mirror of
https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/aports.git
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main/linux-grsec: upgrade to 4.4.6
This commit is contained in:
Timo Teräs
Natanael Copa
parent
a65ddb6057
commit
62dc45dea4
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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_mainflavor=grsec
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pkgname=linux-$_mainflavor
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pkgver=4.1.20
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pkgver=4.4.6
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case $pkgver in
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*.*.*) _kernver=${pkgver%.*};;
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*.*) _kernver=${pkgver};;
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@ -17,24 +17,10 @@ options="!strip"
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install=
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source="http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-$_kernver.tar.xz
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http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/patch-$pkgver.xz
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http://dev.alpinelinux.org/~tteras/grsec/grsec-4.1.18-3.1-201509201149-alpine.patch
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https://raw.githubusercontent.com/slashbeast/grsecurity-scrape/e727c85fe7fdb59bdc2b6acadfcc399708e40b3a/test/grsecurity-3.1-4.4.6-201603171922.patch
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fix-spi-nor-namespace-clash.patch
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imx6q-no-unclocked-sleep.patch
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keys-fixes.patch
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ovl-fix-getcwd-failure-after-unsuccessful-rmdir.patch
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ovl-fix-permission-checking-for-setattr.patch
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staging-dgnc-fix-info-leak-in-ioctl.patch
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via-velocity-length-check.patch
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xsa155-linux-xsa155-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch
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xsa155-linux-xsa155-0002-xen-netback-don-t-use-last-request-to-determine-mini.patch
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xsa155-linux-xsa155-0003-xen-netback-use-RING_COPY_REQUEST-throughout.patch
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xsa155-linux-xsa155-0004-xen-blkback-only-read-request-operation-from-shared-.patch
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xsa155-linux-xsa155-0006-xen-scsiback-safely-copy-requests.patch
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xsa155-linux43-0005-xen-blkback-read-from-indirect-descriptors-only-once.patch
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xsa157-0001-xen-pciback-Return-error-on-XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi-wh.patch
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xsa157-0003-xen-pciback-Do-not-install-an-IRQ-handler-for-MSI-in.patch
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xsa157-0004-xen-pciback-For-XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi-x-only-disabl.patch
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config-grsec.x86
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config-grsec.x86_64
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@ -216,75 +202,33 @@ dev() {
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"$subpkgdir"/lib/modules/${_abi_release}/build
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}
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md5sums="fe9dc0f6729f36400ea81aa41d614c37 linux-4.1.tar.xz
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06faf67e8b926915b94970981c3645e3 patch-4.1.20.xz
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b6c95ca850d6e31fd15c6dbbff9ade38 grsec-4.1.18-3.1-201509201149-alpine.patch
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b0337a2a9abed17c37eae5db332522d2 fix-spi-nor-namespace-clash.patch
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1a307fc1d63231bf01d22493a4f14378 imx6q-no-unclocked-sleep.patch
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04f93023c13c5cf3d9d5cbdf5c2a3ab3 keys-fixes.patch
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0ac0bfd35d8d857b790f3cf55028d967 ovl-fix-getcwd-failure-after-unsuccessful-rmdir.patch
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5f27a173424a42db509b46372c200e85 ovl-fix-permission-checking-for-setattr.patch
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6c48221dbad6928f2b9f6c1f521c5844 staging-dgnc-fix-info-leak-in-ioctl.patch
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073d3b8947c33abf715a0e505f144a7e via-velocity-length-check.patch
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7139ce0106f489a71474b2196cd70edc xsa155-linux-xsa155-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch
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484f3e18e22f6b7c06dabaaf5d5ed274 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0002-xen-netback-don-t-use-last-request-to-determine-mini.patch
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0bf4e9b42ff4c7feb968ab0e5b4a8be0 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0003-xen-netback-use-RING_COPY_REQUEST-throughout.patch
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f57e383a744db7ea6eb64d6a9e6fd5b0 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0004-xen-blkback-only-read-request-operation-from-shared-.patch
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6b41c3dbec8f4897bc9014d2a1ed9e66 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0006-xen-scsiback-safely-copy-requests.patch
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70ae93ddef7c9832ecde037c81009099 xsa155-linux43-0005-xen-blkback-read-from-indirect-descriptors-only-once.patch
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56607a45cf844386189a42ce432f0ce2 xsa157-0001-xen-pciback-Return-error-on-XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi-wh.patch
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0d045adaa831dc6b56c8a2528a96de9b xsa157-0003-xen-pciback-Do-not-install-an-IRQ-handler-for-MSI-in.patch
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a4b81926f3c77b5466de2934f989dabf xsa157-0004-xen-pciback-For-XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi-x-only-disabl.patch
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8592323596689e3ef967ff96d1190d1b config-grsec.x86
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81aab21a18c16cf96d0fa719564281ec config-grsec.x86_64
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c4c15b3ba79bb557a67cd9356b56d7c4 config-grsec.armhf
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28754e558f94f3b3e0b0fcc27c1c955f config-virtgrsec.x86
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ae802ba9bdf0dfa50e7506a08bbf929d config-virtgrsec.x86_64"
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sha256sums="caf51f085aac1e1cea4d00dbbf3093ead07b551fc07b31b2a989c05f8ea72d9f linux-4.1.tar.xz
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c9cb7370fe790df645a13967919628e5bcf1ff333f334fedac6a3c474714c45d patch-4.1.20.xz
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2d24b3a6234feb5a2a02c14061a6b769b46e07907604d9b43c60cb5145609125 grsec-4.1.18-3.1-201509201149-alpine.patch
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01279cfb93273d99670c56e2465957ecde3d03693beeb929a743f03afa0b7bdc fix-spi-nor-namespace-clash.patch
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21179fbb22a5b74af0a609350ae1a170e232908572b201d02e791d2ce0a685d3 imx6q-no-unclocked-sleep.patch
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246119a70831c0c01aabdbb31f75d0476883cfbc172e2a749655ec569569440f keys-fixes.patch
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464fbfe582c2b841c629c78508d117108505aafdcc6fec8a2ae0b34193d04bbe ovl-fix-getcwd-failure-after-unsuccessful-rmdir.patch
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79fa593d628d740c7bc2b68398ab381ad978293102d1f282919ee69aeab6a17d ovl-fix-permission-checking-for-setattr.patch
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144886917b2c5ff880c4beb11ca8743b98ea5ed49bbd10a54a98e1d76cfe23b5 staging-dgnc-fix-info-leak-in-ioctl.patch
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25f174ca77217399a82e59740f60ea75db31a624578cba9ee501b5b7b7ae4cc7 via-velocity-length-check.patch
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2bd18632178e09394c5cd06aded2c14bcc6b6e360ad6e81827d24860fe3e8ca4 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch
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cecdeccb8e2551252c81fc5f164a8298005df714a574a7ba18b84e8ed5f2bb70 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0002-xen-netback-don-t-use-last-request-to-determine-mini.patch
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3916b847243047f0e1053233ade742c14a7f29243584e60bf5db4842a8068855 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0003-xen-netback-use-RING_COPY_REQUEST-throughout.patch
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746c8eb0aeb200d76156c88dfbbd49db79f567b88b07eda70f7c7d095721f05a xsa155-linux-xsa155-0004-xen-blkback-only-read-request-operation-from-shared-.patch
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2e6d556d25b1cc16e71afde665ae3908f4fa8eab7e0d96283fc78400301baf92 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0006-xen-scsiback-safely-copy-requests.patch
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590656d83ad7b6052b54659eccb3469658b3942c0dc1366423a66f2f5ac643e1 xsa155-linux43-0005-xen-blkback-read-from-indirect-descriptors-only-once.patch
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0cb2d1729f17e640e33f11945f2e12eba85071238fab2dcc42f81b5d942c159b xsa157-0001-xen-pciback-Return-error-on-XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi-wh.patch
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7c39b33d0e2d751970bbe56f463661c50aa5e4addc8eee35b80e9e1378e97b02 xsa157-0003-xen-pciback-Do-not-install-an-IRQ-handler-for-MSI-in.patch
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1acfd6f4ea13db6a146d547640f50d0ad40480b914b021760a518ac82e8e4c71 xsa157-0004-xen-pciback-For-XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi-x-only-disabl.patch
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fbc303521afbecbe2dccbe9955d108af53aaaa3388f2ca0962fc93f26a535a56 config-grsec.x86
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0d770dbef70ec200e9f0341f7840847c228ac5e5061401614aaa27db59922614 config-grsec.x86_64
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01b4f4e7eae350d40749f34e916e69c101f2fb5b3b7c2bd1917c29b8df3c2668 config-grsec.armhf
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fcfeedde29606b94f79f79ceb9351bd5d018aca6a76bba04459d85e4ad94939f config-virtgrsec.x86
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91bb0c7e6ad7b438daba3be79117007ecd68afb89857381034467837247edd56 config-virtgrsec.x86_64"
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sha512sums="168ef84a4e67619f9f53f3574e438542a5747f9b43443363cb83597fcdac9f40d201625c66e375a23226745eaada9176eb006ca023613cec089349e91751f3c0 linux-4.1.tar.xz
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5c919982d33270c75b49e1deda32a9704ac8c68c4f07595471357c6b98694a4429dbd85bb31f662e63150294c031205b2d31426e117d0197ce7afdfd45f1c313 patch-4.1.20.xz
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21bb5c3b4d92852652bc2cc75c85c312f183f221b5c116404f0cde570f48ffc592cc9c4b251f8e5ad74a8c9f3990915bbdcd9795b6e1e273492e7f500631301d grsec-4.1.18-3.1-201509201149-alpine.patch
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4e3aeb70712f9838afea75fe9e6c1389414d833a89286ea55441d6a8d54ce74b0e39b565721e3153443af0a614bff57c767251b7e5b81faa5e0784eddfcd2164 fix-spi-nor-namespace-clash.patch
|
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87d1ad59732f265a5b0db54490dc1762c14ea4b868e7eb1aedc3ce57b48046de7bbc08cf5cfcf6f1380fa84063b0edb16ba3d5e3c5670be9bbb229275c88b221 imx6q-no-unclocked-sleep.patch
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8d4646d564e6beb60925724ca4cdef06ac08a4909629330f0e3c5cf1701dc82ca4bc9b809cdbf1f2229a30cc700106733cb77fea12885a44a0c4a65a1d5656d5 keys-fixes.patch
|
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061d58353e8d8eb83a10ae1cdfd16ff5d982ee594decd115d42f438293747b9f4ea3cb16ce242685b34d52ca57feb3b8e9f344adc425e1894f0283abe47ef355 ovl-fix-permission-checking-for-setattr.patch
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51bdf43837e0bc24771b6dd67e4f5f49ae77716a49155b2b04ca17aa84a7aea65f858733795a91d8c5c3221a77c576370c0ccc7e711c32edaa87210cf55974ec staging-dgnc-fix-info-leak-in-ioctl.patch
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0be40b94b99f0fa0ab975c833e50a121e45b057c812e229a3d175a7bc8b03472eb6ab4a1273988971db89625f55b9fc4a35b7696acb21709887294fcf8a7c48d via-velocity-length-check.patch
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a8a0a152638f9125274f9933c90cf2459b941ac5f6b860dcba1f35179eaa8f303eb7c392da360f423534c015ffba8818fb79fdb4a7b82a65d42415a7bd2beeb2 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch
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e85369cec62f0b249362930bf32e03f277cfc7d9844e5250b5fd73a22dcc09720f1920bb5c5f1063a4ee51a146fe9c8eb5f180b58a41cd833916904fdc230e90 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0002-xen-netback-don-t-use-last-request-to-determine-mini.patch
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8814d694c2196ee4c8bcf52522622c56a166e6b77b414e9298190f23ed86c1e205410d3ba257a323d008c59df25496e2161d828bc99a34d445430115769495a8 xsa155-linux-xsa155-0003-xen-netback-use-RING_COPY_REQUEST-throughout.patch
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7640585542d6970d2d35d728091c770daab7ea24c4a5d61e268d27b4b4bc9742d5fa04a11cbff9ac890376397f0b39f693e433639325470f6e39cea7a283810e xsa155-linux-xsa155-0006-xen-scsiback-safely-copy-requests.patch
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2c5246a7c0a8fb19b8adf70162501f0af111ad3d1816e6719ae61b28c2b11565b1bd7a82c04ab50dce1ed88ec2259de0903222976d8cdf4b17ad1e5002e101bd xsa155-linux43-0005-xen-blkback-read-from-indirect-descriptors-only-once.patch
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672508160104509406ea2a0a9a605224366876d256e6b6e8312e3f166672524cdaaa60905aa475980f55b9fa6c7c88656219f651afabfa68e38ba22375788176 xsa157-0001-xen-pciback-Return-error-on-XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi-wh.patch
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09b8a301e326f97f2e6de6e98f0bf835aeaa631272224ba006ce312576e510e260807f0149855630b3449ec7d6728129f3170f8e05b9b815ca7d9a6f1cf6a75d xsa157-0003-xen-pciback-Do-not-install-an-IRQ-handler-for-MSI-in.patch
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|
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819ff2d16b5c15399de9b3c254d4ed6b7ef580a5b7cdacb209d90d35d178e93e34a5d6159b0edfab4afec9decf404901a7504f7b106c62c3dba0cdb4f0951a61 config-grsec.x86
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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md5sums="9a78fa2eb6c68ca5a40ed5af08142599 linux-4.4.tar.xz
|
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d48f09bf61f2500d70f839e190dc7c5a patch-4.4.6.xz
|
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917d0555b110b38d59755dfb94a2608c grsecurity-3.1-4.4.6-201603171922.patch
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c32f1d7517a095a2645fc1c7dec5db8f fix-spi-nor-namespace-clash.patch
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b11c29ee88f7f537973191036d48bee7 imx6q-no-unclocked-sleep.patch
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af91f128ddf9407bb212cbaebca79354 config-grsec.x86
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cc8ab1ec3ec89db081b0ca3cc0955fd1 config-grsec.x86_64
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a453b5ddc5ce5b1ed487747ae785d615 config-grsec.armhf
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ff753181afb1538d9d3d14fe65f834c8 config-virtgrsec.x86
|
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b9f90c5027200c95d4415bb8255766c3 config-virtgrsec.x86_64"
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sha256sums="401d7c8fef594999a460d10c72c5a94e9c2e1022f16795ec51746b0d165418b2 linux-4.4.tar.xz
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||||
efea93ff30955d445344a83c36678fa8e64111219eeafea2a41fd4ee11f79d68 patch-4.4.6.xz
|
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c32ae8d117b28b51cfacae007a36d735e3d6b02cd9420a4c4f75f60fa7747a7d grsecurity-3.1-4.4.6-201603171922.patch
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||||
b8ce28c61663dbd92f7e1c862c042c88c4d0459ce15f6e6ea121e20705b66212 fix-spi-nor-namespace-clash.patch
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7e8a954750139a421a76e414e19a3b57645c9ec70e6c14a6b7708a3fa0cfd5e4 imx6q-no-unclocked-sleep.patch
|
||||
c247a003fb358f611d801277f89a13393d1620ad804553ada97433ef52a7706b config-grsec.x86
|
||||
419eeeb3b553aeb4ce337bad95f12ab975bbc05f8daaff51ad4c8f01b3137bb5 config-grsec.x86_64
|
||||
ac8407f225ff6cb6be9ccd69729262241e61455f816cdea3070e30ddf453f7db config-grsec.armhf
|
||||
8b4a1927b831e94f65ec1b08f9e3bf3f64cea1e6e85e3b6b3dc1a8796e0f206d config-virtgrsec.x86
|
||||
66a5eacb7f65cf8898c023a638859139126b5b374a57765d26ba6b833e79b9ae config-virtgrsec.x86_64"
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||||
sha512sums="13c8459933a8b80608e226a1398e3d1848352ace84bcfb7e6a4a33cb230bbe1ab719d4b58e067283df91ce5311be6d2d595fc8c19e2ae6ecc652499415614b3e linux-4.4.tar.xz
|
||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
fdfdb0600ac79a08d1cd3bd54a70e0bb6ba714f9b1680336d51b64a8a007abae15adb3ce4f94ffc76f0744c4a8ffe553d0cc9a15c3e4e1629935ce50a533e798 config-virtgrsec.x86
|
||||
fa0127850364dcb2f8ddf6ba06e722992ae8c0ce3dc9a1c9cb2dcc9f179c5e3d07becd383efc7ca56a8087a13a6fb20a8255a3e06f90f1f96c4ff0359d0b4a6f config-virtgrsec.x86_64"
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ grsec patch includes <linux/fs.h> which defines READ and WRITE.
|
||||
Remove the macro hackery, and use the proper #define names for
|
||||
macro invocations so there's no surprises.
|
||||
|
||||
--- linux-3.18/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c.orig
|
||||
+++ linux-3.18/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c
|
||||
@@ -166,8 +166,8 @@
|
||||
--- linux-4.4/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c.orig
|
||||
+++ linux-4.4/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c
|
||||
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
/* Macros for constructing the LUT register. */
|
||||
#define LUT0(ins, pad, opr) \
|
||||
@ -15,15 +15,15 @@ macro invocations so there's no surprises.
|
||||
|
||||
#define LUT1(ins, pad, opr) (LUT0(ins, pad, opr) << OPRND1_SHIFT)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -304,14 +304,14 @@
|
||||
@@ -364,14 +364,14 @@
|
||||
dummy = 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(ADDR, PAD1, addrlen),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(LUT_ADDR, LUT_PAD1, addrlen),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base));
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(DUMMY, PAD1, dummy) | LUT1(READ, PAD4, rxfifo),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_DUMMY, LUT_PAD1, dummy) | LUT1(LUT_READ, LUT_PAD4, rxfifo),
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(DUMMY, PAD1, dummy) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD4, rxfifo),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_DUMMY, LUT_PAD1, dummy) | LUT1(LUT_FSL_READ, LUT_PAD4, rxfifo),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write enable */
|
||||
@ -33,26 +33,26 @@ macro invocations so there's no surprises.
|
||||
|
||||
/* Page Program */
|
||||
lut_base = SEQID_PP * 4;
|
||||
@@ -325,13 +325,13 @@
|
||||
@@ -385,13 +385,13 @@
|
||||
addrlen = ADDR32BIT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(ADDR, PAD1, addrlen),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(LUT_ADDR, LUT_PAD1, addrlen),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base));
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(WRITE, PAD1, 0), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1));
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_WRITE, LUT_PAD1, 0), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1));
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(FSL_WRITE, PAD1, 0), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1));
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_FSL_WRITE, LUT_PAD1, 0), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Read Status */
|
||||
lut_base = SEQID_RDSR * 4;
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDSR) | LUT1(READ, PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDSR) | LUT1(LUT_READ, LUT_PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDSR) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDSR) | LUT1(LUT_FSL_READ, LUT_PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Erase a sector */
|
||||
@@ -346,40 +346,40 @@
|
||||
addrlen = ADDR32BIT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -400,40 +400,40 @@
|
||||
cmd = q->nor[0].erase_opcode;
|
||||
addrlen = q->nor_size <= SZ_16M ? ADDR24BIT : ADDR32BIT;
|
||||
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(ADDR, PAD1, addrlen),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(LUT_ADDR, LUT_PAD1, addrlen),
|
||||
@ -66,20 +66,20 @@ macro invocations so there's no surprises.
|
||||
|
||||
/* READ ID */
|
||||
lut_base = SEQID_RDID * 4;
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDID) | LUT1(READ, PAD1, 0x8),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDID) | LUT1(LUT_READ, LUT_PAD1, 0x8),
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDID) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD1, 0x8),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDID) | LUT1(LUT_FSL_READ, LUT_PAD1, 0x8),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write Register */
|
||||
lut_base = SEQID_WRSR * 4;
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_WRSR) | LUT1(WRITE, PAD1, 0x2),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_WRSR) | LUT1(LUT_WRITE, LUT_PAD1, 0x2),
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_WRSR) | LUT1(FSL_WRITE, PAD1, 0x2),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_WRSR) | LUT1(LUT_FSL_WRITE, LUT_PAD1, 0x2),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Read Configuration Register */
|
||||
lut_base = SEQID_RDCR * 4;
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDCR) | LUT1(READ, PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDCR) | LUT1(LUT_READ, LUT_PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
- writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDCR) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
+ writel(LUT0(LUT_CMD, LUT_PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDCR) | LUT1(LUT_FSL_READ, LUT_PAD1, 0x1),
|
||||
base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write disable */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ index 23ddfb6..c1ae29f 100644
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!spin_trylock(&master_lock))
|
||||
goto idle;
|
||||
- imx6q_set_lpm(WAIT_UNCLOCKED);
|
||||
+ //imx6q_set_lpm(WAIT_UNCLOCKED);
|
||||
- imx6_set_lpm(WAIT_UNCLOCKED);
|
||||
+ //imx6_set_lpm(WAIT_UNCLOCKED);
|
||||
cpu_do_idle();
|
||||
imx6q_set_lpm(WAIT_CLOCKED);
|
||||
imx6_set_lpm(WAIT_CLOCKED);
|
||||
spin_unlock(&master_lock);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 11:20:28 +0100
|
||||
Subject: KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
|
||||
|
||||
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
|
||||
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
|
||||
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
|
||||
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
|
||||
keyring metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
Now the kernel gives an error:
|
||||
|
||||
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
security/keys/request_key.c | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
|
||||
index 486ef6f..0d62531 100644
|
||||
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
|
||||
@@ -440,6 +440,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
|
||||
|
||||
kenter("");
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
|
||||
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
|
||||
+
|
||||
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
|
||||
if (!user)
|
||||
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
||||
--
|
||||
cgit v0.11.2
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 8f54c162a20cf70ab9ef4b2ef44270fceea2e67b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Rui Wang <rui.y.wang@intel.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 22:44:14 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ovl: fix getcwd() failure after unsuccessful rmdir
|
||||
|
||||
ovl_remove_upper() should do d_drop() only after it successfully
|
||||
removes the dir, otherwise a subsequent getcwd() system call will
|
||||
fail, breaking userspace programs.
|
||||
|
||||
This is to fix: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110491
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Rui Wang <rui.y.wang@intel.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 3 ++-
|
||||
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
|
||||
index 692ceda..36d6a5b 100644
|
||||
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
|
||||
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
|
||||
@@ -618,7 +618,8 @@ static int ovl_remove_upper(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
|
||||
* sole user of this dentry. Too tricky... Just unhash for
|
||||
* now.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- d_drop(dentry);
|
||||
+ if (!err)
|
||||
+ d_drop(dentry);
|
||||
mutex_unlock(&dir->i_mutex);
|
||||
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.7.5.4
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From acff81ec2c79492b180fade3c2894425cd35a545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2015 19:18:48 +0100
|
||||
Subject: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
|
||||
|
||||
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
|
||||
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
|
||||
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
|
||||
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
|
||||
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
|
||||
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
|
||||
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
|
||||
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
|
||||
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
||||
---
|
||||
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 8 ++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
|
||||
index ec0c2a0..9612849 100644
|
||||
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
|
||||
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
|
||||
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
- upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
|
||||
- if (upperdentry) {
|
||||
+ err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
|
||||
+ if (!err) {
|
||||
+ upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
|
||||
+
|
||||
mutex_lock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
|
||||
err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
|
||||
mutex_unlock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- err = ovl_copy_up_last(dentry, attr, false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
--
|
||||
cgit v0.11.2
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4b6184336ebb5c8dc1eae7f7ab46ee608a748b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Salva=20Peir=C3=B3?= <speirofr@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 17:48:02 +0200
|
||||
Subject: staging/dgnc: fix info leak in ioctl
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
|
||||
struct digi_dinfo after the ->dinfo_nboards member. Add an explicit
|
||||
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c b/drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c
|
||||
index 9ec3efe..518fbd5 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c
|
||||
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ long dgnc_mgmt_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
||||
|
||||
spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
|
||||
|
||||
+ memset(&ddi, 0, sizeof(ddi));
|
||||
ddi.dinfo_nboards = dgnc_NumBoards;
|
||||
sprintf(ddi.dinfo_version, "%s", DG_PART);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
cgit v0.11.2
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From patchwork Mon Nov 16 12:36:32 2015
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
Subject: via-velocity: unconditionally drop frames with bad l2 length
|
||||
From: =?utf-8?q?Timo_Ter=C3=A4s?= <timo.teras@iki.fi>
|
||||
X-Patchwork-Id: 544990
|
||||
Message-Id: <1447677392-17400-1-git-send-email-timo.teras@iki.fi>
|
||||
To: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>, netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Cc: =?UTF-8?q?Timo=20Ter=C3=A4s?= <timo.teras@iki.fi>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 14:36:32 +0200
|
||||
|
||||
By default the driver allowed incorrect frames to be received. What is
|
||||
worse the code does not handle very short frames correctly. The FCS
|
||||
length is unconditionally subtracted, and the underflow can cause
|
||||
skb_put to be called with large number after implicit cast to unsigned.
|
||||
And indeed, an skb_over_panic() was observed with via-velocity.
|
||||
|
||||
This removes the module parameter as it does not work in it's
|
||||
current state, and should be implemented via NETIF_F_RXALL if needed.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Francois, is this something like you had in mind? I can try give this
|
||||
a test spin in the known bad location, if this looks otherwise ok.
|
||||
|
||||
drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-velocity.c | 24 +++---------------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-velocity.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-velocity.c
|
||||
index a43e849..03ce386 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-velocity.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-velocity.c
|
||||
@@ -345,13 +345,6 @@ VELOCITY_PARAM(flow_control, "Enable flow control ability");
|
||||
*/
|
||||
VELOCITY_PARAM(speed_duplex, "Setting the speed and duplex mode");
|
||||
|
||||
-#define VAL_PKT_LEN_DEF 0
|
||||
-/* ValPktLen[] is used for setting the checksum offload ability of NIC.
|
||||
- 0: Receive frame with invalid layer 2 length (Default)
|
||||
- 1: Drop frame with invalid layer 2 length
|
||||
-*/
|
||||
-VELOCITY_PARAM(ValPktLen, "Receiving or Drop invalid 802.3 frame");
|
||||
-
|
||||
#define WOL_OPT_DEF 0
|
||||
#define WOL_OPT_MIN 0
|
||||
#define WOL_OPT_MAX 7
|
||||
@@ -494,7 +487,6 @@ static void velocity_get_options(struct velocity_opt *opts, int index,
|
||||
|
||||
velocity_set_int_opt(&opts->flow_cntl, flow_control[index], FLOW_CNTL_MIN, FLOW_CNTL_MAX, FLOW_CNTL_DEF, "flow_control", devname);
|
||||
velocity_set_bool_opt(&opts->flags, IP_byte_align[index], IP_ALIG_DEF, VELOCITY_FLAGS_IP_ALIGN, "IP_byte_align", devname);
|
||||
- velocity_set_bool_opt(&opts->flags, ValPktLen[index], VAL_PKT_LEN_DEF, VELOCITY_FLAGS_VAL_PKT_LEN, "ValPktLen", devname);
|
||||
velocity_set_int_opt((int *) &opts->spd_dpx, speed_duplex[index], MED_LNK_MIN, MED_LNK_MAX, MED_LNK_DEF, "Media link mode", devname);
|
||||
velocity_set_int_opt(&opts->wol_opts, wol_opts[index], WOL_OPT_MIN, WOL_OPT_MAX, WOL_OPT_DEF, "Wake On Lan options", devname);
|
||||
opts->numrx = (opts->numrx & ~3);
|
||||
@@ -2055,8 +2047,9 @@ static int velocity_receive_frame(struct velocity_info *vptr, int idx)
|
||||
int pkt_len = le16_to_cpu(rd->rdesc0.len) & 0x3fff;
|
||||
struct sk_buff *skb;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (rd->rdesc0.RSR & (RSR_STP | RSR_EDP)) {
|
||||
- VELOCITY_PRT(MSG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, KERN_ERR " %s : the received frame spans multiple RDs.\n", vptr->netdev->name);
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(rd->rdesc0.RSR & (RSR_STP | RSR_EDP | RSR_RL))) {
|
||||
+ if (rd->rdesc0.RSR & (RSR_STP | RSR_EDP))
|
||||
+ VELOCITY_PRT(MSG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, KERN_ERR " %s : the received frame spans multiple RDs.\n", vptr->netdev->name);
|
||||
stats->rx_length_errors++;
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2069,17 +2062,6 @@ static int velocity_receive_frame(struct velocity_info *vptr, int idx)
|
||||
dma_sync_single_for_cpu(vptr->dev, rd_info->skb_dma,
|
||||
vptr->rx.buf_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
|
||||
|
||||
- /*
|
||||
- * Drop frame not meeting IEEE 802.3
|
||||
- */
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (vptr->flags & VELOCITY_FLAGS_VAL_PKT_LEN) {
|
||||
- if (rd->rdesc0.RSR & RSR_RL) {
|
||||
- stats->rx_length_errors++;
|
||||
- return -EINVAL;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
velocity_rx_csum(rd, skb);
|
||||
|
||||
if (velocity_rx_copy(&skb, pkt_len, vptr) < 0) {
|
||||
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4e2bc423e0cef0a42f93d989c0980301df1bd462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 14:58:08 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] xen: Add RING_COPY_REQUEST()
|
||||
|
||||
Using RING_GET_REQUEST() on a shared ring is easy to use incorrectly
|
||||
(i.e., by not considering that the other end may alter the data in the
|
||||
shared ring while it is being inspected). Safe usage of a request
|
||||
generally requires taking a local copy.
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a RING_COPY_REQUEST() macro to use instead of
|
||||
RING_GET_REQUEST() and an open-coded memcpy(). This takes care of
|
||||
ensuring that the copy is done correctly regardless of any possible
|
||||
compiler optimizations.
|
||||
|
||||
Use a volatile source to prevent the compiler from reordering or
|
||||
omitting the copy.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA155.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
v2: Update about GCC and bitfields.
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/ring.h b/include/xen/interface/io/ring.h
|
||||
index 7d28aff..7dc685b 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/xen/interface/io/ring.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/xen/interface/io/ring.h
|
||||
@@ -181,6 +181,20 @@ struct __name##_back_ring { \
|
||||
#define RING_GET_REQUEST(_r, _idx) \
|
||||
(&((_r)->sring->ring[((_idx) & (RING_SIZE(_r) - 1))].req))
|
||||
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Get a local copy of a request.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Use this in preference to RING_GET_REQUEST() so all processing is
|
||||
+ * done on a local copy that cannot be modified by the other end.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Note that https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145 may cause this
|
||||
+ * to be ineffective where _req is a struct which consists of only bitfields.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+#define RING_COPY_REQUEST(_r, _idx, _req) do { \
|
||||
+ /* Use volatile to force the copy into _req. */ \
|
||||
+ *(_req) = *(volatile typeof(_req))RING_GET_REQUEST(_r, _idx); \
|
||||
+} while (0)
|
||||
+
|
||||
#define RING_GET_RESPONSE(_r, _idx) \
|
||||
(&((_r)->sring->ring[((_idx) & (RING_SIZE(_r) - 1))].rsp))
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 100ac372a0e07ccc8c508c3884fa9020cfe08094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 15:16:01 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] xen-netback: don't use last request to determine minimum
|
||||
Tx credit
|
||||
|
||||
The last from guest transmitted request gives no indication about the
|
||||
minimum amount of credit that the guest might need to send a packet
|
||||
since the last packet might have been a small one.
|
||||
|
||||
Instead allow for the worst case 128 KiB packet.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA155.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 4 +---
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
|
||||
index e481f37..b683581 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
|
||||
@@ -679,9 +679,7 @@ static void tx_add_credit(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
|
||||
* Allow a burst big enough to transmit a jumbo packet of up to 128kB.
|
||||
* Otherwise the interface can seize up due to insufficient credit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- max_burst = RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->tx, queue->tx.req_cons)->size;
|
||||
- max_burst = min(max_burst, 131072UL);
|
||||
- max_burst = max(max_burst, queue->credit_bytes);
|
||||
+ max_burst = max(131072UL, queue->credit_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Take care that adding a new chunk of credit doesn't wrap to zero. */
|
||||
max_credit = queue->remaining_credit + queue->credit_bytes;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4127e9ccae0eda622421d21132846abdf74f66ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 15:17:06 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] xen-netback: use RING_COPY_REQUEST() throughout
|
||||
|
||||
Instead of open-coding memcpy()s and directly accessing Tx and Rx
|
||||
requests, use the new RING_COPY_REQUEST() that ensures the local copy
|
||||
is correct.
|
||||
|
||||
This is more than is strictly necessary for guest Rx requests since
|
||||
only the id and gref fields are used and it is harmless if the
|
||||
frontend modifies these.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA155.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 30 ++++++++++++++----------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
|
||||
index b683581..1049c34 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
|
||||
@@ -258,18 +258,18 @@ static struct xenvif_rx_meta *get_next_rx_buffer(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
|
||||
struct netrx_pending_operations *npo)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct xenvif_rx_meta *meta;
|
||||
- struct xen_netif_rx_request *req;
|
||||
+ struct xen_netif_rx_request req;
|
||||
|
||||
- req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->rx, queue->rx.req_cons++);
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->rx, queue->rx.req_cons++, &req);
|
||||
|
||||
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
|
||||
meta->gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_NONE;
|
||||
meta->gso_size = 0;
|
||||
meta->size = 0;
|
||||
- meta->id = req->id;
|
||||
+ meta->id = req.id;
|
||||
|
||||
npo->copy_off = 0;
|
||||
- npo->copy_gref = req->gref;
|
||||
+ npo->copy_gref = req.gref;
|
||||
|
||||
return meta;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct xenvif *vif = netdev_priv(skb->dev);
|
||||
int nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
- struct xen_netif_rx_request *req;
|
||||
+ struct xen_netif_rx_request req;
|
||||
struct xenvif_rx_meta *meta;
|
||||
unsigned char *data;
|
||||
int head = 1;
|
||||
@@ -443,15 +443,15 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set up a GSO prefix descriptor, if necessary */
|
||||
if ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
|
||||
- req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->rx, queue->rx.req_cons++);
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->rx, queue->rx.req_cons++, &req);
|
||||
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
|
||||
meta->gso_type = gso_type;
|
||||
meta->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
|
||||
meta->size = 0;
|
||||
- meta->id = req->id;
|
||||
+ meta->id = req.id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->rx, queue->rx.req_cons++);
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->rx, queue->rx.req_cons++, &req);
|
||||
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_mask) {
|
||||
@@ -463,9 +463,9 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
meta->size = 0;
|
||||
- meta->id = req->id;
|
||||
+ meta->id = req.id;
|
||||
npo->copy_off = 0;
|
||||
- npo->copy_gref = req->gref;
|
||||
+ npo->copy_gref = req.gref;
|
||||
|
||||
data = skb->data;
|
||||
while (data < skb_tail_pointer(skb)) {
|
||||
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static void xenvif_tx_err(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
|
||||
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->response_lock, flags);
|
||||
if (cons == end)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
- txp = RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->tx, cons++);
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->tx, cons++, txp);
|
||||
} while (1);
|
||||
queue->tx.req_cons = cons;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -776,8 +776,7 @@ static int xenvif_count_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
|
||||
if (drop_err)
|
||||
txp = &dropped_tx;
|
||||
|
||||
- memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->tx, cons + slots),
|
||||
- sizeof(*txp));
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->tx, cons + slots, txp);
|
||||
|
||||
/* If the guest submitted a frame >= 64 KiB then
|
||||
* first->size overflowed and following slots will
|
||||
@@ -1110,8 +1109,7 @@ static int xenvif_get_extras(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
|
||||
return -EBADR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- memcpy(&extra, RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->tx, cons),
|
||||
- sizeof(extra));
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->tx, cons, &extra);
|
||||
if (unlikely(!extra.type ||
|
||||
extra.type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
|
||||
queue->tx.req_cons = ++cons;
|
||||
@@ -1320,7 +1318,7 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
|
||||
|
||||
idx = queue->tx.req_cons;
|
||||
rmb(); /* Ensure that we see the request before we copy it. */
|
||||
- memcpy(&txreq, RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->tx, idx), sizeof(txreq));
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&queue->tx, idx, &txreq);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Credit-based scheduling. */
|
||||
if (txreq.size > queue->remaining_credit &&
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 084b8c2e77f1ac07e4a3a121ff957c49a9379385 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 16:34:09 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] xen-blkback: only read request operation from shared ring
|
||||
once
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
A compiler may load a switch statement value multiple times, which could
|
||||
be bad when the value is in memory shared with the frontend.
|
||||
|
||||
When converting a non-native request to a native one, ensure that
|
||||
src->operation is only loaded once by using READ_ONCE().
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA155.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/block/xen-blkback/common.h | 8 ++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/common.h b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/common.h
|
||||
index 68e87a0..c929ae2 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/common.h
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/common.h
|
||||
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static inline void blkif_get_x86_32_req(struct blkif_request *dst,
|
||||
struct blkif_x86_32_request *src)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i, n = BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST, j;
|
||||
- dst->operation = src->operation;
|
||||
- switch (src->operation) {
|
||||
+ dst->operation = READ_ONCE(src->operation);
|
||||
+ switch (dst->operation) {
|
||||
case BLKIF_OP_READ:
|
||||
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE:
|
||||
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER:
|
||||
@@ -456,8 +456,8 @@ static inline void blkif_get_x86_64_req(struct blkif_request *dst,
|
||||
struct blkif_x86_64_request *src)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i, n = BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST, j;
|
||||
- dst->operation = src->operation;
|
||||
- switch (src->operation) {
|
||||
+ dst->operation = READ_ONCE(src->operation);
|
||||
+ switch (dst->operation) {
|
||||
case BLKIF_OP_READ:
|
||||
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE:
|
||||
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER:
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 89739c14c72e5c1626a5cd5e09cbb2efeaadb6d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 18:02:32 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] xen-scsiback: safely copy requests
|
||||
|
||||
The copy of the ring request was lacking a following barrier(),
|
||||
potentially allowing the compiler to optimize the copy away.
|
||||
|
||||
Use RING_COPY_REQUEST() to ensure the request is copied to local
|
||||
memory.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA155.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
|
||||
index 43bcae8..ad4eb10 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
|
||||
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static int scsiback_do_cmd_fn(struct vscsibk_info *info)
|
||||
if (!pending_req)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
- ring_req = *RING_GET_REQUEST(ring, rc);
|
||||
+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(ring, rc, &ring_req);
|
||||
ring->req_cons = ++rc;
|
||||
|
||||
err = prepare_pending_reqs(info, &ring_req, pending_req);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From d52f00960c1070c683809faddd35a2223e2b8a6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 16:40:43 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] xen-blkback: read from indirect descriptors only once
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
Since indirect descriptors are in memory shared with the frontend, the
|
||||
frontend could alter the first_sect and last_sect values after they have
|
||||
been validated but before they are recorded in the request. This may
|
||||
result in I/O requests that overflow the foreign page, possibly
|
||||
overwriting local pages when the I/O request is executed.
|
||||
|
||||
When parsing indirect descriptors, only read first_sect and last_sect
|
||||
once.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA155.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
----
|
||||
v2: This is against v4.3
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 12 +++++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
|
||||
index 6a685ae..f2e7a38 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
|
||||
@@ -950,6 +950,8 @@ static int xen_blkbk_parse_indirect(struct blkif_request *req,
|
||||
goto unmap;
|
||||
|
||||
for (n = 0, i = 0; n < nseg; n++) {
|
||||
+ uint8_t first_sect, last_sect;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if ((n % SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME) == 0) {
|
||||
/* Map indirect segments */
|
||||
if (segments)
|
||||
@@ -958,14 +960,14 @@ static int xen_blkbk_parse_indirect(struct blkif_request *req,
|
||||
}
|
||||
i = n % SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME;
|
||||
pending_req->segments[n]->gref = segments[i].gref;
|
||||
- seg[n].nsec = segments[i].last_sect -
|
||||
- segments[i].first_sect + 1;
|
||||
- seg[n].offset = (segments[i].first_sect << 9);
|
||||
- if ((segments[i].last_sect >= (PAGE_SIZE >> 9)) ||
|
||||
- (segments[i].last_sect < segments[i].first_sect)) {
|
||||
+ first_sect = READ_ONCE(segments[i].first_sect);
|
||||
+ last_sect = READ_ONCE(segments[i].last_sect);
|
||||
+ if (last_sect >= (PAGE_SIZE >> 9) || last_sect < first_sect) {
|
||||
rc = -EINVAL;
|
||||
goto unmap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ seg[n].nsec = last_sect - first_sect + 1;
|
||||
+ seg[n].offset = first_sect << 9;
|
||||
preq->nr_sects += seg[n].nsec;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From e3de4a44cfe196e162ddeffd6379e5c4e75ff1d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2015 11:08:22 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH v2 XSA157 1/5] xen/pciback: Return error on
|
||||
XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi when device has MSI or MSI-X enabled
|
||||
|
||||
The guest sequence of:
|
||||
|
||||
a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
|
||||
b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
|
||||
c) XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi
|
||||
|
||||
results in hitting an BUG_ON condition in the msi.c code.
|
||||
|
||||
The MSI code uses an dev->msi_list to which it adds MSI entries.
|
||||
Under the above conditions an BUG_ON() can be hit. The device
|
||||
passed in the guest MUST have MSI capability.
|
||||
|
||||
The a) adds the entry to the dev->msi_list and sets msi_enabled.
|
||||
The b) adds a second entry but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry)
|
||||
and deletes all of the entries from msi_list and returns (with msi_enabled
|
||||
is still set). c) pci_disable_msi passes the msi_enabled checks and hits:
|
||||
|
||||
BUG_ON(list_empty(dev_to_msi_list(&dev->dev)));
|
||||
|
||||
and blows up.
|
||||
|
||||
The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi to guard
|
||||
against that. The check for msix_enabled is not stricly neccessary.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA-157.
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 7 ++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
index c4a0666..5ce573a 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
@@ -144,7 +144,12 @@ int xen_pcibk_enable_msi(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
|
||||
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
|
||||
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: enable MSI\n", pci_name(dev));
|
||||
|
||||
- status = pci_enable_msi(dev);
|
||||
+ if (dev->msi_enabled)
|
||||
+ status = -EALREADY;
|
||||
+ else if (dev->msix_enabled)
|
||||
+ status = -ENXIO;
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ status = pci_enable_msi(dev);
|
||||
|
||||
if (status) {
|
||||
pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: error enabling MSI for guest %u: err %d\n",
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From aa48314c60da1035a8e6cc05bec12838a074de98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2015 17:24:08 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH v2 XSA157 3/5] xen/pciback: Do not install an IRQ handler for
|
||||
MSI interrupts.
|
||||
|
||||
Otherwise an guest can subvert the generic MSI code to trigger
|
||||
an BUG_ON condition during MSI interrupt freeing:
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < entry->nvec_used; i++)
|
||||
BUG_ON(irq_has_action(entry->irq + i));
|
||||
|
||||
Xen PCI backed installs an IRQ handler (request_irq) for
|
||||
the dev->irq whenever the guest writes PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
|
||||
(or PCI_COMMAND_IO) to the PCI_COMMAND register. This is
|
||||
done in case the device has legacy interrupts the GSI line
|
||||
is shared by the backend devices.
|
||||
|
||||
To subvert the backend the guest needs to make the backend
|
||||
to change the dev->irq from the GSI to the MSI interrupt line,
|
||||
make the backend allocate an interrupt handler, and then command
|
||||
the backend to free the MSI interrupt and hit the BUG_ON.
|
||||
|
||||
Since the backend only calls 'request_irq' when the guest
|
||||
writes to the PCI_COMMAND register the guest needs to call
|
||||
XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi before any other operation. This will
|
||||
cause the generic MSI code to setup an MSI entry and
|
||||
populate dev->irq with the new PIRQ value.
|
||||
|
||||
Then the guest can write to PCI_COMMAND PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
|
||||
and cause the backend to setup an IRQ handler for dev->irq
|
||||
(which instead of the GSI value has the MSI pirq). See
|
||||
'xen_pcibk_control_isr'.
|
||||
|
||||
Then the guest disables the MSI: XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi
|
||||
which ends up triggering the BUG_ON condition in 'free_msi_irqs'
|
||||
as there is an IRQ handler for the entry->irq (dev->irq).
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this cannot be done using MSI-X as the generic
|
||||
code does not over-write dev->irq with the MSI-X PIRQ values.
|
||||
|
||||
The patch inhibits setting up the IRQ handler if MSI or
|
||||
MSI-X (for symmetry reasons) code had been called successfully.
|
||||
|
||||
P.S.
|
||||
Xen PCIBack when it sets up the device for the guest consumption
|
||||
ends up writting 0 to the PCI_COMMAND (see xen_pcibk_reset_device).
|
||||
XSA-120 addendum patch removed that - however when upstreaming said
|
||||
addendum we found that it caused issues with qemu upstream. That
|
||||
has now been fixed in qemu upstream.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA-157
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
index a107928..5bb76c0 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ static void xen_pcibk_control_isr(struct pci_dev *dev, int reset)
|
||||
enable ? "enable" : "disable");
|
||||
|
||||
if (enable) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The MSI or MSI-X should not have an IRQ handler. Otherwise
|
||||
+ * if the guest terminates we BUG_ON in free_msi_irqs.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (dev->msi_enabled || dev->msix_enabled)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+
|
||||
rc = request_irq(dev_data->irq,
|
||||
xen_pcibk_guest_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED,
|
||||
dev_data->irq_name, dev);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 59a403750d3796b45376041a4843fcde436ae37e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2015 10:49:47 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH v2 XSA157 4/5] xen/pciback: For XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x]
|
||||
only disable if device has MSI(X) enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
Otherwise just continue on, returning the same values as
|
||||
previously (return of 0, and op->result has the PIRQ value).
|
||||
|
||||
This does not change the behavior of XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x].
|
||||
|
||||
The pci_disable_msi or pci_disable_msix have the checks for
|
||||
msi_enabled or msix_enabled so they will error out immediately.
|
||||
|
||||
However the guest can still call these operations and cause
|
||||
us to disable the 'ack_intr'. That means the backend IRQ handler
|
||||
for the legacy interrupt will not respond to interrupts anymore.
|
||||
|
||||
This will lead to (if the device is causing an interrupt storm)
|
||||
for the Linux generic code to disable the interrupt line.
|
||||
|
||||
Naturally this will only happen if the device in question
|
||||
is plugged in on the motherboard on shared level interrupt GSI.
|
||||
|
||||
This is part of XSA-157
|
||||
|
||||
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
index 5bb76c0..648c09c 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
|
||||
@@ -185,20 +185,23 @@ static
|
||||
int xen_pcibk_disable_msi(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
|
||||
struct pci_dev *dev, struct xen_pci_op *op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
|
||||
-
|
||||
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
|
||||
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: disable MSI\n",
|
||||
pci_name(dev));
|
||||
- pci_disable_msi(dev);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (dev->msi_enabled) {
|
||||
+ struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pci_disable_msi(dev);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
|
||||
+ if (dev_data)
|
||||
+ dev_data->ack_intr = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
op->value = dev->irq ? xen_pirq_from_irq(dev->irq) : 0;
|
||||
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
|
||||
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: MSI: %d\n", pci_name(dev),
|
||||
op->value);
|
||||
- dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
|
||||
- if (dev_data)
|
||||
- dev_data->ack_intr = 1;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -264,23 +267,27 @@ static
|
||||
int xen_pcibk_disable_msix(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
|
||||
struct pci_dev *dev, struct xen_pci_op *op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
|
||||
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
|
||||
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: disable MSI-X\n",
|
||||
pci_name(dev));
|
||||
- pci_disable_msix(dev);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (dev->msix_enabled) {
|
||||
+ struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pci_disable_msix(dev);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
|
||||
+ if (dev_data)
|
||||
+ dev_data->ack_intr = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* SR-IOV devices (which don't have any legacy IRQ) have
|
||||
* an undefined IRQ value of zero.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
op->value = dev->irq ? xen_pirq_from_irq(dev->irq) : 0;
|
||||
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
|
||||
- printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: MSI-X: %d\n", pci_name(dev),
|
||||
- op->value);
|
||||
- dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
|
||||
- if (dev_data)
|
||||
- dev_data->ack_intr = 1;
|
||||
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: MSI-X: %d\n",
|
||||
+ pci_name(dev), op->value);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user