main/wpa_supplicant: security fix (CVE-2019-16275)

ref #10800
This commit is contained in:
Leonardo Arena 2019-09-17 13:03:15 +00:00
parent f1fd2a5734
commit cd144136ad
2 changed files with 78 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=wpa_supplicant
pkgver=2.9
pkgrel=4
pkgrel=5
pkgdesc="A utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks"
url="https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
arch="all"
@ -17,11 +17,14 @@ source="https://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-$pkgver.tar.gz
wpa_cli.initd
eloop.patch
CVE-2019-16275.patch
config
wpa_cli.sh"
# secfixes:
# 2.9-r5:
# - CVE-2019-16275
# 2.8-r0:
# - CVE-2019-11555
# 2.7-r3:
@ -115,5 +118,6 @@ sha512sums="37a33f22cab9d27084fbef29856eaea0f692ff339c5b38bd32402dccf293cb849afd
c3db077fa78dd296d90d07626cb4e684f87618a77ffd51c1ae04b47be7bc0db1e9a3e0f7442acef21c081f6bb782f150cbbd3d0bf245d6ab43f19da3899b53b9 wpa_cli.confd
b63dcf28c5a4be36b8a3c08c93967122f9001f7fc825940aa78746666d000ccda3038e0226bd5771d37b3bbc8ad617d9ac9c766003173b052bf0d974188898ca wpa_cli.initd
2be055dd1f7da5a3d8e79c2f2c0220ddd31df309452da18f290144d2112d6dbde0fc633bb2ad02c386a39d7785323acaf5f70e5969995a1e8303a094eb5fe232 eloop.patch
63710cfb0992f2c346a9807d8c97cbeaed032fa376a0e93a2e56f7742ce515e9c4dfadbdb1af03ba272281f639aab832f0178f67634c222a5d99e1d462aa9e38 CVE-2019-16275.patch
6707991f9a071f2fcb09d164d31d12b1f52b91fbb5574b70b8d6f9727f72bbe42b03dd66d10fcc2126f5b7e49ac785657dec90e88b4bf54a9aa5638582f6e505 config
212c4265afce2e72b95a32cd785612d6c3e821b47101ead154136d184ac4add01434ada6c87edbb9a98496552e76e1a4d79c6b5840e3a5cfe5e6d602fceae576 wpa_cli.sh"

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@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
address
Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
out a response to another device and that other device processing the
unexpected response.
In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
connected station dropping its association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
"hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
return -1;
}
+
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
+ __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
+ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
return 1;
--
2.20.1