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main/wpa_supplicant: patch CVE-2023-52160

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J0WI 2024-02-13 21:20:57 +01:00 committed by Natanael Copa
parent 08bacce90d
commit 7cf0aec15e
2 changed files with 216 additions and 1 deletions
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7
main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=wpa_supplicant
pkgver=2.10
pkgrel=9
pkgrel=10
pkgdesc="utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks"
url="https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
arch="all"
@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ source="https://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-$pkgver.tar.gz
wpa_cli.confd
wpa_cli.initd
CVE-2023-52160.patch
unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch
unsafe-renegotiation-2.patch
@ -27,6 +29,8 @@ source="https://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-$pkgver.tar.gz
"
# secfixes:
# 2.10-r10:
# - CVE-2023-52160
# 2.9-r13:
# - CVE-2021-30004
# 2.9-r12:
@ -109,6 +113,7 @@ sha512sums="
24bc4d46f3a8923890f233e433928c3f1204ab5f15a1c32b21dca220af89e2474026059e1040834db88cd3d8f6b61c46abb5cf18bda906e78dcd8fccd0f2a382 wpa_supplicant.confd
c3db077fa78dd296d90d07626cb4e684f87618a77ffd51c1ae04b47be7bc0db1e9a3e0f7442acef21c081f6bb782f150cbbd3d0bf245d6ab43f19da3899b53b9 wpa_cli.confd
f4b9c86530a2b10cd50e6014c9bee1d143714ab9f86bf29119dcd2c86dec5239c356518a36147d6418e4eb31aa4a7df3e5c86647779d2b4626bffcfe6685f362 wpa_cli.initd
955c219a9e4e3e89f7f880561755059ea9f1ea27f5a5ec9f6a5b7c29195b06123c8eecfba324f3695bdb8cb53c401745c3d030a97e133dd1730351dc36c92fec CVE-2023-52160.patch
9528735924faf876a7094de46760605e5e66e265187421a668be06dbf03d7b4db6b84cbad793fcd6bd614e3ba540f82f1f80660d75e8a6070eeb7e9abb54ed28 unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch
a92ba3ed3f41022a8af9396d2b703ee47f78aa05c1fddb42919a7fe6a6fad71e3515c63457e97e252ae0a32c6c34d67ea6efe0278df1e141cf36e650237e5295 unsafe-renegotiation-2.patch
fb328872087268056b035802f71df2f7af8d11699822fe68611201a07dc693c4fdb8c50dd4fd509ed6db4cca89f6003ce3303770951686a35633977f466f4fb5 0001-nl80211-add-extra-ies-only-if-allowed-by-driver.patch

210
main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2023-52160.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
From 8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
Subject: PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
configuration parameter option:
'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
* 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
* 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
(private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
not used (default)
* 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++++
src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 ++++++
src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 +++++
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 +++++++
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
index 26744ab68..58d5a1359 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
@@ -471,6 +471,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
* 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
* 2 = require cryptobinding
*
+ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
+ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
+ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
+ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
+ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
+ * not used (default)
+ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
+ *
* EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
* uuid=Device_UUID
*
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
index 12e30df29..608069719 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
u8 cmk[20];
int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
* is enabled. */
+ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
};
@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
}
+ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
+ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
+ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
+ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
+ }
#ifdef EAP_TNC
if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
data->soh = 2;
@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
data->force_peap_version = -1;
data->peap_outer_success = 2;
data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
+ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
if (config && config->phase1)
eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
}
+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_peap_data *data)
+{
+ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
+ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
+ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
+ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
+ data->phase2_eap_started) &&
+ !data->phase2_eap_success)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+
/**
* eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
* @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
" - force failed Phase 2");
resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
+ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
} else {
resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
/* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
* shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
* been completed. */
- if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
- !data->phase2_eap_success) {
+ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
"Success used to indicate success, "
"but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
+
return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
- data->phase2_success;
+ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
}
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
index 6193b4bdb..966cbd6c7 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
@@ -242,6 +242,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
+ if (!phase2)
+ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
+ params->client_cert_blob ||
+ params->private_key ||
+ params->private_key_blob;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
index 9ac00121f..334863413 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
* tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
*/
int tls_v13;
+
+ /**
+ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
+ */
+ bool client_cert_conf;
};
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index f0b82443e..1b09f57d3 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -1370,6 +1370,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
# * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
# * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
# * 2 = require cryptobinding
+# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
+# tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
+# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
+# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
+# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
+# not used (default)
+# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
# EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
# pbc=1.
#
--
cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258