diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/containerd/containerd-0.2.6.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/containerd/containerd-0.2.6.ebuild index f2cf99c230..a7d7e64cdf 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/containerd/containerd-0.2.6.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/containerd/containerd-0.2.6.ebuild @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SLOT="0" IUSE="hardened +seccomp" DEPEND="" -RDEPEND="~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 +RDEPEND="~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2 seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )" S=${WORKDIR}/${P}/src/${COREOS_GO_PACKAGE} diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/Manifest b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/Manifest index fd9d2e5064..2a0d542d00 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/Manifest +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/Manifest @@ -1 +1,2 @@ +DIST docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136.tar.gz 561705 BLAKE2B 4dd5dc689db1ac632bf10a5060f5681c7e44716caf8d3730683aad9df29c7b2628fa9e7253d86d87e9dfd7d27b545713154fa0f2984ca52908b16ab089be5646 SHA512 6052b95042082c3345caf25d3646f47b82c151ff3aca2ca4510dbf72ee80056d8c4077f2a1b48a9f4178c41185835ff51461e52ad47969534ea6febf7cac74f1 DIST docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10.tar.gz 1929802 BLAKE2B 8399c3d62726bbb6256efef7e15b7496a7172bf25170b12beb60be498967dec4fde2aebd073de4265e132ff864bafc4d2499ab677390a4f7c0a1605d83ae55e5 SHA512 598221071ef07d18bf34bf5d5c68b8ad78ee71716177fc3ce5b6909cd841d5aed93f17ebf1f3d134707d29eef1f54a4ddc21e79621a9bd957df28a8d2e028ab7 diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136-r1.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136-r1.ebuild new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb66b23a6b --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136-r1.ebuild @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +EAPI=6 + +GITHUB_URI="github.com/docker/runc" +COREOS_GO_PACKAGE="${GITHUB_URI}" +COREOS_GO_VERSION="go1.7" +# the commit of runc that docker uses. +# see https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/v17.03.2-ce/hack/dockerfile/binaries-commits#L6 +# Note: this commit is only really present in the `docker/runc` repository. +# Update the patch number when this commit is changed (i.e. the _p in the ebuild). +# The patch version is arbitrarily the number of commits since the tag version +# spcified in the ebuild name. For example: +# $ git log --oneline v1.0.0-rc2..${COMMIT_ID} | wc -l +COMMIT_ID="54296cf40ad8143b62dbcaa1d90e520a2136ddfe" + +inherit eutils flag-o-matic coreos-go vcs-snapshot + +SRC_URI="https://${GITHUB_URI}/archive/${COMMIT_ID}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz" +KEYWORDS="amd64 arm64" + +DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools (docker fork)" +HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io" + +LICENSE="Apache-2.0" +SLOT="0" +IUSE="apparmor hardened +seccomp selinux" + +RDEPEND=" + apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor ) + seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp ) + !app-emulation/runc +" + +S=${WORKDIR}/${P}/src/${COREOS_GO_PACKAGE} + +RESTRICT="test" + +src_unpack() { + mkdir -p "${S}" + tar --strip-components=1 -C "${S}" -xf "${DISTDIR}/${A}" +} + +PATCHES=( + "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-1.0.0_rc2-mount-propagation.patch" + "${FILESDIR}/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch" +) + +src_compile() { + # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1 + export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include" + export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '') + -L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)" + + # build up optional flags + local options=( + $(usex apparmor 'apparmor') + $(usex seccomp 'seccomp') + $(usex selinux 'selinux') + ) + + # CoreOS: Don't try to install dependencies. + sed -i 's/go build -i /go build /' Makefile + + emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" \ + COMMIT="${COMMIT_ID}" +} + +src_install() { + dobin runc +} diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/files/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/files/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92b024eb4e --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker-runc/files/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +From 2d069bb79260e594870ce3e7466477e54a0c5307 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Aleksa Sarai +Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host binary + to container + +There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a +pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we +have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being +writeable). + +We require memfd_create(2) -- though there is an O_TMPFILE fallback -- +but we can always extend this to use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or +tmpfs. The main downside to this approach is no page-cache sharing for +the runc binary (which overlayfs would give us) but this is far less +complicated. + +This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the +Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes +ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to +worry about it). + +Fixes: CVE-2019-5736 +Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner +Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai +--- + libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c | 11 ++ + 2 files changed, 279 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c + +diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000000..c8a42c23f73f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c +@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai ++ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC ++ * ++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); ++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. ++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at ++ * ++ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ++ * ++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software ++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, ++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. ++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and ++ * limitations under the License. ++ */ ++ ++#define _GNU_SOURCE ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */ ++#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create) ++# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create ++#endif ++#ifdef SYS_memfd_create ++# define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE ++/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from . */ ++# ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC ++# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U ++# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U ++# endif ++int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags) ++{ ++ return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags); ++} ++#endif ++ ++/* This comes directly from . */ ++#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE ++# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024 ++#endif ++#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS ++# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9) ++# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10) ++#endif ++#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL ++# define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */ ++# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */ ++# define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */ ++# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */ ++#endif ++ ++#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */ ++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE ++# define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe" ++# define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \ ++ (F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE) ++#endif ++ ++static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) ++{ ++ void *old = ptr; ++ do { ++ ptr = realloc(old, size); ++ } while(!ptr); ++ return ptr; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is ++ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather ++ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed. ++ */ ++static int is_self_cloned(void) ++{ ++ int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0; ++ ++ fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE ++ ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS); ++ is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS); ++#else ++ struct stat statbuf = {0}; ++ ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf); ++ if (ret >= 0) ++ is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0); ++#endif ++ close(fd); ++ return is_cloned; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can ++ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access. ++ */ ++static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length) ++{ ++ int fd; ++ char buf[4096], *copy = NULL; ++ ++ if (!length) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ *length = 0; ++ for (;;) { ++ int n; ++ ++ n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); ++ if (n < 0) ++ goto error; ++ if (!n) ++ break; ++ ++ copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy)); ++ memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n); ++ *length += n; ++ } ++ close(fd); ++ return copy; ++ ++error: ++ close(fd); ++ free(copy); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of ++ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry ++ * to the array of pointers. ++ */ ++static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output) ++{ ++ int num = 0; ++ char *cur = data; ++ ++ if (!data || *output != NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ while (cur < data + data_length) { ++ num++; ++ *output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output)); ++ (*output)[num - 1] = cur; ++ cur += strlen(cur) + 1; ++ } ++ (*output)[num] = NULL; ++ return num; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ. ++ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a ++ * main() that we can just get the arguments from. ++ */ ++static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp) ++{ ++ char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL; ++ size_t cmdline_size, environ_size; ++ ++ cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size); ++ if (!cmdline) ++ goto error; ++ environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size); ++ if (!environ) ++ goto error; ++ ++ if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0) ++ goto error; ++ if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ return 0; ++ ++error: ++ free(environ); ++ free(cmdline); ++ return -EINVAL; ++} ++ ++static int clone_binary(void) ++{ ++ int binfd, memfd; ++ ssize_t sent = 0; ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE ++ memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); ++#else ++ memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711); ++#endif ++ if (memfd < 0) ++ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; ++ ++ binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (binfd < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX); ++ close(binfd); ++ if (sent < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE ++ int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS); ++ if (err < 0) ++ goto error; ++#else ++ /* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving -EXTBUSY. */ ++ int newfd; ++ char *fdpath = NULL; ++ ++ if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0) ++ goto error; ++ newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); ++ free(fdpath); ++ if (newfd < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ close(memfd); ++ memfd = newfd; ++#endif ++ return memfd; ++ ++error: ++ close(memfd); ++ return -EIO; ++} ++ ++int ensure_cloned_binary(void) ++{ ++ int execfd; ++ char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL; ++ ++ /* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */ ++ int cloned = is_self_cloned(); ++ if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE) ++ return cloned; ++ ++ if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ execfd = clone_binary(); ++ if (execfd < 0) ++ return -EIO; ++ ++ fexecve(execfd, argv, envp); ++ return -ENOEXEC; ++} +diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c +index 28269dfc027f..7750af35ea92 100644 +--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c ++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c +@@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist) + free(namespaces); + } + ++/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */ ++extern int ensure_cloned_binary(void); ++ + void nsexec(void) + { + int pipenum; +@@ -549,6 +552,14 @@ void nsexec(void) + if (pipenum == -1) + return; + ++ /* ++ * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary ++ * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary ++ * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736. ++ */ ++ if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0) ++ bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary"); ++ + /* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */ + nl_parse(pipenum, &config); + diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker/docker-17.03.2-r1.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker/docker-17.03.2-r1.ebuild index bb54e4427a..bd83378c16 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker/docker-17.03.2-r1.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-emulation/docker/docker-17.03.2-r1.ebuild @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ RDEPEND=" >=app-arch/xz-utils-4.9 ~app-emulation/containerd-0.2.6[seccomp?] - ~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10[apparmor?,seccomp?] + ~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136[apparmor?,seccomp?] ~app-emulation/docker-proxy-0.8.0_p20161019 container-init? ( >=sys-process/tini-0.13.0 ) " diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-torcx/docker/docker-17.03.ebuild b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-torcx/docker/docker-17.03.ebuild index b93b9a7753..f9d827a619 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-torcx/docker/docker-17.03.ebuild +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/app-torcx/docker/docker-17.03.ebuild @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ RDEPEND=" ~app-emulation/docker-17.03.2 ~app-emulation/containerd-0.2.6 ~app-emulation/docker-proxy-0.8.0_p20161019 - ~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 + ~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136 =sys-process/tini-0.13.2 " diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/containerd-0.2.6 b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/containerd-0.2.6 index 0a45296a34..b39cb17d1c 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/containerd-0.2.6 +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/containerd-0.2.6 @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ HOMEPAGE=https://containerd.tools IUSE=hardened +seccomp +go_version_go1_7 KEYWORDS=amd64 arm64 LICENSE=Apache-2.0 -RDEPEND=~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp ) +RDEPEND=~app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2 seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp ) REQUIRED_USE=go_version_go1_7 RESTRICT=test SLOT=0 SRC_URI=https://github.com/docker/containerd/archive/v0.2.6.tar.gz -> containerd-0.2.6.tar.gz _eclasses_=coreos-go 95797abfe5c87b4e2eccc42269b4cee7 coreos-go-depend 90f5716bc80a5aea57dbb393aa0cabdf coreos-go-utils 67004337b6f831adc5f1ff107ee2f157 desktop b1d22ac8bdd4679ab79c71aca235009d epatch a1bf4756dba418a7238f3be0cb010c54 estack 43ddf5aaffa7a8d0482df54d25a66a1f eutils 6e6c2737b59a4b982de6fb3ecefd87f8 flag-o-matic a09389deba2c0a7108b581e02c7cecbf ltprune 2729691420b6deeda2a90b1f1183fb55 multilib 1d91b03d42ab6308b5f4f6b598ed110e multiprocessing cac3169468f893670dac3e7cb940e045 preserve-libs ef207dc62baddfddfd39a164d9797648 systemd 71fd8d2065d102753fb9e4d20eaf3e9f toolchain-funcs 8c7f9d80beedd16f2e5a7f612c609529 vcs-clean 2a0f74a496fa2b1552c4f3398258b7bf -_md5_=413e1d09795ce9ea94e5da74ef2db4ea +_md5_=539991a50f3b6b8aa09619411a0e2ce3 diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 index 08a7af249b..f423a17941 100644 --- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10 @@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ RESTRICT=test SLOT=0 SRC_URI=https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/archive/dc9208a3303feef5b3839f4323d9beb36df0a9dd.tar.gz -> docker-runc-1.0.0_rc10.tar.gz _eclasses_=coreos-go 95797abfe5c87b4e2eccc42269b4cee7 coreos-go-depend 90f5716bc80a5aea57dbb393aa0cabdf coreos-go-utils 67004337b6f831adc5f1ff107ee2f157 desktop b1d22ac8bdd4679ab79c71aca235009d epatch a1bf4756dba418a7238f3be0cb010c54 estack 43ddf5aaffa7a8d0482df54d25a66a1f eutils 6e6c2737b59a4b982de6fb3ecefd87f8 flag-o-matic a09389deba2c0a7108b581e02c7cecbf ltprune 2729691420b6deeda2a90b1f1183fb55 multilib 1d91b03d42ab6308b5f4f6b598ed110e multiprocessing cac3169468f893670dac3e7cb940e045 preserve-libs ef207dc62baddfddfd39a164d9797648 toolchain-funcs 8c7f9d80beedd16f2e5a7f612c609529 vcs-clean 2a0f74a496fa2b1552c4f3398258b7bf vcs-snapshot b77011b62e2053c646ad720defe6d921 -_md5_=2bbb2b86521f55b795b3f39c22d4a29e +_md5_=1d38ba29f63bb7ae9bd9d50e4125db2a diff --git a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136-r1 b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136-r1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d7899215d --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/metadata/md5-cache/app-emulation/docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136-r1 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +DEFINED_PHASES=compile install prepare unpack +DEPEND=dev-lang/go:1.7= +DESCRIPTION=runc container cli tools (docker fork) +EAPI=6 +HOMEPAGE=http://runc.io +IUSE=apparmor hardened +seccomp selinux +go_version_go1_7 +KEYWORDS=amd64 arm64 +LICENSE=Apache-2.0 +RDEPEND=apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor ) seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp ) !app-emulation/runc +REQUIRED_USE=go_version_go1_7 +RESTRICT=test +SLOT=0 +SRC_URI=https://github.com/docker/runc/archive/54296cf40ad8143b62dbcaa1d90e520a2136ddfe.tar.gz -> docker-runc-1.0.0_rc2_p136.tar.gz +_eclasses_=coreos-go 95797abfe5c87b4e2eccc42269b4cee7 coreos-go-depend 90f5716bc80a5aea57dbb393aa0cabdf coreos-go-utils 67004337b6f831adc5f1ff107ee2f157 desktop b1d22ac8bdd4679ab79c71aca235009d epatch a1bf4756dba418a7238f3be0cb010c54 estack 43ddf5aaffa7a8d0482df54d25a66a1f eutils 6e6c2737b59a4b982de6fb3ecefd87f8 flag-o-matic a09389deba2c0a7108b581e02c7cecbf ltprune 2729691420b6deeda2a90b1f1183fb55 multilib 1d91b03d42ab6308b5f4f6b598ed110e multiprocessing cac3169468f893670dac3e7cb940e045 preserve-libs ef207dc62baddfddfd39a164d9797648 toolchain-funcs 8c7f9d80beedd16f2e5a7f612c609529 vcs-clean 2a0f74a496fa2b1552c4f3398258b7bf vcs-snapshot b77011b62e2053c646ad720defe6d921 +_md5_=f9267783f89fc7c0ecfcf1454d98b6ad