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kernel: use new patches for secure boot

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From: https://sources.debian.org/data/main/l/linux/6.12~rc6-1~exp1/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/
This commit is contained in:
Adrian Vladu 2024-09-18 10:12:40 +00:00
parent d67a07b8f0
commit 38cd59cab3
5 changed files with 54 additions and 100 deletions
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9
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/coreos-sources-6.12.20.ebuild vendored
View File

@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ UNIPATCH_LIST="
${PATCH_DIR}/z0001-kbuild-derive-relative-path-for-srctree-from-CURDIR.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0002-revert-pahole-flags.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0003-Revert-x86-boot-Remove-the-bugger-off-message.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-efi-Add-an-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-mtd-phram-slram-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when-in-.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0008-tools-hv-fix-cross-compilation-for-ARM64.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0004-efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0005-efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0006-mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch \
${PATCH_DIR}/z0007-arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch \
"

33
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0004-efi-Add-an-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0004-efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
From 1e2ffbec195c89d887bc088691ebb19c9173ecad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 12:45:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot
mode
Subject: [28/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit?id=a5d70c55c603233c192b375f72116a395909da28
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
flag that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
@ -26,15 +25,13 @@ cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 +----------
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 17 ++++++++------
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/linux/efi.h | 16 ++++++++-----
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index eb129277dcdd..7c4a6697e39d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1190,19 +1190,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@@ -1193,19 +1193,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
@ -55,11 +52,9 @@ index eb129277dcdd..7c4a6697e39d 100644
reserve_initrd();
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index e489fefd23da..f2dfae764fb5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += libstub
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP) += fake_m
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL) += efibc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST) += test/
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER) += dev-path-parser.o
@ -67,9 +62,6 @@ index e489fefd23da..f2dfae764fb5 100644
obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE) += rci2-table.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE) += embedded-firmware.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b6620669e32b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
@ -112,11 +104,9 @@ index 000000000000..b6620669e32b
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 80b21d1c6eaf..d267ddba8369 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
#define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE 11 /* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */
#define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS 12 /* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */
@ -131,7 +121,7 @@ index 80b21d1c6eaf..d267ddba8369 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -895,6 +903,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_supported(unsigned int mask)
@@ -895,6 +903,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
return (efi.runtime_supported_mask & mask) == mask;
}
extern void efi_find_mirror(void);
@ -139,7 +129,7 @@ index 80b21d1c6eaf..d267ddba8369 100644
#else
static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
{
@@ -914,6 +923,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_supported(unsigned int mask)
@@ -914,6 +923,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
}
static inline void efi_find_mirror(void) {}
@ -147,7 +137,7 @@ index 80b21d1c6eaf..d267ddba8369 100644
#endif
extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
@@ -1133,13 +1143,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(void) { return true; }
@@ -1133,13 +1143,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const void *caller);
extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void);
@ -161,6 +151,3 @@ index 80b21d1c6eaf..d267ddba8369 100644
static inline
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var)
{
--
2.39.2

46
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0005-efi-Lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0005-efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
From fa96a2ef86466da0a43756ee39ce3b1cb555a55a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 11:54:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Subject: efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Based on an earlier patch by David Howells, who wrote the following
description:
@ -19,17 +18,15 @@ lockdown is triggered in integrity mode (https://bugs.debian.org/1025417)]
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 5 +++++
drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 3 +++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/lockdown/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 7c4a6697e39d..04e73973098e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1028,6 +1028,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@@ -904,6 +904,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
@ -38,7 +35,7 @@ index 7c4a6697e39d..04e73973098e 100644
reserve_ibft_region();
x86_init.resources.dmi_setup();
@@ -1190,8 +1192,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@@ -1070,8 +1072,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
@ -47,8 +44,6 @@ index 7c4a6697e39d..04e73973098e 100644
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
index b6620669e32b..8f2554291fb1 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
@ -59,7 +54,7 @@ index b6620669e32b..8f2554291fb1 100644
/*
* Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
@@ -28,6 +29,10 @@ void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode)
@@ -28,6 +29,10 @@ void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
@ -70,19 +65,17 @@ index b6620669e32b..8f2554291fb1 100644
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
break;
default:
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4bd0f6fc553e..08258ecbb5f9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct i
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
+int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1404,6 +1405,11 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
void *val, size_t val_len, u64 id, u64 flags);
int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev);
@@ -1504,6 +1505,11 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(e
{
return 0;
}
@ -91,14 +84,12 @@ index 4bd0f6fc553e..08258ecbb5f9 100644
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE)
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
index e84ddf484010..4175b50b1e6e 100644
static inline int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
u32 *uctx_len, void *val, size_t val_len,
u64 id, u64 flags)
--- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
@@ -45,3 +45,18 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
@@ -45,3 +45,18 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTI
disabled.
endchoice
@ -117,11 +108,9 @@ index e84ddf484010..4175b50b1e6e 100644
+
+ Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being
+ triggered in integrity mode if EFI Secure Boot is set.
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 68d19632aeb7..67cc9839952f 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdo
/*
* Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
*/
@ -130,6 +119,3 @@ index 68d19632aeb7..67cc9839952f 100644
{
if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
return -EPERM;
--
2.39.2

13
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0006-mtd-phram-slram-Disable-when-the-kernel-is-locked-do.patch → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0006-mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From bb8912cf807feab56cf8e924d33229d800ae71a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 15:54:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] mtd: phram,slram: Disable when the kernel is locked down
Subject: mtd: phram,slram: Disable when the kernel is locked down
Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20190830154720.eekfjt6c4jzvlbfz@decadent.org.uk/
These drivers allow mapping arbitrary memory ranges as MTD devices.
This should be disabled to preserve the kernel's integrity when it is
@ -21,11 +21,9 @@ Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c | 9 ++++++++-
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
index 208bd4d871f4..30f84a91692d 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
@@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ static int phram_param_call(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
@@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ static int phram_param_call(const char *
#endif
}
@ -38,8 +36,6 @@ index 208bd4d871f4..30f84a91692d 100644
MODULE_PARM_DESC(phram, "Memory region to map. \"phram=<name>,<start>,<length>[,<erasesize>]\"");
#ifdef CONFIG_OF
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
index 28131a127d06..d92a2461e2ce 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
@ -77,6 +73,3 @@ index 28131a127d06..d92a2461e2ce 100644
while (map) {
devname = devstart = devlength = NULL;
--
2.39.2

37
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0007-arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when-in-.patch → sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-kernel/coreos-sources/files/6.12/z0007-arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch vendored
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
From 8598238a38a333fed5ec0c8287f99813578370ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 11:54:38 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] arm64: add kernel config option to lock down when in
Secure Boot mode
Subject: arm64: add kernel config option to lock down when in Secure Boot mode
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831827
Forwarded: no
Add a kernel configuration option to lock down the kernel, to restrict
userspace's ability to modify the running kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is
@ -38,11 +38,9 @@ arm-init to efi-init common for all arch") renamed arm-init.c to efi-init.c]
include/linux/efi.h | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
index 59b0d7197b68..e63f8a82d9f4 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
@@ -204,9 +204,10 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
@@ -213,9 +213,10 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
{
struct efi_memory_map_data data;
u64 efi_system_table;
@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ index 59b0d7197b68..e63f8a82d9f4 100644
if (!efi_system_table)
return;
@@ -228,6 +229,8 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
@@ -237,6 +238,8 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
return;
}
@ -63,8 +61,6 @@ index 59b0d7197b68..e63f8a82d9f4 100644
reserve_regions();
/*
* For memblock manipulation, the cap should come after the memblock_add().
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
index 0ec83ba58097..81a0ac408cf5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ enum {
@ -75,7 +71,7 @@ index 0ec83ba58097..81a0ac408cf5 100644
PARAMCOUNT
};
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ static __initconst const char name[][22] = {
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ static __initconst const char name[][22]
[MMSIZE] = "MemMap Size ",
[DCSIZE] = "MemMap Desc. Size ",
[DCVERS] = "MemMap Desc. Version ",
@ -99,7 +95,7 @@ index 0ec83ba58097..81a0ac408cf5 100644
}
}
};
@@ -64,6 +68,11 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const void *fdt, int node, const char *pname,
@@ -64,6 +68,11 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
int len;
u64 val;
@ -111,7 +107,7 @@ index 0ec83ba58097..81a0ac408cf5 100644
prop = fdt_getprop(fdt, node, pname, &len);
if (!prop)
return 1;
@@ -81,7 +90,7 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const void *fdt, int node, const char *pname,
@@ -81,7 +90,7 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
return 0;
}
@ -120,7 +116,7 @@ index 0ec83ba58097..81a0ac408cf5 100644
{
const void *fdt = initial_boot_params;
unsigned long systab;
@@ -95,6 +104,7 @@ u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm)
@@ -95,6 +104,7 @@ u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi
[MMSIZE] = { &mm->size, sizeof(mm->size) },
[DCSIZE] = { &mm->desc_size, sizeof(mm->desc_size) },
[DCVERS] = { &mm->desc_version, sizeof(mm->desc_version) },
@ -128,11 +124,9 @@ index 0ec83ba58097..81a0ac408cf5 100644
};
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(target) != ARRAY_SIZE(name));
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
index 6a337f1f8787..6c679da644dd 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
@@ -132,6 +132,12 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *orig_fdt, unsigned long orig_fdt_size,
@@ -132,6 +132,12 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *ori
}
}
@ -145,20 +139,15 @@ index 6a337f1f8787..6c679da644dd 100644
/* Shrink the FDT back to its minimum size: */
fdt_pack(fdt);
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index d267ddba8369..fbce526768d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ extern void efi_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
@@ -764,7 +764,8 @@ extern int efi_mem_desc_lookup(u64 phys_
extern int __efi_mem_desc_lookup(u64 phys_addr, efi_memory_desc_t *out_md);
extern void efi_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
extern int efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
extern void efi_initialize_iomem_resources(struct resource *code_resource,
struct resource *data_resource, struct resource *bss_resource);
-extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data);
+extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data,
+ u32 *secure_boot);
extern struct kobject *efi_kobj;
extern int efi_reboot_quirk_mode;
--
2.39.2