer_single_block(s);
+             } else {
+-- 
+2.9.3
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.8.0-CVE-2017-6058.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+This patch fixed a problem that was introduced in commit eb700029.
+
+When net_rx_pkt_attach_iovec() calls eth_strip_vlan()
+this can result in pkt->ehdr_buf being overflowed, because
+ehdr_buf is only sizeof(struct eth_header) bytes large
+but eth_strip_vlan() can write
+sizeof(struct eth_header) + sizeof(struct vlan_header)
+bytes into it.
+
+Devices affected by this problem: vmxnet3.
+
+Reported-by: Peter Maydell <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+index 1019b50..7c0beac 100644
+--- a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
++++ b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@
+ 
+ struct NetRxPkt {
+     struct virtio_net_hdr virt_hdr;
+-    uint8_t ehdr_buf[sizeof(struct eth_header)];
++    uint8_t ehdr_buf[sizeof(struct eth_header) + sizeof(struct vlan_header)];
+     struct iovec *vec;
+     uint16_t vec_len_total;
+     uint16_t vec_len;
+     uint32_t tot_len;
+     uint16_t tci;
+-    bool vlan_stripped;
++    size_t ehdr_buf_len;
+     bool has_virt_hdr;
+     eth_pkt_types_e packet_type;
+ 
+@@ -88,15 +88,13 @@ net_rx_pkt_pull_data(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+                         const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt,
+                         size_t ploff)
+ {
+-    if (pkt->vlan_stripped) {
++    if (pkt->ehdr_buf_len) {
+         net_rx_pkt_iovec_realloc(pkt, iovcnt + 1);
+ 
+         pkt->vec[0].iov_base = pkt->ehdr_buf;
+-        pkt->vec[0].iov_len = sizeof(pkt->ehdr_buf);
+-
+-        pkt->tot_len =
+-            iov_size(iov, iovcnt) - ploff + sizeof(struct eth_header);
++        pkt->vec[0].iov_len = pkt->ehdr_buf_len;
+ 
++        pkt->tot_len = iov_size(iov, iovcnt) - ploff + pkt->ehdr_buf_len;
+         pkt->vec_len = iov_copy(pkt->vec + 1, pkt->vec_len_total - 1,
+                                 iov, iovcnt, ploff, pkt->tot_len);
+     } else {
+@@ -123,11 +121,12 @@ void net_rx_pkt_attach_iovec(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+     uint16_t tci = 0;
+     uint16_t ploff = iovoff;
+     assert(pkt);
+-    pkt->vlan_stripped = false;
+ 
+     if (strip_vlan) {
+-        pkt->vlan_stripped = eth_strip_vlan(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, pkt->ehdr_buf,
+-                                            &ploff, &tci);
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = eth_strip_vlan(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, pkt->ehdr_buf,
++                                           &ploff, &tci);
++    } else {
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = 0;
+     }
+ 
+     pkt->tci = tci;
+@@ -143,12 +142,13 @@ void net_rx_pkt_attach_iovec_ex(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+     uint16_t tci = 0;
+     uint16_t ploff = iovoff;
+     assert(pkt);
+-    pkt->vlan_stripped = false;
+ 
+     if (strip_vlan) {
+-        pkt->vlan_stripped = eth_strip_vlan_ex(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, vet,
+-                                               pkt->ehdr_buf,
+-                                               &ploff, &tci);
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = eth_strip_vlan_ex(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, vet,
++                                              pkt->ehdr_buf,
++                                              &ploff, &tci);
++    } else {
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = 0;
+     }
+ 
+     pkt->tci = tci;
+@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ void net_rx_pkt_dump(struct NetRxPkt *pkt)
+     NetRxPkt *pkt = (NetRxPkt *)pkt;
+     assert(pkt);
+ 
+-    printf("RX PKT: tot_len: %d, vlan_stripped: %d, vlan_tag: %d\n",
+-              pkt->tot_len, pkt->vlan_stripped, pkt->tci);
++    printf("RX PKT: tot_len: %d, ehdr_buf_len: %lu, vlan_tag: %d\n",
++              pkt->tot_len, pkt->ehdr_buf_len, pkt->tci);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ bool net_rx_pkt_is_vlan_stripped(struct NetRxPkt *pkt)
+ {
+     assert(pkt);
+ 
+-    return pkt->vlan_stripped;
++    return pkt->ehdr_buf_len ? true : false;
+ }
+ 
+ bool net_rx_pkt_has_virt_hdr(struct NetRxPkt *pkt)
+-- 
+2.7.4

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-binfmt.initd-r1

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 #!/sbin/openrc-run
 # Copyright 1999-2016 Gentoo Foundation
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Id$
 
 # enable automatic i386/ARM/M68K/MIPS/SPARC/PPC/s390 program execution by the kernel
 

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-binfmt.initd.head

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/sbin/openrc-run
+# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+# Enable automatic non-native program execution by the kernel.
+
+# Defaulting to OC should be safe because it comes down to:
+#  - do we trust the interp itself to not be malicious?  yes; we built it.
+#  - do we trust the programs we're running?  ish; same permission as native
+#    binaries apply.  so if user can do bad stuff natively, cross isn't worse.
+: ${QEMU_BINFMT_FLAGS:=OC}
+
+depend() {
+	after procfs
+}
+
+start() {
+	ebegin "Registering qemu-user binaries (flags: ${QEMU_BINFMT_FLAGS})"
+
+	if [ ! -d /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc ] ; then
+		modprobe -q binfmt_misc
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -d /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc ] ; then
+		eend 1 "You need support for 'misc binaries' in your kernel!"
+		return
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -f /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register ] ; then
+		mount -t binfmt_misc -o nodev,noexec,nosuid \
+			binfmt_misc /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc >/dev/null 2>&1
+		eend $? || return
+	fi
+
+	# Probe the native cpu type so we don't try registering them.
+	local cpu="$(uname -m)"
+	case "${cpu}" in
+	armv[4-9]*)
+		cpu="arm"
+		;;
+	i386|i486|i586|i686|i86pc|BePC|x86_64)
+		cpu="i386"
+		;;
+	m68k)
+		cpu="m68k"
+		;;
+	mips*)
+		cpu="mips"
+		;;
+	"Power Macintosh"|ppc|ppc64)
+		cpu="ppc"
+		;;
+	s390*)
+		cpu="s390"
+		;;
+	sh*)
+		cpu="sh"
+		;;
+	sparc*)
+		cpu="sparc"
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	# Register the interpreter for each cpu except for the native one.

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-binfmt.initd.tail

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+	eend 0
+}
+
+stop() {
+	# We unregister everything in the "qemu-xxx" namespace.
+	ebegin "Unregistering qemu-user binaries"
+	local f
+	for f in /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/qemu-* ; do
+		if [ -f "${f}" ] ; then
+			echo '-1' > "${f}"
+		fi
+	done
+	eend 0
+}

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/metadata.xml

@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@
 		<flag name="sdl2">Use libsdl2 instead of libsdl</flag>
 		<flag name="spice">Enable Spice protocol support via <pkg>app-emulation/spice</pkg></flag>
 		<flag name="ssh">Enable SSH based block device support via <pkg>net-libs/libssh2</pkg></flag>
-		<flag name="static-softmmu">Builds the Software MMU (system) targets as static binaries</flag>
+		<flag name="static-softmmu">Build the Software MMU (system) targets as static binaries</flag>
 		<flag name="static-user">Build the User targets as static binaries</flag>
-		<flag name="static">Enables both 'static-softmmu' and 'static-user'</flag>
+		<flag name="static">Build the User and Software MMU (system) targets as well as tools as static binaries</flag>
 		<flag name="snappy">Enable support for snappy compression</flag>
 		<flag name="systemtap">Enable SystemTAP/DTrace tracing</flag>
 		<flag name="tci">Enable the TCG Interpreter which can speed up or slowdown workloads depending on the host and guest CPUs being emulated. In the future it will be a runtime option but for now its compile time.</flag>
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
 		<flag name="png">Enable png image support for the VNC console server</flag>
 		<flag name="usb">Enable USB passthrough via <pkg>dev-libs/libusb</pkg></flag>
 		<flag name="usbredir">Use <pkg>sys-apps/usbredir</pkg> to redirect USB devices to another machine over TCP</flag>
-		<flag name="uuid">Enable UUID support in the vdi block driver</flag>
 		<flag name="vde">Enable VDE-based networking</flag>
 		<flag name="vhost-net">Enable accelerated networking using vhost-net, see http://www.linux-kvm.org/page/VhostNet</flag>
 		<flag name="virgl">Enable experimental Virgil 3d (virtual software GPU)</flag>

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/qemu-2.7.0-r8.ebuild

@@ -1,710 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2016 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Id$
-
-EAPI="5"
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python2_7 )
-PYTHON_REQ_USE="ncurses,readline"
-
-PLOCALES="bg de_DE fr_FR hu it tr zh_CN"
-
-inherit eutils flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs multilib python-r1 \
-	user udev fcaps readme.gentoo-r1 pax-utils l10n
-
-if [[ ${PV} = *9999* ]]; then
-	EGIT_REPO_URI="git://git.qemu.org/qemu.git"
-	inherit git-2
-	SRC_URI=""
-else
-	SRC_URI="http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/${P}.tar.bz2"
-	KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm64 ~ppc ~ppc64 x86 ~x86-fbsd"
-fi
-
-DESCRIPTION="QEMU + Kernel-based Virtual Machine userland tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://www.qemu.org http://www.linux-kvm.org"
-
-LICENSE="GPL-2 LGPL-2 BSD-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="accessibility +aio alsa bluetooth bzip2 +caps +curl debug +fdt glusterfs \
-gnutls gtk gtk2 infiniband iscsi +jpeg \
-kernel_linux kernel_FreeBSD lzo ncurses nfs nls numa opengl +pin-upstream-blobs
-+png pulseaudio python \
-rbd sasl +seccomp sdl sdl2 selinux smartcard snappy spice ssh static static-softmmu
-static-user systemtap tci test +threads usb usbredir +uuid vde +vhost-net \
-virgl virtfs +vnc vte xattr xen xfs"
-
-COMMON_TARGETS="aarch64 alpha arm cris i386 m68k microblaze microblazeel mips
-mips64 mips64el mipsel or32 ppc ppc64 s390x sh4 sh4eb sparc sparc64 unicore32
-x86_64"
-IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS="${COMMON_TARGETS} lm32 moxie ppcemb tricore xtensa xtensaeb"
-IUSE_USER_TARGETS="${COMMON_TARGETS} armeb mipsn32 mipsn32el ppc64abi32 ppc64le sparc32plus tilegx"
-
-use_softmmu_targets=$(printf ' qemu_softmmu_targets_%s' ${IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS})
-use_user_targets=$(printf ' qemu_user_targets_%s' ${IUSE_USER_TARGETS})
-IUSE+=" ${use_softmmu_targets} ${use_user_targets}"
-
-# Allow no targets to be built so that people can get a tools-only build.
-# Block USE flag configurations known to not work.
-REQUIRED_USE="${PYTHON_REQUIRED_USE}
-	gtk2? ( gtk )
-	qemu_softmmu_targets_arm? ( fdt )
-	qemu_softmmu_targets_microblaze? ( fdt )
-	qemu_softmmu_targets_ppc? ( fdt )
-	qemu_softmmu_targets_ppc64? ( fdt )
-	sdl2? ( sdl )
-	static? ( static-softmmu static-user )
-	static-softmmu? ( !alsa !pulseaudio !bluetooth !opengl !gtk !gtk2 )
-	virtfs? ( xattr )
-	vte? ( gtk )"
-
-# Yep, you need both libcap and libcap-ng since virtfs only uses libcap.
-#
-# The attr lib isn't always linked in (although the USE flag is always
-# respected).  This is because qemu supports using the C library's API
-# when available rather than always using the extranl library.
-#
-# Older versions of gnutls are supported, but it's simpler to just require
-# the latest versions.  This is also why we require nettle.
-#
-# TODO: Split out tools deps into another var.  e.g. bzip2 is only used by
-# system binaries and tools, not user binaries.
-COMMON_LIB_DEPEND=">=dev-libs/glib-2.0[static-libs(+)]
-	sys-libs/zlib[static-libs(+)]
-	bzip2? ( app-arch/bzip2[static-libs(+)] )
-	xattr? ( sys-apps/attr[static-libs(+)] )"
-SOFTMMU_LIB_DEPEND="${COMMON_LIB_DEPEND}
-	>=x11-libs/pixman-0.28.0[static-libs(+)]
-	accessibility? ( app-accessibility/brltty[static-libs(+)] )
-	aio? ( dev-libs/libaio[static-libs(+)] )
-	alsa? ( >=media-libs/alsa-lib-1.0.13 )
-	bluetooth? ( net-wireless/bluez )
-	caps? ( sys-libs/libcap-ng[static-libs(+)] )
-	curl? ( >=net-misc/curl-7.15.4[static-libs(+)] )
-	fdt? ( >=sys-apps/dtc-1.4.0[static-libs(+)] )
-	glusterfs? ( >=sys-cluster/glusterfs-3.4.0[static-libs(+)] )
-	gnutls? (
-		dev-libs/nettle:=[static-libs(+)]
-		>=net-libs/gnutls-3.0:=[static-libs(+)]
-	)
-	gtk? (
-		gtk2? (
-			x11-libs/gtk+:2
-			vte? ( x11-libs/vte:0 )
-		)
-		!gtk2? (
-			x11-libs/gtk+:3
-			vte? ( x11-libs/vte:2.91 )
-		)
-	)
-	infiniband? ( sys-fabric/librdmacm:=[static-libs(+)] )
-	iscsi? ( net-libs/libiscsi )
-	jpeg? ( virtual/jpeg:0=[static-libs(+)] )
-	lzo? ( dev-libs/lzo:2[static-libs(+)] )
-	ncurses? ( sys-libs/ncurses:0=[static-libs(+)] )
-	nfs? ( >=net-fs/libnfs-1.9.3[static-libs(+)] )
-	numa? ( sys-process/numactl[static-libs(+)] )
-	opengl? (
-		virtual/opengl
-		media-libs/libepoxy[static-libs(+)]
-		media-libs/mesa[static-libs(+)]
-		media-libs/mesa[egl,gles2,gbm]
-	)
-	png? ( media-libs/libpng:0=[static-libs(+)] )
-	pulseaudio? ( media-sound/pulseaudio )
-	rbd? ( sys-cluster/ceph[static-libs(+)] )
-	sasl? ( dev-libs/cyrus-sasl[static-libs(+)] )
-	sdl? (
-		!sdl2? (
-			media-libs/libsdl[X]
-			>=media-libs/libsdl-1.2.11[static-libs(+)]
-		)
-		sdl2? (
-			media-libs/libsdl2[X]
-			media-libs/libsdl2[static-libs(+)]
-		)
-	)
-	seccomp? ( >=sys-libs/libseccomp-2.1.0[static-libs(+)] )
-	smartcard? ( >=app-emulation/libcacard-2.5.0[static-libs(+)] )
-	snappy? ( app-arch/snappy[static-libs(+)] )
-	spice? (
-		>=app-emulation/spice-protocol-0.12.3
-		>=app-emulation/spice-0.12.0[static-libs(+)]
-	)
-	ssh? ( >=net-libs/libssh2-1.2.8[static-libs(+)] )
-	usb? ( >=virtual/libusb-1-r2[static-libs(+)] )
-	usbredir? ( >=sys-apps/usbredir-0.6[static-libs(+)] )
-	uuid? ( >=sys-apps/util-linux-2.16.0[static-libs(+)] )
-	vde? ( net-misc/vde[static-libs(+)] )
-	virgl? ( media-libs/virglrenderer[static-libs(+)] )
-	virtfs? ( sys-libs/libcap )
-	xfs? ( sys-fs/xfsprogs[static-libs(+)] )"
-USER_LIB_DEPEND="${COMMON_LIB_DEPEND}"
-X86_FIRMWARE_DEPEND="
-	>=sys-firmware/ipxe-1.0.0_p20130624
-	pin-upstream-blobs? (
-		~sys-firmware/seabios-1.8.2
-		~sys-firmware/sgabios-0.1_pre8
-		~sys-firmware/vgabios-0.7a
-	)
-	!pin-upstream-blobs? (
-		sys-firmware/seabios
-		sys-firmware/sgabios
-		sys-firmware/vgabios
-	)"
-CDEPEND="
-	!static-softmmu? ( $(printf "%s? ( ${SOFTMMU_LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} ) " ${use_softmmu_targets}) )
-	!static-user? ( $(printf "%s? ( ${USER_LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} ) " ${use_user_targets}) )
-	qemu_softmmu_targets_i386? ( ${X86_FIRMWARE_DEPEND} )
-	qemu_softmmu_targets_x86_64? ( ${X86_FIRMWARE_DEPEND} )
-	python? ( ${PYTHON_DEPS} )
-	systemtap? ( dev-util/systemtap )
-	xen? ( app-emulation/xen-tools:= )"
-DEPEND="${CDEPEND}
-	dev-lang/perl
-	=dev-lang/python-2*
-	sys-apps/texinfo
-	virtual/pkgconfig
-	kernel_linux? ( >=sys-kernel/linux-headers-2.6.35 )
-	gtk? ( nls? ( sys-devel/gettext ) )
-	static-softmmu? ( $(printf "%s? ( ${SOFTMMU_LIB_DEPEND} ) " ${use_softmmu_targets}) )
-	static-user? ( $(printf "%s? ( ${USER_LIB_DEPEND} ) " ${use_user_targets}) )
-	test? (
-		dev-libs/glib[utils]
-		sys-devel/bc
-	)"
-RDEPEND="${CDEPEND}
-	selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-qemu )
-"
-
-STRIP_MASK="/usr/share/qemu/palcode-clipper"
-
-QA_PREBUILT="
-	usr/share/qemu/openbios-ppc
-	usr/share/qemu/openbios-sparc64
-	usr/share/qemu/openbios-sparc32
-	usr/share/qemu/palcode-clipper
-	usr/share/qemu/s390-ccw.img
-	usr/share/qemu/u-boot.e500
-"
-
-QA_WX_LOAD="usr/bin/qemu-i386
-	usr/bin/qemu-x86_64
-	usr/bin/qemu-alpha
-	usr/bin/qemu-arm
-	usr/bin/qemu-cris
-	usr/bin/qemu-m68k
-	usr/bin/qemu-microblaze
-	usr/bin/qemu-microblazeel
-	usr/bin/qemu-mips
-	usr/bin/qemu-mipsel
-	usr/bin/qemu-or32
-	usr/bin/qemu-ppc
-	usr/bin/qemu-ppc64
-	usr/bin/qemu-ppc64abi32
-	usr/bin/qemu-sh4
-	usr/bin/qemu-sh4eb
-	usr/bin/qemu-sparc
-	usr/bin/qemu-sparc64
-	usr/bin/qemu-armeb
-	usr/bin/qemu-sparc32plus
-	usr/bin/qemu-s390x
-	usr/bin/qemu-unicore32"
-
-DOC_CONTENTS="If you don't have kvm compiled into the kernel, make sure
-you have the kernel module loaded before running kvm. The easiest way to
-ensure that the kernel module is loaded is to load it on boot.\n
-For AMD CPUs the module is called 'kvm-amd'.\n
-For Intel CPUs the module is called 'kvm-intel'.\n
-Please review /etc/conf.d/modules for how to load these.\n\n
-Make sure your user is in the 'kvm' group\n
-Just run 'gpasswd -a <USER> kvm', then have <USER> re-login.\n\n
-For brand new installs, the default permissions on /dev/kvm might not let you
-access it.  You can tell udev to reset ownership/perms:\n
-udevadm trigger -c add /dev/kvm"
-
-qemu_support_kvm() {
-	if use qemu_softmmu_targets_x86_64 || use qemu_softmmu_targets_i386 \
-		use qemu_softmmu_targets_ppc || use qemu_softmmu_targets_ppc64 \
-		use qemu_softmmu_targets_s390x; then
-		return 0
-	fi
-
-	return 1
-}
-
-pkg_pretend() {
-	if use kernel_linux && kernel_is lt 2 6 25; then
-		eerror "This version of KVM requres a host kernel of 2.6.25 or higher."
-	elif use kernel_linux; then
-		if ! linux_config_exists; then
-			eerror "Unable to check your kernel for KVM support"
-		else
-			CONFIG_CHECK="~KVM ~TUN ~BRIDGE"
-			ERROR_KVM="You must enable KVM in your kernel to continue"
-			ERROR_KVM_AMD="If you have an AMD CPU, you must enable KVM_AMD in"
-			ERROR_KVM_AMD+=" your kernel configuration."
-			ERROR_KVM_INTEL="If you have an Intel CPU, you must enable"
-			ERROR_KVM_INTEL+=" KVM_INTEL in your kernel configuration."
-			ERROR_TUN="You will need the Universal TUN/TAP driver compiled"
-			ERROR_TUN+=" into your kernel or loaded as a module to use the"
-			ERROR_TUN+=" virtual network device if using -net tap."
-			ERROR_BRIDGE="You will also need support for 802.1d"
-			ERROR_BRIDGE+=" Ethernet Bridging for some network configurations."
-			use vhost-net && CONFIG_CHECK+=" ~VHOST_NET"
-			ERROR_VHOST_NET="You must enable VHOST_NET to have vhost-net"
-			ERROR_VHOST_NET+=" support"
-
-			if use amd64 || use x86 || use amd64-linux || use x86-linux; then
-				CONFIG_CHECK+=" ~KVM_AMD ~KVM_INTEL"
-			fi
-
-			use python && CONFIG_CHECK+=" ~DEBUG_FS"
-			ERROR_DEBUG_FS="debugFS support required for kvm_stat"
-
-			# Now do the actual checks setup above
-			check_extra_config
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	if grep -qs '/usr/bin/qemu-kvm' "${EROOT}"/etc/libvirt/qemu/*.xml; then
-		eerror "The kvm/qemu-kvm wrappers no longer exist, but your libvirt"
-		eerror "instances are still pointing to it.  Please update your"
-		eerror "configs in /etc/libvirt/qemu/ to use the -enable-kvm flag"
-		eerror "and the right system binary (e.g. qemu-system-x86_64)."
-		die "update your virt configs to not use qemu-kvm"
-	fi
-}
-
-pkg_setup() {
-	enewgroup kvm 78
-}
-
-# Sanity check to make sure target lists are kept up-to-date.
-check_targets() {
-	local var=$1 mak=$2
-	local detected sorted
-
-	pushd "${S}"/default-configs >/dev/null || die
-
-	# Force C locale until glibc is updated. #564936
-	detected=$(echo $(printf '%s\n' *-${mak}.mak | sed "s:-${mak}.mak::" | LC_COLLATE=C sort -u))
-	sorted=$(echo $(printf '%s\n' ${!var} | LC_COLLATE=C sort -u))
-	if [[ ${sorted} != "${detected}" ]] ; then
-		eerror "The ebuild needs to be kept in sync."
-		eerror "${var}: ${sorted}"
-		eerror "$(printf '%-*s' ${#var} configure): ${detected}"
-		die "sync ${var} to the list of targets"
-	fi
-
-	popd >/dev/null
-}
-
-handle_locales() {
-	# Make sure locale list is kept up-to-date.
-	local detected sorted
-	detected=$(echo $(cd po && printf '%s\n' *.po | grep -v messages.po | sed 's:.po$::' | sort -u))
-	sorted=$(echo $(printf '%s\n' ${PLOCALES} | sort -u))
-	if [[ ${sorted} != "${detected}" ]] ; then
-		eerror "The ebuild needs to be kept in sync."
-		eerror "PLOCALES: ${sorted}"
-		eerror " po/*.po: ${detected}"
-		die "sync PLOCALES"
-	fi
-
-	# Deal with selective install of locales.
-	if use nls ; then
-		# Delete locales the user does not want. #577814
-		rm_loc() { rm po/$1.po || die; }
-		l10n_for_each_disabled_locale_do rm_loc
-	else
-		# Cheap hack to disable gettext .mo generation.
-		rm -f po/*.po
-	fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
-	check_targets IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS softmmu
-	check_targets IUSE_USER_TARGETS linux-user
-
-	# Alter target makefiles to accept CFLAGS set via flag-o
-	sed -i -r \
-		-e 's/^(C|OP_C|HELPER_C)FLAGS=/\1FLAGS+=/' \
-		Makefile Makefile.target || die
-
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.5.0-cflags.patch
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.5.0-sysmacros.patch
-
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-6836.patch   # bug 591242
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7155.patch   # bug 593034
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7156.patch   # bug 593036
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7157-1.patch # bug 593038
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7157-2.patch # bug 593038
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7170.patch   # bug 593284
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7421.patch   # bug 593950
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7422.patch   # bug 593956
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7423.patch   # bug 594368
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7466.patch   # bug 594520
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7907.patch   # bug 596048
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7908.patch   # bug 596049
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7909.patch   # bug 596048
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch # bug 596738
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch # bug 596738
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8576.patch   # bug 596752
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8577.patch   # bug 596776
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8578.patch   # bug 596774
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8668.patch   # bug 597110
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8669-1.patch # bug 597108
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch # bug 597108
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8909.patch   # bug 598044
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8910.patch   # bug 598046
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-9102.patch   # bug 598328
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-9103.patch   # bug 598328
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-9104.patch   # bug 598328
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-9105.patch   # bug 598328
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-9106.patch   # bug 598772
-
-	# fix for vpc creation in qemu-img
-	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/0001-block-fix-vpc-max_table_entries-computation.patch
-
-	# Fix ld and objcopy being called directly
-	tc-export AR LD OBJCOPY
-
-	# Verbose builds
-	MAKEOPTS+=" V=1"
-
-	epatch_user
-
-	# Run after we've applied all patches.
-	handle_locales
-}
-
-##
-# configures qemu based on the build directory and the build type
-# we are using.
-#
-qemu_src_configure() {
-	debug-print-function ${FUNCNAME} "$@"
-
-	local buildtype=$1
-	local builddir="${S}/${buildtype}-build"
-	local static_flag="static-${buildtype}"
-
-	mkdir "${builddir}"
-
-	local conf_opts=(
-		--prefix=/usr
-		--sysconfdir=/etc
-		--libdir=/usr/$(get_libdir)
-		--docdir=/usr/share/doc/${PF}/html
-		--disable-bsd-user
-		--disable-guest-agent
-		--disable-strip
-		--disable-werror
-		# We support gnutls/nettle for crypto operations.  It is possible
-		# to use gcrypt when gnutls/nettle are disabled (but not when they
-		# are enabled), but it's not really worth the hassle.  Disable it
-		# all the time to avoid automatically detecting it. #568856
-		--disable-gcrypt
-		--python="${PYTHON}"
-		--cc="$(tc-getCC)"
-		--cxx="$(tc-getCXX)"
-		--host-cc="$(tc-getBUILD_CC)"
-		$(use_enable debug debug-info)
-		$(use_enable debug debug-tcg)
-		--enable-docs
-		$(use_enable tci tcg-interpreter)
-		$(use_enable xattr attr)
-	)
-
-	# Disable options not used by user targets as the default configure
-	# options will autoprobe and try to link in a bunch of unused junk.
-	conf_softmmu() {
-		if [[ ${buildtype} == "user" ]] ; then
-			echo "--disable-${2:-$1}"
-		else
-			use_enable "$@"
-		fi
-	}
-	conf_opts+=(
-		$(conf_softmmu accessibility brlapi)
-		$(conf_softmmu aio linux-aio)
-		$(conf_softmmu bzip2)
-		$(conf_softmmu bluetooth bluez)
-		$(conf_softmmu caps cap-ng)
-		$(conf_softmmu curl)
-		$(conf_softmmu fdt)
-		$(conf_softmmu glusterfs)
-		$(conf_softmmu gnutls)
-		$(conf_softmmu gnutls nettle)
-		$(conf_softmmu gtk)
-		$(conf_softmmu infiniband rdma)
-		$(conf_softmmu iscsi libiscsi)
-		$(conf_softmmu jpeg vnc-jpeg)
-		$(conf_softmmu kernel_linux kvm)
-		$(conf_softmmu lzo)
-		$(conf_softmmu ncurses curses)
-		$(conf_softmmu nfs libnfs)
-		$(conf_softmmu numa)
-		$(conf_softmmu opengl)
-		$(conf_softmmu png vnc-png)
-		$(conf_softmmu rbd)
-		$(conf_softmmu sasl vnc-sasl)
-		$(conf_softmmu sdl)
-		$(conf_softmmu seccomp)
-		$(conf_softmmu smartcard)
-		$(conf_softmmu snappy)
-		$(conf_softmmu spice)
-		$(conf_softmmu ssh libssh2)
-		$(conf_softmmu usb libusb)
-		$(conf_softmmu usbredir usb-redir)
-		$(conf_softmmu uuid)
-		$(conf_softmmu vde)
-		$(conf_softmmu vhost-net)
-		$(conf_softmmu virgl virglrenderer)
-		$(conf_softmmu virtfs)
-		$(conf_softmmu vnc)
-		$(conf_softmmu vte)
-		$(conf_softmmu xen)
-		$(conf_softmmu xen xen-pci-passthrough)
-		$(conf_softmmu xfs xfsctl)
-	)
-
-	case ${buildtype} in
-	user)
-		conf_opts+=(
-			--enable-linux-user
-			--disable-system
-			--disable-blobs
-			--disable-tools
-		)
-		;;
-	softmmu)
-		# audio options
-		local audio_opts="oss"
-		use alsa && audio_opts="alsa,${audio_opts}"
-		use sdl && audio_opts="sdl,${audio_opts}"
-		use pulseaudio && audio_opts="pa,${audio_opts}"
-
-		conf_opts+=(
-			--disable-linux-user
-			--enable-system
-			--with-system-pixman
-			--audio-drv-list="${audio_opts}"
-		)
-		use gtk && conf_opts+=( --with-gtkabi=$(usex gtk2 2.0 3.0) )
-		use sdl && conf_opts+=( --with-sdlabi=$(usex sdl2 2.0 1.2) )
-		;;
-	tools)
-		conf_opts+=(
-			--disable-linux-user
-			--disable-system
-			--disable-blobs
-			$(use_enable bzip2)
-		)
-		static_flag="static"
-		;;
-	esac
-
-	local targets="${buildtype}_targets"
-	[[ -n ${targets} ]] && conf_opts+=( --target-list="${!targets}" )
-
-	# Add support for SystemTAP
-	use systemtap && conf_opts+=( --enable-trace-backend=dtrace )
-
-	# We always want to attempt to build with PIE support as it results
-	# in a more secure binary. But it doesn't work with static or if
-	# the current GCC doesn't have PIE support.
-	if use ${static_flag}; then
-		conf_opts+=( --static --disable-pie )
-	else
-		gcc-specs-pie && conf_opts+=( --enable-pie )
-	fi
-
-	echo "../configure ${conf_opts[*]}"
-	cd "${builddir}"
-	../configure "${conf_opts[@]}" || die "configure failed"
-
-	# FreeBSD's kernel does not support QEMU assigning/grabbing
-	# host USB devices yet
-	use kernel_FreeBSD && \
-		sed -i -E -e "s|^(HOST_USB=)bsd|\1stub|" "${S}"/config-host.mak
-}
-
-src_configure() {
-	local target
-
-	python_setup
-
-	softmmu_targets= softmmu_bins=()
-	user_targets= user_bins=()
-
-	for target in ${IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS} ; do
-		if use "qemu_softmmu_targets_${target}"; then
-			softmmu_targets+=",${target}-softmmu"
-			softmmu_bins+=( "qemu-system-${target}" )
-		fi
-	done
-
-	for target in ${IUSE_USER_TARGETS} ; do
-		if use "qemu_user_targets_${target}"; then
-			user_targets+=",${target}-linux-user"
-			user_bins+=( "qemu-${target}" )
-		fi
-	done
-
-	softmmu_targets=${softmmu_targets#,}
-	user_targets=${user_targets#,}
-
-	[[ -n ${softmmu_targets} ]] && qemu_src_configure "softmmu"
-	[[ -n ${user_targets}    ]] && qemu_src_configure "user"
-	[[ -z ${softmmu_targets}${user_targets} ]] && qemu_src_configure "tools"
-}
-
-src_compile() {
-	if [[ -n ${user_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/user-build"
-		default
-	fi
-
-	if [[ -n ${softmmu_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/softmmu-build"
-		default
-	fi
-
-	if [[ -z ${softmmu_targets}${user_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/tools-build"
-		default
-	fi
-}
-
-src_test() {
-	if [[ -n ${softmmu_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/softmmu-build"
-		pax-mark m */qemu-system-* #515550
-		emake -j1 check
-		emake -j1 check-report.html
-	fi
-}
-
-qemu_python_install() {
-	python_domodule "${S}/scripts/qmp/qmp.py"
-
-	python_doscript "${S}/scripts/kvm/vmxcap"
-	python_doscript "${S}/scripts/qmp/qmp-shell"
-	python_doscript "${S}/scripts/qmp/qemu-ga-client"
-}
-
-src_install() {
-	if [[ -n ${user_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/user-build"
-		emake DESTDIR="${ED}" install
-
-		# Install binfmt handler init script for user targets
-		newinitd "${FILESDIR}/qemu-binfmt.initd-r1" qemu-binfmt
-	fi
-
-	if [[ -n ${softmmu_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/softmmu-build"
-		emake DESTDIR="${ED}" install
-
-		# This might not exist if the test failed. #512010
-		[[ -e check-report.html ]] && dohtml check-report.html
-
-		if use kernel_linux; then
-			udev_dorules "${FILESDIR}"/65-kvm.rules
-		fi
-
-		if use python; then
-			python_foreach_impl qemu_python_install
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	if [[ -z ${softmmu_targets}${user_targets} ]]; then
-		cd "${S}/tools-build"
-		emake DESTDIR="${ED}" install
-	fi
-
-	# Disable mprotect on the qemu binaries as they use JITs to be fast #459348
-	pushd "${ED}"/usr/bin >/dev/null
-	pax-mark m "${softmmu_bins[@]}" "${user_bins[@]}"
-	popd >/dev/null
-
-	# Install config file example for qemu-bridge-helper
-	insinto "/etc/qemu"
-	doins "${FILESDIR}/bridge.conf"
-
-	# Remove the docdir placed qmp-commands.txt
-	mv "${ED}/usr/share/doc/${PF}/html/qmp-commands.txt" "${S}/docs/" || die
-
-	cd "${S}"
-	dodoc Changelog MAINTAINERS docs/specs/pci-ids.txt
-	newdoc pc-bios/README README.pc-bios
-	dodoc docs/qmp-*.txt
-
-	if [[ -n ${softmmu_targets} ]]; then
-		# Remove SeaBIOS since we're using the SeaBIOS packaged one
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/bios.bin"
-		if use qemu_softmmu_targets_x86_64 || use qemu_softmmu_targets_i386; then
-			dosym ../seabios/bios.bin /usr/share/qemu/bios.bin
-		fi
-
-		# Remove vgabios since we're using the vgabios packaged one
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/vgabios.bin"
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/vgabios-cirrus.bin"
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/vgabios-qxl.bin"
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/vgabios-stdvga.bin"
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/vgabios-vmware.bin"
-		if use qemu_softmmu_targets_x86_64 || use qemu_softmmu_targets_i386; then
-			dosym ../vgabios/vgabios.bin /usr/share/qemu/vgabios.bin
-			dosym ../vgabios/vgabios-cirrus.bin /usr/share/qemu/vgabios-cirrus.bin
-			dosym ../vgabios/vgabios-qxl.bin /usr/share/qemu/vgabios-qxl.bin
-			dosym ../vgabios/vgabios-stdvga.bin /usr/share/qemu/vgabios-stdvga.bin
-			dosym ../vgabios/vgabios-vmware.bin /usr/share/qemu/vgabios-vmware.bin
-		fi
-
-		# Remove sgabios since we're using the sgabios packaged one
-		rm "${ED}/usr/share/qemu/sgabios.bin"
-		if use qemu_softmmu_targets_x86_64 || use qemu_softmmu_targets_i386; then
-			dosym ../sgabios/sgabios.bin /usr/share/qemu/sgabios.bin
-		fi
-
-		# Remove iPXE since we're using the iPXE packaged one
-		rm "${ED}"/usr/share/qemu/pxe-*.rom
-		if use qemu_softmmu_targets_x86_64 || use qemu_softmmu_targets_i386; then
-			dosym ../ipxe/8086100e.rom /usr/share/qemu/pxe-e1000.rom
-			dosym ../ipxe/80861209.rom /usr/share/qemu/pxe-eepro100.rom
-			dosym ../ipxe/10500940.rom /usr/share/qemu/pxe-ne2k_pci.rom
-			dosym ../ipxe/10222000.rom /usr/share/qemu/pxe-pcnet.rom
-			dosym ../ipxe/10ec8139.rom /usr/share/qemu/pxe-rtl8139.rom
-			dosym ../ipxe/1af41000.rom /usr/share/qemu/pxe-virtio.rom
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	qemu_support_kvm && readme.gentoo_create_doc
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
-	if qemu_support_kvm; then
-		readme.gentoo_print_elog
-	fi
-
-	if [[ -n ${softmmu_targets} ]] && use kernel_linux; then
-		udev_reload
-	fi
-
-	fcaps cap_net_admin /usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper
-}
-
-pkg_info() {
-	echo "Using:"
-	echo "  $(best_version app-emulation/spice-protocol)"
-	echo "  $(best_version sys-firmware/ipxe)"
-	echo "  $(best_version sys-firmware/seabios)"
-	if has_version 'sys-firmware/seabios[binary]'; then
-		echo "    USE=binary"
-	else
-		echo "    USE=''"
-	fi
-	echo "  $(best_version sys-firmware/vgabios)"
-}

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/qemu/qemu-2.8.0-r3.ebuild

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2016 Gentoo Foundation
+# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI="5"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ if [[ ${PV} = *9999* ]]; then
 	SRC_URI=""
 else
 	SRC_URI="http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/${P}.tar.bz2"
-	KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~arm64 ~ppc ~ppc64 ~x86 ~x86-fbsd"
+	KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm64 ~ppc ~ppc64 x86 ~x86-fbsd"
 fi
 
 DESCRIPTION="QEMU + Kernel-based Virtual Machine userland tools"
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ gnutls gtk gtk2 infiniband iscsi +jpeg \
 kernel_linux kernel_FreeBSD lzo ncurses nfs nls numa opengl +pin-upstream-blobs
 +png pulseaudio python \
 rbd sasl +seccomp sdl sdl2 selinux smartcard snappy spice ssh static static-softmmu
-static-user systemtap tci test +threads usb usbredir +uuid vde +vhost-net \
+static-user systemtap tci test +threads usb usbredir vde +vhost-net \
 virgl virtfs +vnc vte xattr xen xfs"
 
 COMMON_TARGETS="aarch64 alpha arm cris i386 m68k microblaze microblazeel mips
-mips64 mips64el mipsel or32 ppc ppc64 s390x sh4 sh4eb sparc sparc64 unicore32
+mips64 mips64el mipsel or32 ppc ppc64 s390x sh4 sh4eb sparc sparc64
 x86_64"
-IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS="${COMMON_TARGETS} lm32 moxie ppcemb tricore xtensa xtensaeb"
+IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS="${COMMON_TARGETS} lm32 moxie ppcemb tricore unicore32 xtensa xtensaeb"
 IUSE_USER_TARGETS="${COMMON_TARGETS} armeb mipsn32 mipsn32el ppc64abi32 ppc64le sparc32plus tilegx"
 
 use_softmmu_targets=$(printf ' qemu_softmmu_targets_%s' ${IUSE_SOFTMMU_TARGETS})
@@ -100,14 +100,17 @@ SOFTMMU_LIB_DEPEND="${COMMON_LIB_DEPEND}
 	iscsi? ( net-libs/libiscsi )
 	jpeg? ( virtual/jpeg:0=[static-libs(+)] )
 	lzo? ( dev-libs/lzo:2[static-libs(+)] )
-	ncurses? ( sys-libs/ncurses:0=[static-libs(+)] )
+	ncurses? (
+		sys-libs/ncurses:0=[unicode]
+		sys-libs/ncurses:0=[static-libs(+)]
+	)
 	nfs? ( >=net-fs/libnfs-1.9.3[static-libs(+)] )
 	numa? ( sys-process/numactl[static-libs(+)] )
 	opengl? (
 		virtual/opengl
 		media-libs/libepoxy[static-libs(+)]
 		media-libs/mesa[static-libs(+)]
-		media-libs/mesa[egl,gles2,gbm]
+		media-libs/mesa[egl,gbm]
 	)
 	png? ( media-libs/libpng:0=[static-libs(+)] )
 	pulseaudio? ( media-sound/pulseaudio )
@@ -133,7 +136,6 @@ SOFTMMU_LIB_DEPEND="${COMMON_LIB_DEPEND}
 	ssh? ( >=net-libs/libssh2-1.2.8[static-libs(+)] )
 	usb? ( >=virtual/libusb-1-r2[static-libs(+)] )
 	usbredir? ( >=sys-apps/usbredir-0.6[static-libs(+)] )
-	uuid? ( >=sys-apps/util-linux-2.16.0[static-libs(+)] )
 	vde? ( net-misc/vde[static-libs(+)] )
 	virgl? ( media-libs/virglrenderer[static-libs(+)] )
 	virtfs? ( sys-libs/libcap )
@@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ USER_LIB_DEPEND="${COMMON_LIB_DEPEND}"
 X86_FIRMWARE_DEPEND="
 	>=sys-firmware/ipxe-1.0.0_p20130624
 	pin-upstream-blobs? (
-		~sys-firmware/seabios-1.8.2
+		~sys-firmware/seabios-1.10.1
 		~sys-firmware/sgabios-0.1_pre8
 		~sys-firmware/vgabios-0.7a
 	)
@@ -333,6 +335,30 @@ src_prepare() {
 
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.5.0-cflags.patch
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.5.0-sysmacros.patch
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-1.patch #597108
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2016-9908.patch   #601826
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2016-9912.patch   #602630
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2016-10028.patch  #603444
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2016-10155.patch  #606720
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-2615.patch   #608034
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-2630.patch   #609396
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5525-1.patch #606264
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5525-2.patch
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5552.patch   #606722
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5578.patch   #607000
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5579.patch   #607100
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5667.patch   #607766
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5856.patch   #608036
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5857.patch   #608038
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5898.patch   #608520
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5931.patch   #608728
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5973.patch   #609334
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-5987.patch   #609398
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-6058.patch   #609638
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.8.0-CVE-2017-2620.patch   #609206
+
+	# fix for vpc creation in qemu-img
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/0001-block-fix-vpc-max_table_entries-computation.patch
 
 	# Fix ld and objcopy being called directly
 	tc-export AR LD OBJCOPY
@@ -425,7 +451,6 @@ qemu_src_configure() {
 		$(conf_softmmu ssh libssh2)
 		$(conf_softmmu usb libusb)
 		$(conf_softmmu usbredir usb-redir)
-		$(conf_softmmu uuid)
 		$(conf_softmmu vde)
 		$(conf_softmmu vhost-net)
 		$(conf_softmmu virgl virglrenderer)
@@ -579,7 +604,7 @@ src_install() {
 		[[ -e check-report.html ]] && dohtml check-report.html
 
 		if use kernel_linux; then
-			udev_dorules "${FILESDIR}"/65-kvm.rules
+			udev_newrules "${FILESDIR}"/65-kvm.rules-r1 65-kvm.rules
 		fi
 
 		if use python; then