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* Remove unused bytes.Buffer from dns/idn.encode. This buffer is truncated and written to but never read from. It serves no purpose and all tests pass with it removed. It appears to have been introduced when puncycode.go was first added in miekg/dns@e3c2c07. * Produce less pointless garbage. This change: - removes several needless []byte -> string conversions, - removes two needless append calls in HashName, and - writes the hash to the same nsec3 []byte in HashName rather than creating a new []byte on each of the k iterations. These are all minor performance improvements that will likely go entirely unnoticed. The changes will reduce the ammount of garbage produced when calling CertificateToDANE, HashName, (*SIG).Sign and TsigGenerate.
219 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
219 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package dns
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/dsa"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"encoding/binary"
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"math/big"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Sign signs a dns.Msg. It fills the signature with the appropriate data.
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// The SIG record should have the SignerName, KeyTag, Algorithm, Inception
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// and Expiration set.
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func (rr *SIG) Sign(k crypto.Signer, m *Msg) ([]byte, error) {
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if k == nil {
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return nil, ErrPrivKey
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}
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if rr.KeyTag == 0 || len(rr.SignerName) == 0 || rr.Algorithm == 0 {
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return nil, ErrKey
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}
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rr.Header().Rrtype = TypeSIG
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rr.Header().Class = ClassANY
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rr.Header().Ttl = 0
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rr.Header().Name = "."
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rr.OrigTtl = 0
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rr.TypeCovered = 0
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rr.Labels = 0
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buf := make([]byte, m.Len()+rr.len())
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mbuf, err := m.PackBuffer(buf)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if &buf[0] != &mbuf[0] {
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return nil, ErrBuf
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}
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off, err := PackRR(rr, buf, len(mbuf), nil, false)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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buf = buf[:off:cap(buf)]
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hash, ok := AlgorithmToHash[rr.Algorithm]
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if !ok {
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return nil, ErrAlg
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}
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hasher := hash.New()
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// Write SIG rdata
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hasher.Write(buf[len(mbuf)+1+2+2+4+2:])
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// Write message
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hasher.Write(buf[:len(mbuf)])
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signature, err := sign(k, hasher.Sum(nil), hash, rr.Algorithm)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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rr.Signature = toBase64(signature)
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buf = append(buf, signature...)
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if len(buf) > int(^uint16(0)) {
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return nil, ErrBuf
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}
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// Adjust sig data length
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rdoff := len(mbuf) + 1 + 2 + 2 + 4
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rdlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[rdoff:])
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rdlen += uint16(len(signature))
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(buf[rdoff:], rdlen)
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// Adjust additional count
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adc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[10:])
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adc++
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(buf[10:], adc)
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return buf, nil
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}
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// Verify validates the message buf using the key k.
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// It's assumed that buf is a valid message from which rr was unpacked.
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func (rr *SIG) Verify(k *KEY, buf []byte) error {
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if k == nil {
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return ErrKey
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}
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if rr.KeyTag == 0 || len(rr.SignerName) == 0 || rr.Algorithm == 0 {
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return ErrKey
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}
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var hash crypto.Hash
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switch rr.Algorithm {
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case DSA, RSASHA1:
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hash = crypto.SHA1
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case RSASHA256, ECDSAP256SHA256:
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hash = crypto.SHA256
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case ECDSAP384SHA384:
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hash = crypto.SHA384
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case RSASHA512:
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hash = crypto.SHA512
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default:
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return ErrAlg
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}
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hasher := hash.New()
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buflen := len(buf)
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qdc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[4:])
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anc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[6:])
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auc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[8:])
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adc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[10:])
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offset := 12
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var err error
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for i := uint16(0); i < qdc && offset < buflen; i++ {
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_, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Skip past Type and Class
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offset += 2 + 2
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}
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for i := uint16(1); i < anc+auc+adc && offset < buflen; i++ {
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_, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Skip past Type, Class and TTL
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offset += 2 + 2 + 4
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if offset+1 >= buflen {
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continue
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}
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var rdlen uint16
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rdlen = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[offset:])
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offset += 2
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offset += int(rdlen)
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}
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if offset >= buflen {
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return &Error{err: "overflowing unpacking signed message"}
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}
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// offset should be just prior to SIG
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bodyend := offset
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// owner name SHOULD be root
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_, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Skip Type, Class, TTL, RDLen
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offset += 2 + 2 + 4 + 2
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sigstart := offset
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// Skip Type Covered, Algorithm, Labels, Original TTL
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offset += 2 + 1 + 1 + 4
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if offset+4+4 >= buflen {
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return &Error{err: "overflow unpacking signed message"}
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}
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expire := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[offset:])
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offset += 4
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incept := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[offset:])
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offset += 4
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now := uint32(time.Now().Unix())
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if now < incept || now > expire {
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return ErrTime
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}
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// Skip key tag
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offset += 2
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var signername string
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signername, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// If key has come from the DNS name compression might
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// have mangled the case of the name
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if strings.ToLower(signername) != strings.ToLower(k.Header().Name) {
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return &Error{err: "signer name doesn't match key name"}
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}
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sigend := offset
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hasher.Write(buf[sigstart:sigend])
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hasher.Write(buf[:10])
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hasher.Write([]byte{
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byte((adc - 1) << 8),
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byte(adc - 1),
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})
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hasher.Write(buf[12:bodyend])
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hashed := hasher.Sum(nil)
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sig := buf[sigend:]
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switch k.Algorithm {
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case DSA:
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pk := k.publicKeyDSA()
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sig = sig[1:]
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r := big.NewInt(0)
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r.SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
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s := big.NewInt(0)
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s.SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
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if pk != nil {
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if dsa.Verify(pk, hashed, r, s) {
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return nil
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}
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return ErrSig
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}
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case RSASHA1, RSASHA256, RSASHA512:
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pk := k.publicKeyRSA()
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if pk != nil {
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return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pk, hash, hashed, sig)
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}
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case ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384:
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pk := k.publicKeyECDSA()
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r := big.NewInt(0)
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r.SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
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s := big.NewInt(0)
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s.SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
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if pk != nil {
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if ecdsa.Verify(pk, hashed, r, s) {
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return nil
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}
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return ErrSig
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}
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}
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return ErrKeyAlg
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}
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