main/libksba: backport cve fixes

main/libksba/APKBUILD

@@ -2,15 +2,22 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=libksba
 pkgver=1.5.1
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Libksba is a CMS and X.509 access library"
 url="https://www.gnupg.org/software/libksba/index.html"
 arch="all"
 license="GPL-2.0-or-later or GPL-3.0-or-later"
 makedepends="libgpg-error-dev"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc"
-source="https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libksba/libksba-$pkgver.tar.bz2"
+source="https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libksba/libksba-$pkgver.tar.bz2
+	CVE-2022-3515.patch
+	CVE-2022-47629.patch
+	"
 
+# secfixes:
+#   1.5.1-r1:
+#     - CVE-2022-3515
+#     - CVE-2022-47629
 
 build() {
 	./configure \
@@ -28,4 +35,8 @@ package() {
 	make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
 }
 
-sha512sums="156fe6a36daa7b11ce580366ab36a5fceda253413f0057ace791e4f028fd3158a70a3f6ba1d0c824fafee4420d1076864dbd0911606fb65e14c8b2332b6cc92b  libksba-1.5.1.tar.bz2"
+sha512sums="
+156fe6a36daa7b11ce580366ab36a5fceda253413f0057ace791e4f028fd3158a70a3f6ba1d0c824fafee4420d1076864dbd0911606fb65e14c8b2332b6cc92b  libksba-1.5.1.tar.bz2
+87ebe25efa8f5e7c9375749cd38499084a622b09df585da565ef761dfd76de1de7898214f8f8bcbfa94865a96dccd5fd67da98073fb93c53b7926481d1adf874  CVE-2022-3515.patch
+107755df2354ed738330e6f3a6be60c87afe8607f6d125863688e053255ef12b194c0303b818e51ea7b9acf1d967435b4bfcd4a37ff53358de0902c959488b82  CVE-2022-47629.patch
+"

main/libksba/CVE-2022-3515.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Patch-Source:https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commitdiff;h=4b7d9cd4a018898d7714ce06f3faf2626c14582b;hp=e11e17620189e13b7347139ed5a1f1a76b1f89a7
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 12:19:06 +0000 (+0200)
+Subject: Detect a possible overflow directly in the TLV parser.
+X-Git-Tag: libksba-1.6.2~1
+X-Git-Url: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=4b7d9cd4a018898d7714ce06f3faf2626c14582b;hp=e11e17620189e13b7347139ed5a1f1a76b1f89a7
+
+Detect a possible overflow directly in the TLV parser.
+
+* src/ber-help.c (_ksba_ber_read_tl): Check for overflow of a commonly
+used sum.
+--
+
+It is quite common to have checks like
+
+    if (ti.nhdr + ti.length >= DIM(tmpbuf))
+       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+
+This patch detects possible integer overflows immmediately when
+creating the TI object.
+
+Reported-by: ZDI-CAN-18927, ZDI-CAN-18928, ZDI-CAN-18929
+---
+
+diff --git a/src/ber-help.c b/src/ber-help.c
+index 81c31ed..56efb6a 100644
+--- a/src/ber-help.c
++++ b/src/ber-help.c
+@@ -182,6 +182,12 @@ _ksba_ber_read_tl (ksba_reader_t reader, struct tag_info *ti)
+       ti->length = len;
+     }
+ 
++  if (ti->length > ti->nhdr && (ti->nhdr + ti->length) < ti->length)
++    {
++      ti->err_string = "header+length would overflow";
++      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOVERFLOW);
++    }
++
+   /* Without this kludge some example certs can't be parsed */
+   if (ti->class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL && !ti->tag)
+     ti->length = 0;

main/libksba/CVE-2022-47629.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Patch-Source: https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commitdiff;h=f61a5ea4e0f6a80fd4b28ef0174bee77793cf070;hp=ff8c0e857c2f3380a13be19c67b117337ed0ffb6
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 15:36:46 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fix an integer overflow in the CRL signature parser.
+X-Git-Tag: libksba-1.6.3~1
+X-Git-Url: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=f61a5ea4e0f6a80fd4b28ef0174bee77793cf070;hp=ff8c0e857c2f3380a13be19c67b117337ed0ffb6
+
+Fix an integer overflow in the CRL signature parser.
+
+* src/crl.c (parse_signature): N+N2 now checked for overflow.
+
+* src/ocsp.c (parse_response_extensions): Do not accept too large
+values.
+(parse_single_extensions): Ditto.
+--
+
+The second patch is an extra safegourd not related to the reported
+bug.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 6284
+Reported-by: Joseph Surin, elttam
+---
+
+diff --git a/src/crl.c b/src/crl.c
+index 9f71c85..2e6ca29 100644
+--- a/src/crl.c
++++ b/src/crl.c
+@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ parse_signature (ksba_crl_t crl)
+          && !ti.is_constructed) )
+     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL_OBJ);
+   n2 = ti.nhdr + ti.length;
+-  if (n + n2 >= DIM(tmpbuf))
++  if (n + n2 >= DIM(tmpbuf) || (n + n2) < n)
+     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+   memcpy (tmpbuf+n, ti.buf, ti.nhdr);
+   err = read_buffer (crl->reader, tmpbuf+n+ti.nhdr, ti.length);
+diff --git a/src/ocsp.c b/src/ocsp.c
+index d4cba04..657d15f 100644
+--- a/src/ocsp.c
++++ b/src/ocsp.c
+@@ -721,6 +721,12 @@ parse_response_extensions (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp,
+               || memcmp (ocsp->nonce, data, ti.length))
+             ocsp->bad_nonce = 1;
+         }
++      if (ti.length > (1<<24))
++        {
++          /* Bail out on much too large objects.  */
++          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
++          goto leave;
++        }
+       ex = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ex + strlen (oid) + ti.length);
+       if (!ex)
+         {
+@@ -788,6 +794,12 @@ parse_single_extensions (struct ocsp_reqitem_s *ri,
+       err = parse_octet_string (&data, &datalen, &ti);
+       if (err)
+         goto leave;
++      if (ti.length > (1<<24))
++        {
++          /* Bail out on much too large objects.  */
++          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
++          goto leave;
++        }
+       ex = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ex + strlen (oid) + ti.length);
+       if (!ex)
+         {