aports/main/libcap/security-extra-2.patch

Patch-Source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/commit/?id=6baf268986bc8791d069a25a0514241b5467e379
--
From 6baf268986bc8791d069a25a0514241b5467e379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 6 May 2023 22:24:39 -0700
Subject: Ignore the content of a capability.conf file if it is world-writable.

Other than the case of /dev/null, there is no situation in which pam_cap.so
should act on world writable config files.

There are legitimate local administration choices for the file being owned
by non-root users, and similarly writable by a group of trusted users. So,
we do not require any specific ownership for the file and do not check for
writable access based on owner of group membership.

Credit for finding this bug in pam_cap.so goes to X41 D-Sec GmbH
(https://x41-dsec.de/) who performed a security audit of the libcap
source code in April of 2023. The audit was sponsored by the Open
Source Technology Improvement Fund (https://ostif.org/).

Audit ref: LCAP-CR-23-101

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
---
 pam_cap/.gitignore     |  1 +
 pam_cap/Makefile       |  9 ++++++---
 pam_cap/pam_cap.c      | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 pam_cap/test_pam_cap.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/pam_cap/.gitignore b/pam_cap/.gitignore
index 87f4186..dac617b 100644
--- a/pam_cap/.gitignore
+++ b/pam_cap/.gitignore
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ test_pam_cap
 lazylink.so
 pam_cap_linkopts
 LIBCAP
+incapable.conf
diff --git a/pam_cap/Makefile b/pam_cap/Makefile
index d852101..258e519 100644
--- a/pam_cap/Makefile
+++ b/pam_cap/Makefile
@@ -70,13 +70,16 @@ test_pam_cap: test_pam_cap.c pam_cap.c ../libcap/libcap.a
 testlink: test.o pam_cap.o
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $+ -lpam -ldl $(LIBCAPLIB)
 
-test: testlink test_pam_cap pam_cap.so
+incapable.conf:
+	echo "^cap_setuid  alpha" > $@ && chmod o+w $@
+
+test: testlink test_pam_cap pam_cap.so incapable.conf
 	./test_pam_cap
 	LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../libcap ./pam_cap.so
 	LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../libcap ./pam_cap.so --help
 	@echo "module can be run as an executable!"
 
-sudotest: test_pam_cap
+sudotest: test_pam_cap incapable.conf
 	$(SUDO) ./test_pam_cap root 0x0 0x0 0x0 config=./capability.conf
 	$(SUDO) ./test_pam_cap root 0x0 0x0 0x0 config=./sudotest.conf
 	$(SUDO) ./test_pam_cap alpha 0x0 0x0 0x0 config=./capability.conf
@@ -87,4 +90,4 @@ sudotest: test_pam_cap
 
 clean:
 	rm -f *.o *.so testlink lazylink.so test_pam_cap pam_cap_linkopts *~
-	rm -f LIBCAP
+	rm -f LIBCAP incapable.conf
diff --git a/pam_cap/pam_cap.c b/pam_cap/pam_cap.c
index 91278dc..b9419cb 100644
--- a/pam_cap/pam_cap.c
+++ b/pam_cap/pam_cap.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <syslog.h>
 #include <sys/capability.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <linux/limits.h>
 
@@ -106,6 +108,27 @@ static char *read_capabilities_for_user(const char *user, const char *source)
 	D(("failed to open capability file"));
 	goto defer;
     }
+    /*
+     * In all cases other than "/dev/null", the config file should not
+     * be world writable. We do not check for ownership limitations or
+     * group write restrictions as these represent legitimate local
+     * administration choices. Especially in a system operating in
+     * CAP_MODE_PURE1E.
+     */
+    if (strcmp(source, "/dev/null") != 0) {
+	struct stat sb;
+	D(("validate filehandle [for opened %s] does not point to a world"
+	   " writable file", source));
+	if (fstat(fileno(cap_file), &sb) != 0) {
+	    D(("unable to fstat config file: %d", errno));
+	    goto close_out_file;
+	}
+	if ((sb.st_mode & S_IWOTH) != 0) {
+	    D(("open failed [%s] is world writable test: security hole",
+	       source));
+	    goto close_out_file;
+	}
+    }
 
     int found_one = 0;
     while (!found_one &&
@@ -167,6 +190,7 @@ static char *read_capabilities_for_user(const char *user, const char *source)
 	line = NULL;
     }
 
+close_out_file:
     fclose(cap_file);
 
 defer:
@@ -395,7 +419,7 @@ int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
     }
 
     if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-	D(("pam_get_user failed: %s", pam_strerror(pamh, retval)));
+	D(("pam_get_user failed: pam error=%d", retval));
 	memset(&pcs, 0, sizeof(pcs));
 	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
     }
diff --git a/pam_cap/test_pam_cap.c b/pam_cap/test_pam_cap.c
index 886888e..4bcf236 100644
--- a/pam_cap/test_pam_cap.c
+++ b/pam_cap/test_pam_cap.c
@@ -237,10 +237,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 	printf("failed to parse arguments\n");
 	exit(1);
     }
-    if (read_capabilities_for_user("morgan", "/dev/null") != NULL) {
+    if (read_capabilities_for_user("alpha", "/dev/null") != NULL) {
 	printf("/dev/null should return no capabilities\n");
 	exit(1);
     }
+    if (read_capabilities_for_user("unknown", "capability.conf") != NULL) {
+	printf("capability.conf should return no capabilities for unknown\n");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+    char *iab_text = read_capabilities_for_user("alpha", "./incapable.conf");
+    if (iab_text != NULL) {
+	printf("./incapable.conf should grant no capabilities: got=%s\n",
+	       iab_text);
+	free(iab_text);
+	exit(1);
+    }
 
     /*
      * Start out with a cleared inheritable set.
-- 
cgit