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Merge pull request #1037 from flatcar/krnowak/security-updates
dev-libs/openssl, sys-apps/shadow: Security updates
This commit is contained in:
Krzesimir Nowak
GitHub
commit
1f1a53140c
2
changelog/security/2023-08-01-openssl-shadow.md
Normal file
2
changelog/security/2023-08-01-openssl-shadow.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
- OpenSSL ([CVE-2023-2975](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2975), [CVE-2023-3446](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3446))
|
||||
- shadow ([CVE-2023-29383](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29383))
|
||||
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Copyright 1999-2020 Gentoo Authors
|
||||
# Copyright 1999-2023 Gentoo Authors
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# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Openssl doesn't play along nicely with cross-compiling
|
||||
@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Detect target arch
|
||||
machine=""
|
||||
submachine=""
|
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chost_machine=${CHOST%%-*}
|
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[[ ${CC} == *clang* ]] && submachine="-clang"
|
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case ${system} in
|
||||
linux)
|
||||
case ${chost_machine}:${ABI} in
|
||||
@ -95,7 +97,7 @@ linux)
|
||||
# hppa64*) machine=parisc64;;
|
||||
hppa*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
i[0-9]86*|\
|
||||
x86_64*:x86) machine=x86;;
|
||||
x86_64*:x86) machine=x86${submachine};;
|
||||
ia64*) machine=ia64;;
|
||||
loongarch64*) machine="loongarch64 -DL_ENDIAN" system=linux64;;
|
||||
m68*) machine="latomic -DB_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
@ -109,7 +111,9 @@ linux)
|
||||
powerpc64*) machine=ppc64;;
|
||||
powerpc*le*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
powerpc*) machine=ppc;;
|
||||
riscv32be*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
riscv32*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
riscv64be*) machine="riscv64 -DB_ENDIAN" system=linux64;;
|
||||
riscv64*) machine="riscv64 -DL_ENDIAN" system=linux64;;
|
||||
# sh64*) machine=elf;;
|
||||
sh*b*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
@ -125,7 +129,7 @@ linux)
|
||||
s390x*) machine=s390x system=linux64;;
|
||||
s390*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";;
|
||||
x86_64*:x32) machine=x32;;
|
||||
x86_64*) machine=x86_64;;
|
||||
x86_64*) machine=x86_64${submachine};;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
;;
|
||||
BSD)
|
||||
|
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@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
|
||||
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/00e2f5eea29994d19293ec4e8c8775ba73678598
|
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https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/96318a8d21bed334d78797eca5b32790775d5f05
|
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|
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From 00e2f5eea29994d19293ec4e8c8775ba73678598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode
|
||||
|
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The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
|
||||
authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
|
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|
||||
The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
|
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which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
|
||||
a security issue because such empty associated data then become
|
||||
unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
|
||||
|
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Fixes CVE-2023-2975
|
||||
|
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit c426c281cfc23ab182f7d7d7a35229e7db1494d9)
|
||||
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
|
||||
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
|
||||
@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (inl == 0) {
|
||||
- *outl = 0;
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
|
||||
+ if (out != NULL) {
|
||||
+ if (inl == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (outl != NULL)
|
||||
+ *outl = 0;
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
- if (outsize < inl) {
|
||||
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
+ if (outsize < inl) {
|
||||
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)
|
||||
|
||||
From 96318a8d21bed334d78797eca5b32790775d5f05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:50:37 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add testcases for empty associated data entries with AES-SIV
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 3993bb0c0c87e3ed0ab4274e4688aa814e164cfc)
|
||||
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
|
||||
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ Tag = 85632d07c6e8f37f950acd320a2ecc93
|
||||
Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
|
||||
Ciphertext = 40c02b9690c4dc04daef7f6afe5c
|
||||
|
||||
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
|
||||
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
|
||||
+Tag = f1c5fdeac1f15a26779c1501f9fb7588
|
||||
+Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
|
||||
+Ciphertext = 27e946c669088ab06da58c5c831c
|
||||
+
|
||||
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
|
||||
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
|
||||
+AAD =
|
||||
+Tag = d1022f5b3664e5a4dfaf90f85be6f28a
|
||||
+Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
|
||||
+Ciphertext = b66cff6b8eca0b79f083b39a0901
|
||||
+
|
||||
Cipher = aes-128-siv
|
||||
Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
|
||||
AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +42,24 @@ Tag = 7bdb6e3b432667eb06f4d14bff2fbd0f
|
||||
Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
|
||||
Ciphertext = cb900f2fddbe404326601965c889bf17dba77ceb094fa663b7a3f748ba8af829ea64ad544a272e9c485b62a3fd5c0d
|
||||
|
||||
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
|
||||
+Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
|
||||
+AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
|
||||
+AAD =
|
||||
+AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
|
||||
+Tag = 83ce6593a8fa67eb6fcd2819cedfc011
|
||||
+Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
|
||||
+Ciphertext = 30d937b42f71f71f93fc2d8d702d3eac8dc7651eefcd81120081ff29d626f97f3de17f2969b691c91b69b652bf3a6d
|
||||
+
|
||||
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
|
||||
+Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
|
||||
+AAD =
|
||||
+AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
|
||||
+AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
|
||||
+Tag = 77dd4a44f5a6b41302121ee7f378de25
|
||||
+Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
|
||||
+Ciphertext = 0fcd664c922464c88939d71fad7aefb864e501b0848a07d39201c1067a7288f3dadf0131a823a0bc3d588e8564a5fe
|
||||
+
|
||||
Cipher = aes-192-siv
|
||||
Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfefffffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0
|
||||
AAD = 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021222324252627
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
|
||||
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb
|
||||
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8a62fd996cb1c22383ec75b4155d54dec4a1b0ee
|
||||
|
||||
From 1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
|
||||
|
||||
The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
|
||||
that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
|
||||
value even if it is excessively large.
|
||||
|
||||
There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
|
||||
OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
|
||||
perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
|
||||
new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
|
||||
|
||||
An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
|
||||
obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
|
||||
Service attack.
|
||||
|
||||
The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
|
||||
functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
|
||||
similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
|
||||
DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2023-3446
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d)
|
||||
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
|
||||
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
|
||||
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
|
||||
if (nid != NID_undef)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
|
||||
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
||||
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
|
||||
# include <openssl/dherr.h>
|
||||
|
||||
# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
|
||||
-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
|
||||
+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
|
||||
+# endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
|
||||
+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
|
||||
|
||||
From 8a62fd996cb1c22383ec75b4155d54dec4a1b0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446
|
||||
|
||||
Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an
|
||||
excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not
|
||||
be performing time consuming checks using that modulus.
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit ede782b4c8868d1f09c9cd237f82b6f35b7dba8b)
|
||||
--- a/test/dhtest.c
|
||||
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
|
||||
goto err1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* check fails, because p is way too small */
|
||||
- if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
|
||||
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
|
||||
goto err2;
|
||||
i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
|
||||
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
|
||||
@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
|
||||
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
|
||||
ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
|
||||
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
|
||||
+ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
|
||||
+ goto err3;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
|
||||
+ goto err3;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* II) key generation
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
|
||||
goto err3;
|
||||
|
||||
/* ... and check whether it is valid */
|
||||
- if (!DH_check(a, &i))
|
||||
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
|
||||
goto err3;
|
||||
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
|
||||
|| !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
|
||||
@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ EAPI=8
|
||||
|
||||
VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH="${BROOT}"/usr/share/openpgp-keys/openssl.org.asc
|
||||
TMPFILES_OPTIONAL=1
|
||||
inherit edo flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs multilib-minimal multiprocessing verify-sig systemd tmpfiles
|
||||
inherit edo flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs
|
||||
inherit multilib multilib-minimal multiprocessing preserve-libs verify-sig tmpfiles
|
||||
|
||||
DESCRIPTION="Robust, full-featured Open Source Toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
|
||||
HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssl.org/"
|
||||
@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
|
||||
else
|
||||
SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
|
||||
verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )"
|
||||
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~arm64-macos"
|
||||
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 arm arm64 hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 sparc x86 ~arm64-macos"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
S="${WORKDIR}"/${MY_P}
|
||||
@ -54,6 +55,11 @@ MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
|
||||
/usr/include/openssl/configuration.h
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
PATCHES=(
|
||||
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2023-2975.patch
|
||||
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2023-3446.patch
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
pkg_setup() {
|
||||
if use ktls ; then
|
||||
if kernel_is -lt 4 18 ; then
|
||||
@ -139,6 +145,11 @@ src_configure() {
|
||||
|
||||
append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
|
||||
|
||||
# bug #895308
|
||||
append-atomic-flags
|
||||
# Configure doesn't respect LIBS
|
||||
export LDLIBS="${LIBS}"
|
||||
|
||||
# bug #197996
|
||||
unset APPS
|
||||
# bug #312551
|
||||
@ -216,7 +227,7 @@ multilib_src_compile() {
|
||||
multilib_src_test() {
|
||||
# VFP = show subtests verbosely and show failed tests verbosely
|
||||
# Normal V=1 would show everything verbosely but this slows things down.
|
||||
emake HARNESS_JOBS="$(makeopts_jobs)" VFP=1 test
|
||||
emake HARNESS_JOBS="$(makeopts_jobs)" -Onone VFP=1 test
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
multilib_src_install() {
|
||||
@ -275,5 +286,7 @@ pkg_preinst() {
|
||||
-module "${ED}/usr/$(get_libdir)/ossl-modules/fips.so"
|
||||
eend $?
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
preserve_old_lib /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}$(get_libname 1) \
|
||||
/usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}$(get_libname 1.1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
--- shadow-4.1.3/libmisc/chkname.c
|
||||
+++ shadow-4.1.3/libmisc/chkname.c
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
|
||||
( ('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name) ) ||
|
||||
('_' == *name) ||
|
||||
('-' == *name) ||
|
||||
+ ('.' == *name) ||
|
||||
( ('$' == *name) && ('\0' == *(name + 1)) )
|
||||
)) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
100
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-CVE-2023-29383.patch
vendored
Normal file
100
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-CVE-2023-29383.patch
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
|
||||
From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Added control character check
|
||||
|
||||
Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
|
||||
index 640be931f..fb51b5829 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/fields.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/fields.c
|
||||
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
|
||||
* characters.
|
||||
- * + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
|
||||
- * + 1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
|
||||
- * contains a non-printable character.
|
||||
+ * + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
|
||||
+ * + 1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
|
||||
+ * but the field contains a non-printable character.
|
||||
* + 0 is returned otherwise.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
|
||||
@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (0 == err) {
|
||||
- /* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
|
||||
+ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
|
||||
for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
|
||||
if (!isprint (*cp)) {
|
||||
err = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
|
||||
+ err = -1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field()
|
||||
|
||||
e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
|
||||
control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
|
||||
characters that are not control ones.
|
||||
|
||||
Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
|
||||
checking functions to avoid UB.
|
||||
|
||||
Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
|
||||
index fb51b5829..539292485 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/fields.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/fields.c
|
||||
@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
|
||||
|
||||
/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
|
||||
* of illegal characters. */
|
||||
+ if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
|
||||
for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
|
||||
- if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
|
||||
+ unsigned char c = *cp;
|
||||
+ if (!isprint (c)) {
|
||||
+ err = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (iscntrl (c)) {
|
||||
err = -1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (0 == err) {
|
||||
- /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
|
||||
- for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
|
||||
- if (!isprint (*cp)) {
|
||||
- err = 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
|
||||
- err = -1;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
135
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-password-leak.patch
vendored
Normal file
135
sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-password-leak.patch
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
|
||||
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904
|
||||
|
||||
From 65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
|
||||
|
||||
How to trigger this password leak?
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
|
||||
for confirming the new password). Each of those 2 password prompts
|
||||
uses agetpass() to get the password. If the second agetpass() fails,
|
||||
the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
|
||||
'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
|
||||
|
||||
agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
|
||||
can fail for any of the following reasons:
|
||||
|
||||
- malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
|
||||
|
||||
These are going to be difficult to trigger. Maybe getting the system
|
||||
to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
|
||||
next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
|
||||
About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
|
||||
ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
|
||||
but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
|
||||
files.
|
||||
|
||||
- The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
|
||||
|
||||
The is plausible with physical access. However, at that point, a
|
||||
keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
|
||||
|
||||
And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
|
||||
introduced, which is not going to be easy.
|
||||
|
||||
How to read the password after the leak?
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
|
||||
password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
|
||||
be doable. Try to find some consistent patterns.
|
||||
|
||||
Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
|
||||
leaks their password.
|
||||
|
||||
Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
|
||||
searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
|
||||
password.
|
||||
|
||||
On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
|
||||
> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
|
||||
> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
|
||||
>
|
||||
> - brk / sbrk
|
||||
> - mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
|
||||
> - mmap /dev/zero
|
||||
> - mmap some other file
|
||||
> - shm_open
|
||||
> - shmget
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process. Using mmap of an
|
||||
> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
|
||||
> into the memory space on the first use.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
|
||||
> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED. This is rare.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
|
||||
> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
|
||||
> process. It isn't leftover from other processes.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> The avenues available for reading the memory:
|
||||
> - /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
|
||||
> - /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
|
||||
> - ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
|
||||
> - causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
|
||||
>
|
||||
> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
How to fix it?
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
|
||||
alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
|
||||
make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
|
||||
allowed to impede this zeroing.
|
||||
|
||||
This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
|
||||
the string somewhere hidden in the stack. Those copies won't get zeroed
|
||||
by explicit_bzero(3). However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
|
||||
compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
|
||||
that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3). But we all know that
|
||||
sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
|
||||
this is plausible. Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
|
||||
issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
|
||||
text.
|
||||
|
||||
Security concerns
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
We believe this isn't easy to exploit. Nevertheless, and since the fix
|
||||
is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
|
||||
all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
|
||||
imagination than us to find a way.
|
||||
|
||||
Affected versions
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
All. Bug introduced in shadow 19990709. That's the second commit in
|
||||
the git history.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
|
||||
Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
|
||||
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
|
||||
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
||||
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
|
||||
Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
|
||||
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
|
||||
Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
|
||||
Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
|
||||
Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
|
||||
--- a/src/gpasswd.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
|
||||
@@ -898,6 +898,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
|
||||
erase_pass (cp);
|
||||
cp = agetpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
|
||||
if (NULL == cp) {
|
||||
+ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
|
||||
exit (1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
https://bugs.gentoo.org/903083
|
||||
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/691
|
||||
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/bd2d0079c90241f24671a7946a3ad175dc1a3aeb
|
||||
|
||||
From fcb04de38a0ddc263288a1c450b35bfb1503d523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2023 21:16:55 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] usermod: respect --prefix for --gid option
|
||||
|
||||
The --gid option accepts a group name or id. When a name is provided, it
|
||||
is resolved to an id by looking up the name in the group database
|
||||
(/etc/group).
|
||||
|
||||
The --prefix option overides the location of the passwd and group
|
||||
databases. I suspect the --gid option was overlooked when wiring up the
|
||||
--prefix option.
|
||||
|
||||
useradd --gid already respects --prefix; this change makes usermod
|
||||
behave the same way.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: b6b2c756c91806b1c3e150ea0ee4721c6cdaf9d0
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
|
||||
--- a/src/usermod.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/usermod.c
|
||||
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
fflg = true;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 'g':
|
||||
- grp = getgr_nam_gid (optarg);
|
||||
+ grp = prefix_getgr_nam_gid (optarg);
|
||||
if (NULL == grp) {
|
||||
fprintf (stderr,
|
||||
_("%s: group '%s' does not exist\n"),
|
||||
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI+=" verify-sig? ( https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/downloa
|
||||
LICENSE="BSD GPL-2"
|
||||
# Subslot is for libsubid's SONAME.
|
||||
SLOT="0/4"
|
||||
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 arm arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 sparc x86"
|
||||
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm arm64 hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
|
||||
IUSE="acl audit bcrypt cracklib nls pam selinux skey split-usr su xattr"
|
||||
# Taken from the man/Makefile.am file.
|
||||
LANGS=( cs da de es fi fr hu id it ja ko pl pt_BR ru sv tr zh_CN zh_TW )
|
||||
@ -30,22 +30,24 @@ REQUIRED_USE="?? ( cracklib pam )"
|
||||
|
||||
COMMON_DEPEND="
|
||||
virtual/libcrypt:=
|
||||
acl? ( sys-apps/acl:0= )
|
||||
audit? ( >=sys-process/audit-2.6:0= )
|
||||
cracklib? ( >=sys-libs/cracklib-2.7-r3:0= )
|
||||
acl? ( sys-apps/acl:= )
|
||||
audit? ( >=sys-process/audit-2.6:= )
|
||||
cracklib? ( >=sys-libs/cracklib-2.7-r3:= )
|
||||
nls? ( virtual/libintl )
|
||||
pam? ( sys-libs/pam:0= )
|
||||
skey? ( sys-auth/skey:0= )
|
||||
pam? ( sys-libs/pam:= )
|
||||
skey? ( sys-auth/skey:= )
|
||||
selinux? (
|
||||
>=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28:0=
|
||||
sys-libs/libsemanage:0=
|
||||
>=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28:=
|
||||
sys-libs/libsemanage:=
|
||||
)
|
||||
xattr? ( sys-apps/attr:0= )
|
||||
xattr? ( sys-apps/attr:= )
|
||||
"
|
||||
DEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}
|
||||
DEPEND="
|
||||
${COMMON_DEPEND}
|
||||
>=sys-kernel/linux-headers-4.14
|
||||
"
|
||||
RDEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}
|
||||
RDEPEND="
|
||||
${COMMON_DEPEND}
|
||||
!<sys-apps/man-pages-5.11-r1
|
||||
!=sys-apps/man-pages-5.12-r0
|
||||
!=sys-apps/man-pages-5.12-r1
|
||||
@ -65,6 +67,9 @@ BDEPEND="
|
||||
|
||||
PATCHES=(
|
||||
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-configure-clang16.patch
|
||||
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2023-29383.patch
|
||||
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-usermod-prefix-gid.patch
|
||||
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-password-leak.patch
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
src_prepare() {
|
||||
@ -180,7 +185,7 @@ src_install() {
|
||||
else
|
||||
dopamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/shadow
|
||||
|
||||
for x in chsh shfn ; do
|
||||
for x in chsh chfn ; do
|
||||
newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/passwd ${x}
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user