Merge pull request #2641 from bgilbert/4.12

sys-kernel/coreos-*: bump to v4.12
2025-08-22 15:01:00 +02:00 · 2017-07-03 18:34:01 -07:00 · 2017-07-03 18:34:01 -07:00 · 4bfb26d23e
commit 4bfb26d23e
parent ab20c61d1d eac64b8cd5
33 changed files with 116 additions and 207 deletions
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.12.0.ebuild
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.12.0.ebuild
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.12.0.ebuild
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/coreos-modules-4.12.0.ebuild
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/amd64_defconfig-4.12
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/amd64_defconfig-4.12
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/arm64_defconfig-4.12
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/arm64_defconfig-4.12
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.12
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-modules/files/commonconfig-4.12
@ -703,9 +703,8 @@ CONFIG_INFINIBAND_IPOIB_CM=y
 CONFIG_INFINIBAND_IPOIB_DEBUG_DATA=y
 CONFIG_INFINIBAND_SRP=m
 CONFIG_INFINIBAND_ISER=m
-CONFIG_EDAC=y
+CONFIG_EDAC=m
 # CONFIG_EDAC_LEGACY_SYSFS is not set
-CONFIG_EDAC_MM_EDAC=m
 CONFIG_RTC_CLASS=y
 CONFIG_DMADEVICES=y
 CONFIG_VIRT_DRIVERS=y
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/Manifest
@ -1,2 +1 @@
-DIST linux-4.11.tar.xz 95447768 SHA256 b67ecafd0a42b3383bf4d82f0850cbff92a7e72a215a6d02f42ddbafcf42a7d6 SHA512 6610eed97ffb7207c71771198c36179b8244ace7222bebb109507720e26c5f17d918079a56d5febdd8605844d67fb2df0ebe910fa2f2f53690daf6e2a8ad09c3 WHIRLPOOL f577b7c5c209cb8dfef2f1d56d77314fbd53323743a34b900e2559ab0049b7c2d6262bda136dd3d005bc0527788106e0484e46558448a8720dac389a969e5886
-DIST patch-4.11.8.xz 239352 SHA256 c390540524e9647efa3752550cb04b02f47a60a5d45f26d56a07cd8a67501929 SHA512 9fed139ec4658d373ea6f25b0cc0cd9384e3bf61a05d30a523c13d8b5e673b461cf3cc8d97da2c69ca3a6c718319529f7ccfd90ca38b81d68986b7e63f2db297 WHIRLPOOL a72ef2cebcae11425c5eccb29619d5c9be99624cc48f439f30e6c4499ba7a404abc1bb768a07689ee05e9c086d16f5de0f8eb914c33d1295c0e1450dd60c154c
+DIST linux-4.12.tar.xz 99186576 SHA256 a45c3becd4d08ce411c14628a949d08e2433d8cdeca92036c7013980e93858ab SHA512 8e81b41b253e63233e92948941f44c6482acb52aa3a3fd172f03a38a86f2c35b2ad4fd407acd1bc3964673eba344fe104d3a03e3ff4bf9cd1f22bd44263bd728 WHIRLPOOL 3b97da251c2ba4ace4a27b708f2b1dcf94cb1b59aaeded6acb74bd98f0d3e33f1df83670665e4186d99a55daa84c88d539d93e20f0ff18a6d46ef326c48dd375
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.12.0.ebuild
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-4.12.0.ebuild
@ -44,5 +44,4 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0022-Lock-down-TIOCSSERIAL.patch \
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch \
 	${PATCH_DIR}/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch \
-	${PATCH_DIR}/z0025-ext4-handle-the-rest-of-ext4_mb_load_buddy-ENOMEM-er.patch \
 "
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From e546f8455c33b339a3b84b55f95d4fcb9fe07571 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
-Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 24/25] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
-
-Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
---
- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
-index 4fb6ccd..f791d18 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
-+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
-@@ -200,6 +200,11 @@ section_table:
- 	.short	0		// NumberOfLineNumbers  (0 for executables)
- 	.long	0xe0500020	// Characteristics (section flags)
- 
-+	/* CoreOS 64 byte verity hash value. */
-+	.org	_head + 512
-+	.ascii	"verity-hash"
-+	.org	_head + 512 + 64
-+
- #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_EFI
- 	/*
- 	 * The debug table is referenced via its Relative Virtual Address (RVA),
-- 
-2.9.4
-
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0025-ext4-handle-the-rest-of-ext4_mb_load_buddy-ENOMEM-er.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.11/z0025-ext4-handle-the-rest-of-ext4_mb_load_buddy-ENOMEM-er.patch
@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From 53bcfff6ac09aa20b49b67233f729f06d4eff9a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
-Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 22:35:23 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 25/25] ext4: handle the rest of ext4_mb_load_buddy() ENOMEM
- errors
-
-I've got another report about breaking ext4 by ENOMEM error returned from
-ext4_mb_load_buddy() caused by memory shortage in memory cgroup.
-This time inside ext4_discard_preallocations().
-
-This patch replaces ext4_error() with ext4_warning() where errors returned
-from ext4_mb_load_buddy() are not fatal and handled by caller:
-* ext4_mb_discard_group_preallocations() - called before generating ENOSPC,
-  we'll try to discard other group or return ENOSPC into user-space.
-* ext4_trim_all_free() - just stop trimming and return ENOMEM from ioctl.
-
-Some callers cannot handle errors, thus __GFP_NOFAIL is used for them:
-* ext4_discard_preallocations()
-* ext4_mb_discard_lg_preallocations()
-
-Fixes: adb7ef600cc9 ("ext4: use __GFP_NOFAIL in ext4_free_blocks()")
-Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
-Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
---
- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
-index 354dc1a..3942815 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
-+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
-@@ -3887,7 +3887,8 @@ ext4_mb_discard_group_preallocations(struct super_block *sb,
- 
- 	err = ext4_mb_load_buddy(sb, group, &e4b);
- 	if (err) {
-		ext4_error(sb, "Error loading buddy information for %u", group);
-+		ext4_warning(sb, "Error %d loading buddy information for %u",
-+			     err, group);
- 		put_bh(bitmap_bh);
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -4044,10 +4045,11 @@ void ext4_discard_preallocations(struct inode *inode)
- 		BUG_ON(pa->pa_type != MB_INODE_PA);
- 		group = ext4_get_group_number(sb, pa->pa_pstart);
- 
-		err = ext4_mb_load_buddy(sb, group, &e4b);
-+		err = ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp(sb, group, &e4b,
-+					     GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- 		if (err) {
-			ext4_error(sb, "Error loading buddy information for %u",
-					group);
-+			ext4_error(sb, "Error %d loading buddy information for %u",
-+				   err, group);
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 
-@@ -4303,11 +4305,14 @@ ext4_mb_discard_lg_preallocations(struct super_block *sb,
- 	spin_unlock(&lg->lg_prealloc_lock);
- 
- 	list_for_each_entry_safe(pa, tmp, &discard_list, u.pa_tmp_list) {
-+		int err;
- 
- 		group = ext4_get_group_number(sb, pa->pa_pstart);
-		if (ext4_mb_load_buddy(sb, group, &e4b)) {
-			ext4_error(sb, "Error loading buddy information for %u",
-					group);
-+		err = ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp(sb, group, &e4b,
-+					     GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOFAIL);
-+		if (err) {
-+			ext4_error(sb, "Error %d loading buddy information for %u",
-+				   err, group);
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 		ext4_lock_group(sb, group);
-@@ -5127,8 +5132,8 @@ ext4_trim_all_free(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group,
- 
- 	ret = ext4_mb_load_buddy(sb, group, &e4b);
- 	if (ret) {
-		ext4_error(sb, "Error in loading buddy "
-				"information for %u", group);
-+		ext4_warning(sb, "Error %d loading buddy information for %u",
-+			     ret, group);
- 		return ret;
- 	}
- 	bitmap = e4b.bd_bitmap;
-- 
-2.9.4
-
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0001-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0001-efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 5eb64704322cfac6e12d26abe602c2e702df1312 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 3f3cb677d70e6b5c77420792b9dc3c7183313b22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 01/25] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
+Subject: [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit

 UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
 that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 4bf0c89..396285b 100644
+index f818236..3a3ef6e 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+@@ -1183,6 +1183,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
 			break;
 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ index 4bf0c89..396285b 100644
 			break;
 		default:
 diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 94d34e0..6049600 100644
+index ec36f42..381b3f6 100644
 --- a/include/linux/efi.h
 +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0002-Add-the-ability-to-lock-down-access-to-the-running-k.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0002-Add-the-ability-to-lock-down-access-to-the-running-k.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 17572853d2658797d83a347b569970095be67666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5d520de1931337577f000d9d082fea40e388e546 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:36:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 02/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
+Subject: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
 kernel image

 Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c

 diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
-index 4c26dc3..b820a80 100644
+index 13bc08a..282a168 100644
 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h
 +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
-@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
+@@ -276,6 +276,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
 void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
 void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
 
@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ index 4c26dc3..b820a80 100644
 int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
 int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
 diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
-index 96899fa..5808570 100644
+index af675b5..68bab18 100644
 --- a/include/linux/security.h
 +++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -1678,5 +1678,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
+@@ -1698,5 +1698,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
 { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ index 96899fa..5808570 100644
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
 
 diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
-index d900f47..d9b391d 100644
+index 93027fd..4baac4a 100644
 --- a/security/Kconfig
 +++ b/security/Kconfig
-@@ -193,6 +193,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
+@@ -189,6 +189,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
 	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
 	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
 
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0003-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0003-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 8fdc73845896fe16b1743eeee0984ce8530ede37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b60bbf065c75ec4b32387d0b2396f3d7c8402a09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 03/25] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
+Subject: [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode

 UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
 only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index cc98d5a..21f3985 100644
+index 0efb4c9..4d1c53b 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
 +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
+@@ -1827,6 +1827,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ index cc98d5a..21f3985 100644
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 396285b..85dfa74 100644
+index 3a3ef6e..f6990c0 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ index 396285b..85dfa74 100644
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 +#include <linux/security.h>
 
+ #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
 #include <video/edid.h>
- 
-@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+@@ -1184,7 +1185,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 			break;
 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
 			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0004-Enforce-module-signatures-if-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0004-Enforce-module-signatures-if-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From b952ea662bd2b88a712706bad504826fb5e47f00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 47f98c1c46069b98debb6e46b4da67a385d172b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:22:22 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 04/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

 If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
 signatures that we can verify.
@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

 diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
-index 7eba6de..3331f2e 100644
+index 4a3665f..3f1de34 100644
 --- a/kernel/module.c
 +++ b/kernel/module.c
-@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+@@ -2777,7 +2777,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	}
 
 	/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0005-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-the-kernel-is-loc.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0005-Restrict-dev-mem-and-dev-kmem-when-the-kernel-is-loc.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From ae791b7f235c63639fe7756bd779e646c2492c7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 46e0cb8ba4a7647882b604bb58f86bc310d1c2b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 05/25] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
 locked down

 Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0006-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-is-locked-dow.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0006-kexec-Disable-at-runtime-if-the-kernel-is-locked-dow.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From a9a6794e3d50a2bc3bf638e2a7e151e1483a87a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5aa43af8a55eae13963a0b20b8369de49fa99590 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 06/25] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 06/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down

 kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
 is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0007-Copy-secure_boot-flag-in-boot-params-across-kexec-re.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0007-Copy-secure_boot-flag-in-boot-params-across-kexec-re.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 8659ee3435108bf03df0b1a0155720f051ceabaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From acdcb4a8e2b0644fbd87eb0209ba3d1b3cfbf915 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 07/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
+Subject: [PATCH 07/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
 reboot

 Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
-index d0a814a..3551bca 100644
+index 9d7fd5e..7e6f00a 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0008-kexec_file-Disable-at-runtime-if-securelevel-has-bee.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0008-kexec_file-Disable-at-runtime-if-securelevel-has-bee.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 147b43aeaffaec0a0809314bbfe7afa7bfce9fef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5d6c3356ce40c4cf0994b5d02324bd7db356e2a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:49:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 08/25] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
+Subject: [PATCH 08/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
 set

 When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0009-hibernate-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0009-hibernate-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 639fe1050f8f7ac809d6429023b9e135aa1408a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 8e84b9fb024820a587273a1ddd35e6ba7b1c605b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 09/25] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 09/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down

 There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
 from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0010-uswsusp-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0010-uswsusp-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-down.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 0cf20c96adc7e09d5a7155153d274ed60fd8f323 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 320e7ee93cc1f51f1995e20e9ec43b748a0c87b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:28:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 10/25] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 10/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down

 uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
 makes it possible to modify the running kernel.  Disable this if the kernel
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0011-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-d.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0011-PCI-Lock-down-BAR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-d.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 83624e2a7733314685e2722586e27830b482abd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a9c564104ea9fa19437d581330c558e6f9c9ca6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 11/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
+Subject: [PATCH 11/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
 down

 Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

 diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-index 7ac258f..7d29b03 100644
+index 31e9961..5595560 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+@@ -754,6 +754,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ index 7ac258f..7d29b03 100644
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
-@@ -1022,6 +1025,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
- 	resource_size_t start, end;
- 	int i;
+@@ -1048,6 +1051,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ 	enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
+ 	struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
 
 +	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
 +		return -EPERM;
 +
- 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
- 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
- 			break;
-@@ -1121,6 +1127,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ 	if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -1131,6 +1137,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ index 7ac258f..7d29b03 100644
 }
 
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-index dc8912e..e2c5eff 100644
+index 098360d..ef16fcc 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@ -76,15 +76,15 @@ index dc8912e..e2c5eff 100644
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
-@@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+@@ -236,7 +242,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
- 	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit;
+ 	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
 
 -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
 +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
- 	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io)
+ 	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
 index 9bf993e..c095247 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0012-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-the-kernel-is-lock.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0012-x86-Lock-down-IO-port-access-when-the-kernel-is-lock.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 44aae071f73313b7c3b8e62955d82a7130dac637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 71dd9dbf442d3d92005817b59c3814deb7ddcc88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 12/25] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
+Subject: [PATCH 12/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
 down

 IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0013-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0013-x86-Restrict-MSR-access-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 7a5fcee2005bf31f04fee37f7f99b72633631261 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 582efb243bbb08cadab48c6242c167dbfc23acbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 13/25] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 13/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down

 Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
 it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.  Based on a
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0014-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-the-kernel-.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0014-asus-wmi-Restrict-debugfs-interface-when-the-kernel-.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 375f4e4c2885875f901bd1d773fcbd1387b4d891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 94967b682db14cb61ae864be6981159b87b4aac5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 14/25] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 14/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
 locked down

 We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

 diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
+index 6c7d860..57b82cb 100644
 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
 +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-@@ -1900,6 +1900,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+@@ -1905,6 +1905,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
 	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
 
 	if (err < 0)
-@@ -1916,6 +1919,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+@@ -1921,6 +1924,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
 	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
 				    &retval);
 
-@@ -1940,6 +1946,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+@@ -1945,6 +1951,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	union acpi_object *obj;
 	acpi_status status;
 
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0015-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method-when-the-kernel-i.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0015-ACPI-Limit-access-to-custom_method-when-the-kernel-i.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From d58cf0867fb90f8705b2517446f46acd040b811b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 45b4d28d45f07af2c75d9364ccb5f60f871dc4f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 15/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 15/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
 locked down

 custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0016-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-param-when-the-kernel-h.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0016-acpi-Ignore-acpi_rsdp-kernel-param-when-the-kernel-h.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 384fb2a457962ce0929750a3ac1ba024b8e0d98c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b5defb2cf61590316c053f540f505006749c9984 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 16/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
+Subject: [PATCH 16/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
 been locked down

 This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0017-acpi-Disable-ACPI-table-override-if-the-kernel-is-lo.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0017-acpi-Disable-ACPI-table-override-if-the-kernel-is-lo.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 23dfa5b9a48b4fa6e563eebaa7be8d077251a98b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 39645f967ccec01a3fc9b5385581ad49f89d29b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:32:27 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 17/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
 locked down

 From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

 diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
-index 2604189..601096d 100644
+index ff42539..c72bfa9 100644
 --- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c
 +++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
-@@ -542,6 +542,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)
+@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)
 	if (table_nr == 0)
 		return;
 
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0018-acpi-Disable-APEI-error-injection-if-the-kernel-is-l.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0018-acpi-Disable-APEI-error-injection-if-the-kernel-is-l.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 518e8705e6343a43074ef9ef7f3a62cf4d1525d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 01ec365f7bc1250419041321f346d6a916e05263 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:39:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 18/25] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
+Subject: [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
 locked down

 ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0019-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0019-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 5fd3f4124512e23197efa6bcbca4b41f513f045b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fae701c2fca54509ddfb85da2ac7cc14a4c2011e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:52:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 19/25] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
+Subject: [PATCH 19/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
 kernel is locked down

 There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

 diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
-index cee9802..7fde851 100644
+index 460a031..58eb33d 100644
 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
 +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0020-scsi-Lock-down-the-eata-driver.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0020-scsi-Lock-down-the-eata-driver.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From c6cf9a02898f6b70f35c6436d04b9d151fc1b5d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 83e910f07e8cb747a1d676d86a16b983c53535d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:10:34 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 20/25] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
+Subject: [PATCH 20/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver

 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
 prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0021-Prohibit-PCMCIA-CIS-storage-when-the-kernel-is-locke.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0021-Prohibit-PCMCIA-CIS-storage-when-the-kernel-is-locke.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From ae40d25c6273aee1875301ead7918aed44242342 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6bc5732f932207cdfe3e9c70ac6d43367f0c5c4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 14:37:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 21/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
+Subject: [PATCH 21/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
 down

 Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0022-Lock-down-TIOCSSERIAL.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0022-Lock-down-TIOCSSERIAL.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 1c7e0fcdc01d7d0c6e8002b82f913eea786f045a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 819850ca18442e75bfb9c9d01efd10622f950aad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:28:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 22/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
+Subject: [PATCH 22/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL

 Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
 settings on a serial port.  This only appears to be an issue for the serial
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

 diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
-index 7f91394..ea9944d 100644
+index 13bfd5d..45fb768 100644
 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
 +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
@@ -821,6 +821,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0023-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-KBUILD_SRC-from-CURD.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 95fabc958dfc9e39bea8e9cad7c065e0382ae00f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 56ec4aaa02d21637344b102d88ae817486dcdb41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Vito Caputo <vito.caputo@coreos.com>
 Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 02:59:45 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 23/25] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR
+Subject: [PATCH 23/24] kbuild: derive relative path for KBUILD_SRC from CURDIR

 This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots,
 provided they stay reachable relative to one another.  Useful for
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ by some undesirable path component.
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 8c5c94c..8c63105 100644
+index 283c623..aacf9cc 100644
 --- a/Makefile
 +++ b/Makefile
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make
--- a/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch
+++ b/sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/4.12/z0024-Add-arm64-coreos-verity-hash.patch
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 23fe6061c449fc088d6272c284a66817ccf59d96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
+Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 17:28:52 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 24/24] Add arm64 coreos verity hash
+
+Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
+---
+ arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S
+index 613fc30..fdaf86c 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S
+@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ section_table:
+ 
+ 	.set	section_count, (. - section_table) / 40
+ 
+	/* CoreOS 64 byte verity hash value. */
+	.org	_head + 512
+	.ascii	"verity-hash"
+	.org	_head + 512 + 64
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_EFI
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The debug table is referenced via its Relative Virtual Address (RVA),
+-- 
+2.9.4
+